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YOSOBURO TAKEKOSHI

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS
OF THE
HISTORY OF THE CIVILIZATION OF
JAPAN

VOLUME TWO

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CHAPTER XXXIX

POWER OF TOKUGAWA FAMILY ESTABLISHED

THE INFANT IEMITSU SOLD TO A PASSER-BY.—Satoko, the wife of Hidetada, the second Tokugawa Shogun, lost her first son as an infant, and the father and mother were afraid that the second son, when born, might share the same fate; and believing in a curious superstition that if a newly born son be sold to a stranger, and then be purchased back even directly afterwards, the child will have a very long life, when Iemitsu was born, by his father's orders his maids took him down to the Tokiwa Bridge, just outside Edo Castle. There they offered to sell the child to a passer-by, who agreed to take him, and handed over 1 fun as the price. The baby was put into his arms, and he fondly embraced it; but when told that the child was the Shogun's heir, he at once kneeled down, holding up the child most reverently in both hands and paying it profound respect. He was, he said, Yamada Masayo, one of the retainers of the Shogun. The women, in great delight, took him to the castle, where he was granted an audience with the Shogun's wife and given costly gifts. The child afterwards became the third Tokugawa Shogun.

IEMITSU OF A CONCEITED NATURE.—Historians, mostly in the Tokugawa Age, pay too much tribute to the third Shogun, Iemitsu. They unite in agreeing that he ranks next to Iyeyasu among all the Tokugawa rulers, and portray him as a Shogun with commanding air, lofty spirits, and noble and great mind; but, in fact, he was not such a great character, and was merely a conceited and unruly young man. When Iemitsu became the Shogun, the Tokugawa Dynasty had already passed three generations, and established itself so firmly that no daimyo dared to raise a finger, but trembled before the Shogun and his counsellors. No feudal lord was bold enough to come into direct contact with the Shogun, and the distance between him and the feudal nobility became sharply marked. In consequence the third Shogun was by degrees idolized into a great monarch, with the accompanying result that all his words and actions received a favourable interpretation. There is no other ground for placing him next to Iyeyasu. Sakai Tadayo was the first great lord in the Shogunate Cabinet, equal in rank and position to the Premier of to-day, and he dared to say whatever he thought right before Iemitsu. For this reason, the Shogun disliked Tadayo. Once when the third Shogun was on a progress with his train, he passed a magnificent mansion, and asked his attendants whose it was. When told that it was Sakai's, he knitted his brows and turned his face away. Later, on the autumn holiday, when Sakai went directly to the Shogun's presence to report about state affairs, Iemitsu accused him of arrogance in presuming to come direct to his presence without asking for an audience through the attendant lord. Thereafter, he treated the Premier more and more coldly, until he finally deprived him of his office. The reign of Iemitsu was very peaceful and flourishing, and the people, having quite forgotten the sanguinary age of wars and battles about a generation ago, became addicted to luxury and led very gay lives. The Shogun himself was a great dandy, and very fond of dancing. It is said he used to have himself gaily dressed, his face made up, and his hair dressed with care, and then seat himself between two mirrors and admire his own reflection. One of his grand tutors, Aoyama Tadatoshi, who had served from the time of Iyeyasu and was a veteran of many battles, and ready to sacrifice his life any time for the Tokugawa family, was much grieved over the effeminacy of the third Shogun; and one day, when he found him preening himself before his mirrors, his grief changed to anger, and after severely admonishing Iemitsu he threw the mirrors down. Iemitsu, without reflecting on the loyal faith of his old tutor, was greatly exasperated with Aoyama Tadatoshi, ordered him to retire and never to come again into his presence, and shortly afterwards deprived him of his office. The age was very prosperous and peaceful, and there were not many blunders made in the administration; but this was no thanks to Iemitsu, but is simply due to the fact that the three lords Sakai Tadayo, Doi Toshikatsu, and Aoyama Tadatoshi, all well experienced and prudent, served Iemitsu so faithfully and loyally that they took upon themselves all the responsibilities with regard to the administrative affairs, and gave all the credit to this conceited but untalented Shogun.

HONDA MASANOBU DECLINED THE FAVOUR OF A GREAT FIEF.—Twenty-three years had passed from Sekigahara to the succession of Iemitsu. The old war veterans and grizzled warriors had mostly passed away, and the men now holding important positions in the administration were of a younger generation, to whom Sekigahara was only an historical fact; and even the old adherents of Iyeyasu, who rose to high positions after Sekigahara, were not soldiers. In a busy age, when the struggle for existence is keen, twenty years is not necessarily a long time, but, in an age tranquil and monotonous, it seems very long. During the twenty years after Sekigahara, the condition of Japan was entirely changed, not so much in the progress of the country itself, as that the life of the men at the political and social centre was no longer the hard and trying life led on a campaign, but one of tranquil monotony. The energy of the old fighters declined, and with their deaths, following one after another, the environment was entirely changed and a new state of things appeared, much to the disgust of the survivors of Sekigahara and Osaka, who saw their deeds forgotten in the little credit given to military prowess, and felt that, what they had sowed, other men had reaped. Honda Masanobu had never been a fighter, but only served Iyeyasu as his arch-plotter, and made himself so necessary that he became something like chief councillor to the Shogun, to the ill-suppressed annoyance of the old soldiers in whose eyes nothing was achievement but to besiege and capture castles. However, Masanobu not only made himself essential to the second Shogun also, but his son Masazumi had the same important position, as he served Iyeyasu in Shidzuoka as his executive lord. Masanobu had always reckoned with the suspicious nature of Iyeyasu, and took advantage of it to slander and disgrace his rivals; while, for his own part, he was prudent enough, even in the heyday of his power, to be content with a small fief of 20,000 koku. Other men who had served Iyeyasu as long as he were great feudal lords with revenues up to 700,000 koku, at the least 200,000 koku; but Masanobu consistently declined any increase, and even advised Iyeyasu, if he contemplated an increase, to divide it among brave and young soldiers. The Shogun, in consequence, came to think more and more highly of him, and put in him more and more confidence. After the death of Iyeyasu, the second Shogun, Hidetada, continued his favour, while Masanobu maintained his policy of refusing an increase in his fief. The Shogun expressed surprise that with such a small revenue as 20,000 koku he could maintain his dignity and support several hundred retainers, and Masanobu explained that though his fief was small his office was important, that from time to time he received rich presents from other feudal lords, and could therefore manage without any increase in his fief. He thereupon produced a small pot full of gold, saying it had been given him by Lord Kuroda, and Hidetada laughingly envied him his wealth. It is idle to ascribe Masanobu's moderation to any virtue in his character. He knew that talented men with large revenues were simply courting downfall at the hands of Iyeyasu, and modelling himself on the great Chinese sage, Choryo—who declined the highest position in the state and a large fief and retired to a hermitage—he, too, declined the offers of Iyeyasu and Hidetada, and secured his life in a safe anchorage.

Utsunomiya Strife.—Honda Masanobu's son did not profit by the cautious sagacity of his father, and receiving larger and larger fiefs, until he was given 155,000 koku as the lord of Utsunomiya Castle in Shimotsuke Province, he suffered the fate his sire had so sagaciously avoided, and ended his days in misery. In February 1622 the second Shogun, Hidetada, held the ceremony of the seventh year anniversary of his father's death, and was to stay overnight in the Utsunomiya Castle on his way from Nikko to Edo. Honda Masazumi, being very anxious to give the Shogun as splendid a reception as he could, repaired and redecorated his castle in the most gorgeous style, putting on the work all his retainers high and low. Among them there were about one hundred Negoro foot soldiers of low rank, who came originally from Negoro in Kii, and when the baron ordered these Negoro soldiers to work for the repair and decoration of the castle, they said that they were attached to Lord Honda by the Shogun's orders to do the work of soldiers, and it was no part of their duty to labour inside the castle, which they must decline to do. In high exasperation, Masazumi seized and executed them all. His predecessor at Utsunomiya, Okudaira Tadamasa, had been made lord of Koga Castle in Shimoosa, and his mother, being the sister of the second Shogun; and a haughty and strong-minded woman, paid no heed to the laws and regulations issued by the Shogunate, feeling that she could override her younger brother, and bade the retainers take with them to Koga everything they could, even fences, gates, sliding-doors, bamboos, and plants out of the garden. Masazumi, on the ground of the regulation issued by the Shogunate that no one should cut down bamboos and trees and take them away when transferred by the Shogun's order from one place to another, confiscated at the barrier, which he had just set up at the boundary of his territory, everything that contravened the law. The lady was intensely angry, and waited for a chance to revenge herself. This chance now seemed to have come, and she wrote to Hidetada that Masazumi was plotting rebellion. The inner structure of his castle was a secret to preserve which he had massacred a hundred Negoro men, and Hidetada would be well advised not to enter it. The Shogun followed his sister's counsel, and went direct to Edo without stopping at Utsunomiya. Arrived in Edo, he issued an order transferring Honda to Yamagata in Dewa, and later deposed him from this lordship, giving him a fief of only 1,000 koku. Finally, he was moved to Yokote in Dewa, where he died at the age of seventy-three. Such was the end of Honda Masazumi, who was once so powerful as the executive lord direct under Iyeyasu that all the feudal lords trembled at his frown.

Luxurious Manners and Customs prevail.—The most notable phenomenon at this time was the advancement of the standard of living. Under the first Tokugawa Shogun, everything was simple, and the only pleasure of the all-powerful Iyeyasu was hawking, in which he indulged as a well-to-do old villager might, with only a few attendants, all in simple dress. Once, when someone presented to Iyeyasu an article decorated with gold, he was angry, and said that gold was the most precious thing in the world and indispensably necessary in time of war, so it should never be used for such trifling. But within twenty years after Iyeyasu, all the articles in the Shogun's palace were decorated with gold, and, when Lord Gamo Tadasato asked Iemitsu to favour him with a visit to his mansion, he built a gate, the Onarimon (memorial gate of the Shogun's favour in coming to his mansion), the columns of which were inlaid with wistarias in gold, and the doors ornamented with gold images of saints and sages. Its beauty and workmanship were so remarkable that it became one of the sights of the town. When the same Shogun honoured Maeda Toshitsune, Daimyo of Kaga, with a visit in Edo, his gifts were as follows: To Toshitsune, a sword, a short sword, 3,000 large silver coins, 300 silk suits, 20 quilts, 30 rolls of woollen cloth; to the eldest son, Mitsutaka, a sword made by Sanenaga, a shorter sword, 1,000 large silver coins, 100 silk suits; to relatives and retainers, many silver coins and silk clothes. Toshitsune, in turn, presented to the Shogun swords and short swords, 1 harnessed horse, 300 large gold coins, 100 silk suits, 500 tan of Kaga silk, 2,000 bundles of cotton, 60 yards of crimson blankets; while from Mitsutaka came swords, 1 harnessed horse, 500 large silver coins, 50 silk suits, and 1,000 bundles of cotton, together with many valuable presents from the relatives and chief retainers. Similar costly presents were exchanged between the Shogun and Lord Shimazu, but the Satsuma prince added a suit of armour on the helmet of which was a lofty figure of solid gold. Clothing, too, became very gorgeous, and when Iemitsu dined with Daté Masamuné, not only did the Shogun wear the most sumptuous clothes, but Daté too, so that smart and gay clothing acquired the name of Daté Moyo (style). Daté was very ambitious and crafty, and did not care a fig for fine clothes; but to avert the suspicion of the Shogun and to keep his family safe he pretended to be an exquisite and dandy. It is on record that at a dinner given by Iemitsu, Daté drank too much and fell asleep in his place. In his sleep the Shogun's attendants unsheathed his sword and found it was only a wooden one, which greatly delighted Iemitsu and made him treat Masamuné more and more kindly. Amid this peace and prosperity, the bloodshed of a generation ago faded from men's memories, and the warlike spirit of the nation melted away like snow on a spring day. Ii Naotaka, the lord of Hikone Castle, was one of the surviving old warriors very much dissatisfied with this new state of things, and though all the other feudal lords used to entertain the Shogun with song and dance, Ii

Naotaka never would; and one day when the Shogun Iemitsu pressed him for the entertainment, Naotaka answered that there was none among his retainers who could sing even the smallest ditty. Matsudaira Nobutsuna, the Shogun's equerry, told Ii Naotaka that it was His Highness's orders to summon the young men related to him and force them to dance, whereupon the old man himself stood up, and, wearing a poppy-coloured war-cloak and flourishing a huge cudgel, which reminded everyone of his old manner when he was about to start for the Sekigahara campaign, he danced a queer breakdown, meaning thus to warn the Shogun and his lords never to forget the time of war and due preparation for it. He was not successful, and all his efforts to turn men's minds to the former warlike disposition were in vain.

KANEIJI TEMPLE AT UYENO.—In 1625, when Iemitsu became Shogun, he founded the great Kaneiji Temple at Edo. In the reign of the Emperor Kanmu, about one thousand years before, the saint Denkyo had founded the great Yenryakuji Temple on Mount Hiei, to enshrine the guardian deities of the Imperial House; and following this precedent, Archbishop Tenkai suggested to the Tokugawa family to found the Kaneiji Temple in Edo, to enshrine their guardian deities. Iemitsu fell in with this idea and subscribed 50,000 ryo of silver for the construction of the temple, almost all the feudal lords also making due contribution. When the Kaneiji was completed in 1638, at the request of Edo, Prince Morizumi, the second son of the Emperor Gomizuno, condescended to accept office as successor to Archbishop Tenkai.

KONJUIN SODEN, THE BUDDHIST PRIEST, BRINGS ABOUT THE ABDICATION OF THE EMPEROR.—By this time the general trend of politics was entirely changed, and the great feudal lords were not among the important political elements among which were now counted the Imperial Court and Court nobles, the Buddhist Temples, and the people at large. In the Shogunate Cabinet the old warriors and adherents of the Tokugawa family, who raised themselves by brilliant military achievements during the time of the first and second Shoguns, came to be more and more neglected; and all the political affairs were managed by Archbishop Tenkai and two other Buddhist priests, Konjuin Soden and Shinryuin Bonshun, the Chinese scholar Hayashi Doshun, and Lady Kasuga, who was originally the nurse of Iemitsu and now the Keeper of the Inner Court, and the war veterans and old generals could only humbly obey this powerful junta. Konjuin Soden was the son of Lord Isshiki Hidekatsu, who studied the Buddhism of the Zenshu sect from his boyhood, and was once the chief priest in the Nanzenji Temple of Kyoto. Iyeyasu, hearing of his reputation, summoned him to ask his opinion with regard to religious affairs, and then, appointing him to take charge of the correspondence with the Governments of Siam, Annam, and others, he gradually began to take his opinion on politics too. When Iyeyasu became the actual ruler of Japan, he further appointed Soden to take charge of all the affairs regarding convents and nunneries, and that being a position equivalent to that of the Minister of Religion and Education in a modern Cabinet, his authority was so great that he was able to see the Shogun direct, and consult with him without any intermediary. His social standing, too, was equal to that of the great feudal lords, and Iemitsu himself once called on him at his Konji-in Temple, and Soden entertained the Shogun and his lords in attendance with the tea ceremony. Shortly after this, Soden became very active with regard to the Canon Laws to be settled between the Imperial Court in Kyoto and the Shogunate in Edo. In 1625 the Shogun Iemitsu and the ex-Shogun Hidetada proceeded to Kyoto, and the ceremony of audience passed off all right so far as it went; but Soden, who accompanied the Shogun, complained that the Canon Laws already settled between the Imperial Court and the Shogunate were often unobserved, and, after the ceremony of the audience was over, he demanded to see the Court nobles in charge of religious affairs. The Imperial Court had granted the title of saint to the grand Abbot of the Chion-in Temple, and to the priests of the Daitokuji Temples the privilege of wearing purple gowns, coupled with promotion to the order of elder priest. Not only was this, he said, against the canon law binding all the Buddhist churches, but also against the constitution of the Imperial Court; and after he returned to Edo, with the approval of the Shogunate, he demanded that the Imperial Court cancel the grants. Sanjo Sanemura, chief councillor of the Court, answered that in the case of an Imperial order once issued, nothing could stop or cancel it; but Soden was adamant, and insisted that the constitution of the Imperial Court and the Canon Laws were fixed at the time of Iyeyasu, and as they were all agreed to by the Imperial Court then they must be observed. The Regent and the nobles, finding themselves in this dilemma, were obliged to beg the Emperor to cancel the privileges in question, and His Majesty, saying that an Imperial order could not be rescinded unless the Emperor himself abdicated, gave up the throne to Princess Okiko, who was the eldest Imperial princess by the Empress, who was herself a daughter of the second Shogun. Edo sent to Kyoto, first, Lord Sakai Tadayo; second, Lord Doi Toshikatsu; and Priest Soden to consult with the Court nobles about the abdication, and dismissed Lord Chuin Michimura from his position of acting-minister, and appointed Hino Sukekatsu in his place, believing that the Emperor had been encouraged to believe in his divine prerogative by the argument of Chuin Michimura. Thus, after over one thousand years, Japan saw again a reigning empress as her sovereign, and it is mainly to be attributed to the fact that Priest Soden sturdily upheld the constitution settled by the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Heroic Emperor Gokomyo.—In 1634, in order to celebrate the Empress Myosho's accession to the throne, the Shogun Iemitsu proceeded at the head of 307,000 men to Kyoto to display his own power of Shogun, and strike awe into the Imperial Court of Kyoto, for he had heard that the Emperor Gomizuno had abdicated much against his own will, and there were widespread reports of his dissatisfaction. When the first and second Shoguns visited Kyoto, they did not bring more than 100,000 men, and at the report that Iemitsu was heading more than 300,000, the Imperial Court was so awestruck that the Court nobles stooped to flatter even the nameless soldiers under the Shogun in their eager efforts to preserve their safety. What was their agreeable surprise when Iemitsu, on meeting the ex-Emperor Gomizuno in Kyoto, raised the Imperial revenue from 7,000 koku to 10,000 koku. The new monarch being a female, all the state affairs were to be freely decided by the ex-Emperor Gomizuno, and, in fact, the Shogun was so complacent that Gomizuno succeeded in bringing it about that Empress Myosho abdicated in 1643, and his own son, Prince Tsugushito, ascended the throne. The new Emperor, Gokomyo, was the ablest monarch in the modern history of Japan, and in spite of being surrounded by the high priests of the five Buddhist temples, he despised Buddhism, saying that it was useless teaching for sovereigns and feudal lords, who, as heads of the state, should take up some useful teaching. In his opinion, Confucianism was a much more necessary study for rulers, but the old Chinese commentaries on Confucianism were too absolute, and new ones should be prepared. His lecturers on the Chinese classics objected that it was the tradition of the Imperial Court to study Confucianism from the old commentaries, to which the Emperor replied they might make a new start from his time. The Emperor also severely criticized Japanese poems (odes), and the famous old Court romance, *Genji Monogatari*. None of the great emperors and wise ministers before the Middle Ages, quoth he, cared about poetry. The decline of the Imperial power dated from the craze for it. As to the *Genji Monogatari*, it served only to corrupt the mind of people at large and to beget immorality. In his opinion, these two forms of Japanese literature were contemptible. It may be added that his father, the ex-Emperor Gomizuno, did not share his son's tastes or approve of his iconoclasm. With such insight, resolution, and originality, nothing the Emperor did was commonplace, and men in the Shogunate in Edo, reflecting on past history, were secretly on guard against his actions; and when he died of smallpox in 1654, there were whisperings that the physicians attending the Emperor had poisoned him on a hint from Edo. He was only twenty-two when he died, and was succeeded by Prince Yoshihito, the seventh son of the ex-Emperor Gomizuno, who was called Emperor Gosai-in.

Lady Kasuga, Iemitsu's Old Nurse.—As we have seen, the actual power of the Imperial Court had sunk so far that the word-chopping of a simple Buddhist priest brought about the abdication of an emperor; and similarly an event unparalleled in the history of Japan took place in this age, when an old maidservant in the Tokugawa family, who had, of course, no rank or office in the Imperial Court, was granted an audience by the Emperor. This woman was the so-called Lady Kasuga, who nursed the third Shogun, Iemitsu, as a child and served him ever after. Her real name was Fuku, and while she was the wife of Lord Inaba Masashige, finding that her husband secretly kept a concubine, by whom he had had a child, she stabbed the woman with a sword and fled to Tokyo. This was just the time when Iemitsu was born, and as a nurse was needed she was engaged for the post. The rest of her life passed in faithful service, and there are many stories about her self-sacrificing loyalty to Iemitsu, and also her extraordinary force of character, which enabled her to raise herself from a mere nurse to an influential position at the head of the Inner Court of Edo Castle, until all the regulations there were made by her. She was respected by all the nobles, and even took part in the political and administrative affairs of the Shogunate. In 1629, when the relations between the Imperial Court and Shogunate were strained by the Soden affair, and the Emperor was exasperated with the attitude of the Shogunate, this Lady Kasuga came up to Kyoto in order to observe the actual state of things, and, getting access to the Empress, who was the daughter of the Shogun Hidetada, through Her Majesty begged to be granted an audience with the Emperor. Of course, the Court objected to such an unprecedented proceeding, but she persisted until she was finally granted that honour, and the Court nobles in Kyoto sighed that the authority of the Imperial Court was so declined that a mere old maidservant was granted an audience with the Son of Heaven. A few years after, when the Christians at Shimabara, Hizen Province, revolted against the Shogunate, and plans were being drawn up to subdue the rebellion, the old warrior Okubo Hikozayemon said satirically, that if they would send to Shimabara Archbishop Tenkai and Lady Kasuga, the rebellion would soon be snuffed out. Of course, it was only his joke, but his words were a pointed comment on the political situation.

Oman-no-kata, Iemitsu's Favourite Lady.—Iemitsu had perverted tastes from his boyhood, and no liking for women, and though he early married the daughter of Takatsukasa Nobufusa, the Emperor's Regent, they were not happy, and he and his consort lived totally separate. The lady was not paid the respect due to the Shogun's consort, and the Inner Court, having no proper mistress, all the power there naturally fell in the hands of Lady Kasuga. Everything was under her thumb, and her power overflowed the Inner Court and brought her into close touch with politics and the administration. Aoyama Tadatoshi was deposed from power, and his fief of 50,000 koku was confiscated, because he remonstrated sharply with Iemitsu against the audacity of Lady Kasuga; and all the officials had to court her good will, for he asked her advice on everything and consulted her on all his plans. The story of her successor is curious. She was very anxious to wean the Shogun from his unnatural vices, and collected as her maids a number of beautiful women, hoping one might catch Iemitsu's fancy. While she was trying to pick one to do the work, it happened that the daughter of Rokujo Arizumi, a Court noble, newly appointed Abbess of the Keikoin Temple, came to Edo to thank the Shogun for the appointment and pay him her respects. The Shogun was greatly struck with her beauty and manners, and Kasuga, taking advantage of this, exhorted him not to allow her to return to her temple at once, but to keep her in Edo for a while. Thus returned to secular life, she was taken into the Inner Court and made the Shogun's mistress under the name Oman-no-kata, and completely won his heart. Lady Kasuga, fearing that she had gone too far, recommended other very beautiful women to share with Oman-no-kata the Shogun's love, but it was all in vain, and after the death of Lady Kasuga, Oman-no-kata succeeded to all her power and influence in the Inner Court of Edo Castle.

The Tokugawa's reactionary Foreign Policy.—As we have seen, the men at the executive political centre in the Shogunate were no longer those who had distinguished themselves, but men who had raised themselves by showing administrative talent, with general ability in politics, or were well versed in precedents and examples of administration. All departments of the Government were based on institutions, system, and convention, and everything was carried out in red-tape manner without flexibility. Some of the men in power did not understand the reason why and how the first Shogun set up conventions and established institutions, and pushed on obstinately with their policies, very often at great cost, as in the case of the exceedingly strict and severe treatment of the Catholics, which brought about the Catholic insurrection at Shimabara, Hizen, in 1637, and of their prohibition of the communication and intercourse with foreign countries which utterly checked Japanese expansion and commercial development. Oda Nobunaga had been a destroyer, and Hideyoshi more or less compromising, for he tried to placate the Buddhists, and made friends among the Court nobles and employed them as the instruments of his policy. It was only when he planned to display the power and dignity of Japan as a whole that he was bold and headlong in action. In the case of Iyeyasu, all was reactionary and conservative, especially in his foreign policy. Hideyoshi never lost a chance to extend the power and influence of Japan, even at the cost of some small blot on the national dignity. Iyeyasu never thought of extending the national power abroad, partly warned by Hideyoshi's failure in his foreign expedition, but chiefly because he always had an eye to the main chance; and his ambitions and plans were all concentrated upon one point, to keep the power of the Shogun as the actual ruler of Japan in the hands of the Tokugawa family as long as possible. Though he often granted interviews to the merchants from China, Portugal, and the Dutch Indies, it was simply because he was thinking of the profits to be derived from foreign trade, so that it is proper to say that the history of Japanese expansion and development abroad closed with the decline and fall of the Toyotomi family, and everything in politics and administration was coloured with conservative reaction with the advent of Iyeyasu and throughout the age of the Tokugawa Shoguns.

TOKUGAWA SHOGUNS WERE AFRAID OF THE RONINS.—On the 28th of August, 1623, when Iemitsu became Shogun, the two Siamese envoys and one interpreter were granted an audience with the Shogun in the Nijo Castle, and the interpreter, Kiya-Yazaemon, a well-known merchant trading in Siam and Cambodia, was also summoned. These envoys brought valuable presents of silks, spices, and so on, and also a letter from their king to the effect that he was just intending to chastise the chief of Cambodia for rebellion, but feared that the large number of Japanese merchants in Cambodia might join with the rebels and lose their lives. Would the Shogun order his subjects not to take any active part? At Iemitsu's orders, Abbot Soden wrote that the Siamese King had a right to chastise Cambodia, and that if our Japanese, thinking of their purses only, joined the rebel army, the King of Siam might use his own discretion as to how he dealt with them, kill or save, as he liked. The Shogun and his advisers had clearly no thought of protecting the rights and safety of Japanese merchants abroad, and were only anxious not to have any trouble with foreign countries, because they themselves were afraid of the ronin, or masterless soldiers, in Japan. In a natural state there should be no trouble in Japan, and what troubles there were, were always brought about by the ronins, which the Tokugawa knew by experience from the very start of their dynasty. For the same reason, Hideyoshi had confiscated swords and other arms kept in the houses of farmers, artisans, and merchants. Some of the ronins, cast upon the world after the fall of the Toyotomi family and their supporters, were worldly wise enough to serve other lords, but many stiff-necked ones would not, or could not, join another master, and these fellows, hiding either among the farmers, artisans, or merchants, were waiting for any chance that might arise. Many adventured abroad, and, especially in Osaka and Sakai, centres of intercourse with the south-western provinces and foreign countries, numbers were hanging about on their way to foreign lands. The Shogunate was well aware of all this, and desired to lessen the communications and intercourse with foreign countries, and to stifle the troubles begotten by these ronins, for which they thought it the best policy to abandon them in the Far South and North. Indeed, the Tokugawa dreaded these men like tigers, and set up the most elaborate machinery to suppress them. There were barrier offices in every province, and in Edo a guard-house called Tsujibansho in every street and at cross-roads. The gates were closed at night, and anyone wishing to pass had to give his name and answer many questions. In every quarter of the town was set up Gonin-gumi (five-men companies) who were responsible for any crime or misdemeanour in their district. Employment offices were made a monopoly, and anyone wanting employment had to get a card from the employment offices, without which it was illegal to employ him. Any ronin desiring to rent a house had to take the card of the guarantor to the office of the city magistrate, otherwise no house would be rented to him. These regulations were all set up because the Tokugawa Shogunate dreaded the ronin so much, and now these men began to push their way into foreign trade, some of them becoming purely merchants, while others volunteered as adventurers abroad. Considering, then, that even in Japan where they were watched they were a dangerous element, it was natural for the Shogunate to fear the plots they might hatch if they had strongholds in foreign lands where the laws and regulations of Japan could not reach. The Tokugawa, then, in whose opinion the long duration of their family and the safety of Japan were one and the same, were ready to sacrifice the lives, property, and all the interests of the 100,000 Japanese abroad, and thus cut off the communication and intercourse with foreign countries.

THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUN FINALLY CLOSED THE COUNTRY.—Quite contrary to Hideyoshi, who undertook the great enterprise of conquering Korea, and almost brought that country under his rule, Iyeyasu treated Korea on an equal footing, and often sent the Daimyo of Tsushima Province to Korea to conclude a treaty of peaceful intercourse, but Korea would not listen. Iyeyasu then sent back to Korea 1,702 Korean captives, and, having thus showed his good will, he again asked for the friendly treaty. The Korean Court returned a most insulting answer to the effect that whether Japan sent back or kept in their country hundreds of thousands of Korean captives, it would make no difference to them, but that if in future years Japan should show herself sincere, then the great Korean Empire might see its way to treat the barbarians generously and not cut off the communication and intercourse with Japan. Iyeyasu kept his temper, and, exhausting every means to satisfy Korea, he succeeded at last in concluding a friendly treaty and opening trade. Iyeyasu was once, then, so humble and condescending even toward such a small country as Korea, and eager to extend the trade relation with foreign countries; but when the circumstances abroad were more and more clearly known, and it came to light that all the adventurers on the seas were ronins, or people akin to them, antagonistic to the Tokugawa Shogunate, or at least not its devoted followers, the Tokugawa Shogunate suddenly changed their attitude toward the adventurers and traders with foreign countries, and issued a new order that all ships venturing abroad after June 1631 (8th year of Kanei) should obtain a licence issued by the executive lords in the Shogunate, in addition to the former Red-marked Licence, which new licence could be had through the Bugyo of Nagasaki. After the promulgation of these new regulations, the executive lords of the Shogunate jointly signed the new regulation of seventeen articles in February 1633 (10th year of Kanei), and sent instructions to the Magistrate of Nagasaki as follows :—

> That all ships, except those that have obtained the new licence, shall be forbidden to sail abroad, and if anyone violates the law and goes abroad secretly, he shall be put to death, and then detaining the ship and ship-owner, the Magistrate of Ngasaki shall report it to the executive lords in the Shogunate. That all those who reside in foreign lands and temporarily come back to Japan shall be put to death, but those who, though they have resided in foreign countries, came back to Japan within five years shall be carefully examined, and if they do not go abroad again they shall be pardoned, but if they plan to go abroad again they shall be put to death.
>
> That those who give information to the Magistrate about a Christian shall be rewarded with 100 silver coins, and all the foreign missionaries who are preaching Christianity or any other wicked religion shall, as before, be imprisoned at Omura.

This was the beginning of closing the country, and in 1636 (13th year of Kanei) the following further ordinance entirely closed it :—

1. No Japanese ships shall ever be sent to foreign lands.

2. No Japanese shall be permitted to go abroad, and if there be discovered anyone who has a secret intention to go abroad he shall be put to death, and the Magistrate, detaining the ship and ship-owner, shall make report to the executive lords in the Shogunate.

3. If any Japanese residing abroad comes back temporarily to Japan, he shall be put to death.

4. Rewards to be given to those who will report to the authorities about the Christians: those who give information about the foreign missionaries shall be given 200 to 300 silver coins according to their merits, and all other informers shall be rewarded as before.

5. Children and grandchildren of the foreign Christian missionaries shall not be permitted to remain in Japan, and if there be anyone secretly giving shelter to such persons of foreign blood, he shall be put to death, and others concerned with that crime shall be sentenced to a penalty in accordance with their relative guilt.

6. Children of foreign blood at Nagasaki and those who adopted these children of foreign blood were sentenced to death, but the Government was benevolent at that time and did not execute the penalty on those whom the foreign missionaries agreed to take to their own countries and sent them abroad. If such a person comes back to Japan or writes to relatives in Japan, he shall be put to death and those who are related with the person shall be sentenced to a penalty in accordance with the relative gravity of their crime.

Object of closing the Country.—Historians have attributed the closing of the country to the desire of the Shogunate to root out all the Catholic believers in Japan; but this is not the whole truth, for the fundamental cause was that the Shogunate were afraid that the ronins, going abroad as adventurers, would cause serious troubles with foreign countries. The Catholics being a part of the ronins, the laws set up against the ronins were naturally applied against the Catholic believers, for though the ronins were not necessarily Catholic believers, yet the Catholic believers were all ronins; and although all the great feudal lords, who owed so much to Hideyoshi, had entirely forgotten the Toyotomi family, or, at least, pretended to do so, and cringed before the powerful Tokugawa Shogun, the ronins and Catholic believers never changed their attitude towards the Tokugawa Shogunate, so that they were counted by it as its most dangerous opponents. If it be true that the Tokugawa Shogun closed the country because he was afraid of Catholicism, then why was it not closed in 1616, when the Catholic influence was widespread and most formidable? In 1636 the Catholics were crushed by the Shogunate, and no one was courageous enough to pronounce publicly that he was a believer, so that the administration had nothing to fear from the Catholics in Japan. The reason why the Tokugawa Shogunate forbade any Japanese to go abroad was not, of course, because they were afraid of Catholicism; and furthermore they were satisfied to have the Dutch and English in Japan, as they were not Catholic believers, and consequently did not propagandize Catholicism. They allowed the Dutch to monopolize all the trade profits with Japan after the banishment of the Portuguese and Spaniards from the country, but forbade any Japanese to go to the Dutch colonies. All these facts make it clear that the Tokugawa Shogunate closed the country because they were afraid that, when the ronins went abroad, their ambition and boldness would not allow them to rest satisfied with their condition, and would give rise to serious troubles with other countries, or, from their strongholds abroad, they would plot against the Mother Country. Daté Masamuné was the senior among all the feudal lords since the time of the first Tokugawa Shogun, and his fame and standing were so high that even the Shoguns always paid him due respect and attention; yet this Masamuné humbled himself before the third Shogun, who was a mere child in his eyes, and fell innocently asleep at his table, girt with a wooden sword. Why? The Shogun had cast suspicious eyes on Daté ever since when, at the advice of the Spanish priest, Sotelo, he appointed his retainer, Hasekura Rokuemon, to head about 180 men, including about 40 Portuguese and Spaniards, and go to Rome for an audience with the Pope. Masamuné was no such devout Christian, nor yet recklessly bold as he pretended to be to the Shogunate, when he claimed that his real intention was to conquer Europe. What he wanted was to observe the real situation in Europe, and to discover in that new world new things; but such an enterprise was viewed by the Tokugawa Shogunate as most dangerous to their safety. Thus, suspected by the Shogun and his men, Masamuné exhausted every means to clear away their doubts, pretending to a harmless dandy and wearing a wooden sword in the Shogun's presence. If, then, Masamuné, despite his desire was to be most sincere to the Tokugawa Government and the Tokugawa family, was so suspected, it shows that the circumstances and general situation did not allow men to trust one another absolutely.

SHOGUNATE GOVERNMENT DREADED THE OSAKA RONINS WHO ESCAPED ABROAD.—When Osaka Castle fell and Toyotomi Hideyori killed himself, the rumour went abroad that he was not really dead, but had escaped to the western provinces, and that Akashi Kamon-no-suke—one of the well-known generals in Osaka, who was the most popular leader among the Catholics and looked upon by his fellow-Christians as the actual head of all the Christians in Japan after Konishi Yukinaga died—escaped with one Harunaga to Nagasaki, where they embarked on a ship and went abroad. It was, of course, no easy task to find out definitely whether these rumours were true or not, and it was undoubtedly true that there was a connecting-link between the defeated Osaka army, ronin, Catholics, and foreign lands; and in order to be on the safe side the Tokugawa Government at last totally forbade any communication and intercourse with foreign countries, only leaving Chinese and Dutch merchants to come and sell their merchandise in Japan, with the deplorable result that, soon after the Tokugawa family got the whole country under their thumb, they forbade the building of large junks and confiscated all large ships already built and in use. Pitiful lords of a tiny island country! They thought only of the fortune of a mere private family and paid no attention to the future destiny of the Empire of Japan.

ALL THE TRADE PROFITS MONOPOLIZED BY THE CHINESE AND DUTCH.—Thus the Tokugawa Shogunate entirely closed the country, leaving only the Dutch and Chinese ships to enter the Japanese ports, and the So family of Tsushima to keep up commercial relations with Korea. In 1636 the Magistrate of Nagasaki was bidden to make an artificial island outside the port of Nagasaki, in which all the Portuguese and Spaniards living scattered over the Nagasaki city were collected and cut off from the outside. The cost of making this artificial isle was charged upon twenty-five Nagasaki merchants, who, however, enjoyed the privilege of receiving from these foreigners 80 kwamme of silver as a land-tax. The Catholic rebellion burst out at Shimabara the next year, and the Shogunate, sending Lord Oda to Nagasaki, ordered all the Portuguese and Spaniards to withdraw from Japan by a fixed date, as they would not be allowed to live in the country any longer. Further, the Dutch were ordered to give up trading at Hirado and move to Nagasaki, where alone they were allowed to do business, and at the same time the Shogunate limited the Chinese merchants to Nagasaki also. The final outcome was that trade between Japan and foreign countries was concentrated on that place, though for Korean trade Tsushima was open; and Satsuma, too, traded in secret with China under the name of trade with the Loochoo Islands. The foreign countries with which Japan traded on a small scale were only Holland, England, China, and Korea, and their competitors, the Portuguese and Spaniards, whom the Japanese used to call the southern barbarians, were cleared out of Japan entirely and their ships driven away. The English merchants, unable to compete with the Dutch, withdrew of their own accord from Japan afterwards, and so the foreign merchants who monopolized the profits of the trade with Japan were at last only the Chinese and Dutch.

CLOSING OF THE COUNTRY BROUGHT ABOUT THE RISE IN PRICE OF ALL THE FOREIGN COMMODITIES.—The entire closing of the country brought about two momentous results. The first was the rebellion of Christians at Shimabara, who, cut off from communication with foreign countries, were so closely persecuted and so hotly hunted down that they could find no place of security anywhere, and finally made up their minds to stand to the last by their faith and die martyrs to their religion. This Christian rebellion took place in October 1637, and, although a mere insurrection of unarmed private citizens, obliged the Shogunate to call up the military forces of all the feudal lords in Kyushu Province and suppress it with excessive severity, under which all the Catholics were destroyed and extinguished, while those who escaped became beggars and slaves, or pretended to have given up their faith. In the whole of Japan no one dared to call himself a Christian, and the Tokugawa Government now had nothing more politically to fear, save for the small trouble of detaining the few who wished to leave Japan, and refusing a landing to anyone coming back from foreign countries. The second result was that as the Chinese and Dutch merchants were allowed to monopolize the profits of the trade with Japan, the price of exported commodities fell, and that of imports rose. For example, the price of one bundle of Shiraito (white raw silk) was 1 kwan and 200 or 300 momme of silver when it was imported into Japan in 1609, but it went as high as 2 kwan and 700 or 800 momme of silver in December 1637. Thus the commercial policy of the Shogunate had extraordinarily economic results, and brought into being an abnormal trade system at Nagasaki (see the chapter "The Foreign Trade and Nagasaki"). Those who do not know might be puzzled to understand why the trade system at Nagasaki, which was at first conducted on the Free Trade principle, was changed afterwards to a system very like that of the East India Company, which monopolized trade profits under certain privileges; but it is all due to the fact that Japan, who at first traded with all the foreign countries, granted freedom of communication and intercourse with every one, and, taking advantage of the competition among the foreign merchants, could buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market, ended by cutting her own throat commercially by killing competition and relying only on the Chinese and Dutch. A policy so perverse compelled the Tokugawa Government to regulate the foreign trade by equally unnatural methods, and the final result was a monopoly system which violated all the laws of economics.

POWER OF THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED.—The fundamental principle of politics of the third Tokugawa Shogun, Iemitsu, was mistaken from the beginning, and invited many failures, but in spite of this, as the whole nation was tired of prolonged war and bloodshed, the current of progress and desire for peace was in no way to be stopped: the popular mind became settled during these years of peace, order was firmly established, the national resources of wealth were opened up, and an age of great prosperity began to dawn. In time of wars and battles men's faith in one another seemed lost; there was no confidence even between the retainers and the feudal lords, who always took hostages as a surety, and such was the general trend in the country; but after Sekigahara, Maeda Toshinaga of Kaga set an example to the other feudatories by sending his mother, Lady Hoshin-in, to Edo as a hostage, trying thereby to remove all the suspicions of the Shogun. The hostage was called guarantor, and many of the feudal lords had fallen in with the practice, when Shimazu Iehisa of Satsuma suggested to Doi Toshikatsu, the Shogunate Tairo (Premier), that since three Tokugawa generations had now passed and all the feudal lords were heartily loyal to the Shogun, and put implicit confidence in his government, it would further the cause of peace and prosperity if the Shogunate ordered all daimyos to bring their wives and children to Edo. Shimazu Iehisa himself did so, and, much pleased with the suggestion, the Shogunate ordered all the feudal lords to follow his example. Before this there was no definite regulation as to whether the feudal lords should reside in Edo or not, but now the Shogunate granted leave of absence to Lord Maeda and twenty-five other lords to return to their own provinces, and ordered Shimazu Iehisa and fifty-four other lords to take up residence in Edo for a certain number of years fixed by regulation, and feudal lords had hereafter to stay in Edo for a certain period of years by turns, and then return to their province. The principles of administration of this period are summed up in the following regulations:—

> All the feudal lords and their retainers are to be diligent to acquire accomplishments both literary and military, together with skill in horse-riding and shooting in accordance with the old principle that literary accomplishments and military acquirements are indispensable elements in a man's training, and skill in riding and shooting should be the chief aim of the samurai. It is true that arms are dismal instruments, as they were called of old, but sometimes it is absolutely necessary to use arms, that is, to make war; and men must not forget the state of war in the age of peace and neglect to acquire the military arts. By decree, all the feudal lords by turn have to reside for a period of some years in Edo in order to serve the Shogun, and come to Edo in April every year. Of late, when coming to Edo, they have brought too many retainers and servants, who cost too much and may form a severe burden upon the land and people. The number of retainers brought to Edo by a feudal lord must be reduced, and no further services levied on the people than is permitted by the Shogun's order. It is strictly forbidden for any feudal lord to build a new castle and forts, and in case repairs to moat or stone walls are necessary, the feudal lord is to make a report about it to the Magistrate, and follow his instructions, and tower, wall, gate, etc., are to be repaired

as they were before. Whatever may happen in Edo or in any province, the feudal lords are not to move, but wait for orders from the central authority. In the case of the execution of a criminal, only the official examiners are to come to the place, and any sort of plotting, insurrection, or secret alliance is to be strictly forbidden. Lords of provinces and other feudal lords are never to quarrel among themselves, and always be very careful not to encroach upon the rights of the others; and if there be any delay in discharging their duty, they are to make report to the Magistrate about it. The lord of a province, the lord of a castle, those in possession of fiefs of over 10,000 koku and chief retainers of feudal lords are not to marry without the Shogunate permission. It has become a common practice to spend large sums of money in exchange of presents, on the marriage ceremony, reception, and banquet, and on building luxurious houses and mansions. The central authority is anxious to reform all such things and to foster in men's minds a habit of thrift, economy, and frugality.

As to the materials of clothing, there must be a distinction in accordance with the social standing of the men who wear it. Shiraya silk is not to be worn except by the Court nobles, white silk clothes only by the chief retainers or by their seniors, and silk clothes of purple colour are not to be worn except by the privileged class. The retainers under feudal lords have been forbidden from olden times to wear expensive clothes made of brocade or some good quality of silk, and men must bear this in mind.

Relatives of the Shogun's family, lords of provinces and castles, those whose fief is over 10,000 koku, sons and daughters of feudal lords, the eldest son of lords of castles or of those whose Court rank is the lord attendant to the Emperor or above it, those above fifty years of age, physicians, diviners, and sick persons may use palanquins, and as to the retainers and their family under a feudal lord, the lord may give the privilege to those whom he thinks qualified. Court nobles, lord abbots of Buddhist temples, and high priests are free to use palanquins.

Feudal lords are not allowed to take into their service any ronin against whom his former lord has some charge or complaint, and if there be any report concerning the said ronin that he was formerly rebellious against his lord or killed someone, the lord who has taken that ronin into his service is to send him back to his former lord. When such ronin and those who are in some way or other related to ronin are to be put to death, report must be made to the Shogunate, and their permission obtained. In case the execution cannot be postponed, the feudal lord is to make a full report to the Shogunate after the execution is over.

As to administrative affairs in the fief of a feudal lord the principle of righteousness is strictly to be observed and the utmost care is to be taken not to allow the territory to decay. Roads and communications must never be interfered with; no feudal lord is allowed to set up his own private barrier office on land or sea, or to build a large junk.

Some of the Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples that are scattered over the country have had from olden times their own maintenance estates attached to them, and no feudal lord is permitted to deprive those shrines and temples of them.

All the regulations are to be as well observed in the provinces as they are in the City of Edo.

The fundamental principle of all the above is in accordance with that already fixed at the establishment of the Shogunate, though some points are now reformed in accordance with changed conditions, and all these rules must be strictly observed.

(Signed) The Third Shogun, Iemitsu.

June, 12th year of Kanei.

Military Preparation of the Feudal Lords and Hatamoto.—Administrative regulations already set up by the first Tokugawa Shogun, Iyeyasu, were reformed, as above, by the third Shogun, Iemitsu, and became a constitution to be observed by the feudal lords, bodyguard, and their retainers. Before this, all the feudal lords had joined in a race for armaments, with consequent financial embarrassment. Many of the hereditary adherents to the Tokugawa family were so hard hit that the Shogun, as a special favour, lent them 508,700 ryo, but at the same time, as it was generally agreed now that in peace-time there was no necessity to keep up an excessively large military force at the expense of the feudal lords and others, the Shogunate issued in 1633 new regulations with regard to military service, lightening the burden considerably :—

Feudatories of :—

Koku.

1,000 are to bring to the battle-field 23 men, 1 spare spear, 1 bow (with arrows), and 1 gun (with bullets).
1,200 are to bring to the battle-field 27 men, 3 spare spears, 1 bow, and 1 gun
1,300 are to bring to the battle-field 29 men, 3 spare spears, 1 bow, and 1 gun.
1,400 are to bring to the battle-field 31 men, 3 spare spears, 1 bow, and 1 gun.
1,500 are to bring to the battle-field 33 men, 3 spare spears, 1 bow, and 1 gun.
1,600 are to bring to the battle-field 35 men, 3 spare spears, 1 bow, and 1 gun.
1,700 are to bring to the battle-field 37 men, 4 spare spears, 1 bow, and 2 guns.
1,800 are to bring to the battle-field 39 men, 4 spare spears, 1 bow, and 2 guns.
1,900 are to bring to the battle-field 41 men, 4 spare spears, 1 bow, and 2 guns.
2,000 are to bring to the battle-field 43 men, 5 spare spears, 1 bow, and 2 guns.
3,000 are to bring to the battle-field 2 mounted men, 3 guns, 2 bows, and 5 spare spears.
4,000 are to bring to the battle-field 3 mounted men, 5 guns, 2 bows, 10 spare spears, and 1 banner.
5,000 are to bring to the battle-field 5 mounted men, 5 guns, 3 bows, 10 spare spears, and 2 banners.
6,000 are to bring to the battle-field 5 mounted men, 10 guns, 5 bows, 10 spare spears, and 2 banners.
7,000 are to bring to the battle-field 6 mounted men, 15 guns, 5 bows, 10 spare spears, and 2 banners.
8,000 are to bring to the battle-field 7 mounted men, 15 guns, 10 bows, 20 spare spears, and 2 banners.
9,000 are to bring to the battle-field 8 mounted men, 15 guns, 10 bows, 20 spare spears, and 2 banners.
10,000 are to bring to the battle-field 10 mounted men, 20 guns, 10 bows, 30 spare spears, and 3 banners.

20,000 are to bring to the battle-field 20 mounted men, 50 guns, 20 bows, 50 spare spears, and 5 banners.
30,000 are to bring to the battle-field 35 mounted men, 80 guns, 20 bows, 70 spare spears, and 5 banners.
40,000 are to bring to the battle-field 45 mounted men, 120 guns, 30 bows, 70 spare spears, and 8 banners.
50,000 are to bring to the battle-field 70 mounted men, 150 guns, 30 bows, 80 spare spears, and 10 banners.
60,000 are to bring to the battle-field 90 mounted men, 170 guns, 30 bows, 90 spare spears, and 10 banners.
70,000 are to bring to the battle-field 110 mounted men, 200 guns, 50 bows, 100 spare spears, and 15 banners.
80,000 are to bring to the battle-field 130 mounted men, 300 guns, 60 bows, 110 spare spears, and 15 banners.
90,000 are to bring to the battle-field 150 mounted men, 300 guns, 60 bows, 130 spare spears, and 20 banners.
100,000 are to bring to the battle-field 170 mounted men, 350 guns, 60 bows, 150 spare spears, and 20 banners.

The captains of the Shogun's bodyguard are exempted from the fixed war services, but are ordered to be ready with men as stated below :—

THOSE WHO HOLD A FIEF OF :—

Koku.

200, with 1 retainer, 1 armour bearer, 1 spear bearer, 1 box carrier, 1 baggage-horse driver, 1 sandal bearer, and 2 footmen—8 men in all.
300, with 2 retainers, 2 baggage-horse drivers, 2 footmen, 1 armour bearer, 1 box carrier, and 1 sandal bearer—9 men in all.
400, with 3 retainers, 2 spear bearers, 2 footmen, 2 baggage-horse drivers, 1 armour bearer, 1 box carrier, and 1 sandal bearer—12 men in all.
500, with 4 retainers, 2 spear bearers, 2 footmen, 2 baggage-horse drivers, 1 armour bearer, 1 box carrier, and 1 sandal bearer—13 men in all,
600, with 5 retainers, 1 gun, 2 spear bearers, 2 footmen, 2 baggage-horse drivers, 1 armour bearer, 1 box carrier, and 1 sandal bearer—15 men in all.
700, with 5 retainers, 1 gun, 2 spear bearers, 2 baggage-horse drivers, 2 footmen, 1 armour bearer, 1 box carrier, 1 sandal carrier—15 men in all.
800, with 5 retainers, 1 gun, 3 spear bearers, 4 footmen, 2 baggage-horse drivers, 2 sandal bearers, 1 armour bearer, and 1 box carrier, beside 1 man in reserve—19 men in all.
900, with 6 retainers, 1 archer, 1 gun, 3 spear bearers, 4 footmen, 2 baggage-horse drivers, 2 box carriers, 1 armour bearer, and 1 sandal bearer—21 men in all.

SYSTEM IN THE SHOGUNATE.—It was about this time that the cabinet system in the Shogunate began to take a definite form. Through the ages of the first and second Shoguns, the state affairs were all simple, and everything being decided as it came up by the

Shogun and his high lords, there was no departmental distinction made between home and foreign affairs and civil and military affairs. The executive lords were summoned to a council meeting on the 12th and 22nd days every month, and the department affairs were divided among the executive lords. The oversight of the feudal lords and lawsuits between them was entrusted to Lords Doi Toshikatsu, Sakai Tadakatsu, Matsudaira Nobutsuna, Abe Tadaaki, and Hotta Masamori, who took it in turns to be in charge for one month, and were called elder lords, or Cabinet Ministers in the modern sense. Later on, Doi Toshikatsu and Sakai Tadakatsu were released from responsibility for smaller affairs, and as a special honour came to the Shogunate on the 1st and 15th days every month, only to discuss important business with the other executive lords. This was the origin of the chief of the executive lords, or the premier of the department dealing with samurai whose fief was below 10,000 koku. Doi Toshitaka, Sakai Tadatomo, Miura Masatsugu, Ota Sukemone, and Abe Shigetsugu took charge in turn every month. They were the junior executive lords of later days. Sakai Tadayo, Matsudaira Shigenori, Makino Nobushige, Sakai Norihisa, and Sugiura Masatomo were appointed treasurers, and these five lords, together with Matsudaira Ienobu as an additional helper, also took charge of the supervision of finances. Ando Shigenaga, Matsudaira Katsutaka, and Hori Yoshishige headed the bureau of shrines and temples. Kagazume Tadazumi and Hori Naoyuki were in charge of all affairs touching towns and citizens, and ran the office of city magistrate. Matsudaira Masatsuna, Itami Yasukatso, Ina Hanjuro Tadaharu, Okochi Kinbei Hisatsuna, and Sone Genzaemon Yoshitsugu were chiefs of the bureau dealing with the Shogun's own territories in the Kwanto provinces and the lawsuits of the farmers, and were the first Accountant Magistrates. Sakuma Sonekatsu, Sakai Tadatomo, and Kamio Motokatsu were in charge of all public works as the first Public Works Magistrates. Finally, Mizuno Morinobu, Yagyu Munenori, Akiyama, Masashige, and Inouye Masashige were appointed lord justices, taking charge of general appeal cases, and so fixing the dates to hear appeals that the appeals of feudal lords and samurais were heard the 3rd, 9th, and 18th days, and those of the general public on the 9th, 19th and 27th days.

Ordinance strictly supervising the General Public.—After the above ordinances were issued the Shogun Iemitsu went out hunting about Ushigome, and finding two retainers in the company of bowmen dressed much above their position and income, and disregarding the purpose of the ordinance issued to encourage thrift, he was on the point of ordering them off to instant execution, but finally banished them only, and issued the following edict in the eight Kwanto provinces to enforce discipline on the people at large: "The Gonin-gumi shall be more diligent in fulfilling their duties, so that no vagabond nor bad character shall be found anywhere in their district, and everything in the district will be subject to thorough investigation. If the Gonin-gumi neglect their duty and overlook mischief-makers in the district, not only shall the Gonin-gumi, but all the men in the district, be punished. No stranger shall be lodged in anyone's house; and if something wrong occurs in a house where a man of suspicious character lodged, anyone who knows of it, and even the relative of the suspected man, shall at once report to the chief of the district and the Gonin-gumi. Irrespective of whether it be in territories under the Shogun's direct control or belonging to a feudal lord, if anyone makes application for residence in a newly opened quarter or any other place in the district, a close investigation shall be made into his origin, and permission shall not be granted for residence until it is proved that he is a man of good character. When men or women leave one district for any other, to be hired as servants or sold as slaves, they must inform the village head-men and the Gonin-gumi where they are going. When there are thieves or bad characters plotting evil, anyone who knows about it shall at once inform the authorities, and even if the informant was implicated he will be pardoned and rewarded. But anyone who knows and does not give information shall share in the punishment of the evil-doers when they are discovered. If anyone is afraid to act as informant for fear of the evil-doers or their relatives taking revenge upon him, let him make a secret report, and he shall be rewarded and preserved from injury. When a suspicious character is found in woods or in thickly grown places, the village head-men and farmers combined shall arrest and deliver him up to the local authority; and if the farmers cannot arrest him, they shall inform the village head-man and receive a reward for him. The head-man shall then immediately summon the village men and try to apprehend the fugitive, but if he has escaped they shall pursue him and arrest him. In case a man knows of a bad character hiding himself somewhere and does not report about it to the local authority, thereby conniving at his escape, he shall be punished afterwards, when the circumstances are clearly known. When bad characters are found in a village, anyone who finds them first shall ring the bell, and any man who does not answer the call shall be punished afterwards. When such evil-doers are arrested the head-man of the district and the farmers shall take them to the office of the local authority, but in case of the latter's absence they shall immediately go to the office of the magistrate with the prisoner. Any expenses therein incurred shall afterwards be paid by the authority. That thieves or rascals are to be found here and there in the village districts is due to the fact that the local authorities are neglectful of their duties, so they must always be attentive and watchful that they may not overlook cases from which something serious may develop. The purport of this ordinance shall be thoroughly transmitted throughout the village districts, and also to the Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples."

COLLISION BETWEEN THE EX-EMPEROR AND THE LORD-COMMISSIONER OF KYOTO.—Regulations for the Imperial Court were drawn up in the time of Tokugawa Iyeyasu, and Iemitsu, being desirous strictly to carry out these regulations and to shut off the Imperial Court from the outside world, attached to the palace of the Emperor, the Empress Dowager, and the ex-Emperor a feudal lord as Lord Commissioner. Nominally this was for the defence of the palace, yet, in fact, it was to restrict the Imperial power and authority; and the items called Black-mark Items in the instructions given to the feudal lords attached to the Courts by the Shogun's order prove that the Imperial Court was little more than a prison.

"There shall be no music, dancing, or any other sort of entertainment in the presence of the ex-Emperor, but when Their Majesties the Emperor, the ex-Emperor, and Empress Dowager are together in the palace of the Empress Dowager, there may be music and dancing. The Lord-Commissioners shall so arrange that the Emperor or ex-Emperor can have an interview with the Imperial princes and princesses only on New Year's Day. On no other occasion shall an audience be given by Their Majesties even to nobles descended from princes of blood. When the ex-Emperor receives congratulations from the Court nobles, the Lord-Chamberlain is to be notified first, and he shall usher the nobles into the presence of His Majesty the ex-Emperor. The Lord-Commissioner in Kyoto shall not object to the ex-Emperor visiting the Imperial Palace and the Empress Dowager's Palace, or his visiting with the Empress Dowager the two Imperial princesses, but it is desirable that the ex-Emperor should not leave his palace just as he likes. Within the Imperial Palace Court, Lady Nagahashi[1] and the two Buke-denso[2] are to be consulted about everything, and the opinion of the Lord-Commissioner of Kyoto, Itakura Shigemune, must be taken. Grants of office and rank in the Imperial Court are public affairs, and therefore the two Buke-denso shall never privately lay before the Emperor their opinions in such matters, or in cases when the Court ladies and low officials are about to break precedents and do something new. They shall first obtain the opinion of the Shogunate through the Lord-Commissioner of Kyoto. No diviner shall be admitted to the Court of the ex-Emperor without the permission of the Commissioner, and when the ex-Emperor proposes to make some gift to these diviners, His Majesty shall do so with the consent of the Commissioner of Kyoto. When the Court ladies in the ex-Emperor's service go in and out of the palace they shall show a pass to the guard every time. They may go home three times a year, if they wish. The gates of the ex-Emperor's palace shall be closed and bolted day and night, and, if necessary, they will be opened in the daytime only. When the Court ladies need men for some service they shall take the Iga[1] servants as escort."

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[1] Nagahashi—a chief manager of Court ladies.

[2] Buke-denso—an official whose duty it was to hear any statement from the Shogunate government and report to the Emperor.

This decree was a severe one, restricting the power and dignity of the Imperial Court; and Iemitsu, desiring to put it into practice, appointed Lord Itakura Shigemune to the office of Lord-Commissioner in Kyoto. He was a man of strong will and great sagacity, and was deeply respected by all the Court nobles in Kyoto. So important was the post considered that in times of emergency he was vested with power to give orders to all the feudal lords in the south-western province, for which reason the Tokugawa Shogun selected the ablest man he could find. On one occasion, when Shigemune was in Edo, the ex-Emperor planned to make a pilgrimage to the well-known Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples in the provinces around Kyoto, and Lord Takagi Isenokami, who was attached to him by the Shogun's order, said that a report must first be made to Edo, and the Shogun's consent obtained. His Majesty indignantly replied that no one in the world had the power to stop the pilgrimage of an ex-emperor, besides, it had already been publicly announced, and could not be postponed; but Takagi Isenokami was obstinate, and maintained that he was the Shogun's man and must obey his orders. If the ex-Emperor was determined to go on a pilgrimage, utterly disregarding the Shogun's will, then he was free to do so, but he himself would blockade the road, and if His Majesty attempted to force a passage he might have to fire on the Imperial palanquin. In the event the ex-Emperor was compelled to postpone his pilgrimage.

THE WHOLE COUNTRY IN UTTER SUBJECTION.—Thus Iemitsu, the third Tokugawa Shogun, readjusted and extended all the institutions which his father and grandfather had established, and the power and authority of the Tokugawa Shogun attained their summit at this time. He had already forced an emperor to abdicate, and raised to the throne his niece, the Princess Okiko. All the Court nobles in Kyoto were awed by his power, and yet mollified by generous financial treatment, so that they had nothing to say. The Shinto shrines and

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[1] Iga—low-class soldiers whose ancestors come from the province of Iga.

Buddhist temples, too, which had even defied the power of Hideyoshi and Nobunaga, were all suppressed by the clever management of Archbishop Tenkai and Soden, and had no courage or energy to raise a murmur against the all-powerful Tokugawa Shogunate. In the twenty-seven years of his Shogunate, Iemitsu deposed forty-six feudal lords, confiscating their fiefs of 5,430,000 koku, some on the ground that they were insolent and denied the authority of the Shogunate, and others because they could not maintain their family reputation and misgoverned their territories, or had no child to succeed. In fact, he never lost an opportunity to root out the old feudal lords and to create new ones, and thus to increase the fiefs of his own Tokugawa family at the time of such transfers. His administration may be likened to a steam-roller that levels everything in its path, with the exception, strange to say, of the self-governing body of farmers and merchants, for, in spite of their being in quite an infant state, the despotic militarism of the Tokugawa Shogun not only did not crush them, but helped them to grow.

Fall of the Ming Dynasty of China.—While Japan was thus enjoying peace and prosperity, China just across the sea was in the throes of one of the greatest civil strifes that the old Empire has ever experienced, and witnessed the downfall of the Ming Dynasty. Under the Ming Dynasty, China had been in trouble for a hundred years. First, the Japanese adventurers ravaged the southern and eastern coasts, and when all the coast provinces were largely exhausted with their efforts at defence, Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent his expedition to Korea, which obliged the Ming Emperor to dispatch a large army to the aid of the invaded country. This army was maintained in Korea several years before the Japanese withdrew on account of Hideyoshi's death, and then, just when the resources of the Chinese Empire were thus greatly impoverished, internal trouble raised its head at home, when the progenitor of the Shin Dynasty, the last Imperial dynasty in China, established his own kingdom in Manchuria and announced his independence of the rule of the Ming Dynasty. The Chinese Court had been always a hot-bed of party dissensions, which engaged the attention of the officials so much that they neglected the administration and appeared quite indifferent to the movements of large mobs of rioters and bands of robbers, so that finally even the respectable, sober citizens joined these wandering vagabond armies and ravaged the country far and wide, and quite unchecked by the local authorities, who were indeed powerless to check them. The ringleaders, Rijisei, Chokenchu, and Rijaku called themselves kings, and in 1644, at the head of their vagabonds, besieged Peking, the Imperial city. The Emperor Kiso hanged himself, and Shikaho, the Governor-General of Nanking and his party, raised Prince Fuku to the throne. Gosankei, the Governor-General of the Liaotung Province, begged for aid from the Manchus, and regained somehow Peking Castle, and drove Rijisei and his rebel followers out; but as soon as he and his men set out westward, his Manchu allies suddenly changed their minds, seized Peking Castle, and made it their own capital, and marching to Nanking captured Prince Fuku. All the castles and provinces under the rule of the Ming Dynasty were reduced and the whole Chinese Empire brought under their sway.

Supporters of the Fallen Ming Dynasty asked Japan for Aid. There was a pirate chief named Teishiryu, who was allied with the Japanese adventurers and had been placated by the Ming Dynasty with an official title and rank, and in its fall this Teishiryu still remained faithful to the dynasty, and established an empire for Prince To-o, a descendant of the first Emperor Toiso of the Ming Dynasty in Fukien Province. In 1645 Teishiryu sent a messenger, Kochomei, to Japan to beg for help to support his protégé, but this man and his party were unfortunately captured on the sea by the patrol ships of the new Manchu Dynasty and never reached Japan. General Saichi, a subordinate of Teishiryu, sent a second messenger, Rinko, and asked the Shogun for help, presenting a letter through the Magistrate of Nagasaki.

No Help from the Shogunate.—The situation of the Ming Dynasty, thus faintly maintaining its existence in a southern corner of China, was so miserable and helpless that it attracted deep sympathy both at home and abroad, but the Shogunate of Japan that had already forbidden all its nationals to go abroad and even abandoned hundreds of thousands of its own people and left them to their own fate to die in distant lands was not likely to share in the feeling. Nagasaki was instructed, in advance, to answer that since there has been no intercourse between Japan and China under the Ming Dynasty, all the merchants from China were a sort of smugglers, and the Chinese Government of the Ming Dynasty had forbidden any Chinese merchantmen to come publicly to Japanese ports. In consequence it was not possible to transmit the message from the survivor of the Ming Dynasty to the Shogun. But now Kochomei, who was detained by the patrol ship of the new Chinese Dynasty, managed somehow to transmit the message of his chief, Teishiryu, to Nagasaki and beg for aid, and he also sent some tribute to the Shogun. A conference was called, consisting of the three lords of Owari, Kii, and Hitachi, the Shogun's near relatives, and also the higher lords in the administration, and it was debated whether to send help or not. Lord Tokugawa Yorinobu of the Kii Province was eagerly in favour of it, and said that he himself would gather 100,000 adventurers and head them to the rescue of the unhappy Ming Dynasty; but opinions in the Council were divided, and while the time was thus passing the news came that Teishiryu was unable to maintain himself in Fukien Province and had evacuated the castle and retired to the sea. The Shogunate decided that it was useless to carry on the discussion any longer, sent back the messenger from Teishiryu, and returned his tribute. The policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate was so remarkably conservative and retrograde that they entirely closed the country both in peace and war, and therefore, notwithstanding that many Japanese in Formosa had acquired settled properties in the island, and their rights were all abolished by the Dutch, the Shogunate was so indifferent about it that it did no more than allow the Magistrate of Nagasaki to interfere privately. In later years Teiseiko, the son of Teishiryu, and his Japanese wife, came to Formosa from China, and, heading many Japanese adventurers, drove out all the Dutch. Here was a very good opportunity for the Japanese to regain their rights, but, as before, the Shogunate took no steps at all, leaving Teiseiko alone to deal with the Dutch. Afterwards, Teiseiko and his men were routed by the Chinese, and the entire island of Formosa was taken over by China. The Japanese, who had built up a foundation of power and influence after long struggles in the island, were left empty-handed, and Formosa was long possessed by China.

Iemitsu followed in Death.—Iemitsu was taken ill in April 1650, when he entrusted all the important affairs to Lord Hoshina Masayuki, and, ordering some of his lord attendants to follow him in death, he died at the age of forty-eight. When his death was announced, Hotta Masamori, the lord of Sakura Castle and one of the Ministers of State, told the other high lords in the Shogunate that since he had been so much favoured by the Shogun, that he had been from the Shogun's page promoted to his present high position, he owed so much to His Highness and his sorrow was so great that, leaving it to other high lords to serve the next Shogun who was yet young, he was willing to follow Iemitsu in death. Abe Shigetsugu, the lord of Iwatsuki Castle, followed, saying that he had the same feeling as Lord Hotta, and it was now the time to obey it. The other high lords were full of sympathy with, and appreciation for, the determination of Lords Hotta and Abe, who soon after returned home and killed themselves.

Their example was followed by Lord Uchida Masanobu, then an attendant to the Shogun, who also killed himself to follow the Shogun; neither were the only martyrs these three lords, for some of the retainers of Hotta and Uchida committed suicide. The mother of Lord Hotta, who was then sixty-three and had long served in the Inner Court of the Shogun as one of the lady superintendents, feeling that with the death of the Shogun and the martyrdom of her son there was nothing left to live for, put an end to her life. Thus died the third Tokugawa Shogan, Iemitsu, a great tyrant, whose arbitrariness and wilfulness led him often into mistakes, and who has been exalted as a hero, exposing to the last moment his own characteristics. When we realize that his last command to his lords was that some of them should follow him in death, we can see that his arbitrariness and wilfulness were incurable.

CHAPTER XL

UNIFICATION OF THE CURRENCY SYSTEM OF THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE

Development of National Economy following the Unification of the Currency System.—In any country, at any age, and for any enterprise, no single man has sown the seeds, nurtured them, and reaped the fruits thereof by himself alone. It invariably has been the case that one man sowed the seeds and another reaped the fruits. It was so with the achievements of the Tokugawa Shoguns. Nobunaga commenced, Hideyoshi followed up, and Iyeyasu perfected. No one denies the fact. For instance, in the case of the unification of gold and silver currencies, and of establishing a system of currency on the basis of numerical calculation throughout the country in order to facilitate the commercial transactions, the historians retained by the Tokugawa Shoguns made every effort to credit the enterprise to their master, Iyeyasu. The fact was that the enterprise was commenced by Nobunaga, followed up by Hideyoshi, and only perfected by Iyeyasu, as was already explained in the chapter on the currency system of the Oda period. Certainly, to commence an undertaking does not necessarily mean to perfect it. Nobunaga, in the hope of establishing the system of legal tender, had the Oban coined. But he left many details to be worked out. Iyeyasu first divided the Oban into ten fractions, each valued at 1 ryo, and the ryo was proclaimed as the unit of value, thereby establishing the system of currency on purely numerical calculation. Secondly, he determined the quality of silver currency, so as to facilitate buying and selling. Thirdly, he unified copper coins, and also minted them abundantly for circulation. Fourthly, he established gold and silver mints and prohibited private coinage. Indeed, the unification of the currency system throughout Japan was for the first time perfected by the Tokugawa Shogun, and a consistent currency policy was carried out throughout the country. The work of currency unification, which Nobunaga and Hideyoshi could not accomplish, was completed by the Tokugawa Shogun, to his credit. Following the currency unification, the local economic system in different provinces, where each province supplied its own needs, was revolutionized, and a tendency towards national economy was brought about.

Goto Family, the Gold Mint-Master.—The currency policy, as described in the foregoing paragraph, was not carried out all at once, but grew with the growth of the political influence of the Tokugawa Shogun.. Iyeyasu, for the first time, planned to coin gold currency in 1592, the year when Hideyoshi dispatched the Korean expedition. In 1590 Hideyoshi had invaded Odawara in Sagami Province and subjugated the Hojo family, dividing their land among different lords. Iyeyasu received the provinces of Sagami, Musashi, Izu, and Suruga, thus becoming a great lord to be reckoned with. Thereupon he wished to establish a uniform currency system within the confines of his domain. Previous to that, when Shingen Takeda of the province of Kai still held his own as a powerful lord, the civil government, financial and criminal systems of his Government were excellently conducted, and Iyeyasu had learned much from the examples shown by Shingen. In time, the Takeda family declined in power, and Iyeyasu stepped into their shoes. Seeing that the currency there had been in perfect order for a long time, he wanted to imitate it; and so it came about that in 1592, when he became a great lord, Iyeyasu wanted to establish a gold mint monopoly in his own domain, imitating the gold-mint monopolies in the province of Kai and in Kyoto. He consulted Tokujo Goto, who was serving in the gold mint for Hideyoshi, to obtain the service of some noted expert whom he might take with him to Edo, but none cared to leave Kyoto to go to the east. Whereupon there appeared a man named Shozaburo, a relative of the Goto family, who of his own accord volunteered to go, and was taken into service by Iyeyasu. On this man's advice, Iyeyasu divided the Oban into ten fractions, and coined the Koban. The Koban, which was minted in Shizuoka, was popularly called Suruga Koban. Those minted in Edo were called the Musashi Koban. In the 4th year of Keicho (1599) the Koban was divided into four fractions, which were named Buban. But such was not necessarily Shozaburo's original idea. It has already been advocated for a long time in the minting monopoly bureau of Kyoto. Shozaburo only put the idea into practice.

According to the *Keicho Kembunshu*—observations of the Keicho period—in the year 1590, when Iyeyasu first entered Edo, there were merchants in that city, such as Shijo, Sano, Matsuda, and others, who melted down gold-dust, weighed the little lumps, and wrapped them in paper packages, marking the packages 1 ryo or 1 bu 1 shu, first and second, etc., and used them for making and receiving payments. When Shozaburo Goto established the system of Koban, the commercial transactions were considerably facilitated, so it was recorded. These Koban were stamped with the characters of Mitsutsugu. Mitsutsugu was the surname of Shozaburo Goto, who was the minter as well as the guarantor of the quality of the gold. Thus

Goto became the mint-master for the Tokugawa family. His official position was entitled the Kanemiyaku—Currency Superintendent. Wherever the political influence of the Tokugawa family extended, the currency, coined and approved by Goto, became legal tender.

RATIO OF ONE GOLD TO TWELVE SILVER.—But the mint bureau did not necessarily coin all of the currency in circulation. Lords of different provinces were permitted to mint independently in their own respective provinces. The duty of the mint monopoly bureau was only to test the quality of the gold and its weight. Regarding this, the Sankwa Dzui says, quoting from *Ryuei Hikan* as follows :—

> Shozaburo Goto served as the Mint-Master in Suruga and established the system of Koban. Gold was produced in Kyoto, Edo, Sado, and in other provinces, and its quality was examined in Suruga, where Shozaburo Goto stamped it, and the currency circulated at the rate of 12 ryo. But the stamp had to be put on at Suruga or Edo by Goto, in order to permit the currency to circulate. As Goto was empowered thus, if any gold submitted was not up to the standard, it had to be melted down again, for if it was returned to the source of production there was much expense to be incurred, suffering losses and considerable inconveniences. Twelve ryo may have meant the rate of exchange as between ratio of weight of currency in circulation in exchange for bullion or hand-coined gold. In other words, if the weight of Koban is 1 ryo, twelve times that should be the weight of silver in circulation. Accordingly, 1 gold Koban weighing 4 momme and 8 bu was exchanged for 57 momme and 6 bu of silver.

According to the foregoing quotation, the ratio of gold to silver in Osaka and Edo about the Keicho period was one to twelve; but this exchange rate was for the metropolitan cities. In Nagasaki, one of gold was exchanged for thirteen of silver. It was due to the scarcity of gold in Nagasaki; and when foreign merchants demanded, much inconvenience had to be borne, as gold had to be supplied from Osaka or other eastern provinces.

SILVER MINT MONOPOLY ESTABLISHED AND SILVER CURRENCY ISSUED.—The ratio between gold and silver was thus distinctly known. But whereas gold was already coined into Oban and Koban in denominations of numerical calculation, silver was still dealt out by chopping off, or, as it was roughly manufactured, by weight. Haifuki silver was roughly manufactured by blowing the silver ore in a furnace. Chopping off meant to have silver beaten flat, marked with lines into sections, and chopped off at the lines when paid out. Dealing out by weight meant paying out silver ingots by weighing them. In June 1601 Toshikata Kanemon Suyeyoshi, a daikan, an agent of the Shogun at Otsu, argued that unless silver coins were issued in order to adjust the ratio between gold and silver and the prices of commodities, commerce could not be conducted properly.

Iyeyasu at once took the advice and established a silver mint in Fushimi, and placed it under the direction of Shozaburo Goto and Kanemon Suyeyoshi, and the management of Sakumon Yuasa, a silver dealer in Sakai. Previous to this, as Sakai had become the trade centre of the country, many silver dealers and silver-work experts had naturally gathered there. They had established the Nanryo-za, where they monopolized the trade in silver. Another name for the house was the Sogin-za. Hideyoshi, angry that the za and tonya monopolized the commerce and trade of the district, ordered them to be closed everywhere; but he was obliged to permit the Nanryo-za of Sakai to be kept open, which shows how powerful this house was. Hideyoshi later ordered the members of the Nanryo-za, and silver merchants of Kyoto, twenty in all, to form a syndicate called josé. José was only another name for za. In the *Komai Nikki* is given the following statement, dated April 17, 1594 :—

> TO THE SILVER MANUFACTURERS OF OSAKA.
>
> His Lordship Taiko hereby changes the name into josé, and the following persons are chosen as members : Kyusatsu, Sosetsu, Shusei, Soretsu, Jihei, Riemon, Matabei, Yosuke, Jinzaburo, Jiroyemon, Sukejiro, Saburojiro, Genzaemon, Shingoro, Sanemon, Saburoemon, Yahei, Jirozaemon, Toemon, and Jihei. Total, twenty persons.
>
> The above-mentioned persons will be granted His Lordship Taiko's seal afresh as a token of appreciation for the presentation of ten pieces of tin ware and five pieces of hot-water pots to His Lordship Hidetsugu.

HISTORY OF SILVER MINT JOSÉ MONOPOLY.—In the Monarchical age the Fujiwara family had what was called uji-no-choja, head of families, whose duty it was to see that fair-play and square deal were maintained as the guiding principle among the related families, and that their relations to each other were harmoniously preserved. The Tachibana family had no one among its related families to take that position. The Fujiwara, therefore, supplied one such chief to perform the service for the Tachibana families. This office was called the josé. In 1068, during the reign of Emperor Goreisen, Morosane Fujiwara was appointed a josé for the Tachibana families to manage the affairs pertaining to the family interests. The office of josé, founded by the silver merchants of Sakai, was so named after the ancient one. Hideyoshi, in ordering the establishment of the syndicate of josé, only employed the name which had already existed among the silver merchants of his time. Apparently, Sakuemon Yuasa was the leading family for the syndicate. These josé silver merchants stamped their respective family emblems on the silver lumps which they manufactured, or used one common emblem as a mark of guarantee for the quality of silver. The Taishi silver and the Kamaya silver circulated very widely. Sakuemon appears to have used the emblem of Daikoku god. Thus the private silver currencies, issued by the silver merchants, had circulated for years and in wide circles. When the Tokugawa family newly issued a legal tender silver currency, it was feared that the people might not trust it, and hinder the circulation because of their suspicion. Consequently, Sakuemon was ordered to stamp the emblem of Daikoku, which he had used formerly for his private silver currency, and to add the word "josé" to the mark. This legal tender silver currency was called Keicho silver, such great care did the Tokugawa family take when it minted the newly established silver currency. Still the general public hesitated to use the new currency in circulation. The silver merchants, therefore, attached their own family stamps additionally as a guarantee for the currency, thus helping it to circulate generally. That the exchange merchants of Edo and Osaka in later years attached their own family stamps to the gold and silver coins was a relic of this old practice. The Shogunate Government disapproved of it, but was obliged to acquiesce since without those stamps the new currency could not be circulated in commercial transactions. It showed that the credit of the Tokugawa family currency was yet weak.

WEAKNESS OF THE CREDIT OF SILVER CURRENCY ISSUED BY THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE.—While the Tokugawa Shogunate established a gold and silver currency system, gold had not been used much among the people in commercial transactions up to that time, so that it was not an easy task to establish unity in the gold monetary system. But as regards silver, it had long been used in Kyoto and its neighbourhood. The Iwami silver-mine and the Tajima silver-mine had been producing silver in large quantities since the middle of the Ashikaga period. Especially the Yamana family of Tajima Province and the Ouchi family of Iwami had long held power in the silver market, with Kyoto as their centre of activity. Much silver, therefore, was distributed by the two families in different localities, with Kyoto as the distributing centre. To add to that condition, the Tada silver-mine of Settsu Province produced a large quantity of silver all at once during the Toyotomi period. That set a pace for the output of other mines, mostly in the south-western districts. Consequently, the markets in Kyoto and Osaka districts generally used silver as the medium of exchange. Moreover, silver was convenient to use as it represented smaller units of value. Accordingly, silver had long been the medium of exchange for the Kyoto and Osaka districts. That the Tokugawa Shogunate Government, coining the new silver currency, could not readily drive out from circulation the private coins issued by silver merchants, may be gathered from the fact that the private coins were

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tacitly permitted to be circulated side by side with the legal tender coins, as witness the following quotations from the proclamation published after the Tokugawa Shogunate issued the legal tender silver currency:—

> It is hereby proclaimed, by order, that there shall be no discrimination made between the silver stamped with the Kiku Daikoku and the silver minted by the josé, and that both of them shall, hereafter, be treated on equal terms. If, however, the quality of silver is found to be bad, it shall be reported to the Government. Otherwise, no discrimination shall be shown.

This tacit permission was observed rather permanently. It opened the way for two systems—gold weight and silver weight. Long afterwards the private silver coins issued by silver merchants were at last withdrawn from circulation by the Government of the Shogunate, and recoined into Government currency. But silver was not used like gold currency, i.e. by numerical calculation. It still was employed in circulation by weight, i.e. a currency by weight. Therefore, it should be noted, whereas the currency policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate was a complete success as far as the gold was concerned, it almost failed as regards silver. If in anything it can be called successful, it will be due to the fact that the ratio of the quantity of pure silver, and the foreign substance contained in the coins, was determined, so that the ratio between the weight of gold and of silver was fixed.

Unification Policy of Copper Currency.—Copper coins had already been generally used from the Kamakura period among the people in trade; but the old copper coins minted after the Monarchical age, the Kara-sen or the Chinese coins which came from China, and private copper coins circulated at that time. Meanwhile, there were variations in the price, high or low, and in popularity, so that these coins were circulated among the people with much confusion. The dishonouring of these coins because of dislike was popularly spoken of as eramu, or choice. Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, in their work of reform of the currency system, stopped short at the gold currency and did not touch the copper currency. Yet in the ordinary daily business transactions, among people below the middle classes, copper coins were chiefly employed. Especially in the eastern provinces, where the supply of silver was scarce, the unification of copper currency was an urgent necessity. In such case, the first method to unify the currency would have been to choose among the several kinds of currencies which had so far been in circulation, make it legal tender, and reject others. In that event, the amount of the chosen currency should have been made sufficient to meet the needs of the people, and also the practices among the people looked into. The second method would have been to place all currencies on an equal footing, and to prohibit the use of private and damaged coins.

But when the coins so far employed had been the currency *de facto*, such a vague standard would necessarily weaken the power of choosing the proper currency. The third method would have been for the nation to issue a new currency and to redeem the old currency, or to leave it to be driven out of circulation. The third method would have been the best one to adopt. But, in order to resort to it, sufficient real strength would have been needed, and the new currency should, in reality, have controlled the old currency. The policy of the Tokugawa family was to employ all of the foregoing methods. In 1603 the Eiraku sen, copper coins imported from China, were circulated, and base coins also were circulated at the rate of four to one. This showed that the first method adopted was already a failure. In 1605 the Keicho tsuho were newly minted. But the quantity of the new coins was insufficient to relieve the market of the old coins. In the same year an order was proclaimed for the prohibition of the use of base coins. In 1607 circulation of the Eiraku sen was stopped by order. But this order did not mean that the qualification to be legal tender copper coins was altogether removed. Only the Eiraku sen were reduced to the level of the baser coins. It was due to the fact that the worn-out Eiraku sen were not, after all, much better than baser coins. In 1608 the ratio was determined between all kinds of currencies in circulation, 1 ryo of gold was to be exchanged for 50 momme of silver and 4 kwamme of copper coins. Thus the Shogunate Government chiefly relied upon the second method in order to unify the copper coinage. In the 3rd year of Genwa (1617) the Genwa tsuho were issued. But these coins met the same fate as the Keicho tsuho. Later, several times, orders were proclaimed regarding the circulation of base coins. The regulations became very minute. In 1616 the following order was issued:—

> Broken, damaged, worn-out and Namari coins shall be discriminated. Excepting these kinds of coins no other shall be discriminated. One bu of gold shall be exchanged for 1 kwamme of copper. Any person found discriminating, or in the attempt to pass the same, upon found guilty, shall have his face stamped with a burning brand, and when any violation of the regulations is located, all the inhabitants of the town shall be fined for the offence.

Despite all these punishments, they had no effect in carrying out the policy of the unification of the copper currency. In 1636 the colossal statue of Buddha was melted, and the Kwanei tsuso coins were minted. Thus the Tokugawa Shogunate failed in the first and second methods and was obliged to resort to the third method. In the same year, the Shogunate began to mint the copper coins in Edo and at Sakamoto in Omi Province. In the following year, copper mint monopolies were chartered at nine places, namely: Mito, Sendai, Yoshida (Mikawa Province), Matsumoto, Takata, Nagato, Bizen, Bungo, and in the domain of Naizen Nakagawa. In these places the Kwanei tsuho coins were ordered to be minted. The coins thus minted were artistic. They were permitted to circulate alongside with the old coins. As a result the copper currency was almost altogether unified. Thereafter the only act done which was noteworthy was to issue repeated orders for driving out base currencies and prohibiting private coinage. When the Kwanei tsuho was minted, at first the circulation of the old coins was not prohibited. Despite this fact the bad money did not drive out the good in accordance with Gresham's Law. The reason was due to the fact that there were not sufficient quantities of the good coins to go round. The new coins, although possessing value far above par, were not retired from circulation. There was, however, a fear that these coins might be exported through Nagasaki. This was the reason why, in 1659, by request of the Dutch, copper coins for export purposes were minted. The prohibition of the export of Kwanei tsuho was due to this reason. Next in importance to be noted was the fact that, whereas copper coins were several times minted and added to the volume in circulation, viz. in the 2nd and 3rd year of Meireki (1656 and 1657), the 8th year of Kwammon (1668), and the 4th year of Genroku (1691), the impression of all the coins was the Kwanei tsuho. This showed in one respect that the coins minted in the era of Kwanei circulated very favourably, and in another respect that it was the most proper method to follow from the standpoint of currency policy, as was the case of establishment of the josé. Thus in the year 1670 an order was issued prohibiting the mixture of old copper coins with the new, and so the copper currency system was brought to perfection.

Reason for the Success of the Unification of Gold and Silver Currencies.—As described, the unification of the copper currency required comparatively long years to bring to perfection. The work concerning gold and silver was completed in 1601, as far as the first method was concerned. This was due, no doubt, to the fact that the policy of Iyeyasu was an opportune one. But there were two contributory causes which helped to carry out the policy. One was the concentration of political power which was perfected by the Tokugawa family. The second was the increased production of gold and silver, which, together with the amount accumulating since ancient times, were concentrated by the Tokugawa Shogunate. Even after the country was brought to a political unity, it could not be said that there was centralization of power, and there were circumstances which made it impossible for the Government to change the popular customs and practices at once. Such local currencies as the kai gold and hanafuri gold and others still circulated in their respective localities. Especially to be noted was the fact that it was in the year 1609, when the Toyotomi family minted the daibutsu ban gold out of the treasured hoard of gold. Yet the Tokugawa family had not regarded these coins as private coins.

Increase of Gold and Silver.—The cause of the increase of the supply of gold and silver in those early years of the Tokugawa Shogunate Government was twofold—the opening of the gold and silver mines and the confiscation or contributions of gold and silver. The Tokugawa family did not declare Government ownership of mines, but directly operated all the best mines. As for any claim which had already been discovered, it was left to the so-called governor of the land where it was discovered, as of Oadzuke—left in the care of the governor—and a portion of the output was ordered to be paid as a tribute. Years before, when Iyeyasu was only the governor of the provinces of Suruga, Totomi, and Mikawa, he had already taken pains to have gold and silver mines opened. According to Article 53 of the Mountains Act, issued in Suruga Province, extra-territoriality of mines was recognized in order to encourage the mining industry. It appears that the gold of the time came from the northern part of Main Island and Izu Province, where the metal had been abundantly stored at that time, tradition says. But after the establishment of the Edo Shogunate Government, the production of gold and silver suddenly increased. The *Kembunshu* records the circumstance as follows :—

> In the period of administration of the present Shogun, gold and silver mines appeared in various provinces, and the tributes of gold and silver were carried by bullock carts or on horse-back every day continuously. Especially, the island of Sado was a treasure island composed of gold and silver only. These gold and silver products were shipped in boxes of 12 kwamme each, one hundred of such boxes constituting a ship-load for uniform vessels of fifty horse-loads each. Every year five or ten vessels left Sado Island in fair weather and arrived at a port of Echigo Province.

Again, it tells of the circumstance of the distribution of gold and silver among the people as follows :—

> When I, an old man, was young, I used to regard 1 or 2 ryo of gold or pieces of gold-work on a utensil as rare objects, and one who possessed five or ten pieces of gold was regarded with envy as a man of wealth. To-day things have changed. Even a mere farmer or a commercial man possesses 5 or 10 ryo of gold. The commercial man who is regarded as wealthy possesses 500 or 600 ryo.

Viewed in that light, the statement of Hakuseki, the famous historian and statesman, was by no means altogether out of place.

> When our sacred Iyeyasu appeared, Heaven and Earth seemed to have assisted his work.

But Hakuseki and other scholars said, counting the amount of gold minted since the commencement of the Tokugawa Shogunate by Iyeyasu, that they totalled 20,000,000 ryo, and that minted since the Middle Ages of Japanese history 70,000,000 ryo. That these figures were exaggerated may be seen by reading the chapters on " Trade of Nagasaki " and on " Gold and Silver."

CHAPTER XLI

FROM THE SLAVE SYSTEM TO THE WAGE SYSTEM OF ECONOMICS

Moral Sentiment towards Slaves.—In the Nara period the slave system was the mainstay of the social structure, as has already been explained in the chapter on "The Period of Slave System of Economics." The slave system existed everywhere in ancient times, and was not a remarkable thing at all. But in point of moral sentiment Japan was far behind other nations. For instance, in ancient Rome the number of slaves increased as Rome conquered foreign countries. Because they sided with Hannibal, the Volchians were enslaved. One hundred and fifty thousand Epirotes were sold as slaves by Paullus and 7,000 Carthaginians by Scipio. These are a few examples. The slave trade was most prosperous about 200 B.C., but these slaves did not receive such cruel treatment as some of the negro slaves in America in modern times. They were stewards, actors, or gladiators, and as such were kept for the amusement of the powerful. The position of some of them was to be envied, in comparison with the slaves of the Monarchical age of Japanese history. But deprived of their natural liberty, they were not content with their lot, and in 73 B.C. came the slave war under Spartacus, which shows that the Roman slaves were more spirited than the slaves in Japan. Later, about 50 B.C., Cæsar issued a proclamation that one-third of the cultivators of farms and gardens should be free citizens, thus desiring to check the increase of slaves and their abuse. The cruelties perpetrated on slaves were not decreased by it, and it was not until about A.D. 200 that the right to punish slaves was taken away from the citizens of Rome, and was delegated to the police officials, in order to prevent the owners of slaves from treating them with extraordinary cruelty. Should any slave-owner perpetrate unbearable cruelty upon the slaves, the latter could either be released or transferred to a more lenient owner. In those days, should a slave show especial loyalty to his owner, or if he had done something for which the owner wanted to do him a special favour, it was often the case that a slave was given his freedom. Again, some owners often released their slaves to satisfy their own vanity, to be praised for such acts of kindness. In China there were many slaves in Tsin and West Han. But Emperor Kuang Wu of East Han, about 30 B.C. or 40 B.C., often proclaimed laws for the emancipation of slaves, although such laws were not often regarded. It is an undeniable fact that it was realized then that slavery was a bad system. On the contrary, in Japan the slave system was publicly recognized in the Nara period, and was continued even until the so-called enlightened periods of Enki and Tenroki, about A.D. 950. No Government order was issued regulating the slave system. To prohibit the abandoning of old slaves by the roadside was the only thing done. In that respect the statesmen and scholars of Japan were lacking in mental vision, and Japan was at least from 400 to 500 years behind China and Europe in point of moral sentiment.

MANORS ROSE AND THE PEOPLE MIGRATED.—Time is a great reformer. About A.D. 950, that is, in the period of Enki and Tenroki, the slave system had to disappear of its own accord. But it was not the work of a great law-maker, nor was it an achievement of a great statesman. It did not come from the influence of religion, as was the case in Europe. It was due to the establishment of manors by the family of the Emperor, Princes and Court ladies, who wanted to satisfy their private greed for gain. It is to be noted that the agrarian system of land distribution according to the population, of the periods of Taikwa and Taiho, failed, and that the system of manors rose, because the ideal established during the Monarchical age did not materialize. It was indeed a source of regret to all. But, as a result of the rise of the manors, the slave system was destroyed, which should be regarded as a great service rendered by manors in the progress of the civilization of Japan. In the day when, because of the system of land distribution according to population, the area of land cultivated by the people of different provinces and counties was uniform, there was no migration of the people. Even if they migrated, they could find no means of livelihood. But when the system of land distribution according to population was destroyed, and manors arose, the industry of cultivation of the land appeared, for which manual labour would be concentrated, where it was needed. Thus the migration of the people began. The people who could not obtain land by distribution migrated as waves driven by storm, and rushed towards the manors, driven by the necessity of a livelihood. In that manner the class of so-called "ronin," which literally means " people moving like sea waves," arose. When the ronin migrated from their original places, the slaves also migrated in company with them. No one could prevent that. Thus laws did not release the slaves, and although there was no war of slaves, as in Rome, slavery as a social system disappeared in a short time. History does not record how and when the system disappeared. But it appears that when laws were frequently proclaimed dealing with vagrants, that was the period when slavery disappeared. The taxes on manor land owned by temples, shrines, and the princes were small and the personal service required was light, so that farmers abandoned their own land acquired by the system of land distribution according to population, and migrated to the manor land. The phenomenon has already been described in the chapter on "The Manor System." Glancing at the Government order of June 894 (6th year of Kampei), one will see that the Governor of the province of Kii contended that the farms within his jurisdiction on the land distributed by the Government had decreased, because the workers removed to the manor owned by the shrines, that, whereas formerly a farming establishment on land owned by a shrine had originally consisted of five or six men, the number was then increased to fifteen or sixteen, and even to twenty or thirty. This was due to the lightness of taxes on land owned by shrines and the heaviness of the tributes of personal service and the taxes on land owned by the Government. The farming people on land owned by the Government were under the jurisdiction of the provincial Governor, whereas the farming people on the manor land were under the jurisdiction of manor house, temple, or shrine.

North-Eastern People flee to Keiki Districts.—The foregoing historical facts enable one to imagine how the people on the Government distributed land, suffering from heavy taxes and severe personal service, fled from one place to another to the shrine land, the temple land, and the manor land. But the migration of farmers took place not only within a county, but also from one province to another. The Government order of June 893 (5th year of Kampei), commanded that the people of the provinces of Mutsu and Dewa, who had fled to the Kyoto districts in order to escape from the burden of taxation and services, should be arrested and brought back to the original districts from which they had fled. These migrants were called fuko (vagrants), possibly because they depended upon others for a living and lived like slaves. But in August of 884, an Imperial message was sent to the province of Kazusa, and an order was proclaimed that the ronin (the wave men) within that province, be driven away. It appears, therefore, that the Yezoites migrating from the north-east to other districts were called fuko, and the people of the more civilized districts who migrated from their original grounds to other districts were called the ronin. But the moving of the people was not confined to those places alone. There were persons who abandoned Kyoto districts and went to country districts, where, taking advantage of the ignorance of the inhabitants, they reaped enormous profits. Some persons went out to country districts as local government officials, whence they did not return, even after their term of office expired, and robbed the inhabitants of their property. That fact can be noted from the following order of the Government, issued in September 891 (3rd year of Kampei):—

THE ORDER OF DAJOKWAN.

The members of the families of farmers in Keiki districts have been prohibited from migrating to live in other provinces. This was already clear from an order issued on June 25th, 2nd year of Seiko (854), and the instructions given to the Dazaifu on April 29th, 16th year of Enreki (797), regarding the supervision of the fuko. The order, therefore, should have been clearly known by the people. We, however, hear in these days that some persons, when their term of official service is over, and they are relieved of their office, even the retainers of the Imperial princes and their sons and grandsons, form into groups and rob the farmers, hinder the progress of agriculture, trespass on the rights of others. If the native people welcome such migrants and do not report them to the authorities, and if the authorities, knowing it, should fail to punish the offenders, they shall all be subjected to the same degree of punishment since the orders shall be repeated and strictly enforced. Recently, noble people, domiciled in the Keiki districts, either by marriage or by changing their occupation into agriculture or trade, begin a new occupation and often do serious harm. Persons who commit such an outrage shall be strictly controlled and ordered to return to their original places of living. Those who appeal to be permitted to remain where they are should, upon proper investigation, be registered there officially. Persons who violate this order shall be subjected to punishment for violating the Imperial command, regardless of whether or not they have atoned for the offences committed, and they shall engage in the same occupation as the natives. These men have organized their factions, overrun the villages and hamlets, overawed petty officials, and menaced the people. Not only have they hindered the progress of the country, but they have also destroyed the welfare of the country. The Prime Minister hereby instructs that the order be promulgated and strictly enforced, and reports be submitted before July next year as to whether the migrates are going to leave or stay. Those who still violate the laws, in spite of repentance, shall be punished without exception. If the farmers should still welcome them and authorities fail to punish them, they, too, shall be subjected to the punishment described before.

September, 3rd year of Kampei.

MANORS PROSPERED AND GOVERNMENT FARMS DECLINE.—About A.D. 800, both the central districts and the outlying local districts were in a state of great economic and social confusion. In spite of the long distances to be traversed and the inconvenience of travel, people migrated in large numbers. At the same time the manors prospered extraordinarily. Even the land, not permitted to be opened by any law, was called a manor, so long as it belonged to persons of power or nobility in the central districts, and such manor was exempt from taxation. If the governor of a province pressed the people for the payment of taxes, the manager of a manor, representing the owner, would protest against the payment, confidently relying upon the authority and influence of the owners in the central district. The governor, therefore, found it impossible to enforce the law, as he feared retaliation, on various pretexts, by the powerful and rich owners, through which he might lose his official position. So he assumed an indifferent attitude. After some years of this situation the manors became protected by custom and openly exempt from taxation. Thus exempt from taxation, those who lived in them and tilled the soil had their burdens lightened in various ways. That was an attractive inducement to many who flocked there to establish their new homes. The koden, farms owned by the Imperial Household and corresponding to the Government land of to-day, were abandoned. The taxes of the time were divided into two kinds of land-tax—service-tax and tributes. When the koden declined and their area decreased, the return from land-taxes and the tribute decreased accordingly. The governors of provinces and the sheriffs of counties, in order to maintain the dignity of their offices, needed a certain amount of service-taxes. But, because farmers of the koden fled in groups to the manors, the burden of the service-taxes fell altogether upon the farmers who tilled the soil in the remaining Government farms. These, also unable to bear the burden, which grew ever heavier, fled to the manors. Consequently, the manors prospered all the more and the Government farms declined. The Government farms declining, the land-taxes and the tributes to the Central Government decreased proportionately. The decrease of the revenues of the Government led to the decline of the authority of the Government. Those who served the Government found it unprofitable to continue in this service and that they ran no danger in contravening the Government authority. Thus, governors and county sheriffs began to serve the owners of the manors and to take orders from them, and acquired the titles " Zaicho " (underlings) and " Shoji " (clerks).

The most extreme cases were those of some of the governors, who robbed the Government of the Government farms and made them their own private property, or of some of the officials of the Central Government, who changed their occupation and became big land-owners in local districts. In those times the powerful families in the local districts who had been managing manors for the central nobles also changed their occupation and revolted against the owners, robbed them of the manors, and made the property their own. Such were the conditions of the country in the last days of the Fujiwara family.

SLAVERY DISAPPEARS ABOUT A.D. 900.—The big land-owners, who thus robbed the manors and the Government farms, gathered all kinds of men under them regardless of their character, so that they might be able to place under cultivation as much land as possible. Thereupon the farmers of various districts flocked to the protection of the big land-owners. The wave of migration grew tremendously. Consequently, the system of miscellaneous service under which the people of the Government farms had been suffering, that is, beside the land-taxes, the personal service for a number of days during a year, rendered for the Government, was destroyed. The slaves in different localities disappeared, as they were saved by the sweeping tide of the migration, and fled to different places. The distinction between a slave and a free citizen was obliterated. That change took place between A.D. 800 and A.D. 940. Going back a little, we observe that, had the agrarian system of kubunden, distribution of land according to population, continued long, the slaves might have been kept under so long as to have been unable to leave the land where they served. Had there not been such a thing as a manor, which needed surplus labour, the slaves who could not leave the place of their official registry might not have found enough to subsist on. Viewed in that light, the great agency that destroyed the slave system was the disuse of the system of land distribution according to population, and the development of the manors. That means that the old system established for the economic necessity of ancient times was done away with by the new system, born of the economic necessity of modern times. In European history, at the end of A.D. 900, the slaves were changed, almost altogether, into tenant farmers. The serfs, who had been deprived of their liberty to migrate, were changed into small land-owners. Only in a corner of Italy there was a small number of slaves until about the 12th century. Throughout Europe the slave system as such disappeared at the end of the 9th century. That it took place at almost the same time, East and West, was a very peculiar phenomenon.

Slave Economy passes and Land Economy rises.—The age of slave economy passed and the age of land economy came. To be sure, so long as the old laws regulating the relations of the governors of provinces towards the general peoples, of the owners of manors towards the inhabitants, and the imposition of personal service upon the people besides the land-tax, and other taxes were unrepealed, it could not be said that the atmosphere of the age of slavery had altogether disappeared. But the atmosphere was only a remnant of the former age, and slavery as a system had already vanished. In our opinion, even if the age of land economy did come, it would have been of no economic value if it only meant that the former slaves became land-owners. There was no difference between the age of slavery and that of land economy in that the value of land rose only when it was placed under cultivation. The difference between the two systems was, that in the age of slavery the tilling of the soil was altogether entrusted to slaves, so that a large number of slaves were needed, resulting in the hunting of slaves and their sale. The standard of the wealth of the farmers was the number of slaves owned. In the age of land economy, wealth and power were gauged by the acreage of land already cultivated with people living on it. Consequently, in the latter age, the question was not who tilled the soil, but how much cultivable soil there was. This is called the age of land economy. When this age came, the class of retainers popularly known as ienoko or rodo rose.

Land Economy and Retainers.—When the manors developed and they had formed virtually autonomous states, there were, to be sure, people already living in them. But, in order to open up new, unbroken land and to extend the acreage, the number of people had to be increased. Besides, for defence against enemies, soldiers were needed, so that the owners of land with their families and their relatives as centres had to gather under their protection people who belonged to them personally. The owners guaranteed these persons their means of livelihood. In ordinary times these people were commanded to engage in tilling the soil, and in times of war they gave their lives in fighting for their masters and in protecting the castle. Among these camp-followers there were some who were distant relatives of the family of the owners, others were merely retainers. They were generally called ienoko (child of the house) or rodo (followers) which originated about A.D. 1000, when the development of the system of manors reached its height. About A.D. 1091, when the influence of Yoshiye Minamoto had reached the provinces of Kwanto, the eastern part of Japan, the powerful natives offered him their land as tribute. At the same time they acquired and boasted of the title of "Retainers of the Minamoto family," and used the name of the great house to overawe the governors of the provinces. As the powerful natives, as camp-followers of the Minamoto were retainers of that family, so they in turn applied the title of "camp-followers" to their own retainers in their villages. The camp-followers were the same as vassals in the family which they followed, and became hereditary followers or fudai. Slavery thus declined, and with the passing of slavery, came the age of land economy and the age of ienoko. The ienoko were classed between the slaves and the free citizens, in accordance with the Taihorei, but they were rather nearer in rank to the slaves. In the laws concerning the disposition of the property of the families, it was ordered that ienoko should receive the benefit of the distribution of the farm land, house lots, and other property. The ienoko, as was the case with the ryoko, and kwanko slaves by degradation, were confined to marriage among their own class. The children and grandchildren of the retainers succeeded to the title of retainers, and were subject to the orders of the head of the family to which they belonged., They were exempt only from the disgrace of being bought and sold. It was decreed by law that a child born of a retainer, or a slave, as a result of illicit relationship with the head of the family, or any of the five classes [1] of relatives of the head of the family, should be deprived of its social rank and made a slave. That meant that the retainers were the same as the retainers of the later periods of Japanese history. They were a sort of a slave-tribe of former generations. At the same time, the ienoko, who were otherwise the retainers, were regarded as belonging to the class of slaves changed in form. The principle of slavery was that human flesh was to be used as a form of tax. Consequently, not alone were those persons slaves whose bodies were bought and sold, and whose hands and feet were manacled, and who were lashed with whips to force them to work, but, as long as the system of imposing taxes upon flesh remained, it retained a degree of slavery, even though there may have been differences in the degree. The bukyoku, followers of ancient times, were called the slaves of the Imperial Household, because all the products of their labour were offered to the Imperial Household, and they did not enjoy liberty like free citizens. Now the system of miscellaneous services which was tinged with slavery disappeared, together with the slave system itself, but the system of retainers developed. They paid implicit obedience to the powerful provincials similar to that shown to the Emperor. The retainers should not be regarded as actually slaves. But there was no question but that the loss caused by the decline of the system of slavery was supplied by the ienoko.

Blood of the Retainers in that of the Slaves.—As the system of retainers was thus related to the slavery system, in their veins there flowed the blood of the slaves. From the Nara period the Imperial Government had esteemed the bravery of the peoples in the east, and had been accustomed to summon far more of the eastern provinces as guards of the Imperial palaces. At first this levy of personal service was equitably distributed among the different villages ; later, these men were called in for several generations from particular villages continuously, to engage in the protection of the Imperial Palace. These villages were called parties or factions. These parties were particularly numerous in the province of Musashi. The so-called " Seven Parties of Musashi " were example. These seven parties, of which the most noted was the Kisai-no-To (Private Party), fought bravely in the wars of Minamoto and Taira. The development of these parties most clearly shows that the slaves became the serfs, the serfs the powerful tribes, and the powerful tribes the samurai warriors. In 577 (the 6th year of the Emperor Bitatsu) the Kisaibe private village was for the first time established. The Kisaibe was otherwise called the people of the private villages of the Empress. The Kisaibe were found, here and there, in the provinces of Musashi and Kawachi. The people of the Kisaibe in Musashi changed into serfs in a short time, and from serfs into powerful native tribes, then into soldiers, who were summoned to Kyoto. Continuing in their occupation, from generation to generation, they were called the Private Party. This Private Party were the soldiers who came from Kisaibe and made fighting their hereditary occupation. There were many other parties beside the Kisai-no-To, who were also professional soldiers, such as the Arimichi-To, the Murayama-To, the Shibuya-To, and the Kodama-To. These parties were different from the daimyo or nobility. They were people of modest means, who could not afford to employ many retainers to make themselves independent, and they therefore formed alliances with other parties. The Seven Parties of Musashi were an example. It was called also Shi-no-To. The central headquarters were at Kisai in North Saitama, which was called Kisai. From that place the people of Kisaibe expanded to Honjo, Kumagai, Chichibu, and other neighbouring districts, but Kisai were the original. There were forty-five villages which had a shrine of Ikutsu, whose origin no one has been able to ascertain. Possibly a chief, who led slaves in a fight to obtain liberty, was deified there.

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[1] Five classes of relatives were: 1. Parents and children. 2. Brothers and sisters. 3. Uncles and aunts. 4. Cousins. 5. Second cousins.

THE KISAI-NO-TO, A VERITABLE SPARTACUS BAND.—Among the warriors of the eastern districts, who most bravely fought during the period of the Minamoto and Taira rivalry, there were not a few who had risen out of the ranks of the serfs. That fact can be noted from reading the accounts in the *Heike Monogatari* and the *Genpei Seisuiki*. Kumagai-no-Jiro Naozane, who was the most renowned warrior in the battle of Ichi-no-tani, was a leader of a Kisai-no-To. By their efforts the Taira family was driven from Ichi-no-tani to the western sea. At that time Kumagai-no-Jiro was no longer a slave. He was a powerful man having a large following under his command. But his lineage was that of slaves. The warriors of the eastern section of Japan around Tokyo were indeed a sort of a Spartacus band. When Naozane with his iron arm killed the delicate Taira-no-Atsumori, it was a battle of slaves against the nobility. The war of Minamoto and Taira was like the wars fought by the Grachi and others of Rome. It was a significant slave-war.

THE LAW PROHIBITING THE ENSLAVEMENT OF MAN.—As was explained in the foregoing paragraphs, along with the abolition of the system of land distribution according to population, development of the manors, and migration of the population, the slave system disappeared. But the slaves, whose presence was the curse of society, still persisted. There were some persons who kidnapped others and sold them as slaves. Some parents, who were hard pressed for a living, sold their children. But during the one hundred and fifty years after the period of Enki and Tenreki, 901 to 950, the social conscience gradually awakened. Moreover, because of the peace which was established in the land by the Minamoto and the Hojo, the minds of the people became gentle and the waves of civilization rose higher. The evil practice of human enslavement was not tolerated, and a proclamation was issued in 1225 (the 1st year of Karoku) to prohibit the practice.

Slavery is permitted during the Years of Famine.—The Imperial command for permitting slavery was issued from the Imperial Government at Kyoto to the districts in Kinki under the direct jurisdiction of that Government. In 1230 (the 2nd year of Kwanki) there were universally poor crops in the country, which caused a famine. Starved corpses lay uncared for along the roads. Poor people, hard pressed for a living, sold their wives and children. In extreme instances, not a few men sold themselves as slaves. Whereupon, with the idea of meeting the extraordinary situation by an extraordinary method, the sale of the human body was publicly permitted. That it was permitted to those who saved starving men and women to make them their slaves was noted in the order of the Shogunate Government, dated April 17th, 1228 (1st year of Sho-o), as recorded in a compilation of Government orders. As a result of such public permission of the sale and purchase of slaves, the trade prospered, and there were many instances of trickery, fraud, and kidnapping in the business. Litigation increased enormously. The Government, unable to endure listening to those cases of law, again prohibited the slave-trade, that is in 1238, during the reign of Emperor Shijo, in accordance with the proclamation of the period of 1225 to 1226. When the Imperial Government of Kyoto took such trouble to prohibit the slave-trade, the Shogunate Government at Kamakura, however vicious, could not sit idly by. In 1239 an order prohibiting the sale and purchase of slaves was issued. Later, many more prohibiting orders were also issued.

Tax on the Slave-Trade.—The most astonishing thing in the Kamakura period was the law issued in 1256, which provided for the slave-trade, exacting a fixed sum of money as a tribute, or tax, to be offered to the Daibutsu, the great statue of Buddha at Kamakura. Until that time no tax had ever been levied on the slave-trade, but now the custom was adopted, which proves how prosperous the slave-trade was. In ancient times in Rome a tariff was levied on slaves imported from, and exported to, foreign countries. A tax was also levied on the sale and purchase at the rate of 2 to 4 per cent. The East and the West met on common ground here.

The Shogunate Government at Kamakura prohibited the slave-trade, to be sure. But it had not prohibited the slave system itself. The slaves continued to be present in those days. Slaves appeared in other ways than by the trade in them. However, the slaves could regain their liberty more easily than in former times. Those who on account of debts became slaves by circumstance were recognized. The Shikimoku, statutes of Kamakura, issued in 1232 (Keiyei period) provided for it.

MOST SLAVES OWE DEBTS.—The Shikimoku, mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, provided that in case slaves and others of miscellaneous duties served one master for ten years, they may be exempted from further service even if another owner appeared and claimed them. Even if a lawsuit was filed it was not to be accepted. In the Taihorei (Law of Taiho), out of due regard paid to the blood-distinction between the free citizens and the slaves, it was ordained that the offspring of a slave, whether male or female, should belong to the mother. However, in the Kamakura period, the blood-distinctions between the free citizens and the slaves were not respected. Common-sense judgment was resorted to, whereby a male offspring of a slave came to belong to the family of the father, and a female offspring to the family of the mother. The slaves were bound to their masters as such, not only for one generation, but for generations after them ; only their treatment was much improved from that of the Fujiwara period, because at the time there were many wars and the powerful men were anxious to increase the number of their followers, and they were afraid that the followers might leave to belong to others. The slaves were relieved of the greatest of their sorrows, that is, of being bought and sold. Thus the number of slaves bought and sold decreased. But, as a result of debts, many persons were forced into slavery. A man failing to pay tributes for the use of land to the owner was not infrequently made a slave. The Shogunate Government, therefore, issued another law by which, while the slave system was not altogether abolished, many conveniences were granted to the slave.

THE KAMAKURA SLAVES AND THOSE OF THE MONARCHICAL PERIOD. Judged by the foregoing historical facts, we can see that the slave system of Kamakura had changed completely from the slave system in the Monarchical period. The class of people who had been called the Ujibito, men of the family, in ancient time were called aristocrats and free citizens. Those who were called the bukyoku (slaves) in ancient times were called the zakko and the senmin, the miscellaneous households and the outcasts. But in the Kamakura period some persons, either among the Ujibito or the bukyoku, were elevated to the position of powerful natives or warriors. These warriors, in turn, kept under them men of the pedigree of the bukyoku or senmin of ancient times, as their followers, who were then called the fudai, or the hereditaries. That transformation is a noteworthy thing. The ienoko, or man of the family; the fudai, or hereditaries; and the rodo, or party of men, these were the most essential elements of the samurai (warrior) society. Their names, too, have been handed down from ancient time. The samurai society was, after all, a society which had its roots in slave society.

FROM SLAVES OF AN INDEFINITE PERIOD TO SLAVES OF A DEFINITE PERIOD.—Coming down in history from the Kamakura period to the Ashikaga period, there was unlimited political struggle and civil strife, and the authority of the law was disregarded. In the Kamakura period the slave-trade, which had been kept under control to some extent, was revived. Among the Utai, a musical recitation, written in the Ashikaga period, there is a piece entitled *Shizen Koshi* (*Man of Nature*), in which are mentioned " Men who trade in men " and " Ships for the trade of human beings." This gives a hint that the sale of human beings was still conducted on an extensive scale. Among the collections of old documents preserved in the Katori shrine of Hitachi there is a certificate of the transfer of persons, dated 1473, which reads as follows :—

> It is hereby certified that the said man, commonly called Magotaro, age thirty-two, is transferred from next year of Kinor Uma until the year of Tsuchinoe Inu, to wit for five years, for the consideration of 1 kwan-mon. Should the said man take a rest for even one day, we shall see that the purchaser is indemnified for the loss of service at the rate of 20 mon per diem. Should the said man take refuge in the household of a powerful family, a wealthy household, a shrine or temple premises, this certificate may be used to capture the said man. In that event, no objection shall be offered by the village chief, or government of the village, or the relatives. In witness whereof, for future reference, we have written this certificate above set forth.
>
> (Signed and Sealed) SAKON JIRO, {Man who transferred—native of Sumiya of Katori.
> TORAKUSU, Broker.

The significant point which should not be forgotten is the phrase " for five years," which proves that a term limit was already placed on the sale of men at the time, and shows the development of the idea of separating the person of a man from his labour. At the same time laws were issued prohibiting the abandonment of sick slaves on the road. That shows how the treatment of slaves had changed.

The Term Fudai Appears.—Coming farther down in history, in the warlike period at the end of the Ashikaga Dynasty, the fudai was the term for the retainers, miscellaneous service men, slaves, and others, who established permanent relations of master and servant, of lord and retainer. In the family constitution laid down by Takeda Shingen of the province of Kai, in 1547, the following paragraphs are found :—

> When a fudai secures a position to serve a master other than his former master, it shall be, and hereby is, forbidden to the former master to arrest the fudai upon right.
>
> No light punishment shall be meted out to those who permit a person in debt to roam about, running away from his native place. Those who give the debtor harbourage, shall be required to pay the debts. It is provided, however, that in the case of selling one's self as a slave, the former practices shall be followed.

Later, in 1597, the 100 Articles of Law laid down by Motochika Chosokabe contained the following :—

> In regard to fudai, men and women who have served their masters for ten years shall be fudai, if there be no reason to the contrary.

The term fudai was employed in the middle of the Monarchical Age in the case of a father and his son who had continued in official service in succession. The significance of the term was changed, and it was applied to all those serving their masters, from retainers down to slaves, that is to those who, from the father or grandfather, down to the son and grandson, were inseparably bound to their masters by the ties of service. The system of fudai was best organized by the Tokugawa family. Those retainers who served the Tokugawa family when it gained supremacy were known as fudai, while those who came to serve the Tokugawa family, after it had established its hegemony in the country, were called tozama (outsiders). It was ordered that none but fudai should become the high officials of the Central Government of the Shogun. All the Government was planned with the fudai as the centre, and they enjoyed many special privileges. At the head of their fudai, who were well organized and trained, the Tokugawa family oppressed the nation. When it is remembered that these fudai were in reality nothing but slaves enjoying liberty or reformed retainers, or well-treated bukyoku, we can assert safely that the society of samurai was, after all, a changed form of the slave system.

The Fudai System of the Tokugawa Family.—When Oda Nobunaga replaced the Ashikaga family, all temples were destroyed and new religions were encouraged; old principalities were subjugated and new ones created; the old economic system was shattered and *laissez-faire* policy was resorted to. Hideyoshi, succeeding Nobunaga, went a step farther in advancing the policy of his predecessor. The two men paid little attention to the slave system and the fudai system; but when Tokugawa succeeded, he issued the new rules, and planned to re-establish the fudai society. His work was that of reactionary conservatism, after the destruction wrought by his two predecessors, so that the important parts of the old systems were re-established. In that respect Tokugawa was the political opposite of the other two men. To be more concrete, whereas Toyotomi Hideyoshi was forward in his foreign policy, Tokugawa was backward; whereas Oda and Toyotomi were for the open-door policy, Tokugawa was for the closed-door policy; whereas Oda and Toyotomi destroyed and prohibited the industrial system based on monopolies, Tokugawa revived the system and extended the scope of the operation of the monopoly of za, which was improved by the introduction of shares. Oda and Toyotomi, establishing the relations of lord and retainer, based their choice chiefly upon the character of men, and were free, generous, and open; whereas Tokugawa Iyeyasu laid importance on history, previous conditions, and fudai, and established his Shogunate Government upon the fudai policy. Since the fudai policy was the basis of his government, it was natural that Tokugawa extended that principle throughout the country, and that he wished to see the relations of master and servant observed by the samurai, and also by commercial men. A strange development was that whereas, during the early and middle periods of the Tokugawa Shogunate, a commoner wished to treat his employees as slaves, like the fudai, or for a long term of service, the samurai (warriors), who had been brought up and reared on the fudai principle, showed a tendency to employ their servants on contract for short terms of one year or half a season. It was an extraordinary development.

EMPLOYMENT OF SERVANTS ON CONTRACT FOR A SEASON BY MEN IN THE SHOGUNATE SERVICE PROHIBITED.—The circumstances which led to the foregoing development may be judged to have been as follows. In the time of war and strife, the samurai, who owned land outside the castles of their lords, ordered their retainers to do the work of cultivation. When war broke out, the retainers were expected to muster below the castles, and were, therefore, indispensable, both in peace and in war. But as a transition step from war to peace, two phenomena developed, the centralization of power and the rise of powerful princes. Of course, in time of war, the power of a handful of influential persons was not sufficient to cope successfully with an enemy, and such people wished to belong to powerful princes and to enjoy safety under their protection. So the smaller influential natives lost their power and powerful princes rose. These princes possessed one or two castles within the confines of their respective dominions, where it was necessary to concentrate the fighting forces. The influential natives, who before had been scattered in different places, and who now became a part of the war machinery of the princes, could not long enjoy peace and safety if they remained on their own land. They, therefore, were obliged to leave their landed possessions to farmers to till, and they themselves, at the head of their own retainers, went to live below the castles of the princes, as in Edo, Osaka, and so on. But about the time the samurai gathered below the castles of the princes, the country commenced to enjoy a period of peace and prosperity, and there was very little opportunity for warfare. The samurai found it irksome to maintain the retainers long in their service, however indispensable they may have been at first. While the samurai had possessed their own private domains, and had employed the retainers in the service of exacting taxes and tributes from the farmers, in gathering the crops of rice and other grain, in weaving cotton and hemp fabrics, they had not minded the expense of maintaining them. But now that they themselves were living below the castles and drew their revenues, not from their land possessions directly, but from the granaries of their lords, and did not make their own clothes but bought them from the clothiers, and had to pay for every piece of land or tree or grass, they regarded the retainers rather as a burden to themselves than as a help. On the other hand, there were a large number of country people who wandered away from their agricultural districts in quest of the life in cities and below the castles. The samurai began to see the profit there might be in engaging these unoccupied persons for little pay, and they cultivated the practice of employing them when they needed the help of followers, in receiving callers at home and making calls on others, thus pretending to have the required number of retainers in their service. The Tokugawa Shogunate Government, from the point of view of maintaining the fudai system, noted the new development with alarm. If it were sufficient to employ contract labour for a term of one year or half a year, this labour could not be depended upon in times of war. Besides, if the relations of master and servants were changed from fudai system into the relations of contract labourers, who would be shiftless because of the amount of pay, it would lead to disaster. This could not be overlooked by Tokugawa, whose policy was a conservative one, and the Government issued a proclamation in October 1616 (2nd year of Genwa) forbidding the samurai to employ their retainers on contract for a term of one year or half a year. But the proclamation clearly was a contravention of the spirit of the age. How much did the Shogunate Government allow to be paid to the chugen (servant) or the komono (pages), whom the Government wanted to make the fudai? According to the law of February, the 15th year of Kanyei (1638), "The chugen, the komono, and zoritori" (one who looks after sandals), "shall receive, besides the food supplied by their employers, between 2 ryo and 2 ryo 2 bu a year, and no clothing shall be furnished them." What a bold policy it was to make persons fudai for such small pay. This law was repeatedly issued and forced upon the people. But its effectiveness was lessened year by year, and after the middle of the Tokugawa Dynasty it became altogether ineffective.

THE SHOGUNATE GOVERNMENT PROFITS SLAVES UNDER THE GUISE OF LONG-TERM SERVICE.—As has been explained before, the plan of the Tokugawa Shogunate Government to apply the fudai system to the retainers of the families of the samurai was a failure. But the plan to break up the fudai system among the commoners succeeded. In the first place the Government, in order to break up the evil practices among the commercial families, farmers, and craftsmen who engaged servants by contract for a long-term service, and who bound the persons of the servants almost the same as in the case of the sale of slaves, issued the following proclamation in the 2nd year of Genwa (1616):—

> The term of service of a servant shall be limited to three years. Any longer service shall be, and is, unlawful.

At the same time the sale of persons and the brokerage of such sale of persons was prohibited on penalty of capital punishment. The Government also tried to prohibit contracts for long-term service intended for using persons as slaves, and in 1619 issued the following proclamation:—

> Any person kidnapping others and selling them shall receive capital punishment.
>
> Any person buying the persons of others and selling them shall be imprisoned for one hundred days and fined, according to his position and wealth. Should he fail to pay the fine he shall receive capital punishment.
>
> After the sale of persons shall be prohibited, the seller and the purchaser of persons, whether fudai or ienoko, shall pay the fines, both of the sale and the purchase price. The persons sold shall be released and permitted to do as they find suitable to themselves.
>
> Any person kidnapped and sold shall be returned to the original owner. If he does not belong to anyone, he shall conduct himself as he wishes.
>
> Any person who has conducted a lodging-house for slave-trade for a long

> time shall receive capital punishment. If he has given lodging for one night, he shall be examined and properly punished according to the findings of the examination.
>
> In regard to brokerage for the sale of persons as slaves, if that brokerage was connected with the sale of persons kidnapped, the broker shall receive capital punishment. If it were the sale of fudai, iyenoko, and other retainers, the punishment shall be meted out in accordance with the degree of culpability, either by imprisonment or the imposition of a fine.
>
> Any person violating the proclamation prohibiting long-term service shall be punished with fines on both sides in accordance with his position and wealth.

In the time of Iyemitsu, third Tokugawa Shogun, a law was proclaimed in 1625 ordering that the sale of persons shall be prohibited altogether :—

> The employment of men and women for continued service shall be limited to ten years. Beyond ten years it shall be punishable by law.

In January 1627 the following law was proclaimed as a general order of prohibition, applicable both to the samurai families and the commoner families :—

> The samurai shall not employ one-season retainers, or chugen, or komono, provided, however, that if these should wish to render the service they may do so with impunity.
>
> The master who retains persons for one season shall be fined according to his position and wealth.
>
> A person who is found to be in service for one season shall be imprisoned or ordered to become a fudai.
>
> A person who becomes a bondman for one season retainer shall be punished either with imprisonment or fine.
>
> Any person discovering any case of violation of the foregoing orders shall report the matter to the authorities at once and he shall be immediately rewarded.
>
> As to the service, the limit shall be ten years. Beyond ten years it shall be punishable.
>
> The sale of persons shall be altogether stopped. If anyone is found violating the law, he shall be punished in accordance with the degree of culpability, either with capital punishment, or imprisonment, or fine. Supplementary to the foregoing, the keeper of a lodging-house and the keeper of an employment brokerage agency shall be punished similarly.

PRICE OF A SLAVE, FIFTEEN MOMME.—The law laid down in the foregoing articles was issued not only once, but tens of times. It was proclaimed also in the time of the next succeeding Shogun. Many historians in the past have neglected that fact. But from the point of view of economic history it has an important significance, because the time of the repeated issue of the law was the time when great efforts were being made to abolish the slave system among the common people, and to replace it with a system of apprentices and pages. One who has studied only the slave system in America, which, as the result of the practice of making slaves in most cases out of foreigners, was accompanied with lashing and hard labour, may be astonished to hear that there was a slave system also in Japan. But that system certainly existed until the close of the Toyotomi period, or in the earlier period of the Tokugawa period. In 1612 (17th year of Keicho, the year when a Dutch ship came to Hirado, the year when the noted order forbidding Jesuit Christianity was issued, and two years before Iyeyasu invested Hideyori, in the castle of Osaka) the following deed of transfer of a person was actually delivered :—

DEED OF TRANSFER OF A SON.

I hereby sell and transfer to you the person of my son, Nashinoetta, aged fourteen, for 15 momme of silver. I recommend that he shall be made a fudai for generations. Should there be any violation of the terms of this deed, I shall readily accept the divine punishment of the greater and lesser gods of Japan, especially the Daimyojin at Ichinomiya. This document is hereby made and delivered as a proof for the future.

(Signed and Sealed) TAGAMI SHINKICHI OF FUNAGAWARA MURA.

February 11th, 17th year of Keicho (A.D. 1612).

OKAMOTO SUKEBEI, OF IKKAICHI.

In this year the price of 1 koku of rice was approximately 17 momme, so that 15 momme of silver would buy only about 8 or 9 to of rice. A son was sold for this small amount of silver, and the son's sons and grandsons were pledged for ever to servitude by the slavery contract. An astonishing phenomenon, indeed. Moreover, there were some persons who sold the children of others to the Portuguese or the Spanish at Hirado or at Nagasaki. These foreigners took the children on board and worked them unmercifully hard, or took them to the Philippines or Macao, or other places, and sold them there again. Thereupon the Government of Toyotomi and Tokugawa issued laws to prohibit the practice. But it was not a phenomenon which was confined to one locality. Slaves existed everywhere throughout the entire country.

SLAVE SYSTEM GAVE PLACE TO APPRENTICE SYSTEM.—However, in the earlier period of the Tokugawa Shogunate Government, with the inauguration of the reign of peace, the minds of the statesmen turned gradually towards justice and humanity. The opinions of scholars came gradually to be respected and put into practice by the Government. In order to stop the sale of persons as slaves, viewing it as a remnant of barbarism, the authorities prohibited it, and also prohibited the practice of making persons slaves on pretence of long-term service, or, in the name of fudai, condemning the sons and grandsons of slaves for ever to a life of slavery. At the same time, fearing that a contract labour system for one season might bring sudden changes, and decline to commerce and industry, the practice of binding persons for a term of ten years continuously was permitted, in the hope of leading the minds of the people, who regarded the slave system as very convenient, to the principle of employment by contract for a term. The development of the system of apprenticeship was then really inaugurated.

INCONSISTENCY OF THE SHOGUNATE GOVERNMENT.—While thus the Shogunate Government attempted to destroy the slave-trade among the people, and also the fudai system for long-term service, at the same time it blundered into inconsistency. Already the country had enjoyed a period of unity and peace for twenty-five years. The chiefs of the principalities and the hatamoto chiefs lived in Edo to enjoy a peaceful life. War became a dream of the past, so that there was no need of employing chugen, komono, and other war-like retainers. They were needed only for making and receiving calls, or for ceremonies. No importance was therefore attached to them. For such service working-people, drawn to Edo by the attractions of the city, were employed temporarily, and paid a fixed amount for their services. They were free to come and go to suit themselves and their employers. The Government was alarmed by this condition, because, if in that manner the organization of the samurai should become one based upon contract labour according to civil law, how much good would such mercenary soldiers be in times of war? What about the inseparable relations of lord and retainer based upon the fudai principle as the foundation of the solidarity of society, as sung in the old ballads?

"The relations of parent and son are for one generation, those of husband and wife for two generations, and those of lord and retainer for three generations." This idea, so deeply rooted in the minds of the people, would be fundamentally uprooted. The Government authorities seriously studied the problem. While prohibiting slave-trade and similar practices among the commoners, the same law also provided that military retainers should not be employed for one season or half a season, and ordered that they should be made fudai. Fudai, as noted in the deed of transfer of persons of the 17th year of Keicho, mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, meant a perpetual service of one's self, sons, and grandsons to a master. That was certainly a sort of slave system. While prohibiting the perpetuation of the slave system among the commoners, thus carrying out a radical reform policy, the Shogunate Government, on the other hand, maintained it among the samurai class. It was clearly an inconsistency.

THE APPRENTICE SYSTEM RISES AND THE SLAVE SYSTEM ALTOGETHER DISAPPEARS.—At that time, in large cities beginning with Edo, already many commercial and industrial undertakings had arisen. The nature of these undertakings was such that it could not be understood except by those who had served long, and who could receive secret instructions and continued verbal education, so that the enterprises, when they employed assistants, maintained them for the first few years, giving them only their board and clothing. These assistants were very rarely expected to help in the manufacturing work from the start. Should they, after two or three years of apprenticeship, having learnt something of the art of manufacturing, go away to serve another employer, the employer would gain nothing for having fed, clothed, and educated them. The employer therefore avoided employing assistants as much as possible, but preferred to keep apprentices who would agree to serve for many years without shifting from one master to another. If possible, he would buy the persons of such apprentices. If not, he would want the apprentices to make a contract for permanent service. In the commercial houses the situation was not altogether the same as with the craftsmen. But, in judging commercial articles and deciding the method of sale, the commercial men were naturally experts in their line, and their ways could not be learned unless the men were more or less experienced. Consequently, when commercial houses engaged apprentices, they could not afford, as in the case of craftsmen, to have the apprentices leave them after a short term of service, so that their position was not different from that of craftsmen, in so far as they wished that their apprentices should serve for a long term. With the development of commerce and industry, the number of apprentices employed by commercial houses and craftsmen gradually increased. But now, because of the order prohibiting the contract for long-term service and of the sale of persons, these employers faced a deadlock in the supply of apprentices and pages. They were then permitted to engage them only for a term of three years continuously. But three years were not enough for the commercial and industrial enterprises, and the Shogunate Government permitted the extension of the term of contract to ten years. At the same time the sale of persons was all the more strictly prohibited. From that time on the system of apprentices and pages of the Tokugawa period came to be firmly established. In fact, the apprentice system became an instrument both for furnishing the machinery of commercial and industrial production, and for the commercial and industrial education. On the part of the apprentices the object was to acquire commercial and industrial knowledge, experience, and skill, so that after accomplishing their training they might establish their independence. On the part of the employers the recognition of the independence of the apprentices was given only when they were satisfied that the young ones were qualified for such independence. Accordingly, even when there was no law as to the term of service—since years were necessary for an apprentice to acquire special knowledge, special experience, and special skill in his trade—there really was a system of service for a certain term. The law proclaimed only gave sanction to the custom in vogue. The system thus established contributed much toward economic development, because commercial and industrial knowledge, experience, and skill were thereby enriched and handed down traditionally, just as with the apprentice system in Europe, which has been a paramount contributory cause of commercial and industrial progress in modern Europe. To be sure there were defects in the system. In the long term of service of ten years at a stretch, the apprentices and the pages were expected to trust their employers in respect of food, clothing, and shelter, even of their own lives. If they were beaten for punishment, or imprisoned for correction, the apprentices were not permitted to say a word of protest. Their condition was almost like that of slaves. Besides, commercial houses and craftsmen, knowing that their competitors in trade might increase, made the gates and doors of their establishments as narrow as possible, and also on various pretexts tried to curb any independence on the part of the apprentices and craftsmen. But, as machinery of production of modern commerce and industry, and also as an educational institution, the apprentice system unquestionably rendered an invaluable service in fostering commerce and industry in the Tokugawa period. Thus the slave system, which had existed for more than a thousand years, was brought to an end.

Reappearance of Slaves.—But a social disease of a chronic nature is liable to break out again. In 1674 there were big rainstorms lasting for days. Rivers overflowed their banks, and the poor in different provinces were very hard pressed. So the next year the Shogunate Government issued a proclamation : " As a result of the damage by floods in different provinces last year, the people are suffering from hardships, and so, for the present year only, persons may be employed for long-term service or as fudai." That was an extraordinary measure to meet the situation caused by natural calamity, and was only temporary, but from that time the practice of selling persons as slaves came again to be resorted to, under the guise of the fudai or " long-term " service. The atmosphere of the period, when the minds of the people were awakened, contributed toward the abolition of the ten-year term service and permission for the employer and employee to settle their own relations by the issue of the following ordinance:—

" The sale of persons is all the more strictly prohibited. The term of service of servants, men and women, is limited to ten years. But hereafter there shall be no limit to the term of service. Even if employed as fudai, the relations of the employed with the employer shall be determined between themselves. This order shall be kept in mind. Witness the official seal, etc."

With this the system of fixed term service, which had been repeatedly enforced by law since the periods of Keicho and Genwa, stopped absolutely, and the ancient system of perpetual service and the fudai system were revived. It should be regarded as a great social retrogression. However, the period of peace had already continued long, the general standard of living among the people rose considerably, and the spirit of charity was gradually fostered, so that the inhumanity of the sale of persons came to be realized more keenly. Accordingly, while the perpetual service or fudai system existed, the employees were not treated like cattle by their employers, as was formerly the case.

ORGANIZATION OF CRAFTSMEN.—While, as was explained before, the fudai contract between commercial and industrial men and apprentices was permitted, at the same time it was provided that there should be patriarchs of craftsmen in Edo in 1699. These patriarchs were known as kimoiri, whose duty it was to supervise the craftsmen of the same trade, and a sort of trade union was officially organized. The law as to the unions was as follows :—

FOR CARPENTERS : Tsuru of Hida, Kora of Buzen, Heinai of Osumi, Tsujiuchi Mohei, Mizoguchi of Iwami, Yoda of Aki, Kashiwagi of Suwo, and Otani Heitayu.

FOR LUMBER MEN : Ishiyama Kaemon, Sakurai Rokubei, Sakurai Shinbyoye, Tadokoro Sakuemon, and Sano Kiyemon.

FOR LACQUER WORKERS : Koami Yohyoye and Enami Matagoro (also for relief lacquer workers).

FOR METAL ORNAMENT WORKERS : Hachiami Genshichi, Hachiami Matsuyemon, Matsui Genshichi, and Hachiami Genjiro.

FOR BLACKSMITHS : Takai Sukeyemon and Takai Yasoemon.

FOR STRAW MAT WORKERS : Iami Shinnojo, Hayakawa Sukeyemon, Nakamura Yatayu, and Watanabe Yosoyemon.

FOR PLASTERERS : Yasuma Gentayu, Tani Tarobei, and Shimizu Yojiyemon.

FOR ROOF WORKERS : Suzuki Ichibei and Hikawaya Chojiro.

FOR WOODEN BUCKET MAKERS : Hosoi Tojiro and Noyama Gensuke.

FOR TILERS : Hirashima of Iki, Saito Yoshiro, and Hashimoto Gohei.

FOR QUARRY MEN : Kameoka Kyuzaburo and Maeda Bunshiro.

FOR PAPER PASTERS : Yamada Kihei.

The foregoing persons are hereby appointed the kimoiri. Therefore, not only the craftsmen having their own establishment, but also those renting a house or a shop or a lot, and their apprentices and employees, shall be apprised of this order. In regard to the work done, all shall mind and observe the directions of the kimoiri without fail. This order shall be promulgated among the craftsmen in each and every section of the city.

Law Prohibiting a Scramble for Working Hands.—Together with the rise of the apprentice system, the system was extended so as to make it a kind of trade union. The Shogunate Government prohibited the apprentices and pages from leaving their employer before the expiration of the term of service to go to serve another employer, in an effort to preserve the apprentice system intact. That fact can be noted from the following proclamation, issued in 1706, to forbid the weaving hands of Nishijin, Kyoto, from leaving the plants at which they worked :—

CAUTION.

The weaving hands and thread workers at the weaving works in Nishijin, who are employed on contract for one year or half-year, do not serve out the term as agreed in the contract and leave to serve other employers. Such is the complaint made by the elders at Nishijin. It is an intolerable practice. If it be done after an understanding with the employers, it may be passed over. But if anyone be found to leave without this understanding with his employer, and go to another employer, he as well as his bondsman shall be punished. Hereafter, workers shall strictly serve out the term as agreed upon by them.

Provided, however, that before employing a hand, the employers shall ascertain whether the previous employer of the hand has any objections or not. If, before the employee has shown his willingness, the employer establishes an understanding with the bondsman for the employee and makes out the contract, any trouble rising from it shall be laid at the door of the employer.

The foregoing order shall be proclaimed among the weavers and sellers of the products in Nishijin and elsewhere, and it shall be carried out.

Fudai Servants as Slaves.—That the last of the long term of fudai servants during the middle of the Tokugawa period was tinged with the colour of slavery is proven by the following memorandum regarding the recapturing of fudai servants who had deserted. The date of the document is not clear, but it is to be believed that it was about the beginning of the 18th century.

We hereby respectfully submit the following memorandum :—

A woman, named Ama, is our fudai servant. Up to last year, the year of the Rat, she had served for twenty-nine years. On the night of July 21st, the same year of the Rat, she was stolen away by a younger brother, Koichiro of the Fujiyemon group, in the service of the acting-governor, Isshiki Tadashiro, of the Nijima estate We made repeated representations that the woman be returned to us. But she has not been returned as yet. She is now in the care of Fujiyemon and Koichiro. We therefore respectfully request that they be summoned and the matter officially examined into.

BUNGAIJI (Seal).

AT THE KATORI SHRINE, SHIMOOSA PROVINCE.
February, the year of the Bull.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR.

On the back it is endorsed :—

We hereby forward to you the memorandum as written on the face of this document. If the matter can be settled out of court informally, we recommend that an order be issued that such a method be resorted to. Otherwise, we shall see that witnesses and evidences on both sides are brought to you. No advantage shall be permitted to be taken of unguardedness.

KAYEMON (Seal).
GENZAYEMON (Seal).
KIMBEI (Seal).
HAUJU (Seal).
HARIMA (Seal).
ICHIMASA (Seal).
IZUMO (Seal).
UKYO (Seal).

February 24th, the year of the Bull.

TO ISHIKI TADAJIRO.

OFFICIAL MAID-SERVANTS.—The foregoing is a proof that the employee was in some respects a slave. But a more surprising fact was that there was a class of persons who were clearly called slaves in Edo in 1702. The *Genkyokan Ki* of Isezakicho, which records incidents of Isezaki Street, in the past, contains the following reproduction of a document :—

MEMORANDUM.

At the office of Lord Matsumae of Izu, a girl named Kin, ten years old, has been granted to the town to be employed as a slave. We hereby submit our note therefore.

(The note hereby submitted.)

A male and a female person each granted 1 bu of gold and without any home, who came from your house in Honjo, have been granted to the town, to be employed as slaves. We are very grateful for the grant. We shall not make any complaint to you should any trouble arise in regard to them. Your gracious order that should they make an escape or commit something wrong in the future we should report it to you is suppliantly regarded by us with appreciation. In witness of the foregoing, this note is hereby submitted.

HACHIYEMON (Seal). } Monthly Secretaries
SABUROYEMON (Seal). } for Ise-cho.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR.

The above-mentioned Kin, being a female, cannot be maintained in the town. We therefore made inquiries whether anyone would take her as an adopted daughter, and found a person who is willing to adopt her.

SECRETARY.

As to a girl named Kin, ten years old, a slave granted by honourable authority to the town of Ise-cho, I, wishing to adopt her as my daughter, duly expressed the wish, Jirobei officiating as kimoiri, to the honourable parties in charge, and the said Kin was granted to me to be made adopted daughter. Especially, in view of her bringing up and marriage in due time, 4 ryo of gold has been granted to me, which I appreciate most heartily. I shall not waste the money. I shall properly bring her up. Aside from her marriage, I shall never send her away to another family. Should you hear of any wrong done, you shall reproach us in any way to suit yourselves.

In witness of the foregoing, I, together with the security men and their seals attached, hereby execute this note of security.

KAMBEI, Adopted Father (Seal).
In the shop of Matayemon, Sanchome,
Tachibana-cho.

ROKUBEI, Security Man (Seal).
In the shop of Kyubei, Sukeyashiki,
Shinnorimono-cho.

JIROBEI, Kimoiri.
In the shop of Jenbei.

June 17th, 15th year of Genroku.

TO THE MONTHLY SECRETARIES FOR ISE-CHO.

The slave men and women of the period under review, while the slave system as such existed, were not in practice treated differently by society from the ordinary commoners. They were not the victims of fear and cruelty.

SALE OF PERSONS IN KYUSHU.—As stated in the foregoing paragraphs, the system of long-term slavish service was practised in Edo and Shimoosa Province, which is very near to Edo. No wonder that it also was practised in outlying districts. Tachibana Nankei was a native of Kyoto, who practised medicine and was a learned scholar of literature. He died in 1805, and in his book, *Seiyuki* (Western Travel), it is recorded that for two years, from 1781, after the famine of Temmei, there was an open custom of selling slaves.

“ In regard to slaves who sell themselves for life, the owner had the liberty to beat them to death, and no complaint is to be filed by their parents. Both male and female, there were many servants of that nature. Farmers who possessed large tracts of rice farms employed many servants. They might establish a secret liaison with the servants and beget children. No strict prohibition was exercised over such practice. The owners of the servants looked after those children with kindness. They were called the niwanoko, children of the garden, and were regarded, as fudai, slaves in perpetuity. The slaves, too, regarded the households of the masters as their own, and served the masters loyally and faithfully. When any daughter of a master was married, the slave-maid was sent with the daughter of the house to the family into which the daughter was married. If the slaves were displeasing to the master, the master sold them as he wished." Not only in the district mentioned, but also in the farming villages removed from metropolitan cities, such customs must have been practised, whereas in metropolitan places the term service system was in vogue. In short, in agricultural districts there were slaves, whereas in commercial and industrial districts the term service system was practised. Liberty followed where commerce and industry were developed. Thus, on one hand, there was the term service system, and, on the other, was the system of service for life. However, from the earlier period of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the workmen of cities were generally employed for wages. That custom gradually spread to the agricultural villages. Throughout the Tokugawa period the wage economic system gradually was developed, while the apprentices were limited to special crafts and commerce.

CHAPTER XLII

PERSECUTION OF CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY

Catholic Christian Doctrine in Japan.—Christianity came into Japan after the arrival of the Portuguese; the Jesuits were the first to come, and later the Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustins, who, while differing in the minor points of their teachings, preached essentially the same doctrine.

Atmosphere of the Doctrine.—Every one of the articles of their faith stood for the advancement of morality and the purity of conduct. There was no ground for opposing or criticizing them as they stood. But no religion, no political doctrine, no philosophical theory, is judged on its tenets, logic, or principles, but generally by the atmosphere in which it is advanced. When Catholicism came to Japan, the civilization of Western Europe, which was the product of Catholicism, the arms which were brought by the Portuguese under the direction of the missionaries, the commercial advantages which they gave, the devotion and the purity of conduct, and other attributes of the missionaries beyond the articles of their faith, surprised the Japanese people, and the new religion spread like wildfire.

Similarly, in the reactionary period, in the time of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Catholicism met with many obstacles, not because of its articles of faith, but because of the attributes of the religion. The Portuguese, who were regarded with respect by the Japanese, gradually grew arrogant, and often inflicted wrongs upon the Japanese, even resorting to force. After Xavier, the first missionary who started Christian propaganda in Japan, the later missionaries who came were inferior in character. Taking advantage of the piety of the Japanese adherents, these missionaries became arrogant, and were often contemptuous of, and disrespectful to, the high officials of the Government.

Moreover, some of the more clever missionaries intrigued among the daimyos and influential people, and mixed in politics in order to extend their power. For that reason, the people in general, even until to-day, have been suspicious of Catholicism. These failings, combined with the growing national self-consciousness, proved the source of the troubles which overwhelmed Catholicism in Japan. From the close of the regimé of Hideyoshi to the earlier period of Iyeyasu, Catholicism was doomed to decline.

Catholicism at the Close of the Hideyoshi Regime.—In 1598

Hideyoshi fell ill of a kind of dysentery in his new palace in Fushimi. The physicians at first thought that the illness was very slight, and had not paid serious attention to it, but from the close of June the patient grew worse, and on a certain day in August was unconscious for two hours. Thereafter he entrusted the affairs of state to daimyos, trying to forestall jealousies and quarrels by marriage alliances between daimyo houses. At that time the Catholic missionaries were already driven out of the country. There was, however, one missionary named Rodriguez who was permitted to live in Nagasaki and act as an interpreter between the foreign merchants and the Japanese officials and people. When a Portuguese ship arrived in Nagasaki, Rodriguez, carrying gifts from the captain and accompanied by two or three Portuguese, went to Fushimi and applied for an audience with Hideyoshi, who refused to see his companions, but received Rodriguez alone by his sick-bed. Seizing his chance, the Portuguese preached to Hideyoshi about heaven, but his hearer haughtily refused to accept the gospel. Still, he gave Rodriguez 200 sacks of rice, a suit of clothes, and a ship, and at the marriage ceremonies of the daimyo he had the priest invited as a guest of honour, showing how important a social position the Catholic missionaries held. When Hideyoshi died, the missionaries in Kyushu, taking advantage of the opportunity thus presented, made many efforts to have the prohibition law alleviated. The daimyos also overtly obeyed the law, but covertly were slow to enforce the prohibition.

From the time of the death of Hideyoshi to the 5th year of Keicho (1600) there were 70,000 persons converted in Kyushu alone. Iyeyasu, when approached by the missionaries, told them that it was not proper to break the old law so soon after the death of Hideyoshi, and advised them to wait for a more favourable opportunity later. As a matter of fact, Iyeyasu did not care about any religion, but he was more alive than Hideyoshi to the advantage of the commercial gains and civilization which were behind Catholicism. He, therefore, soothed the missionaries with a promise for the future in his usual non-committal way, but the very fact that he did not strictly enforce the prohibition law was a great blessing to Catholicism in Japan, and the evangelists, thinking that the time of the revival of religious influence had come, redoubled their efforts. In the 5th year of Keicho (1600) fourteen missionaries came to Japan, and in the same year fifty churches were revived. These two facts amply prove that Iyeyasu temporarily adopted a policy of leniency.

DEATH OF MITSUNARI AND YUKINAGA.—Meanwhile Iyeyasu, in the same year, defeated the remaining followers of Hideyoshi at Sekigahara, and not a few Christians, from Ishida Mitsunari and Konishi Yukinaga down, were made prisoners and were executed. When Mitsunari was captured, he was worried by an attack of dysentery, and his attendants laughed at such cowardice when he was on the verge of death, and suggested he should commit suicide. Mitsunari coolly replied: "God in heaven granted me my life. It is my duty to do everything in my power to maintain it until He takes it from me." Yukinaga had intended to commit suicide, but in conformity with one of the Catholic articles of faith he suddenly changed his mind, and decided rather to meet criminal punishment and to bear the ignominy and pains of being a Christian. His request to be allowed to see a priest was refused by Kuroda Nagamasa.

In the meanwhile Iyeyasu issued an order that Mitsunari, Yukinaga, and Yekei of the Ankokuji be blindfolded, put on the backs of donkeys, and paraded through the streets of Osaka, while a prison official was ordered to cry aloud the crimes they had committed. They were then taken to Kyoto, where they were drawn on a wagon through the streets, and exposed to public view as in Osaka.

Finally they were executed. When he was killed, Yukinaga called out the name of Christ, produced a picture of the Saviour, and held it heavenward.

The loss of Mitsunari and Yukinaga was a severe blow to Catholicism in Japan, for the influence of these two men had made the religion politically important. More than that, many of the converts, who were brave generals and men under the command of the two Christian statesmen, also died in the battle, which robbed the Church of many of its strongest adherents. Mori Terumoto, too, had publicly permitted Christianity to be preached, and was counted among the patrons of the religion. After Sekigahara, he fled to his own country, and Iyeyasu ordered the Mori family to deliver the head of Terumoto, promising, on that condition, to pardon the rest of the generals and the men. The Mori family was perplexed and at a loss what to do. A twelve-year-old son of Yukinaga, who had come to the Mori family to seek protection, was offered in place of Terumoto, but Iyeyasu would not accept the compromise. The Mori family, therefore, first hid Terumoto and then requested the Hongwanji to intercede and to appeal to Iyeyasu for a pardon, which was obtained; and thereafter the Mori family oppressed the Catholics and supported the lesser temples of the Hongwanji, giving them various special privileges. The two provinces of Nagato and Suwo were for a long time a stronghold of the Hongwanji, and the Koshoji in Echigo Province claims that it is in the direct line of succession of the Hongwanji. To this temple the Mori used to contribute secretly, and it may have been that they rendered services in the case of Terumoto.

CATHOLICISM PUBLICLY PERMITTED AND PREACHED IN HIZEN IN THE PERIOD OF GENERAL PROHIBITION.—Terasawa Shima-no-Kami Hirotaka was the lord of Karatsu, Hizen Province, and at the same time governor of Nagasaki. He profoundly hated the Catholics, and was in his turn an object of hatred of the Christian converts. By order of Iyeyasu, allied with Arima Harunobu and Omura Kizen, he had set out to attack the Shimazu forces; but the Shimazu family early submitted, and consequently Iyeyasu planned to move the Omura family from Omura in Hizen Province to govern Amakusa, which had been the possession of Konishi Yukinaga, and in turn to set Hirotaka over the Omura domains. The Omura Daimyate was purely Catholic, so that the idea of letting Hirotaka govern it was plainly an expression of the policy of setting the anti-Catholics to fight the Catholics, and shows somewhat the attitude Iyeyasu adopted toward the faith. From the point of view of foreign trade, Omura persuaded Iyeyasu that it would be unwise to send him to Amakusa, and he posted Hirotaka there after all. The influence of Christianity was still sufficiently strong to oblige Iyeyasu to give way at least temporarily, and permit the people in the domains of Omura and Arima to follow the Catholic faith. Even with the backing of Iyeyasu, Terasawa Hirotaka, who came into possession of the former domains of Konishi, could not accomplish his plan of ejecting Catholicism.

He not only permitted the people to adhere to their faith, but also requested a missionary, who came from Nagasaki for religious supervision, to send teachers for the work of educating the people. This missionary, after several conferences with Hirotaka, drew up with him a treaty of four articles, under which he agreed to send teachers.

Article 1 of the treaty provided that the church and other buildings, which were the possession of the missionaries while Konishi Yukinaga was alive, should be returned to them. Article 2 provided that permission should be granted to rebuild the churches which had been destroyed and to build new ones. Article 3 provided that permission should be granted to employ men for public service in building churches and houses for the missionaries, and that contributions might be solicited. Article 4 provided that no obstacle should be placed by the lord of the domain and his officials in the way of preaching the Gospel. When one considers the significance of Article 3, which was the permission for the people to build churches and houses as a public service, it is clear that Amakusa was altogether a Catholic country, and that the Catholic churches had the authority to command the people.

KATO KIYOMASA AGAINST CATHOLICISM.—But Kato Kiyomasa, who ruled a greater portion of the province of Higo, was determined to carry out prohibition more openly than Terasawa. When he first came into the province, he, too, had adopted a fair and mild policy, thereby easing the mind of the people. But from about the 5th year of Keicho (1600) he gradually showed his true colours. Toward his retainers and the people of his domains who became Catholics, he was unsparing in his condemnation. A register of names was kept, and every one had to swear whether he was a Christian or not, and attach his seal to his name; all adherents of Christianity were to be stripped of land and other property, and official salaries and allowances stopped. Because the order was very severe, some of the Shintoists and Buddhists advised the Catholic adherents to obey the order of the ruler openly, and to adhere to their own religion secretly, in order to avoid immediate disasters, and a number of the Catholic Christians took the advice.

But the majority refused to do so. Kiyomasa was unsparing in carrying out his orders, and punished them by boycotting, every one being forbidden, on pain of severe penalty, to sell them anything. And yet it is curious that, while himself a devout follower of Hokke sect of Buddhism he secretly sheltered the boycotted Catholics and sent them food. He was still afraid to behead them. In the end, all the Christians fled from the province, and Kiyomasa was much elated. One day he met Hosokawa Tadaoki, lord of Buzen, in the palace of Iyeyasu in Fushimi, and boasted of the success of the anti-Catholic policy in Higo, taunting Hosokawa with not being a Catholic and yet harbouring Catholics within his province. Tadaoki was violently angry and replied: "I do not know if there is anyone among my retainers who is a Catholic or not. But I do know this much—my retainers are all honest and loyal subjects." Both men became so furious that a duel in the palace was only just prevented.

KIYOMASA INFLICTS CRUEL PUNISHMENTS.—Kiyomasa then returned to his domains, and, in order to ascertain whether the anti-Catholic policy was really strictly carried out, he one day sent a Buddhist priest of the Hokke sect to the house of Kakusayemon, Mayor of Yatsushiro, and ordered Kakusayemon to call his followers together and bid them place the Hokke sutra on their heads and worship in front of the priest. These men were secretly Catholics, but the majority of them, as a measure of expediency, obeyed orders. Minami Gorozayemon, a personal friend of the mayor's, and a few others, would not obey the order, in spite of all the persuasive words of Kakusayemon. By order of Kiyomasa, Gorozayemon was killed by three soldiers and his children crucified. From that time the cruelties and persecutions continued. Waverers either abandoned their faith or hid it, but the stronger spirits rebelled on account of the incident, and resolved to die for their religion if there was no relief for them.

IYEYASU AND THE TACTICS OF THE MISSIONARIES.—As was explained before, the Catholics were well treated in some quarters and maltreated in others.

There was no fixed policy toward religion at all, the result of the lack of a definite idea as to the Catholic faith on the part of Iyeyasu, who never paid any attention to any religion, although particularly hating Catholicism. He, however, valued highly the advantages of trade, and feared lest he might lose them if she should maltreat the Catholics, and thereby anger the Portuguese. He therefore hesitated. Consequently, when Lord Terasawa of Shima, as the Governor of Nagasaki, lost the confidence of the Christians, Iyeyasu, in the 8th year of Keicho (1603) dismissed him and appointed Ogasawara Ichian as his successor. But the real power was held by Murayama Toan, chief of the Catholics and a close friend of the missionary, Rodriguez. He was assisted by four elders of the Church. They were all Catholic Christians.

In January, the 8th year of Keicho, Marecio, the priest in charge of Christian propaganda in Kyoto, was courteously received by Iyeyasu, and when the news reached Osaka, the persecution of Christians there stopped. The missionaries, too, realizing that the object of Iyeyasu was trade and not religion, did everything in their power to bow to his wishes. The Franciscans, for instance, learned that Iyeyasu wished to have the Spanish merchant vessels call at the ports in Kwanto, in his own direct domain, and bring the profits of the trade there. They therefore suggested to the Shogunate Government that they intercede between Japan and Spain, so that every year large vessels might sail from Lisbon, and other Spanish possessions, with merchandise, and call at the Kwanto ports. Iyeyasu was delighted at the suggestion, and permitted the Franciscans to reside in an important part of Yedo, and asked them to get him large vessels built in Spain to be worked by Japanese and gold-mining experts. (For details, *vide* the chapter on foreign trade.) But the Spanish authorities in Lisbon, not liking to sell large vessels to Japan, refused to do so, on one pretext or another, and the merchant ships which were sent to the Kwanto ports were very small ones. Even then the Spanish, on the ground that the Kwanto ports were narrow and small, and that there was danger from pirates, avoided calling there. The main reason of Iyeyasu for permitting the foreign missionaries to stay in the country then disappeared; but they were clever enough to get hold of Honda Tadazumi and Okubo Tadakuni, who were most influential in the Shogunate Government, and were very jealous of one another, and, by temporary means, succeeded in preventing interference with their preaching.

Dutch Vessels burnt and Dutch Traders driven away.—At that time the daimyos and influential men vied with one another in sending vessels abroad to engage in trade. In the 10th year of Keicho (1605), Harunobu, daimyo of Arima, Hizen, sent a ship to Annam, by permission, and succeeded in obtaining a supply of incense-wood which Iyeyasu had long sought in vain. The Shogun was greatly delighted and ordered more, granting 60 kwamme of silver as a capital to be invested in purchasing foreign goods, besides armour, gold screens, etc. Harunobu planned to send a merchant vessel specially to Annam, and it set out under command of Kyubei, piloted by a Portuguese, and with a crew of 300 or more men. When the vessel was at anchor at Macao, waiting for fair winds, the Portuguese of Macao quarrelled with the crew of the vessel, and many Portuguese were killed. As a matter of fact, the traders did not at all like Harunobu trading directly, and when this incident took place the elders of the port instigated the citizens to attack the house where Captain Kyubei was staying. All the members of his crew, except the Portuguese pilot, were killed. In 1609 a Portuguese named André Pessoa brought a ship to Japan, and the Shogunate Government ordered Harunobu of Arima to attack the vessel in revenge for the Macao incident. The rumour at once spread that the sinking of the vessel would be followed by the massacre of the Portuguese residing in Nagasaki, so the Catholics, that is, all the Portuguese, were advised to flee to the vessel ; only 50 had time to do so before she put out to sea.

Harunobu commanded about 1,000 soldiers to pursue in ten or more ships. The wind went down, the Portuguese vessel was becalmed, and eventually blown up and sunk. The Shogunate Government ordered that all the Portuguese in Nagasaki district be killed and the missionaries driven out of the country, but Harunobu, having been a Catholic himself, interceded for them, and the affair was closed with only the ejection of the Portuguese traders.

Iyeyasu again invites Portuguese Merchants to Come.—The Portuguese thus driven out of the country, foreign trade almost altogether declined.

In the 14th year of Keicho (1609) Dutch and English came to Nagasaki, but they were not as familiar with Oriental trade as the Portuguese and the Spanish, and their goods did not satisfy the needs of the Japanese people. Whereupon, Iyeyasu ordered the Governor of Nagasaki to address a letter to the Catholic missionaries in China, requesting them to use their influence to induce the Portuguese to send their merchant vessels to Japan again for reopening trade. They did, and made Hirado and Nagasaki their headquarters. In August, the 16th year of Keicho (1611), Hasekawa Fujihiro, Governor of Nagasaki, reported to the Shogun to his great satisfaction that the number of vessels from China, the South Seas countries, and other foreign lands, reached eighty, and that the trade was prosperous. Iyeyasu was very much delighted to hear the report.

DOWNFALL OF OKUBO CHOAN.—But to prohibit the Catholic faith absolutely was already the desire of the nation. The people who had respected the character of the Catholic missionaries began to hate the Portuguese, who were behind the missionaries; and those who had been awed by the great power of European civilization before they had distinguished between the right and wrong of the Catholic faith, now suspected that the race which possessed so great a civilization as the European race, must have ambitions to annex other countries, and that Catholicism was a means to the end of annexation. Together with these suspicions which had been aroused, the national self-awakening had become a great power. Gradually the people became conscious of the fact that, whereas Japan was behind Europe in the matter of material civilization, she was by no means behind Europe in moral civilization, the influence of Catholicism became limited. At that very time the Dutch, who wanted to monopolize the Japanese trade, pretended to be faithful to the Shogunate, and spoke evil of Catholic countries. This also helped to deepen the suspicions of the people, which were added to by the political quarrels at home. For example, Okubo Choan was a Christian, and he had a desire to overthrow the Tokugawa house. Among those not of samurai blood employed by Iyeyasu were Goto (the Mint Master), Chaya Hirojiro, and Okubo Choan, who had been a Nō actor. Okubo controlled the mines of Sado, Izu, Suruga, and other places, and had the supervision of the roads.

In February, the 9th year of Keicho (1604), he raised the milepost along the Tokaido, the Tosando, and Hokurikudo. These mounds were placed 1 ri apart, and on each was planted a nettle (enoki) tree. Nihombashi in Edo was made the starting-point of the roads, and distances between towns and villages throughout the country were surveyed, and the freight rates on horseback between different horse-stations, which had been various, were unified. The burden for a horse was fixed at 45 kwan (if there were a rider weighing 18 kwan, then 22 kwan of goods), and the rate for one-horse load was 16 mon, with an increase for a road across a mountain or a river, or any other difficult road. Choan was an expert civil administrator who understood the people, and everything he did in various administrative affairs was well done. This simple actor of Nō became within a few years a nobleman, and was called the lord of Iwami; but the luxurious life he led when he began to manage the mines invited the envy of others and made him many enemies. In February, the 18th year of Keicho (1613), he died, and his enemies, anxious to punish him, accused him of having used the Catholic faith to establish communications with foreign countries, in treason against the Tokugawa Shogunate. His house was searched and his property examined. It was a popular story that when Choan was about to die, he called his twenty-four concubines and gave them each 10,000 ryo, beside Chinese and Japanese fabrics; but Choan's legitimate eldest son, Tojuro, and his second son, Chojiro, had seized the gold promised to the women, and only handed over 1,000 ryo each. The women were very much provoked, and twenty or more of them went in a body to Suruga to appeal directly to Iyeyasu. Then the Shogun was said to have sent officials to search Choan's house. They discovered 700,000 ryo of gold in the house, and, in a stone box buried in the garden, copies of a treaty of alliance with several malcontent daimyos for forming an alliance with the South Sea countries in a war against the Tokugawa Shogun. Whether Choan was a Catholic or not was not clear, but he had employed foreign experts to supervise the mining operations in Sado, thereby greatly increasing the production of gold, and, consequently, it was a fact that he had made a contract with foreigners. But he was a simple official of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and his only aim in life was to amass a fortune and to amuse himself with mistresses. Had he entertained any grudge against the Tokugawa family? Was there a plan for a civil uprising? The documents said to have been found in his box, signed by the daimyos, may have been the accounts of the Sado Mines and securities for loans made to daimyos out of ill-gotten gold. Yet his enemies, who were inflamed with jealousy, insinuated that he had been planning a revolt.

Iyeyasu was quite intelligent enough to know that it was only a made-up story, but the extravagance of Choan had offended him, and he tacitly permitted the confiscation of his household property, pretending to know nothing about it. For many such reasons, which were altogether outside of the sphere of religion, the Catholic faith was misunderstood and hated by the people. In March, the 17th year of Keicho (1612), the Shogunate Government at last decided on a policy of prohibiting Catholicism.

AMONG IYEYASU'S CLOSE FOLLOWERS THERE WERE CHRISTIANS.— In the same year, in March, Iyeyasu, while in Fushimi, summoned Itakura Katsushige to Kyoto, and ordered him to destroy all the

Catholic churches, and Catholicism was prohibited in the country. At the same time, ten Edo hatamotos, close followers of Iyeyasu, were formed into a group to supervise prohibition, and ordered to watch each other carefully. The orders were transmitted over the country, and the daimyos everywhere employed all the forces at their command to prohibit Catholicism, except two or three feudatories of Kyushu, and even these latter were later obliged to come into it. Iyeyasu for a long time had disliked the Catholic religion, but put up with it out of consideration of the foreign trade advantages; and now he was shocked to find that even among his hatamotos, whom he had trusted as being undividedly loyal to him, there were a large number of converts.

In the 17th year of Keicho (1612), there were fourteen daimyos, or titled nobles, whose territorial possessions were confiscated on account of their faith. Among these were a hatamoto samurai called Ogasawara Gonnojo of Suruga; two converts baptized as Joseain and Bartholomew; Sakakibara Kahei, Master of the Hawks; and Hara Mondo. But what Iyeyasu was most afraid of was that the Catholic religion had invaded the sacred precincts of his own household.

Otaa, Iyeyasu's favourite Mistress, and Her Faith.—The conjugal irregularities of Iyeyasu were more serious than those of Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi loved women, but he duly respected his true wife. Among his mistresses, he loved Yodogimi best, and she was the centre of his household. In the household of Iyeyasu there was no distinction between wife and mistresses. Anyone who gave birth to a child was respected; others were neglected. When he had killed Konishi Yukinaga, Iyeyasu took into his household a Korean woman named Otaa, whom Konishi had captured in Korea and made his favourite mistress. This unfortunate creature became converted, and was baptized as Julia, and nothing Iyeyasu could do would persuade her to renounce her new faith. Horrified at finding Christianity inside his very house, Iyeyasu exiled her to the island of Oshima, and afterwards to Kamizu.

What Iyeyasu was Afraid of.—Iyeyasu was by now aware of the fact that in Nagasaki, and other districts, the Catholic adherents would not retract their confession of faith, even though subjected to punishments with swords, saws, fire, or other tortures equally horrible. He realized the advantage of foreign trade, and, more than anyone else, desired it; but foreign trade brought the people into contact with foreign countries, as a result of which their minds might be enlightened, and he feared that they might become difficult to manage. He had at first only a vague idea of the existence of foreign countries, and when he looked at the map of the world presented to him by the Portuguese, he realized that Japan was only a small island, and that unless she took great care the future might hold dangers for her. If the Japanese people, who had not realized this danger, should come in close contact with foreign nations and cause trouble with them, he could not but fear the result. In 1599 some Japanese attacked a Chinese vessel off the coast of Manila and plundered it. In 1604 some Japanese raided along the coast of China, and were repulsed by Spanish ships. In 1605 several thousand Japanese planned to stir up trouble in Manila, rebelled against the Philippine Government, and were surrounded and made captives. In the same year Yamada Nizaemon, who was known to come from Suruga, but of whom Iyeyasu had known nothing, suddenly was reported to have become a prince of Siam. Again, in 1606 some Japanese quarrelled with the Portuguese and the Dutch, and they were later reported to have been massacred. Iyeyasu believed that among the tens of thousands of Japanese who were scattered abroad there were many heroes, many rough characters, and many deserters from justice, and he could not but feel that with their return civil strife would arise. He began to fear, when he saw dark clouds and threatening storms filling the atmosphere abroad, that it was most dangerous to approach foreign countries. In 1609, when Harunobu, lord of Arima, sank the Portuguese vessel, Iyeyasu confiscated all ships of more than 500 koku in size, in order to keep the people from going abroad. Now, when he came face to face with the problem of the Catholic religion invading his own household, he was astonished and concluded that, unless this new religion which was spreading among the people was stopped altogether, the country would not be safe. Therefore he proclaimed a prohibition of the Catholic religion. In 1611 Itakura, lord of Iga, was ordered to search the Kyoto, and neighbouring districts, and Yamasaki, lord of Nagato, the western districts.

These men were to take charge of the work of arresting the Catholic Christians everywhere, and of bringing them to Kyoto to be beheaded in Gojo kawara. Iyeyasu also urged the priests of the different sects of Buddhism to build temples in Nagasaki. More than this he could not do toward the prohibition of the Catholic religion. But he could not easily extirpate the faith.

THE SON OF HARUNOBU, A CATHOLIC ADHERENT, PERSECUTES THE CATHOLICS.—Harunobu, lord of Arima, in 1609 attacked a Portuguese vessel and destroyed it. For that service he expected a reward. But the reward had not come immediately, the fact being that Harunobu's Christianity outweighed in the mind of Iyeyasu any service he could render. Too dull-witted to perceive this, he succumbed to the wiles of a petty Catholic official of the Shogunate, who made Harunobu believe that he could get him anything he would, in return for which he pocketed a handsome bribe. When the plot was found out, the Shogunate Government forgot the service rendered by Harunobu in destroying the Portuguese vessel, and at the same time put on record the fact that he was swindled by the cunning petty official.

His daimyate was confiscated and he was exiled to the province of Kai. Iyeyasu then appointed Harunobu's son, Naozumi, who had been long retained in Edo and was educated to hate the Catholic religion, the new lord of Arima, and married him to a daughter of Honda Tadamasa, who was adopted by Iyeyasu. Naozumi from boyhood had disagreed with his father, Harunobu, and he thus became the new lord of Arima, and married the adopted daughter of Iyeyasu, at whose orders he commenced the cruellest persecution of Catholic adherents known in our history.

SECRET CONFERENCE AMONG CATHOLIC ADHERENTS IN ARIMA.—As soon as Naozumi assumed his office as lord of his estate, he drove away every one of the missionaries, and destroyed every one of the churches. Then he forced his people to renounce the Catholic faith, employing every means at his command both to exert his authority and appear beneficent.

Because his people, while they may have secretly continued in their faith, openly renounced it for fear of punishment, Naozumi believed that his work was a success. Among his important retainers there were three, Takahashi Mondo, Fujita Riyemon, and Takeji Kanyemon, who publicly declared that either privately or openly they would not renounce the Catholic religion. Naozumi had the three men and their families arrested, and ordered that they be sent to the stake. The Catholics were satisfied that what they had expected for the sake of their faith had come, and gladly went to the place of execution. The missionaries in Nagasaki, believing that the last day of the Catholic Church had already come, openly sent representatives to encourage the adherents in Arima, while the people of that place were enraged and gathered to the place of execution, to the number of 20,000 or more, openly wearing the cross, the symbol of their faith. They let it be known that they would not shirk sharing the death of the three condemned men, but in order to avoid possible misunderstanding on the part of the lord of the province, none of them carried either sword or club. This huge crowd spent several days and nights in the open, outside the castle of Arima, waiting to see the execution, and the Buddhist priests fled for refuge to the castle, and even the samurai in the castle felt uneasy and retired to Nagasaki, carrying a rumour that an army of Catholics had invested the castle of Arima, and that Naozumi, the lord of Arima, had been killed. Every one was terror-stricken. Naozumi ordered the crowd to disperse on penalty of being shot down, but the threat produced no effect, and five of his own followers, who had publicly renounced Christianity, were so deeply moved by the attitude of the faithful that they went back to the fold and told Naozumi they wished to share the fate of the three. Naozumi, already faced with the complications that might arise from the death of only three men, was much disturbed at the thought of five more, and connived at the escape of the repentant five with their families to Hirado.

HEROIC DEATH OF KANYEMON.—Naozumi felt matters were very serious, but he could not retrace his steps and gave orders for the three men and five members of their families to be burned alive. The crowd had now increased to 40,000, and when the daimyo watched this sea of adherents, he scarcely knew what to do. The Christians solved his difficulty by asserting that their intentions were peaceful and they had no desire except to be present at the death of their fellow-believers. Therefore, if they were allowed to form a procession, there would be no trouble. Naozumi and his advisers had no choice but to grant the request. Whereupon, led by their elders, bearing crosses, the faithful proceeded to the sound of hymns to the place of execution. Those who came from the city of Arima bore lighted candles and wore wreaths of flowers as they marched. Just as the executioner was about to tie Kanyemon's hands to the stake, the victim released himself and addressed the people. Before he had finished, the crowd began to weep and cry aloud, so that his words could not be distinctly heard. Then the fires were lighted, and calling from the flames on the names of Christ and Mary, so that every one of tens of thousands of people heard, the martyrs died an heroic death, and Naozumi lost the bravest and most influential among his retainers. A Buddhist priest named Banzui was summoned from Edo to preach among the people of the daimyate for seven days, but no one would listen to him, and Banzui was disappointed and returned in deep gloom to Yedo, declaring that there was no salvation for the souls of the people. In the event, Naozumi was deprived of his possessions in Arima and removed to Hyuga.

GREAT PROCLAMATION FOR EXTINCTION OF CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY. That 40,000 Catholic converts had defeated the lord of the province at the place of execution in Arima, by conducting religious processions and a peaceful demonstration, was certainly a victory for the cause. But that victory was won at a very high price, for it filled Hasegawa Fujihiro, Magistrate of Nagasaki, with anger and fear. Seeing the

Catholic converts kneeling at the feet of the martyrs and praying, he concluded that they worshipped criminals. Seeing that the clothes which had been worn by the martyrs, and even the stake to which they had been bound, were treasured as relics, he believed that the Catholics worshipped martyrs. When he reported what he had seen to the Shogunate Government, Yedo issued a proclamation in December 1603 ordering the complete extinction of the Catholic religion throughout the country. This proclamation was known to have been penned by Soden, the priest of the Konji-in Temple.

The Numbers of Catholic Adherents at the Time.—Since the arrival of Xavier in 1549 (18th year of Temmon), until the time of the great proclamation, sixty-three years had elapsed. In the forty-nine years between 1549 and 1598, the number of those who had been baptized reached 600,000, and between 1598 and 1614, 152,900. Even during the great persecution there were not a few who received baptism, and up to 1630 there was an increase of 25,000 in the number of converts. If children are included, the Christians may have numbered 2,000,000. In the history of the Church, there had been no such experience since the time of the conversion of Constantine the Great.

But a grafted tree is bound to die, and the end of the Catholic faith approached. From 1613, while there were a number of new converts in parts of Kyushu, the history of the Catholic religion was, generally speaking, nothing but a record of persecutions, martyrdom, and decline.

From the Kirishitan (Christian) quarter of Kyoto, the men were altogether driven away, and the women and children packed in sacks, their heads protruding, were piled up like sacks of rice, and exposed to the severe cold of the winter nights. Women were stripped naked and paraded through the streets, but at that time not much blood was spilt. The same conditions prevailed in Sakai, Osaka, and other large cities, but in these cities the most horrible fate encountered was that of the converts in Kyoto and Osaka. Seventy-one persons, who refused to renounce their faith, were banished to Karatsu, Mutsu Province, in the north-east, as severe a punishment as to be exiled to-day to the northern part of Siberia. The converts, however, cheerfully obeyed the order and went, wearing their best clothes. Among them was a beautiful young woman, who, fearing to attract the passions of the wicked, disfigured her face with her own finger-nails and purposely made herself hideous.

Daimyos who were Lenient toward Catholic Christians.—The converts in Kyoto, Sakai, and Osaka were not, of course, confined to the foregoing few. But the Government officials applied the orders of persecution in a reasonable degree, and did not carry them to the extreme. At the same time the Christians, while covertly devout in their faith, overtly pretended to have abandoned it, thus giving the authorities an excuse to overlook them, and consequently the horrors of bloodshed were averted. Fukushima Masanori of Hiroshima was one of the daimyos who were lenient, and from Edo he bade his heir, who was in Hiroshima, take a mild attitude toward the religion and the expulsion of the missionaries. In case the latter were sent to Nagasaki, he ordered that they be kindly treated on the way.

Toward the converts among the poor within his province he ordered that outwardly severe punishment be administered and that, in reality, a mild policy of leniency be adopted, while in dealing with those of social distinction he gave instructions that rough treatment should be avoided, and that it was sufficient to tell them to abandon the religion openly.

The province of Aki was one of the strongholds of the faith, and in devotion the converts there compared well with those in Kyushu, and that there was no bloodshed there is due to the mild policy of Masanori.

The books written during the Tokugawa period generally speak of Masanori as pig-headed, ill-tempered, and liking to kill people, but such charges are not borne out by facts.

Aki was not the only province where the proclamation for the suppression of the Catholic religion was mildly executed. When Naozumi, lord of Arima, was dispossessed of his fief and removed to Hyuga, the Arima fief was put under the temporary administration of three lords, Nabeshima, Matsuura, and Omura, pending the appointment of a new lord; and while they governed Arima, they made a point of being lenient toward the Catholics. In the memoranda preserved by the Omura family, the views of Omura Hikoyemon are recorded as follows :—

> If the present method of changing the religious faith is to be continued in force, the people in the villages will be perplexed, and while the Kirishitan may be kept under control, the people will die of starvation. Such people in the villages under Omura's charge as sign the pledge with their blood are not to be examined by the inspectors sent from the Shogunate Government, but left to Hikoyemon to deal with at his discretion.

The lord of the Omura daimyate was clearly intelligent enough to realize that the fanatical, ardent converts would not be forced by law to give up their faith altogether, and wanted to deal with them leniently for the time being, publicly executing the prohibitory law strictly, while in reality overlooking the religion as much as possible.

Takayama and Naito, two Warriors, banished.—Persecution thus rife throughout the land, the Catholics in Nagasaki believed that the end of the world was coming, and preferred to suffer rather than renounce their religion. To ensure their future salvation, they inflicted all kinds of tortures upon themselves, and daily paraded the streets of Nagasaki, beating or otherwise punishing themselves. Some days as many as 3,000 walked in procession, conducting their rites of atonement for the sins of the world. We are told of 400 or 500 wearing purple robes, and others carrying large crucifixes, and the citizens of Nagasaki decorating their streets with embroideries and screens in honour of the devotees.

The entire city appeared to have gone mad. Hasegawa Fujihiro was terrified and sent an exaggerated report to Edo; and Yamaguchi Shigehiro was hurriedly sent to Nagasaki with instructions to the daimyo to see that the prohibitory proclamation was strictly carried out. At the same time, Iyeyasu issued orders of banishment against several Japanese Christians, including Takayama Ukon, who had taken a share in the defeat of Mitsuhide by Hideyoshi, and afterwards been employed by Maeda in Kaga; and John Naito, who had been a distinguished soldier under Iyeyasu.

When these two men, accompanied by their families, arrived at Nagasaki, the faithful showed them great respect; and the Magistrate of Nagasaki, fearing that trouble might arise, called in the Satsuma warriors to Nagasaki and requested them to guard the city. On October 25, 1614 (the 19th year of Keicho), when all those who were ordered to be banished were gathered together at Nagasaki, they were shipped aboard three Chinese junks, which took them via Macao to the Philippines. There were twenty-two foreign missionaries; seven Japanese; five Japanese women, who were candidates of teachers; besides Takayama and Naito; Ukita Kyukan, who owned an estate of 1,500 koku; Shinagawa Uhei, who owned an estate of 1,000 koku; Shibayama Gombei, who owned an estate of 500 koku; and other adherents. In all, there were 117, and 200 students of theological schools. When the ships left Nagasaki, mobs broke into the Catholic churches and plundered the treasures without interference from the Government authorities.

Later, the churches were torn down and the wood given to the Buddhists. Even at this crisis, however, a few foreign missionaries hid themselves in farmers' houses and patiently bided their time.

The cruellest and worst Persecution of the Catholics.—The Tokugawa Shogunate had succeeded in banishing the most dreaded leaders, but great efforts were needed to prosecute the remaining work, if the Government intended to wipe out Catholicism in reality. Iyeyasu had, of course, the battle of Sekigahara to his credit, but Toyotomi Hideyori still held his own in the great stronghold of Osaka, and his influence and resources were yet sufficient to command the respect of the country. The Tokugawa Shogun feared Hideyori would attract to his banner all the discontented, and had long wanted to put an end to the Toyotomi family, but he suspected that the moment he attacked Hideyori the Christians in Kyushu would rise against him. These Christians must, therefore, be wiped out. In Kyushu, Hasegawa Fujihiro, Yamaguchi Shigehiro, Mamiya Gonzayemon, and other officials who took orders from the Government, were bureaucrats who had no insight into politics, and simply went to work on a thorough method to uproot Catholicism. The persecution was very fierce, and the atrocities perpetrated were worse, certainly not less, than those recorded in European history. The chief desire of the Government was to get rid of the converts in Arima, and Gonzayemon summoned 200 or more of their leaders to assemble on the former site of a theological school. One thousand soldiers were called out to prepare for any emergency that might arise, and twenty-five were ready with their paraphernalia for any command. Presently, the converts arrived. The officials then asked each and every one of the converts whether or not he or she would abandon the religion and korobu (meaning shift) from the Catholic faith to Buddhism. Those who refused were flung instantly into prison, their hair torn out, and ears and tongue uprooted with a pair of pincers. They were then scourged, stripped naked, thrown into mud, beaten in the face with dirty straw sandals, and returned again to prison. Friends of these unfortunates, overwhelmed with pity, bribed the jailers, and the poor victim was sometimes released on the ground that he had renounced his religion. If not released, the next day they were subjected to the torture of the boot, which crushes the shin-bones. The spines of the poor wretches were snapped with the weight of heavy stones; they were branded on the forehead with the mark of the cross; their hands and feet were struck off, and thus mutiliated they were forced to climb ladders. Others were thrown into the boiling-hot water of Mount Unzen. These extreme punishments terrified many, who made public renunciation, while secretly adhering to their religion. Still there were a few who daringly defied the orders of the authorities, and gladly suffered the cruel tortures; and, as a matter of fact, the Satsuma and Hirado men, while asserting that they would strictly execute the orders for prohibition, refrained as much as possible toward converts who did not resist with force and insult, and it is recorded that such were their private instructions from their daimyo. The Christians of Nagasaki, anticipating that cruel punishments with water and fire were coming to them, made preparations to face death, when they were saved temporarily by Iyeyasu's declaration of war against Hideyori, and the consequent movement of the Kyushu troops towards Osaka.

CHAPTER XLIII

CATHOLIC REBELLION IN SHIMABARA

CATHOLICS MOSTLY SIDED WITH HIDEYORI.—In 1614 Tokugawa Iyeyasu personally led his men to the siege of Hideyori's Castle of Osaka, but failed to take it and concluded a truce. The next year, that is in 1615, he succeeded in his plans, and the house of Toyotomi was wiped out, which proved a severe blow to the Catholic converts who had sided with Hideyori against Iyeyasu on account of Tokugawa's persecution of the Catholics.

Iyeyasu was not afraid of Hideyori's military strength, but he did fear very much the gold and silver and other treasures accumulated in the castle of Osaka since Hideyoshi's time, because their owner might use them to win over the unruly ronin (unemployed samurais) to his side, and he had therefore persuaded the young man to erect a big statue of Buddha. Hideyoshi had erected a wooden Buddha painted in colours, but Hideyori set up a bronze statue which cost several millions of ryo. When the image was completed, Hideyori gathered 3,000 Buddhist priests in Kyoto, and otherwise gave warm protection to Buddhist temples. Still he was young and magnanimous, so that even if there were some among his followers who adhered to Catholic Christianity he did not object very seriously. But Lady Yodo was the real master of the castle, and she and her women were devout Buddhists who despised the Christian converts and slighted them in every way. Nevertheless, the Catholics still preferred Hideyori to Iyeyasu, and flocked to the castle of Osaka. Akashi Hoki-no-Kami was one of the most noted of them, and many other less well-known warriors, wishing for revenge against Iyeyasu, took sides with Hideyori.

DOWNFALL OF MURAYAMA TOAN.—Iyeyasu conquered, as had been expected, and as there was no question but that the Catholics had sympathized with Hideyori, Tokugawa made the prohibition more severe, and went to work to extinguish the faith. Murayama, a Christian convert, who was a deputy official of the Shogun for Nagasaki, and had sent his son with help to Osaka to serve Hideyori, was executed, and thorough-going measures were taken to exterminate Christians. In 1618 (4th year of Genwa) Kagami Hayato and several of his men, who were retainers of Hosokawa Tadaoki, were massacred.

In 1623 (9th year of Genwa) Magozaemon, a bodyguard to the Shogun, who was known as Faramon, and others, in all 50 or more, were burnt to death outside Edo. In Bungo Province, Kawai Kiyemon, known as Joan, and other men, 23 in all, and 9 women were burnt to death. The method of execution was extraordinarily cruel, for in order to make the pains of death more severe, only a weak fire was used. In Chikuzen Province a foreign missionary named Baltasar de Torres was hunted down and died in the woods from a fall. The punishment of the woman, known as Susanne, who harboured the missionary was a very savage one. She was the wife of a samurai in Hakata, and her whole family were Christians. When arrested, she said farewell to her husband, and told him that she would die before him, but he must not trouble about her, and never forsake his faith. The officers of justice tried to make this man recant by tormenting his wife, stripping her naked and hanging her from a tree by her hair. Five other women, fearing to suffer such disgraceful and shameful punishment, recanted, but Susanne would not. She was then imprisoned as a slave and subjected to hard labour for six months, after which she was sent to Nagasaki, where she was beheaded. In 1629 (6th year of Kwanei), when Uyesugi, lord of Yonezawa, planned to execute Amakusa Yemon, who was renowned for bravery and loyalty, his retainers protested that if all adherents of Christianity were to be killed it would mean the death of 3,000 persons, which shows how large was the number of adherents in the north-east. However, Uyesugi, not fearing that the death of this brave warrior would compromise his family interests, massacred Amakusa, his son and the whole family, and Hanazawa Heiyemon, Iida Seiyemon, and others, 29 in all.

DAIMYO FAILED TO EXECUTE THE PROHIBITION ORDER.—Daté Masamuné of Sendai was a brilliant statesman. He proclaimed the prohibition of Catholic Christianity, and bade the converts renounce their faith on penalty of severe punishment, yet he told those who were unwilling to do so to leave his domains and to remove to other countries, thus opening a way for escape. Moreover, the prohibition order was only carried out superficially.

In reality, the converts were leniently treated, so that there was very little bloodshed. Lord Nabeshima of Hizen Province, too, who had at first persecuted the Christians, later reported that there was not one convert in his province. He did not even insist upon the Christians treading on the picture of Christ. Only every year in January it was sufficient if the village chiefs appeared in the Government offices of the daimyo, and reported that there was no adherent of the strange religion in their districts. In Miyamura, Sonoki Peninsula, a village where the percentage of converts was the largest, the officials from the Government of the daimyo of Saga attended at the Tempukuji Temple, and only asked whether the children were dutiful to their parents, and so on, and as to the presence or otherwise of persons adhering to the strange religion.

The priest of the Tempukuji even attended the funerals of the converts, thus leaving the Christians to do as they pleased. But in the case of the Omura daimyate, which held a portion of the Sonoki Peninsula, because the daimyo was a Christian, the Tokugawa Shogunate Government feared that he might show a partiality toward the Catholic converts, and the control was exercised more strictly than in the case of Saga. In the Omura jurisdiction only the eldest son of a Christian family was allowed to survive.

The brethren could not bear the thought of killing their own children, and brought them up, but it was forbidden to divide the heritage of a family among all the children. Consequently, the children born in the converts' families, save the eldest son, were left to sink or swim. Many of them left home, and went elsewhere where they were not persecuted so severely. In 1680 (Kwansei) the Goto daimyate was suffering from scarcity of population, and wanted 1,000 or more farmers to come to settle there. This was easy, and the number of those who immigrated to Goto Island reached more than 3,000. The migration of Christians to the island was unceasing thenceforward, and the entire island was opened up to cultivation. The daimyo knew very well what was happening, but as long as he could make money out of them, and secure the means to travel in proper state to Yedo, he turned a blind eye to their religion, and even, on one excuse or another, punished informers against the Christians. The control of the converts was then stricter in the Omura daimyate than in Goto and Saga, but certainly the fundamental policy was one of leniency.

In the early years of Meireki (1658), a large number of converts were found in Uragami, in Nagasaki, who were divided among different daimyates for custody. The Omura daimyate collected and burned all the documents, thereby destroying the evidence, because among the documents there were some which recorded the Kwanyei policy of control of the Catholics and the names of the natives who should have been arrested but had not been.

However, the converts were not confined to those lands. In 1658 (the 4th year of Meireki), when the Shogunate Government issued a strict order to the daimyos to annihilate the converts, and to report the results, Catholic Christians were spread all over the country, except in Osumi, Kai, Hoki, Awa, Oki.

ORDER OF RELIGIOUS RENUNCIATION AND THE LAW OF STAMPING ON THE PICTURE OF CHRIST.—In the 16th year of Keicho (the Kirishitan

Ki—Christian Record), 1611, or before or after, there were 700,000 baptized converts in Japan, and adding those not yet baptized, and children, the total is recorded at 2,000,000. In the early part of Kwanei, 280,000 were massacred or burnt alive. The rest fled to foreign countries, or became beggars, and died of starvation. Some renounced their faith, others outwardly renounced it. Consequently, the number was reduced to 40,000 or thereabouts.

The 40,000 had all outwardly renounced their faith once, so that officially there were no Christians at all, but Edo had a kind of nightmare that there might be books of the religion which had not yet been burnt, and the persecution knew no bounds. Finally, all the people of the country were ordered to belong to the Buddhist temples. Every temple had to keep a book, the Shumon-cho, in which were minutely recorded the names, ages, and the marriage relations of the adherents of the temple.

On the side of the people, each family was ordered to maintain a book of names classified according to religion. In that book the name and age of every member of the family were recorded, and a certificate of correctness of the record from the temple was necessary. Men and women, of fifteen years and upward, whether members of the family or employees, were required to appear in the Government offices once a year, and to attach their seal or the mark of their finger-nail in the presence of the officers whose duty it was to witness it. Anyone whose name was not found in the Shumon-cho was branded as a Catholic convert, and subjected to cruel punishment.

Of course, this put tremendous power in the hands of the temple priests, who might erase the names of those who offended them from the Shumon-cho and get them into trouble with the Government officials. From that time the powers of the temples suddenly increased, and Buddhism for the first time assumed the form of a national religion. But still the Shogunate Government was not satisfied, and published a law for trampling on the picture of Christ. The image was engraved on a copper plate, and when the people attended every year to put their seal on their register, they had to trample on the picture, and foreigners had to do the same when they landed in Japan. This law was established for fear that some of the converts might have outwardly renounced their religion, while secretly adhering to it, and their fidelity was thus tested. Even yet, it was feared there were holes in the law, and so the inhabitants of cities, towns, and villages were divided into groups of five each, called the Gonin-gumi, or groups of five.

Each of these groups was expected to detect Christians. If a Christian was in any group, and that group failed to report, the chief person and all the members of the group, upon discovery of the fact, were severely punished. The following rewards were offered to anyone secretly reporting about Christians :—

MEMORANDUM.

The Kirishitan (Christian) religion has been prohibited for many years. Consequently, if there be anyone who is suspected of being a Christian, he shall be reported. The following rewards shall be granted to those who bring the reports—

To anyone who has reported about a bateren (priest or padre), a Christian convert, 500 pieces of silver.

To anyone who has reported about an evangelist[1] (Japanese), 300 pieces of silver.

To anyone who has reported about a tatekaeri-mono,[2] 300 pieces of silver.

To anyone who has reported about a doshuku and shumon,[3] 100 pieces of silver.

The foregoing rewards shall be granted. Even in the case of a doshuku or a shumon, 500 pieces of silver may be granted according to the character of the person reported. If the presence of such convert is hidden and afterwards reported from some other source, the chief person of the place and the group of five shall be summarily punished by order.

THE MAGISTRATE.

May 1616.

Thus, by means of the Shumon-cho, secret reports for rewards, and the system of group of five, the net was drawn ever closer, and no one could hope to escape. But the Government was not yet satisfied, and a vow was expected from each person renouncing the faith. In those days the process of renouncing Christianity and becoming Buddhist went by the name of korobu (to shift). However, fearing that a person who had " shifted " might adhere at heart to Christianity, only professing to have renounced it with his mouth, the following two pledges were demanded from every one who recanted. One was a vow before all the gods in heaven and earth, as well as in the sixty or more provinces of Japan, and the other was a vow before the God of the Christians. The " shifter " was supposed to have abandoned his god as non-existent, but now he was called upon to make a vow before that god—a curious inconsistency.

Yet the officials of the Shogunate Government exacted the vow from the " shifters."

TEXT OF VOW OF NAMBAN (SOUTHERN BARBARIANS).

We have been Kirishitans for many years. But the more we learn of the Kirishitan doctrines the greater becomes our conviction that they are evil. In the first place, we who have received instructions from the padre regarding the future life were threatened with excommunication, and that we shall be kept away from association with the rest of humanity in all things in the present world, and in the next world shall be cast into hell. We were also taught that, unless a person committing a sin confesses it to the padre and secures his pardon, he shall not be saved in the world beyond. In that way the people were led into believing in the padres. All that was for the purpose of taking the lands of others.

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[1] A teacher not ordained.

[2] Having once renounced, has returned to the religion again.

[3] Doshuku is a preacher educated at the church dormitory free. Shumon is ordinary convert.

When we learnt of it we " shifted " from Kirishitan and became adherents of Hokekyo, while our wives became adherents of Ikkoshu. We hereby present a statement in writing to you, worshipful Magistrate, as a testimony.

Hereafter we shall not harbour any thought of the Kirishitan in our heart. Should we entertain any thought of it at all, we shall be punished by Deus Paternus (God the Father), Jesus (His Son), Spirito Santo (the Holy Ghost), as well as by Santa Maria (St. Mary), various angels, and saints.

The grace of God will be lost altogether. Like Judas Iscariot, we shall be without hope, and shall be mere objects of ridicule to the people. We shall never rise. The foregoing is our Kirishitan vow.

JAPANESE PLEDGES.—We have no thought of the Kirishitan in our hearts. We have certainly " shifted " our faith. If any falsehood be noted in our declaration now or in future, we shall be subject to divine punishment by Bonten, Taishaku, the four great angels of heaven, the great or little gods in all the sixty or more provinces of Japan, especially the Mishima Daimyojin, the representative of the god of Izu and Hakone, Hachiman Daibosatsu, Temma Daijizai Tenjin, especially our own family gods, Suwa Daimyojin, the village people, and our relatives. This is to certify to the foregoing.

KYUSUKE.
HIS WIFE.

The 2nd year of Shoho.

ENDORSEMENT.

TO THE HONOURABLE MAGISTRATE.

To stamp on the image of Christ, after "shifting" from the Kirishitan and giving such a pledge, is a rare thing never heard of before in any country. How, and for what reason, can such persons return to the faith again? They will not be reinstated as Kirishitans except through the mediation of a padre. They will not be able to return of their own accord.

CHUAN BATEREN, converted in Nambam.
RYOJUN AND RYOHAKU BATEREN, converted in Japan.

I hereby certify that the foregoing Kyusuke and his wife have truly become Ikkoshu converts.

SHUSAN OF THE SEISHOJI.

2nd year of Shoho.

RENOUNCERS OF FAITH GIVEN IMPORTANT POSITIONS.—Chuan, Ryojun, and Ryohaku, the three persons whose names are signed at the end of the foregoing pledge, had renounced their Catholic faith.

The Shogunate Government, using the three men as expert witnesses, tested the sincerity of those who had newly recanted, and the three men were ordered to countersign all the pledges made by those who renounced Christianity. The *Koshuki*, a collection of historical documents, has the following passage regarding the change of religious faith :—

> About the 6th year of Kwanei (1629), there were padres named Chuan, Ryohaku, and Ryojun. These persons, after a cross-examination, renounced their faith in the evil religion and flatly confessed that Christianity was altogether a falsehood, and that it was a plot to rob other countries. They declared that if they commanded the Christian converts who renounced their faith to present a pledge that they would never return to the religion again, and they countersigned it, there would be no mistake. So they were pardoned, and during their lifetime they were engaged in countersigning the pledges. Chuan and Ryohaku were from Namban and Ryojun a Japanese.

Chuan and Ryojun afterward confessed again that they were Christians, and were martyred. There was a blind man named Shinto, who, as an official of the guild of shampooers, went on a pilgrimage throughout different provinces and secretly spread the gospel of Catholic Christianity. As he found in the end no place to live and be free, he finally confessed to Hasegawa Gonroku, Magistrate of Nagasaki, and expressed his desire to renounce his faith. Shinto's real name was Tawara Genzo. He was a relative of Tawara Shoon, a high official of Otomo Sorin. Gonroku sent the man to Edo, where he was pardoned, and was commissioned as a spy upon Catholic priests.

Cruel Administration of Matsukura.—The persecution of Catholic Christians was such that they had either to fly to heaven or hide in the earth, no other way being open for them to escape. Consequently the Catholics, who had numbered about the 16th year of Keicho between 400,000 and 700,000, were reduced by the 1st year of Kwanyei (1624) to the number of 280,000. Many died on the roadside from starvation, or abroad, or changed their religious faith out of fear of torture. Those who hid their religion, and were thus enabled to preserve their lives, were only 40,000 or more. These 40,000 had no possessions but their own lives, and were in extreme poverty. They finally exerted their last strength to shake the whole of Japan. In 1616 (2nd year of Genwa) Iyeyasu ordered Matsukura Shigemasa, lord of Yamato, to remove to Hizen, giving him 43,000 koku. Shigemasa gave up Hara, the original seat of his government, and removed to Arima, where he built a castle. The grandfather of Matsukura Shigemasa was a resident of Etchu, who removed to Yamato, where he served Tsutsui Tenkei, by whom he was well treated, receiving 20,000 koku. His son, Katsushige, served Nobunaga. Shigematsu, who was a son of Katsushige, served Hideyoshi as a page and distinguished himself in the service.

In the Osaka campaign, Shigemasa sided with Iyeyasu. Brave as this man was in the battlefield, his administration was marked by extreme cruelty. He never gave a thought to the preservation of the people or to open up the wealth of the land, and considered it his chief business to annihilate Christianity. Not a day passed without five or six Christians being killed, and in one year several hundred persons perished.

The details of this savage persecution are almost too horrible. Men were induced to recant by their wives being stripped naked and threatened with public violation, and then were roasted on gridirons like grilled fish ; branded in the face with the characters for Christian ; burned alive ; thrown into the crater of a volcano ; buried in the ground up to the neck, and then decapitated with a bamboo saw. Children were pitched into the sea.

KAJINO JIROBEI AND THE PLOT OF AMAKUSA.—Thus the Government confined itself to exterminating Christian converts, the people spent their time either in dying as converts or escaping punishment by proving that they were not converts. Consequently they became weary of their lives.

This was not necessarily because Shigemasa hated Christians, but he feared to be reported to Yedo as lukewarm. When he died, and his son, Shigetsugu, succeeded him, the son lacked his father's courage and bravery, while he excelled him in evil qualities. He lost the confidence of his followers, and their *moral* declined just at the time when there was a man in Furukawacho, Nagasaki, named Kintsuba Jihei, who was one of the leading Catholic converts. Wearing a sword with a golden sword-guard, he quietly visited the neighbouring villages, comforting the Christians. Some of the citizens of Nagasaki informed against him, and an order was issued throughout Nagasaki and the whole of Kyushu for his arrest. This he was clever enough to avoid, and barrier gates were erected everywhere in Kyushu, through which no traveller was permitted to pass without a permit issued by his lord. Finally, in the 14th year of Kwanei (1637), he was at last caught in Katabuchimura, in Nagasaki district, and is said to have killed a hundred of his captors with a spear. It is possible that Jihei was one of the warriors of Osaka Castle, who fled after the fall of the castle, and who passed under an assumed name. Another of the Christian leaders was Kajino Jirobei, who cultivated new rice-fields in the Senzoku Island in Amakusa County, where he hid himself. Later, he went to Furukawacho in Nagasaki and watched the progress of affairs. When he heard of the search for Kintsuba Jihei, he hurriedly returned to Senzoku Island, and there made up his mind to raise a revolt.

Amakusa People in Conference.—In the 14th year of Kwanei (1637) Shogun Iyemitsu fell ill, and for several months from the spring to fall he could not attend to the affairs of the Government. Various rumours were spread about, and it was even said that the Shogun was already dead, but the fact was not officially announced. One fine day in the fall of that year, the clouds in the eastern sky were red in the morning, and in the western sky burning red in the evening, while the cherry flowers bloomed as if it were spring. In an age when the astronomical changes were superstitiously believed to have relations with human affairs, the people feared something unusual was about to happen, and were very much agitated. Certain farmers of Amakusa, named Oyano Matsuyemon, Senzoku Zenzayemon, Oye Genzayemon, Kadoyama Zennemon, and Mori Sohi had declined to abandon Christianity, and removed to Shimabara, where they lived in Fukayemura, and urged those who had renounced their faith to return to it.

The people flocked around them. Amakusa was remote enough to retain some remnants of the social system of the Middle Ages, and several small villages combined to form a group. In all, there were eighty-seven villages, divided into eight groups. In each group the family head governed. Oyama and his friends lived in Oyano, and while they professed agriculture; in fact, they were farming samurai, who once had followed Konishi. Now came the rumour from Edo that the Shogun was dead, but the fact was kept secret, and there were strange phenomena in heaven. Thus agitated, the people were ripe for revolt, and Jirobei was the firebrand. He spread a fairy story through the country that Saint Francis Xavier, when he was about to return to his own country, left this prophecy :—

> Twenty-five years from now our religion will develop greatly. Among the ardent followers there will rise a man who is divinely intelligent and who, without learning, will understand everything. He will be the messenger sent by God. At that time the colour of the clouds in the eastern and western skies will change, dead trees will blossom, the mountains and plains will be planted with white flags, and on the head of the people the cross will be worn.

" The time is now," said Jirobei, and the divine messenger was found in the person of Masuda Shiro of Oyano, and a son of Masuda Jinbei, who had been secretary to Konishi Yukinaga and after his father's death had hidden himself in Yenabe Mura, Uto County. Shiro, at that time only sixteen, was his eldest son, stately in appearance, intelligent, and learned, and the people at once trusted and obeyed him. Shiro assumed the name of Tokisada, and at Miyatsu, Oyano, he preached the gospel of Christianity to crowded audiences. In October a message was sent to different villages saying that God was very angry, and was about to send down heavenly fire on the people, to escape which all should come to hear Tokisada and be saved.

But this message was really not necessary. The oppression of Matsukura was sufficient reason for revolt. They only had lacked a leader. Now the leader had appeared, and they joined him without further ado. Between Amakusa and Shimabara the distance is 3 ri (about 7 miles). Midway is an island called Yushima, and there the leaders of the Christians secretly met for consultation. This island in later years got the name of Dangoshima, the conference island.

Christians of Amakusa rise in Revolt.—When Oyanao, Kajino, and others raised a movement for the revival of Christianity, in no time the movement changed into a revolutionary one. The people in the neighbourhood who sympathized with the movement all rose in arms, led by the Shoya, the village chiefs. Arima was divided into two parts, north and south. The village chief of South Arima, Jiyemon, had a younger brother named Kakunai. In North Arima there was a man called Sankichi. In the early years of Kwanei, their fathers, having refused to abandon Christianity, Lord Matsukura killed them and exposed their heads in public. The two men stole the heads of their fathers, and hid them for several years. Now they erected a tabernacle in Sankichi's house, and held a memorial service for their fathers, placing the skulls in the tabernacle. When they thus openly professed Christianity, several hundred people of the neighbourhood at once gathered and confessed their former faith. The two Deputy officers of Nagasaki were sent to suppress the movement, arrested Kakunai, Sankichi, and their families, and threw them into prison; but the Christians of Arima were not inclined to submit, killed one of the Deputies, and then a number of other prominent men, and twenty soldiers sent by Matsukura. All officials were hunted down, and Buddhist monks promenaded through the streets and then killed. At that time Lord Matsukura Shigetsugu was in Yedo, but high officials, Okamoto Shimbei and Taga Mondo, who were administering the affairs of the Government at Shimabara in his absence, led forty warriors and several hundred men on nineteen large and small vessels to Arima, and attacked the Christians, who repulsed them. After that, there were one or two more skirmishes, but as the Christians were brave and fierce, the garrison of the castle could only close the gates and wait for relief.

The Officials of the Shogunate Government lose their Opportunity.—When the news reached Osaka Castle on November 5th, the castellan, Abe Bitchu-no-Kami Masatsugu, consulted with his colleagues what should be done, but he doubted whether he had authority to issue instructions to daimyos of Kyushu, and to mobilize troops to quell the rebellion, and could decide on nothing. On the one hand he reported the news to Yedo, and on the other hand he sent notes to daimyos in Kyushu advising them to guard the frontiers of their dominions so as to prevent the spread of the rebellion. At that time, Kawakatsu Tamba-no-kami Katsumasa and Sassa Gombei Narisumi were stationed in Kokubu, Bungo, as inspectors, to watch over Echizen-no-saisho Tadanao, who was living in exile. The daimyos of Kyushu collected their troops along the frontiers, and were ready to march into Shimabara with permission of the inspectors. But the latter would not permit it, and told the daimyos to wait for instructions from Edo, so they all idly looked on while the Christians were doing as they pleased.

The rebellion was not confined to Shimabara and Arima. It spread also to Amakusa. Of the people of Amakusa, who represented 40,000 koku, those covering 10,000 koku joined the rebellion within a few days and rose in arms. The soldiers of the punitive army sent from the castle of Tomioka, and the reinforcements sent from Karatsu by Lord Terasawa, all retreated, and only defended the castle.

Itakura Shigemasa becomes Commander-in-Chief.—On November 9th, when the urgent messenger from Osaka arrived in Edo, the decision arrived at by the Shogunate authorities was to appoint Itakura Naizen-no-sho Shigemasa of Nakashima, Mikawa Province, to suppress the rebellion. Shigemasa, on the very night, accompanied by his son (Mondo Shigenori), Ishitani Iyuzo, and his retainers, went down to Osaka. On his way he called on his elder brother, Itakura Suwo-no-kami Shigemune, who lived in Fushimi. Shigemune, seeing that the forces led by his brother were very small, took pity on him, and lent him 12 or 13 of his own warriors, and 100 men. Then Shigemasa embarked on the *Yawata-maru*, belonging to Ikeda Mitsumasa, lord of Okayama.

When he left Osaka his men numbered 150 or more. Reaching Kokura, in Buzen Province, on November 31st, he delivered instructions to the daimyos to subjugate the rebels of Shimabara. The rebels, learning that the Shogunate Government had sent a high officer to co-operate with the daimyos of Kyushu in attacking them, set to work to repair the ruined castle of Hara, which was located several ri south-east of the castle of Shimabara now standing. It had once been Lord Arima's stronghold, but considering Shimabara to be a better strategic position, he had removed there and abandoned Hara. The rebels now spent eight days in repairing the ruined works, which had become a grass plot, and made it a formidable fortress. They stole 5,000 koku of tribute rice stored in Kuchinotsu by Lord Matsukura, 530 rifles and ammunition to go with them. Of the rebels, there were 15,000 fighting men, and counting all—old men, women, and children—there were 37,100 people in the castle. Masuda Shiro was their commander-in-chief, and there were the following officers under him: tsukai-ban (communication officers, staff officers, gunbugyo (disciplinary officers), hatagashira (company commanders), and ronin-shu (free-lancers). These led the farmers; the central strength was 40 or more ronins and 2,000 uki-mushas, the latter a fighter who did not have a regular position, but went from place to place at any time when he was needed. In the garrison was a ronin about forty years of age who was a very able tactician, and planned the movements of the whole army. It is said that nobody knew his name or career, and probably he was Kajino Jirobei, who, having been on the defeated side at Sekigahara, wanted revenge on Tokugawa.

In the army of offence, very useful service was rendered by 130 ronins, amongst whom were Murai Jurobei and his son, who had fought with Hideyori in the castle of Osaka, and after the castle fell had concealed themselves in Kyoto. Now they came forward to join Shimabara, and after accomplishing valiant feats, died on the battlefield. These facts show that the revolt of Shimabara was in a sense an outcome of the desperate situation of many ronins.

DEATH OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ITAKURA SHIGEMASA.—Itakura Shigemasa left Kokura on December 1st, and arrived in Takase, Higo Province, on December 2nd, requesting daimyos as he passed to send him reinforcements. He arrived in Kojiro, Hizen Province, on December 3rd, and on December 5th entered Shimabara, where Lord Nabeshima of Hizen, and his chief retainers, Nabeshima Aki, Nabeshima Motoshige, and Nabeshima Naozumi, at the head of 15,000 soldiers, were already quartered in the neighbourhood of the castle. There were gathered also to the siege of the castle of Hara, Matsukura, the lord of Shimabara, Hosokawa Higo-no-kami, and Terashima Hyogo-no-kami, who had previously cleared Amakusa and relieved the garrison in the castle there, Tachibana Tadashige from Chikugo, Arima Tadayori from the same province, and troops belonging to Omura of Hizen. The Government army numbered 52,000, to whom were opposed untrained farmers mainly, of whom only 12,000 or 13,000 were men of fighting age. The castle of Hara itself appeared to be only a makeshift, and the besiegers thought to capture it at one attack.

But when shots were exchanged, it was found that the defending army unexpectedly possessed courage, training, and tactics sufficient to repulse the attackers very often, and that the farmers could not be regarded with scorn. Presently in Edo the rebellion in Shimabara was regarded as a very serious event, and it was thought better to supersede Shigemasa by Matsudaira Izu-no-kami and Toda Samon. Shigemasa feared this, but would not credit it, and when he was officially informed of it he was in a great rage and decided to storm the castle at once. On January 1st, 15th year of Kwanei (1638), he ordered an attack in force, and when his men proved unable to overcome the desperate defence, Shigemasa dismounted and advanced in person to encourage his followers. As he approached the castle wall, he was killed by a bullet, and the besiegers retreated in confusion. In this engagement the Government troops lost 3,058 killed and wounded, and the rebels only 90. On January 3rd Matsudaira Nobutsuna and Toda Ujikane arrived and took command, the forces now reaching more than 100,000 with the arrival of Kuroda of Chikuzen, Ogasawara Tadanao of Hizen, Ogasawara of Nakatsu, and Mizuno Katsushige of Fukuyama, Bingo.

In fact, all the troops in Kyushu were concentrated against the castle. At the same time, at the request of Edo, two Dutch ships and two Chinese ships bombarded the castle from the sea, and Hosokawa of Higo, and Kuroda of Chikuzen, were ordered to do the same. In recent years balls are often discovered. They measure about 3½ inches in diameter, but since they must have increased in size owing to rust, the original size was probably about 3 inches. As it is recorded that the defenders suffered most from the bombardment from the sea, it is apparent that these iron balls were fired from that quarter. The weapons used by the land forces were most likely simple and ineffective.

Christians Reproach Nobutsuna.—The castle of Hara, which was surrounded by plains on three sides and by sea in the rear, was now altogether invested, and Nobutsuna sent in a message that he intended to starve out the defenders without fighting. He also advised the defenders to set free the gentio from the castle, and in return Shiro's mother, his elder sister Fuku, younger sister and younger brother Kahei, who were imprisoned outside the castle, would be released and sent into the castle. Gentio is "zentio" in Portuguese, and means those who are not followers of Christ.

At Nobutsuna's request Shiro's mother wrote a letter to her son. He also shot a letter into the castle promising that if the reason of the rebellion was simply a grudge against Lord Matsukura, he would see to it that the injustice would be rectified, and if Shiro would return to his native village he would be given 2,000 koku and exempted from tribute.

All these promises produced no effect, and although thus surrounded on land and sea, and having no way of securing relief, the spirit of the defenders was not weakened. They shot an arrow with a message into the camp of the besiegers on January 19th, denouncing Nobutsuna for his cowardice in depending upon foreign power in quelling domestic rebellion.

DEFENDERS HARD PRESSED, THE CASTLE FALLS.—From that time on, while the defenders of the castle often repulsed attacks, their provisions decreased day by day, and by February 10th they were almost altogether exhausted. The ammunition had given out at the end of January. Yet they carried on. On February 28th the offensive army conducted a general assault; the defence was worn out of strength, and the castle finally fell, Shiro and other officers dying in the fight. Thirty-seven thousand rebels were killed, but at a cost to the besiegers of 1,136 killed and 6,950 wounded in two days' fighting.

In fact, the castle fell because provisions and ammunition were gone. Edo could not find much cause for pride in the victory. Several hundred Christians escaped to Madara Island, outside of Karatsu Bay, where they upheld their religion all their lives. Their descendants have been Catholics until to-day. In this affair the fighting lasted four months only, but it was one of the biggest wars in the history of Japan. When Hideyoshi attacked Odawara, his men numbered 250,000, and he thus commanded all the strength of the realm. Hojo was one of the greatest lords of the east. For three generations the family had maintained an army, and he had 40,000 men under his command. Yet from April 1st, Tensho 18th (1590), when Hideyoshi crossed the pass of Hakone, until July 6th the same year, when the castle fell, it was only three months. When Hideyoshi besieged the castle of Takamatsu, the campaign commenced in the early part of April, Tenso 10th (1582), when the houses of the people in the neighbourhood were burnt and plundered, and ended on June 4th, when the castle was surrendered, a period of one month and a half. When Tokugawa Iyeyasu invested the castle of Osaka, the winter campaign commenced in November, Keicho 19th (1614), when Iyeyasu started from Sumiyoshi, and lasted until December 21st, about two months.

The summer campaign began on April 25, 1615, and on May 8th Hideyori committed suicide. In 1637 the Tokugawa Shogunate was supreme, and mobilized the entire forces of Kyushu to besiege a handful of rebels in a corner of Hizen, and yet the war lasted four months. The *moral* of the Government army must have been very low. 1637 was only twenty-two years after the great battle of Sekigahara, yet the times were much changed. Among the rebels, those who were accustomed to fighting were only a few ronin and the leaders of the farmers. Yet with 15,000 men they could defend their position against 100,000 men of the daimyos of Kyushu, killing and wounding in all 13,000 or 14,000. When the castle fell, it was because the provisions and ammunitions were exhausted, and not because the spirit of the defence was weakened. It shows how strong was the spiritual power of the converts.

Expenditure for the Amakusa War.—It will be interesting to make a study of the expenditure incurred by the Tokugawa Shogunate and feudal lords on account of this Amakusa War, the reason being that, for the first time, in this Amakusa War, a rough calculation of the expenditure was made and given out. It was said that the Tokugawa Shogunate expended 111 kwan 693 momme and 3 rin of silver from the financial resource called the Kessho-gin of Nagasaki City (confiscated silver coins in Nagasaki City), which was used for the repairs of cannons, guns, and muskets, and also for gunpowder, general war materials, and the wages for carpenters, blacksmiths, and kiyaku (coolies). In addition, they paid out 398,000 ryo of gold from their treasury in Osaka Castle. It is not known how this amount of gold was applied, though it is supposed it went for the same purpose as the silver, and also in supplying provisions and horses to the feudal lords of the Kyushu Provinces, but of course the lords spent a great deal more from their own resources, and probably in the total expenditure Edo bore two-thirds and the feudal lords one-third. It must be remembered, furthermore, that the estimate of expenditure was only a rough one, and Matsudaira Kainokami Terutsuna, the son of Matsudaira Izunokami Nobutsuna, the commander-in-chief in the campaign, makes the following statement with regard to finance in his work, the *Shimabara and Amakusa Diary* :—

> The Shogunate announced on the 27th of January, 15th year of Kanei, the issue of rations for 100,619 men to compensate for their hard work and fatigue in the Amakusa War, at the rate of 10,000 koku of rice for every 400 men. All the feudal lords in the neighbouring provinces, and also those on active service, were ordered to supply the rice, and afterwards the Shogunate gave silver to all these men at Osaka.

According to this, the Shogunate gave all the soldiers an extra allowance to reward their efforts in the war, and the feudal lords, in fact, paid their men silver or copper money on the spot, and were afterwards reimbursed by the Shogunate. This campaign began on January 29th, and the castle was captured on February 29th, that is, an interval of thirty-two days. The ration for one man being 5 go of rice, and the extra allowance for one soldier for these thirty-two days being 16 sho of rice, the total quantity for 100,619 men was 16,980 koku of rice. About the 13th year of Kanei, the price of rice being from 22 momme to 33 momme of silver per koku, the average price for 1 koku was perhaps 25 momme. One ryo of gold was worth 56 momme of silver, with a purchasing power of a little more than 2 koku of rice, and thus the money the Shogunate took out of Osaka and Nagasaki to expend on the war would buy about 900,000 koku of rice. At recent prices of rice, say 35 yen per koku, the total expenditure on this Amakusa War was about 31,500,000 yen. When Saigo Takamori revolted in the 10th year of Meiji, his army was 15,000 strong, while the Imperial army, including all the sailors in the 14 warships, 52,200 regular soldiers, 600 militia, and 11,000 gendarmes, consisted of 66,000 men, besides about 100,000 coolies. The campaign commenced on February 9th, 10th year of Meiji, and ended in September of the same year; and though the total expenditure of this war was 41,567,726 yen, yet as the expenses of moving the headquarters of the Emperor to Osaka, rewards, relief money, and so on, were included in it, the actual cash spent for war purposes was only about 38,523,120 yen, which included the pay of army and navy officers, gendarmes, and the private soldiers.

We are justified, therefore, in saying that the total expenditure on this Saigo affair was about equal to that on the Amakusa War, showing how strongly united by their religion were these nameless rustics of Amakusa Island, who fought so desperately against the veterans of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

MOST CATHOLIC BELIEVERS CONVERTED TO CHRISTIANITY AT THE PLACES WHERE THE CATHOLIC FAITH WAS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.—Among the feudal lords who faithfully executed the Shogunate's policy of persecuting the Roman Catholics, Lord Matsukura was the most remarkable, and his severe repression was the chief cause of the Amakusa rebellion. When the war was over, Edo sent Lord Ota Bitchu-no-kami to the Kyushu Provinces, and punished Matsukura, who had been so faithful an executor of its policy, by exiling him to Tsuyama in Mimasaka. Afterwards, he was ordered to be confined in the castle of Lord Mori Naiki Nagatsugu, and his brother, Matsukura Ukon Shigeyori, was exiled to Sanuki and confined in the castle of Lord Ikoma Mitsutoshi. In fact, the Tokugawa Shogunate behaved disgracefully to the family of Lord Matsukura, who were unwittingly too obedient to their orders; for Mori Naiki Nagatsugu was bidden to behead Matsukura Shigetsugu at the Mori Mansion in the Shibaguchi district in Edo, and at the same time his chief retainers were most severely punished. Matsukura Ukon Shigeyori, it is true, was released from the death penalty and ordered to serve Hoshina Masayuki of Aizu as his retainer, but out of shame for this humiliation he committed suicide. In fine, the family of Lord Matsukura, who had so faithfully executed the policy of the Shogunate against the Catholic believers, was destroyed, while the other feudal lords who pretended to persecute the Christians, but left them, in fact, to do as they liked, were not punished by the Tokugawa Shogunate. It is interesting to observe that the Catholic believers were not rooted out even by the very severe persecution of Matsukura, and by the terrible Amakusa War. Catholicism died in the provinces where the feudal lords were lukewarm in executing the Shogunate policy, persecuting the Catholic believers only in public, and leaving them, in fact, to do whatever they liked. It is indeed a strange result that the Tokugawa Shogunate, endeavouring to uproot Christianity in Japan, unconsciously gave great support and assistance to the Ikko and Jodo sects of Buddhism, who were once the dreaded enemies of the Tokugawa family and fought obstinately against them.

CRUEL PUNISHMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BELIEVERS IN EDO. Having destroyed the Toyotomi family and suppressed the Christian rebellion in Kyushu, Edo now felt it had little to fear, and adopted the sternest measures to root out Christianity completely. Before the Amakusa War, converts were kindly warned to recant, but now an instant and cruel death penalty was imposed. In the 2nd year of Manji it was proclaimed that the most deeply dyed criminal would be pardoned if he gave information about a Christian, and every means was taken to persecute the few Christians who still remained. On December 3rd, 15th year of Kanei, twenty-three Christian men and women were flung into the sea outside Shibaguchi in Edo, and six other men who entreated for the lives of the Christians were executed also, together with fourteen wives and children of the martyrs. Not much later, the Government burnt fifty Christians to death at Shibaguchi, Edo. Again, in the 17th year of Kanei, the Government captured nine Christians who were concealing themselves in the Yotsuya district in Edo, and killed them all, and in the same year about seventy were crucified upside down in the sea of Shinagawa, in the manner called water crucifixion. Under this cruel method the victims were hung on the cross when the tide was low, and left to be drowned when the tide rose. The torture was so great that the faces of the dead were unrecognizable. Neither was Edo the only place where the Christians were persecuted. Persecution reigned everywhere in Japan, and was especially cruel at Nagasaki and thereabout.

SO-CALLED ONANDO BUPPO (BUDDHISM IN PRIVATE ROOMS).—The cruel persecution by the Tokugawa Shogunate of the Roman Catholic believers in Japan was such that its parallel is scarcely found in the history of Christian persecution the world over, but, nevertheless, later there were found Christians around Nagasaki. In 1858, when the French Catholic Fathers came to Japan as the result of the treaties concluded between Japan and England, the United States, France, and Russia, the Japanese Catholics came and visited their houses and afterwards came to church, and confessed their faith that they had so long embraced in secret. The number of these Japanese Catholics is said to have increased by degrees from several hundred to several thousands, until it finally reached such a great number as 15,000 or 16,000. It was in the 15th year of Kanei that all the Japanese believers in Roman Catholicism appeared to have been totally wiped out by the very severe repression of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and it seemed as if there were no Christians left in Japan, but the Shogunate was deceived. Many Christian families secretly maintained their faith during the long interval of two hundred and thirty years, and now could confess their belief freely when the treaties were concluded between Japan and the principal European countries and America. Buried like a seed in the earth for hundreds of years, Christianity now spread its leaves to the sun, which shone for the first time upon it, and the tree flourished and spread its branches widely. It is worthy of special mention how these Catholic believers around Nagasaki could keep up their faith and transmit it to posterity for two hundred and fifty years under such severe persecution. They did so by Onando Buppo, that is, the Buddhist way of worship in secret or a private room, and the details of their organization are highly interesting.

First came the ocho-kata (secretary), one in every village. He kept the religious calendar and notified all believers when it was necessary to celebrate a special mass. Then there was the omizu-kata (watering-man), who baptized newborn children and new converts. In every district there was an okiki-yaku (hearing-man). When the omizu-kata was informed by the ocho-kata about some festival in the coming week, he reported it to the okiki-yaku, who then told all other Catholic believers in the district.

These three men, the okiki-yaku, ocho-kata, and omizu-kata, were jointly called the jii-yaku (fathers, or eldermen) by the other Catholic believers, and commonly they were respectfully called jii-dono by other men.

These Japanese Christians used to call their fellow-believers yokahito (good men), discriminating against other people who were not Christians, whom they denominated rokubei or tsutan. Thus isolated from the outside world, these Christians accumulated many superstitious traditions, and came to look upon St. John as a water-god, St. Lorenzo and St. Francis as wind-gods. Even when the French Fathers came to Japan in early Meiji, and tried to show them the error of their ways, they stuck obstinately to their old belief and method of celebrating the mass on the ground that they were directly transmitted to them by the holy St. Francis Xavier himself. The Tokugawa Government was not only afraid of the Catholic believers themselves, but also strictly on guard against their children, who were made Buddhists. The Government officials called such children Hon-nin-dozen, which means that they were as troublesome people as their parents, and to be always guarded against. In the year 1719 (4th year of Kyoho) the last Hon-nin-dozen in Kyoto, two old sisters over eighty years of age, died, and the tribune of Kyoto sent to their houses and inspected and salted the dead bodies. It was only after making a full report of their death to the bureau of religious affairs in Edo, and obtaining their permission, that burial was carried out.

PROHIBITION OF IMPORT OF FOREIGN BOOKS.—While the Tokugawa Government was taking such severe measures against Roman Catholicism, they gave every protection and assistance to Buddhism, and especially in the places where Catholic influences were once great; they summoned Buddhist priests, rewarding them amply and constructing large temples for them, thus taking every positive and negative means to root out Christianity. Further, making a strict inspection of books coming from foreign countries, they forbade the import and circulation of books in which there was even a word about Christianity. In the 7th year of Kanei the following books were prohibited from circulation :—

Kijin-juron (ten treatises by an eccentric man). *Nijugogen* (twenty-five sayings). *Seigakuhan* (outlines of Western learning). *Shokuho-gaiki* (outlines of countries and peoples out of China proper). *Kikagempon* (elements of geometry). *Tokei-kyohi* (print of the monument of Christians in the To Dynasty, China). *Tenshujutsugi* (truth of Roman Catholicism). *Konkotsuhen-dusetsu* (illustrations of world's history and geography). *Shichikoku* (seven controllings). *Bammotsu-Shingen* (true origin of all things). *Bengakuito* (treatises on classified learnings). *Reigen-hanku* (spiritual words and sayings). *Dobun-sanshi-zenpen* (first book of mathematics). *Dobun-sanshi-tsuhen* (books of general mathematics). *Hyodo-setsu* (theories on latitudes). *Koyuron* (essays on true friendship). *Taisei-suiho* (marine measurements in Europe). *Sanzan-rongaku-ri* (discussions about learning in the three Buddhist cathedrals in the mountains). *Jureki* (ten generations). *Temmon-ryaku* (outlines of astronomy). *Toheigi-sekki* (explanations of the terrestrial globe). *Kwanyo-kukugi* (comparisons of histories and geographies of the world). *Sokuryo-hoji* (principles of surveying). *Sokuryohoji-ido* (comparisons of the principles of surveying). *Kyoyo-kairyaku* (general outlines of Christian doctrines). *Seishu-hyakugen* (hundred teachings of Jesus Christ). *Shokuzai-seiki* (histories of the people converted to Christianity). *Mizara-saigi* (on worships and holy communion). *Ju-e* (ten consolations). *Daigi-hen* (treatise on scepticism). *Kyogi-keikai* (general principles of the doctrines). *Fukukentsushi* (history of the Fukien Province of China). *Kii* (world-map).

Besides the above books, the number of books prohibited importation increased year after year, because any book in which there were even a few words about Roman Catholicism or something was mentioned about new events in Europe, was prohibited. The Japanese people, thus forbidden to read any Chinese translation of a European book, giving an account of the new things in Europe, were quite blind to the world's civilization. Neither did it end here, for the Tokugawa Government forbade the further printing of such books as *Kirishitan-Taiji-Monogatari* (tales about the destruction of Christianity and Christians); *Nihonjimbutsu-shi* (history of the famous men in Japan), which contained something about Takayama Ukon; *Shimabara-gassenki* (history of the Shimabara War); and *Nambanji-kohaiki* (history of rise and fall of the Christian churches and temples in Japan). Following this precedent in later years, they suppressed *Komodan*, that gave a full account of the manners and customs in Holland; *Fujutsui*, by Gamo Kumpei, that treated of the necessity to defend the Japan Sea; *Hokkai-esetsu*, telling of the Russian encroachment upon the northern end of Japan in the 6th year of Bunkwa; and also *Yume-monogatari*, by Takano Choei.

CHAPTER XLIV

FOREIGN TRADE AND THE PORT OF NAGASAKI

ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND HIDEYOSHI AND IYEYASU.—In his declining years, Hideyoshi became very wayward in conduct, and seems to have been as severe on Christianity as Nobunaga, his predecessor, was on Buddhism. But there were many Jesuits among his staff who were not without hope that though he often published very unfriendly ordinances against their religion, their master's prejudice would melt some day. When Iyeyasu laid siege to the castle of Osaka after his victory in the decisive battle of Sekigahara, the native Jesuits sympathized deeply with the remnants of Hideyoshi's retainers, so much so that Murayama Toan, Magistrate of Nagasaki, secretly helped the besieged party by sending arms and ammunition. It is, therefore, quite natural that when he became Shogun, Iyeyasu should have found himself in a position in which he could not be friendly toward the Jesuits, and, indeed, he wished to extirpate the Roman Catholic influence. But he found himself on the horns of a dilemma because, if he should prohibit the propagation of the religion, he would be compelled to deport the Portuguese, which would mean the end of the trade with Spain and Portugual. Few of the successful warrior-statesmen in the history of Japan have given so much attention to trade as Hideyoshi and Iyeyasu. Rising to the post of Shogun from a very humble station in life, they both knew, from their experience, the importance of business, that money was a key to unlock the hearts of war lords, and that money could be obtained only by promoting business. The fact that they made themselves agreeable to business men is an eloquent testimony of how important money was in the carrying on of administration in those days. While even feudal lords of no mean standing could get an audience with the Shogun only by the most respectful solicitations, tradesmen of Izumi and Sakai had free and easy access to him. Shimaya Sotan, a merchant of Hakata, had especially close connections with Hideyoshi. This is ascribed by some historians to the fact that he was an expert in the tea ceremony, in which Hideyoshi was greatly interested; but this is not a very satisfactory explanation, for many of the merchants of those days pretended to be interested in the tea ceremony, to prove that their sordid pursuit had not robbed them of æsthetic tastes. In fact, merchants were in a sense more influential than the staff of the Shogun. Witness the following story: When Hideyoshi was attempting the invasion of Korea, members of his staff were all sceptical of success. Not having the courage themselves to approach their master with advice, they planned to cause Sotan, just referred to, to warn Hideyoshi of the danger he was incurring, for the Kampaku had summoned Sotan to get information on the Korean question. Iyeyasu also often summoned merchants to his presence to obtain from them information on current questions.

In 1598 the Dutch Government sent off five merchant ships to Japan with the object of opening trade with her. After their long voyage via the Atlantic and the Cape of Good Hope, they were approaching the shores of Japan when they encountered a violent gale. Four of them sank, and the fifth, in a half-wrecked state, arrived at a certain place in Bungo Province, Kyushu, carrying five survivors whom Iyeyasu signified he would receive in audience. The Portuguese and Spanish residents tried in vain to prevent the access to the Shogun of these Protestant Dutchmen, but Iyeyasu, who was then in Osaka after the battle of Sekigahara, gave audience to two of the five men. One of them was an Englishman by the name of William Adams, and the other a Dutch chief sailor named Janyos. The Shogun listened to their tale with great interest, and especially to what they told him of Holland's hostility to the Church of Rome. This was the sort of people he wanted to trade with, and he often called them to his presence, eventually persuading them to remain in Japan. He gave William Adams the Japanese name of Miura Anjin, and accorded him the treatment of a hatamoto (direct feudatory). As to Janyos, Iyeyasu granted him a residence at Edo, as Tokyo was then called. The street in which his residence stood was called by the people Yayesucho after him.

While thus befriending them in every way, Iyeyasu caused their half-wrecked ship to be sent round to Uraga, where Commodore Perry's monument now stands, and there had five sailing vessels of European style built under their supervision, which pleased him all the more, as he had failed in an attempt to obtain through the Governor-General of Manila foreign shipbuilding experts.

Dutch Occupation of Formosa.—Iyeyasu, who had before him the example of success and failure left by his predecessor, Hideyoshi, showed good administration at the beginning of his new Government, giving his first attention to the renewing of friendship with Korea, which task he entrusted to So Tsushima-no-kami. Trade with China had stopped since the running amok of Japanese pirates in Chinese waters. It was true that Chinese ships began to visit Japan again for trade, but none of them came with the permission of their Government, and the Shogunate simply connived at the trading in their ports of these unlicensed Chinese ships. Deploring this virtual stoppage of trade with China, Iyeyasu secured an agreement with the Chinese Government, then represented by the Ming Dynasty, for resuming trade according to the licence system, after the example set by the whilom Ashikaga Shogunate. This system provided that trading should be limited to a certain number of ships fixed by each Government, and that these privileged ships should be furnished by their respective Governments with licences. Chinese merchant ships under this system usually called at Nagasaki, and very rarely at Hirado, as a result of which Nagasaki more and more increased in importance, leaving Sakai and Hakata to lag behind in the matter of import trade, busy as they were with exports. At this time the trade of Nagasaki was still monopolized by the Spanish and Portuguese merchants, and Dutch ships were not allowed to touch there. But the young Republic of Holland was all for marine adventure. In 1595, or the year after Hideyoshi obliged Hidetsugu to kill himself, Holland occupied Java, and in 1600 Sumatra. In these and subsequent activities, she measured swords with Spain and Portugal at sea, and proved herself stronger; and not only was she strong in sea-power, but also so opulent that she was called " a bank for all Europe." As a result of her occupation of Java, the Republic began to wish to open trade with Japan and China with her newly acquired island as a base. A letter from William Adams convinced her more firmly of the advantages attaching to it, and in 1604 she dispatched a squadron to the East. On its way to China, this Dutch squadron was compelled by force of weather to take refuge in a port of the island of Fishermen in the Pescadores, twenty-two miles east of the island of Lamok, just outside Swatow, instead of making the port of Macao. There they proposed to open trade, but the Chinese declined. In 1607 the Dutch Government sent a second fleet to the East. This time they visited the island of Lamok, and asked the local authorities for permission to open trade, but again to no purpose. Thereupon, the commander landed marines, from whom the natives fled in terror. The display of a white flag convinced the officials that their intention was peaceful, but they again failed to attain their object of opening trade with the islanders. The Dutch East India Company at last decided that Holland could secure a trade base in the Orient only by wresting Macao from the hands of Portugal. In 1622 a fleet was sent to the East on this mission, but again through stress of weather failed to reach its destination. Thus failing to accomplish his object, the admiral touched at the Pescadores, and then at Taiyen (Formosa). Not realizing the advantages of Taiyen, he returned to the Pescadores, where he found three

English ships riding at anchor. The Dutch fleet captured the islands, and looted and burnt many villages, crowning their atrocities by kidnapping 1,400 natives and selling them into slavery. The Chinese Government, which had watched these violent deeds of the Dutch invaders with fear and trembling, at last consented to open trade relations with them, besides giving them Formosa to settle in in place of the Pescadores. The treaty of commerce then signed was drawn by Martin Sonk in 1624. On signing the treaty, the Dutch purchased from China 6,000 pounds of white cotton yarn, while at the same time they built a castle in the western part of the island, and styled it Selangore, after the name of one of their ships.

Dutch getting Access to Japan.—Having thus acquired a base in the China Sea in 1607, Holland sent off to Japan a fleet consisting of ships of war carrying 1,900 men, and equipped with 7 guns, under Commander Velhoven. A gale in the Atlantic wrecked all the ships save two, which arrived at Hirado in July of 1609. Lord Matsuura of Hirado, who had ceased to be a patron of pirates and was now one of the faithful servants of the Tokugawa Shogunate, readily consented to the request preferred by those Dutch ships, and sent their representatives to Yedo, where Iyeyasu immediately granted their petition for trade with Japan as embodied in a letter addressed to him from their President, and allowed them to establish a Dutch factory in Hirado. In 1611 the Dutch East India Company dispatched a ship laden with products of Holland and the Dutch East Indies, and in August of the following year she arrived at Hirado, bringing representatives of the Dutch Government, who forthwith proceeded to Shizuoka by land via Kyushu, Osaka, and Kyoto, and there had an audience with Iyeyasu, whom they asked for further favours. Prior to this, in 1608, the Governor-General of Manila, having served his term of office, had sailed for Spain by the *San Francisco*. But his ship met bad weather, and, after drifting about for some days, arrived at Uraga. The Spaniard took this opportunity to pay his homage to Iyeyasu, and as it was then clear that Holland was about to compete with Portugal and Spain in trade in the Orient, he defamed her in every possible way in his conversation with the Shogun, and warned him of the danger of trading with pirates.

Dutch at last accepted by Japan.—From 1606 there had been in Japan a Spanish Franciscan, Luis Sotelo, who kept in close touch with Iyeyasu, and by his sagacity, powers of oratory, and broadmindedness, completely won the hearts of the warriors. This priest never ceased to urge that it would be profitable for Japan to open trade with South and Central America, which went in those days by the name of New Spain. It is said that it was on his suggestion that later Daté Masamuné dispatched one of his retainers, Ichikura Rokuyemon, to the Vatican as envoy. Persuaded by Sotelo on one side, and by the Governor-General on the other, Iyeyasu was for a time unable to make up his mind about the Dutch. In fact, he became so distrustful of them that he would not receive a Dutch envoy who came to Shizuoka. Thus repulsed, the Dutchman went to Edo, where he found a very influential helper in the person of William Adams, through whose intervention he succeeded in getting an audience with the Shogun Hidetada, and answered the searching questions of Honda Masanobu, who was practically a regent of the Edo Government. In order to refute the charges brought against the Dutch by the Portuguese and Spaniards, he told something of the history of Europe. After narrating how Holland had freed herself from the tyranny of Roman Catholic Spain, he said that Spain and Portugal were attempting to invade other countries, both politically and religiously, and drew a lurid picture of their designs on the Orient. The Edo Government, which believed every word of this Dutch envoy, concluded that Holland was not a Christian country at all, and permitted her not only to continue trading with Japan, but guaranteed her complete freedom to trade at any port of the country. This naturally was a severe blow to Spain and Portugal, which had monopolized the foreign trade of Japan.

IYEYASU'S INTENTION TO PROHIBIT ROMAN CATHOLICISM.—Six decades had already elapsed since the arrival in Japan of Father Xavier. When the Catholic missionaries first came to the shores of the country, accompanying that famous priest, they were all men of noble spirit and aflame with the zeal of propagating their religion, while at the same time they were deeply impressed with the valour, gallantry, and politeness of the Japanese people. But the missionaries had now greatly changed. The successful propagation of their religion for the past sixty years had deteriorated instead of uplifting them. They no longer held the lofty ideals inculcated by the religion that they professed, but were chiefly concerned about the increase of the influence of their churches and the number of their members, with the result that they began to lose credit. Seeing that Iyeyasu had a mind to reform all the laws and regulations left by his predecessor, Hideyoshi, the missionaries who had once been greatly discouraged by the promulgation of an anti-Catholic ordinance by Hideyoshi did their best to make themselves popular with Iyeyasu. Thus simply trying to get a new lease of life, they relaxed in spirit and often acted in such a way as to lay themselves open to the suspicion of the authorities. In 1606 Lord Arima sent a merchant ship to Cochin China to make some purchases, but stress of weather drove her to the port of Macao where all the members of the crew were reported to have been murdered by Portuguese residents. This report naturally infuriated Lord Arima, who bided his time to wreak vengeance upon the Portuguese. This longed-for opportunity offered itself in November of 1610, when a Portuguese ship called at Nagasaki. On receipt of the news of the visit, Lord Arima, who happened to be stopping in Edo, obtained the permission of the Shogunate to retaliate upon the Portuguese for the murder of his men at the port of Macao. Thereupon he hastened back to Nagasaki, and attacked the Portuguese ship, which was set on fire and all the crew perished. Though it is said to be not clear whether the murderers of the crew of Arima's ship were Portuguese or the local aborigines, it is undoubted that Portuguese and Spaniards began in these days to disregard Japanese laws and regulations, and offer affronts to both officials and civilians of the country.

In view of their increasing lawlessness, Iyeyasu sent in 1606 a communication to the Governor-General of Manila, with the following three items :—

(1) Though Spanish ships are permitted to trade at Japanese ports, they were forbidden by Japanese law to set sail from any of the ports without official permission ; (2) no Spanish subject who has fled to Luzon after committing a crime in Japan would be allowed to return ; (3) aside from the fact of there being the two religions of Shinto and Buddhism in Japan, the teachings of Christianity are in many ways at variance with the laws of the country, and the propagation of the religion would hereafter be prohibited even though the Shogunate should be approached by the Governor-General to permit it.

On succeeding Iyeyasu as Shogun, Hidetada decided that the anti-religious act promulgated by the former could not be effective unless a ban was placed upon the country's trade with Spaniards and Portuguese who professed the religion. Therefore, he first prohibited trading with Spain by deporting Spanish residents and closing the country entirely to people of that nationality.

WISDOM OF MAGISTRATE OF NAGASAKI.—If these laws against the Spaniards and their religion had been literally enforced, a great change would have come about already in the days of Iyeyasu in matters of religion and trade. It was solely due to the efforts of Magistrate Hasegawa Sahei of Nagasaki, and his younger brother, Hasegawa Gonroku, that such a rapid change was averted. Hasegawa Sahei was appointed Magistrate of Nagasaki by Iyeyasu in 1614, and on taking up the office he was greatly impressed with the self-sacrificing spirit that characterized Christians, while he perceived also that it would be detrimental to the country to give up foreign trade. Therefore, he wisely exercised moderation in enforcing the laws and regulations against Christianity and foreign trade. This principle of moderation was endorsed by his brother Gonroku, who succeeded him. Apart from his wisdom in dealing with matters relating to foreign trade and the religion, he proved himself a man of rare administrative ability. Men of such administrative ability and breadth of view as these brothers were indeed rare among the officials of those days, who were generally militaristic in spirit and short-sighted in view. Later, Hasegawa Sahei was transferred to Sakai. Here again he displayed his talents when he protected the foreign trade of the port by establishing a special quarter for foreign merchants, in compliance with the request of one Goto Shosaburo, naming it Ebisujima. Referring to Hasegawa Gonroku, the *Nagasaki Minato Gusa* (Records of the Port of Nagasaki) says: " This Hasegawa was also not only gallant but very benevolent. He was very kind and sympathetic towards the people, and was not harsh in dealing with the evil religion (Christianity)." The Central Government had already by this time ordered the prohibition of the trading of Spanish and Portuguese ships, but in view of the effect it would have on the livelihood of many people, the magistrate prohibited the calling at the port of Spanish ships only, after providing measures to permit Dutch ships to come and trade there. About this time, Hidetada issued an order to destroy by fire all the Christian buildings in the port, but Hasegawa was too generous and benevolent literally to enforce this cruel command. As he had proved himself more than equal to the post, he was at last greatly favoured by Hidetada, and, indeed, if all the feudal lords and officials in the service of the Shogunate had been so wise and far-sighted as the Hasegawa, the national strength would have greatly developed. But most of them were simple-minded warriors, who blindly obeyed all orders. As a result, not only about a million people were killed by them, but the growth of national strength was gravely retarded.

Deportation of Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch Residents.—In 1624 the Governor-General of Manila sent a note to the Shogunate soliciting in vain the resumption of the trade relations with Spain, but Portuguese merchants were permitted to resume their commerce. At first, they lived among the natives. However, this made it difficult to distinguish them from missionaries when it came to enforcing the anti-religious law, and in 1735 they were all removed to Dejima, separated from the land by a narrow belt of water, situated west of Nagasaki. A bridge connected with the mainland was built to facilitate their communication with the natives, but they were allowed to have no connection with the Japanese save on matters of trade. In 1637 the authorities made investigations into the number of half-castes born of Portuguese and Japanese parents, and brought to light 287 Eurasians of Portuguese blood. These were all exiled to the port of Macao, to weed out the seeds of Roman Catholicism; and local records tell as of many family tragedies arising from this decree. Not long afterwards, trade with Portugal was also entirely prohibited. Not content with the vigorous measures so far meted out to Spaniards and Portuguese, the authorities, who were obsessed with the fear and abhorrence of Christianity, picked out eleven men and women of Dutch blood in Hirado and Nagasaki and sent them to Java. In this connection, a very pathetic story is told of a girl of sixteen, born of a Dutch father and Japanese mother, who lived in Chikugo-machi, Nagasaki. She was exiled to Jakatara in Java, where the poor girl became almost mad with yearning after the beloved land of her birth, and could only console herself by writing her sentiments to a Japanese friend named Tatsu. The letters written by Haru, for such was her name, are known up to this day as "Jakatara letters," and their pathos brings tears even to the hardest eyes. They were first made public by the local scholar, Nishikawa Jokan, in his *Nagasaki Yobanashi-gusa*, and their style is so excellent that they form a masterpicce of literature. For this reason, some take the view that they must be the work of some unknown writer of a later generation, and not of that sixteen-year-old girl. Be that as it may, there is no doubt about the existence of the girl.

Dutch Service to Shogunate.—Though the Shogunate showed harshness and bigotry in their religious policy, the Portuguese missionaries must be held partly responsible for the steps taken by the Japanese Government; but we can find no excuse for their banishing a helpless girl of sixteen, especially since her father did not come from a Catholic country, and was, therefore, allowed to trade with Japan. The impatience, the lack of wisdom, and the perfidy thus characterizing the administration of the Shogunate led to the revolt of the native Catholics in Shimabara and other places in 1637. The rebellion was of such a serious nature that the Shogunate had to send an expedition of over 100,000 men. Of these, 1,127 were killed and 7,000 wounded, while the rebels, numbering over 30,000, were all exterminated. Full particulars of the rebellion are found in the chapter on "Rebellion of the Roman Catholics."

The Dutch, at the request of the Shogunate, bombarded the castle held by the Catholic rebels from off the coast of Shimabara, and though this bombardment did not directly lead to the storming of the fortress, it proved no small menace to the besieged. This was not the first time that the Dutch had rendered services to the Shogunate.

On the contrary, they had taken every opportunity available to show their allegiance to the Government. To give a few of the most notable examples of services rendered by them prior to the Shimabara rebellion: they had informed the Shogunate of the smuggling in of a Catholic priest in a boat owned by a merchant of Sakai; they presented to the Shogunate a secret note said to have been submitted to the Pope by one Moro, urging him to send an expedition to Japan. They asserted that this note had been discovered by them on board a Portuguese ship, which they had captured near the Cape of Good Hope. Though it was incredible that a man of no distinction should have ever written to the Pope to urge the sending of an expedition to Japan, the action of the Dutch was held up for admiration as showing their allegiance. Their efforts were at last crowned with success when Japan's trade with Europe fell exclusively into their hands, Japan keeping her doors open only to China and Holland.

The deportation of the Spanish and Portuguese robbed the port of Nagasaki of all its prosperity. In view of this deplorable change in the city, and the appeals made by the native traders in 1641, the Shogunate caused the Dutch to remove from Hirado to Dejima. Simultaneously it was decided that Nagasaki should be the only open port of the country, and that trade be limited to Holland and China. From that time down to 1859, covering 219 long years, Holland monopolized Japan's trade with Europe. The island of Tsushima had trade connections with Korea, and the province of Satsuma with the Loochoo Islands, and Chinese and European goods were not infrequently smuggled into those districts, but only to a negligible extent.

DUTCH-JAPANESE COMPETITION IN THE CAPTURE OF FORMOSA.—This apparent loyalty shown by the Dutch was highly appreciated by the authorities of the Shogunate, who had but scant knowledge of diplomacy. While pretending friendliness towards the Shogunate, the Dutch were to no small extent ousting Japan in the oversea regions which were beyond her ken. At this time they had already forced China to cede to them the right of residence in the island of Formosa. Nominally the island belonged to China, but practically it was outside her jurisdiction and under the influence of Japan. It was first inhabited by Chinese in the 42nd year of Kasei, in the Ming Dynasty, when a gang of pirates, led by Lindokan, took refuge in it after having been dispersed by official forces directed against them by a Chinese governor. The governor then sent his men to the present port of Anpyon to watch the pirates who might possibly make their appearance, but the leader made good his escape to Annam. It appears that there were no small number of Japanese amongst his followers. Coming down to the Chinese era of Manreki Gan-shi-sai, a pirate, who called himself a general of an eastern country (Japan), established his base in Formosa, and often attacked the shores of his own country. As this piracy was a Sino-Japanese joint undertaking, the number of Japanese residents in the island naturally began to increase. In those days the island was known as Taiyen, but traders from Japan called it Takasago, probably because they found the surroundings of Anpyon resembled those of Takasago in Harima Province. The Japanese not only had close connections with the southern part of Formosa, they had rights and interests to a considerable extent in the north also, especially in Keelung. This is partly illustrated by the fact that the records of the coast defence of the province of Fukien, China, report to the effect that in 1616 eastern barbarians (Japanese) captured Keelung. Now, this island of Formosa was wantonly occupied by hordes of Dutch travellers to the East. Just about this time robbers were rife in various places in China, and many sufferers from their violence took refuge in Formosa, their number amounting to 25,000. Owing partly to this great increase in the number of settlers, the rice and sugar plantations swiftly developed. The aborigines were gradually driven away to mountains and valleys, and the farms and fields were occupied by these newcomers.

Seeing how prosperous these settlers were, the Dutch not only imposed a tariff upon their products, but also wrested from them their farms and fields, the Dutch becoming the owners of rice-fields and sugar-farms, and Chinese settlers their employees. If the Shogunate had known that the Japanese had right of priority in Formosa, and protected them against the invasion of the Dutch, the island would have been occupied by Japan three hundred years ago; but the Tokugawa family was not only ignorant but only considered the safety of the family and did not desire complications with foreign countries, and paid no heed to the misfortunes of the Japanese residents in Formosa. The Dutch were able to occupy the island without any protest from Japan. But, helpless as they were, these Japanese settlers were not wanting in courage. Fearlessly protesting against Dutch control, they said that since they had been in occupation of the island for six years prior to the Dutch invasion, they could find no reason for being placed under Dutch jurisdiction, and that consequently they were under no obligations to pay customs duties. Though they had not the slightest knowledge of international law, their common sense told them that they were right to protest against Dutch control, and they thus proved themselves wiser than the authorities of the Shogunate. The Dutch authorities, who could not resist this reasonable protest from Japanese settlers, laid it before the Governor-General of the East resident in Java. In 1622 instructions were sent that the Japanese traders should be exempt from customs duties, as there was some reason in their protest, but that they must pay all other duties since the island had been made over to Holland by the Chinese Emperor. But the courageous Japanese settlers would not submit to Dutch jurisdiction. On the contrary, they firmly insisted upon not recognizing Dutch sovereignty over the island. The Governor-General of Formosa, who found the Japanese hard to manage, at last reported the matter to the Governor-General of Batavia and asked for instructions. He was instructed to see that every law and regulation was strictly enforced upon the Japanese. This was followed by long unfriendly relations between the Japanese and the Dutch.

DUTCH LACK KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN.—In view of the Japanese-Dutch relations referred to in the preceding chapter, on being appointed Governor-General of Formosa in 1627, Peter Nuyts was ordered to visit Japan in order to demonstrate that Holland entertained no ill-will towards her. The following year, the Governor-General came to our shores on that mission. But his lack of knowledge of things Japanese was simply remarkable. Judging from the tenor and form of the official letter brought with him, he had apparently believed that the Japanese were only slightly ahead of the aborigines of Java. By addressing Doi-Ohinokami, Tairo (Prime Minister) as head of the Takasa people, he obviously regarded him as something like the chief of a tribe of aborigines. The term Takasa is, of course, taken from the name Takasago given by the Japanese to Formosa.

AT THE CASTLE OF BATAVIA, JAVA.
May 10, 1620.

I respectfully beg to address you this letter, and am glad to see the growing good relations between the Dutch and the Japanese. It is over twenty-eight years since the Dutch first came to Japan, and during that period they have received continuously good, kind treatment from Ogosho, Sadai-sho, and the Shogun, which they appreciate very much. With a view of manifesting our appreciation of Japanese friendship, as stated above, we have dispatched two men on a mission to pay, on our behalf, respect to the two rulers of Japan. The two men are Governor Peter Nuyts and Captain Itolm Fuff. They will bring my letter addressed to the two rulers of Japan, which we respectfully ask you to forward to the addresses. We beg to ask you to extend your kind assistance to them, without which they cannot do anything in Japan, and those who see them, too, will be inconvenienced without your assistance. If you have anything for us to do on your behalf, you are respectfully requested to let us know any time.

You have been as kind to the Dutch as a father to his sons, and I sincerely hope you will continue to act, as you have been doing, between your Government and the Dutch. We are told that the Portuguese, Spanish and other foreigners have approached your Government, and it is sincerely hoped that you will always explain to the rulers of Japan about the Dutch, so that they may be well understood by the Japanese.

As a mark of my appreciation of the kindness shown by you to the Dutch, I am sending to you, together with this letter, one Dutch gold chain and silks, and I beg you will kindly accept them.

Your most obedient servant,
Peter Karahendor.

To Doi Oino-kami,
Lord of the Takasa Clan.

As a result of consultation with scholars attached to the Shogunate, the authorities decided that from the style of the letter, which was composed of Chinese characters and Japanese ideographs, it had been written by the administration in Java; and feeling that it would be rude even for Holland directly to address the Chief Executive of Japan, left unanswered this letter from Java, which was only a dependency. Nuyts apparently thought that the Japanese Government did not reply to the letter because they had been informed from Nagasaki of looting perpetrated by the Dutch among Japanese residents abroad, and returned to Formosa disappointed. He seriously feared that this tacit refusal to deal with the Dutch on the part of the Japanese Government would be followed by untoward consequences. Not many months had passed before his fear was justified.

Suetsugu Heizo retaliates upon the Dutch.—In 1626 (the 3rd year of the Kanei era) the Dutch Government sent Peter Jansen Muilelt to Edo as envoy and chief of a party of merchants. While he and his party were staying in the capital, the Shogunate began to show its ill-feeling towards the Dutch. The authorities of the Shogunate, who were simple-minded soldiers, had no suspicion of the Dutch ambition to acquire rights and interests in Japan, but they were displeased with them on account of the reports received from Nagasaki that Japanese residents abroad had suffered violence at Dutch hands.

In 1628 (the 5th year of the Kanei era) several Japanese ships sailed for Anpyon, Formosa, with more than 470 people under the leadership of Hamada Yahei. At this time foreign trade was still limited to the licensed ships with characters in the form of goshuin, which were called the goshuin-bune (red seal ships). According to the registers kept by three temples, namely, the Hokokuji, the Konjiin, and the Yenkoji, which were charged with the control of these vessels, there were altogether 170 of these licensed ships for the twenty years from the 9th year of the Keicho era (1604) to the 1st year of the Kanei era (1624), and among the holders of these charters were such feudal lords as Matsuura, Shimazu, and Kato. Of this number, nine ships sailing from the port of Nagasaki were most prominent. Two of them belonged to Suyetsugu Heizo, and one each to Matsumoto Heizo, Araki Soyemon, Itoya Seiyemon, Iyoya of Sakai of Izumi

Province, Chaya, Sumikura, and Fushimiya of Kyoto. Most of them were built in Nagasaki. The one owned by Sumikura is said to have been 20 ken in length and 9 ken in width, and carried about 380 men. These vessels visited Tonkin, Cochin, Formosa, Luzon, Annam, Moriuca, the Moluccas, Borneo, Cambodia, and Siam, but they did not touch at any Chinese ports, because ever since the Japanese pirate raids, during the Ashikaga period, the Chinese Government had continuously denied kangoin (kind of charter) to Japanese ships, though Japan had welcomed Chinese ships. Suyetsugu Heizo referred to above was one of the wealthiest merchants of Nagasaki. His father, Suyetsugu Okiyoshi, had migrated there from Hakata, and was such a prosperous and influential merchant that there sprang up a flourishing street called, after him, Okiyoshi Machi. Suyetsugu Heizo had been indignant at the action of the Dutch in unwarrantably capturing Formosa and forcing Japanese to pay custom duties, especially because he had no small rights and interests in the island. In the 4th year of the Kanei era (1627) he sent a loaded ship to Formosa to tranship a part of the goods to Fukien, China, just opposite the island, and purchase there stocks of raw silk, but his vessel was attacked by Dutch from the Pescadores, and goods and money plundered. Suyetsugu Heizo was so infuriated at their outrage that he determined to retaliate upon the Dutch. The task was taken up by Hamada Yahei, his brother Kozaemon, and his son Shinzo, who were noted for their chivalrous spirit and who had been patronized by the house of Suyetsugu.

Governor-General Nuyts yielded to Hamada Yahei.—It is alleged by the Dutch that Hamada Yahei was an exile from Japan; but this is not the truth. According to Governor-General Nuyts's own record, on landing in Formosa, Hamada Yahei appears to have tried to overawe the Governor-General by means of blustering and bombastic speeches. He had six guns on board his ship and nine concealed in the cargo, and demanded that the Governor-General personally visit his ship. The Governor insisted on the captain of the ship visiting the Governor-General, just as masters of Dutch ships were required to do when they cast anchor in Japanese ports, and Hamada Yahei, at last compelled to do this, in the interview accused the Dutch of lawlessness and cruelty in their dealings with the Japanese, and in reply the Governor asked why he had his ship armed if he desired an amicable settlement. For a moment Yahei was at a loss how to answer, but after a short hesitation he said that the guns had been brought simply for defensive purposes. Finding no opportunity to use these guns, Yahei decided to browbeat the Governor with his tongue. With this end in view, he even went the length of saying that he and his master Suyetsugu Heizo were so influential in Japan that they had been practically responsible for the fact that during his recent visit to Japan the Governor-General had asked in vain for an audience with the Shogun. Referring to Hamada Yahei's visit to the island in his record, the Governor-General says : " Equipping himself with these arms, Yahei firmly demanded permission to go to China to take delivery of the stocks of raw silk which Japanese traders had bought some years before. Partly because it became unbearable for me to continue to deal with him, and partly because I feared that if not satisfied he would aggravate the relations between Holland and Japan after his return home, I consented to his demand. As, however, no Chinese junk would agree to take him to China, he was compelled to return home without accomplishing his object."

Yahei and Business Interests.—In the 5th year of the Kanei era (1628), Hamada Yahei started on a second voyage to Formosa at the head of over 100 ronins. On arriving at the island, they said that they had come solely for farming purposes, showing by way of demonstration that they had brought with them hoes and spades, but no arms. The Dutch authorities inspected the ship, but, finding no arms in her, they appeared to be more or less reassured. Nevertheless, as there was still some suspicion, they did not allow these would-be settlers from Japan to land, and did not give them food supplies. Thereupon Yahei caused one of the Dutch guards to tell the Governor-General that if not allowed to farm in the island, he and his men wished for permission to weigh anchor for home. The Governor-General then arranged an interview with Yahei and two of his companions. As soon as he was presented to the Governor-General, Yahei covered him with a sword which he had concealed in his clothes, while the two others engaged with scores of the retainers. The latter wanted to fire on Yahei, but they all hesitated to do so for fear of shooting their master. Meantime Yahei had forced the Governor-General to promise to give his son as hostage, and triumphantly returned to Japan with 43 Dutch officers in addition to his son. All of them were put in prison at Omura, and released, together with other Dutchmen, and sent home seven years later. Japanese history and biographical records merely admire Hamada Yahei for his valour in his dealings with the Dutchmen in the Formosan expedition. But this is not enough. Yahei was not a mere fighter. Nor did Suyetsugu Heizo send his ship to Formosa for the simple purpose of browbeating the Dutch. On the contrary, their ultimate object was to acquire commercial interests ; and this object was fully attained. After the Yahei affair was settled, stocks of raw silk were kept in all the godowns of the island. The stocks of raw silk then in the possession of the

Dutch in the island amounted to 120 piculs in all. They were disposed of to Japanese traders represented by Yahei at a cost of 141 ryo, plus 20 per cent. interest. As they were able to sell the silk at Nagasaki at more than five or six times the purchase price, the Hamada expedition to Formosa gave a profit of some 100,000 ryo to Suyetsugu. It will thus be seen that by undertaking this expedition he successfully followed the example set by Japanese ronins, who used to raid the Chinese coast in the Ashikaga period.

Forbearance of the Dutch.—Had it not been for the steady and moderate policy pursued by the Dutch East India Company, Dutch residents in Japan would have experienced the same fate as that which befell Portuguese and Spaniards. The Company was greatly indebted to Francis Caron, one of its directors, for the practice of this wise policy. He used to instruct Dutch officials dispatched to the Orient always to endeavour to gain substantial interests, while denying themselves extravagance. Dutch officials and merchants resident in Japan, who faithfully followed these instructions, gave close attention to the idiosyncrasies and merits and demerits of the Japanese, and exercised every discretion to avoid anything that might lead to unpleasant relations with them. It was in accordance with the spirit of these instructions from the director of the East India Company that they cautiously refrained from showing anger, even when the son of the Governor-General of Formosa was taken to Japan as hostage. This policy, characterized by so much fortitude and forbearance, was adopted, apparently, because they realized the causes of the fate which befell the Spanish and Portuguese in Japan. Commenting on the policies followed by the Dutch, Nuyts says in one of his dispatches :—

> When purchasing goods in China, Spaniards used partly to pay in advance. Portuguese in Macao are thoroughly acquainted with the conditions of China through their 113 long years' settlement there. They have established themselves firmly in these regions by means of payment of heavy taxes and presents to Chinese officials and civilians, and they are allowed to take part in a big fair held semi-annually in Canton, making formerly great profit by selling the goods purchased in Canton in India, Japan, and also their homeland. But they roused the deep suspicions of the Chinese by building a fortress there. The Chinese naturally suspect that they would build fortifications in China as they did in Malacca. This has hampered the Portuguese in various ways and adversely affected their trade. If they be shut out from Japan, they will have eventually to give up Macao.

Encouraged by this report from the Governor-General of Formosa, the Dutch East India Company made it their sole object to drive the Portuguese away from Japan. For the attainment of this object it took two measures: one of them was a diplomatic policy intended to befriend Japan, and the other a strategical plan of an attack from Formosa and the Pescadores on Portuguese ships going to and returning from Japan. The authorities of the East India Company thought that if the Portuguese should thus be prevented from trading with Japan, they would in the end give up Macao. These policies directed against the Portuguese brought unexpected gains to Japanese merchants. Although the Dutch were so gentle in Japan, yet once they were on the sea they freely displayed the violent nature characteristic of the North Sea tribes. In the China Sea they attacked every ship they came across regardless of its nationality, whether Spanish, or Portuguese, or Chinese, and sold the goods that they had plundered to Japanese at almost cost price. This they did solely for the purpose of winning the favour of Japan, monopolizing her foreign trade, and obtaining supplies of arms and foodstuffs. The general impression of the Dutch as to the Japanese will be gathered from the following observation credited to one of their nationals: " The Japanese are bold and bellicose by nature. They do not hesitate to risk their lives if they are promised worthy remuneration." Japanese were, therefore, regarded as indispensable members of the crews of Dutch ships in the Orient.

JAPAN'S RIGHTS IN FORMOSA.—This Dutch policy of driving the Portuguese away from Japan, on the one hand, and monopolizing Japan's foreign trade, on the other, was accompanied with difficulties. These difficulties are told in the following passage in one of the reports sent by Nuyts to his Home Government: " There are two obstacles to be surmounted by the Dutch in the way of their settling in Zelangor. One of them is the fact that Spaniards, who are the arch-enemies of Holland, have built a fortress in the northern part of Formosa. The other is that the Japanese demand a share in the business interests. We must deal with Spain by force; but the Japanese we must smooth down by a friendly manner. However, we must never let them know our real intention in dealing with them." Japan's trade with Formosa in those days was not an inconsiderable amount, as can be gathered from another report to his Home Government sent by Nuyts: " Prior to our settlement in the island, Japanese had secretly transacted business with Chinese in Formosa. Their interests have been adversely affected by our settlement. If the Japanese are driven away from the island, their trade interests will fall into our hands. But at present the capital at our command is too small to win the respect of the Chinese. In order to meet the situation, we must take two measures. One is to induce the English to make investments in the island, and the other is to show favours to the Japanese by giving them a share of our business and exempting them from the payment of customs duties. By these measures alone, our trade with Japan can be maintained. Dutch traders in Japan are left entirely free, having no obligation to pay duties. Only they have to offer some amount of tribute to the authorities. It seems, therefore, unreasonable to levy duties on the goods dealt in by the Japanese who were in the island before our arrival, and whose country gives entire freedom to our traders. If we obey Your Excellency's instructions, we shall have eventually to withdraw from Japan. If the two countries come to blows, who shall guarantee that we can protect even the single place of Keelung against the attack of Japanese?" This report reveals two important facts. In the first place, our trade with Formosa was a considerable proportion in those days (this is entirely overlooked in our official documents), and Japanese merchants led by officials of Nagasaki had formed themselves into a diplomatic agent in their dealings with Dutchmen, while the Central Government had no knowledge of it. Secondly, the Dutch authorities in Formosa urged upon their Home Government the absolute necessity of respecting the rights of Japanese. The rights of Japanese traders in Formosa would have been recognized if the Shogunate had preferred a demand for it to the Governor-General. It is deeply regrettable that Edo should have been so stupid as to ignore the fact that the rights of their nationals were being denied in the island of Formosa not far away from their country. Holland employed a capital of about 700,000 guilders for trade with Japan. This can be gathered from the following report made by Nuyts :—

> What we are suffering from in China is not the dearth of supplies but the smallness of capital. We cannot tell exactly how much capital is necessary in order successfully to carry on trade here in China. But it is certain that we can fulfil our promise to supply to Japan 700,000 guilders worth of Chinese goods a year. Let us take the liberty of explaining to Your Excellency that trade with Japan not only serves to meet our expenditure but is also highly profitable. In 1627 we sent from here (Formosa) cargoes of white yarns on five vessels to Japan and dispatched two ships laden with the same goods to Batavia with the object of getting them transhipped from there to Holland.

Name of Ship sent to Japan.	Value of White Yarn.	Profit.
	Florins.	Per cent.
Woolaid	228,214	17·6
Welsden	225,757	19·0
Huesden	92,587	2·0
Eitam	60,000	0·0
Westcappel	15,294	17·0
Total	621,912	—

Name of Ship sent to Batavia.	Value of White Yarn.	Profit.
	Florins.	Per cent.
Urade	337,932	19·0
Erasmus	221,561	0·2
Total	559,493	—

The value of the trade for 1628 was unusually small owing to disturbances in China, and a shortage of funds. Still, the following shipments were sent to Japan and Batavia :—

Name of Ship sent to Japan.	Value of Shipment.	Profit.
	Florins.	Per cent.
Erasmus	111,953	14·8
Welsden	107,398	17·0
Huesden	191,511	4·0
Total	410,862	—

Name of Ship sent to Batavia.	Value of Shipment.	Profit.
	Florins.	Per cent.
Batavia	277,572	15·12

Dutch Trade Profits.—The profit on these shipments by the Dutch East India Company was estimated by Nuyts at 1 florin per florin. On this estimate, the Company made a profit of some 620,000 florins on shipments sent to Japan in 1627. This may be regarded as the level of profit accruing to the Company from its shipment of goods to Japan. The value of trade for 1628 must not be taken as an example, since, as stated above, it was unusually small owing to disturbances taking place in China in that year.

It will be seen that these vast shipments to Japan handled by Dutch consisted of Chinese goods, and that consequently the trade was practically Sino-Japanese trade, though it was carried on under the Dutch ensign. As for the Dutch-Japanese trade in the narrow sense of the term, or trade done exclusively between Japan and Holland, Nuyts mentions the following goods as yearly ordered from Holland by Japan, on the basis of a report from a Dutch commercial commissioner, Nyenrede, in Japan (1621) :—

Kersey	60	Giraffel close	40
Grogram	300	Sandal-wood	25
Leyden grogram	100	Guinea linen	500
Wood couratten	600	Salpicods	100
Perpetuanen	80	Tafatsjelas di golconda	400
Men's serge	100	Tsjelas	200
English perpetuanen	60	Narsapour	200
Coarse cloth	100	Mokafonis	200
Stammetten	50	Salampaeris	400
Siam Sappan	2,000 piculs	Mocris	300
Cambodian nuts	600 piculs	Paucallem	200
Bundles of rattan	600	Rochoskin	500
Pepper	200 piculs		

VALUE AND VOLUME OF IMPORTS INTO JAPAN.—The goods in the list given above consist chiefly of European articles, and partly of products of the Orient, exclusive of China. The list of imports into Japan credited to Leonard Camps contains the value of the goods (which is left out in the list given above) as follows :—

Class of Goods.	Volume.	Cost.	Selling Price.
	Picul.	Florins.	Florins.
Refined uncoloured silk yarns	3,000	540,000	1,080,000
Crude silk yarns	500	90,000	180,000
White silk yarn	100	22,000	40,000
Twisted white silk yarn	100	22,000	30,000
Waste silk	100	19,000	30,000
Black cloth with willow branches woven into it	15,000	37,500	67,500
Armozynen	20,000	30,000	30,000
Black satin	2,000	16,000	24,000
Black damask	5,000	30,000	47,500
Ordinary satin	8,000	30,000	47,500
Black velvet	2,000	16,000	26,000
Black crude camelot	2,000	16,000	24,000
White satin	5,000	20,000	31,250
Damask	2,000	7,000	12,000
Crimson twill	3,000	15,000	22,500
Crimson crape	5,000	20,000	50,000
Embroidered serge	3,000	13,500	21,000
White crape	3,000	90,000	13,125
Embroidered serge	2,000	70,000	11,000
Superior heavy material	5,000	50,000	75,000
Total	85,800	1,154,000	1,862,375

According to the above figures, the so-called Japanese-Dutch trade consisting of imports from China and Europe represented a cost price of 1,154,000 florins, and the profit of the Dutch traders was 850,000 to 860,000 florins. Deduct from the total of the cost price of imports into Japan, as given above, the cost price of white yarns to the amount of 621,912 florins imported into Japan from China in 1627 by Dutch traders, and the balance will be 388,088 florins. From this it may be seen that the total value of Japanese Dutch trade in the narrow sense of the term was between 300,000 and 400,000 florins.

Capital Involved in Japanese-Dutch Trade.—Holland also gained princely profits on the sale of Japanese products such as copper and camphor in China and Europe. Though there is no means of knowing the extent of the value of these exports from Japan, the capital required by Dutch traders for carrying on their business in Japan and China, as reported by Nuyts, was 700,000 florins a year. In view, however, of the fact that the value of the imports trade of the Dutch traders amounted to about 1,000,000 florins, it may be concluded that about half of this was employed for the continuation of trade for the rest of the year. The capital required for the purchase of Japanese articles was also estimated at 700,000 florins in Nuyts's report. In view of the fact that finding this amount too small to meet their requirements, Dutch importers used to borrow money from Japanese traders, it is pertinent to observe that as in the case of the export trade about half of the capital recovered was re-employed. As the goods thus purchased were sold at nearly double the purchase price, it may be conjectured that Dutch traders gained a profit of about 2,000,000 florins, with a capital of 1,450,000 florins. This profit later diminished, but it continued for the first few years of the trade. Nuyts concluded one of his reports by the following words: "As long as God wills to keep me in India, I can earn for the Company a profit of 850,000 rials in pure silver once in four or five months." Imports into Japan and China were all handled by Nuyts, while the sale of exports from Japan and China in Europe was conducted through the hands of the Dutch East India Company. The profit thus estimated by Nuyts was, therefore, exclusively a profit on imports into Japan and China. It is undoubted that this profit to the amount of 850,000 rials was exclusive of all charges, including the expenses of the Dutch officials resident in Japan. The value of the rial, which was the unit of currency common in Spain, Portugal, and Holland, differed according to time. However, its value in those days corresponds to 25 sen or thereabouts of our money, and the year's profit may be estimated at 400.000 yen to 500,000 yen.

Chinese in Nagasaki.—Nagasaki, which had practically been a diocese of the Roman Catholic Church representing Portugal, became a self-governing city under the direct jurisdiction of the Shogunate, and at the same time the principal port for Dutch trade. It must not, however, be hastily concluded that the trade of the port was monopolized by the Dutch. Chinese residents in the port were greater in number and influence. When he was about to start on the Korean expedition, Hideyoshi summoned the machidoshiyori (Eldermen of streets) of Nagasaki to Nagoya, and gave them the following instructions: "Many Chinese ships have of late visited the shores of Kyushu. I am told that many Chinese samurai come under the guise of traders by these ships. I think that it is probably for the purpose of keeping away from the civil disturbances of their country that they mingle themselves among traders, and I believe the time may come when their services will be needed by our country. If you, therefore, find bright boys among them, induce them to go to Nagasaki, and show them kindness by marrying them to Japanese girls and supplying them free with necessaries." In obedience to these instructions, machidoshiyori selected more than ten promising young men from among the Ming traders and helped them in every way at Nagasaki. The kindness and patronage thus shown to these Chinese young men was not lost, for they rendered invaluable services when the authorities drew up a commercial treaty in response to the request made by Chinese ships in the 5th year of the Keicho era (1600) for permission to trade at the port of Nagasaki. In the 9th year of Keicho (1604) the Japanese authorities appointed a Chinese daitsuji (great interpreter). The duties of this office of daitsuji consisted of not only translation, but also helping the magistrate in all affairs relating to trade. Not long after the opening of trade with China, or in the 15th year of Keicho (1610), a Chinese from Nanking, a merchant, Shinjosei by name, came to Shizuoka and asked for an audience with Iyeyasu. Iyeyasu, who gladly received this man in audience, took the opportunity to cause Honda-Kotsuke-no-kami-Tadazumi to present to the Governor of Fukien Province a state note through this Chinese merchant, applying for Kangoin. But the Ming Government, which had suffered seriously from the Japanese piracy (referred to already) for a few hundred years, could not be easily persuaded to resume connections with Japan. Up to that time Chinese merchant ships had come to Japan against the law of their country, but their trade had not reached any considerable proportions, because, instead of concentrating their attention upon Nagasaki, they had visited at random such places as Akutsu of Satsuma Province, Hakata of Chikuzen, Fuchu of Bungo, Goto, Hirado, Omura, and Nagasaki of Hizen. When, in the 11th year of Keicho (1606), the Ming Court sent an envoy to the Loochoo Islands, Lord Shimazu Iyehisa sent a note to the Chinese Government through this envoy urging it to send merchant ships to Japan. Though this was not responded to by the Chinese Government, it attracted the attention of merchants of Sakai, who went down to Kyushu in large numbers to trade with the Chinese.

As the Chinese Government had withheld permission for opening trade relations with Japan, both Chinese and Japanese merchants naturally experienced great inconveniences in trading in each other's country. In order to escape these inconveniences, the traders of both countries at last agreed to transact business in the island of Formosa, which they considered to be the safest place for carrying on secret trade. This very inconvenient mode of trading continued for sixty or seventy years, from the era of Keicho to the era of Genroku. China at last resumed her trade relations with Japan in the 1st year of the Teijyo era (1684), when civil and military officials and thirteen merchant ships were sent to Japan by the Tsing Dynasty, which had destroyed the Ming Dynasty in the preceding year, and brought the whole of China under its unified control.

THE EMPEROR KOKI REALIZED THE PROFITABLENESS OF SINO-JAPANESE TRADE.—When the Dutch captured Formosa they established their bases at Anpyong and Tainan, and thereby controlled the whole island. But their control of Formosa did not last long. They were subjugated by Teiseiko, son of Teishiryu, a pirate chief who had served the Ming Dynasty, and who had fled to the island for refuge after an unsuccessful revolt against the Tsing Dynasty, in which he attempted to restore the dynasty of Ming. More than twenty years had passed when these remnants of Ming supporters, now represented by the grandson of Teiseiko, surrendered to the Tsing Dynasty, falling before a military attack. The leader was sent to Peking, and was presented to the Emperor, who asked him from curiosity how he had been able to hold out so long in that small island with nothing but wild fields. His Majesty was told that when they had suffered from the shortage of food supplies they had been able to purchase rice very cheaply from Siam and Cambodia, and that they had been able to get the necessary money by selling the products of the island, namely, sugar and deer hides, to Japan and other places. The wise Emperor saw at once the advantage of trading with Japan, and ordered the Governor of Fukien Province to send thirteen Government ships to Japan for the purpose of selling the Formosa sugar. These ships were sent under the charge of a civil official and a military officer. The former had long resided in Japan and had a thorough knowledge of things Japanese.

This opening of trade connections with China was followed by the visit to Japan in quick succession of Chinese merchant-ships. Not many years had passed when Nagasaki became practically a Chinese town. In the closing years of the Keicho era Chinese ships were often seen visiting Japanese ports. The Shogunate confined their visits to Nagasaki. But not infrequently they disregarded these injunctions and called at other ports of the country. They were especially attracted to Kagoshima, for the reason that Lord Shimazu, of Satsuma, invited them to come to the port, which was under his jurisdiction, though, of course, he formally declined to receive them, in deference to the orders of Yedo. But as the Government tightened the screw in the 12th year of the Kanei era (1635), the visits to Kagoshima of Chinese ships became less and less frequent, while, on the other hand, they were gradually concentrated upon the port of Nagasaki. The number of Chinese residents in Nagasaki so much increased that they practically formed a settlement of their own. In view of this situation the authorities allowed the Chinese residents to operate self-government amongst themselves by appointing judges to deal with civil and criminal cases. The first judges numbered six. It will thus be seen that as long as three hundred years ago Chinese residents in Nagasaki enjoyed consular jurisdiction of consultative nature and self-government. As the Chinese residents grew in numbers they increasingly married Japanese girls, and Nagasaki developed peculiar features representing the mixture of Dutch and Chinese manners and customs.

IMPORTATION OF VARIOUS FORMS OF FOREIGN CIVILIZATION.—The intercourse with China and Europe resulted in various forms of foreign civilization being implanted on the soil of Japan. To mention some of the examples, tobacco plants were first introduced into this country in the 4th year of the Keicho era (1592) by the Namban people (Portuguese or Spaniards) and planted in Sakura-no-baba. Spectacles came in the Kanei era (1623–43), when Yahei Hamada returned from the southern islands and taught one Toshichi Ikuta how to make eyeglasses. The latter, who had been interested in mechanics, not only quickly learned the art of making the new instruments, but also succeeded in making telescopes and microscopes for himself. Carved red lacquer and gold lacquer work was also started by Toshichi Ikuta, who learned the art from the Chinese. These works were already in existence in the eras of Genna (1615–23) and Kanei (1624–43). Inlaid works are associated with one Kanshichi, who learned the art from the Namban people in Satsuma. Oil-painting was first tried by a certain Saburozayemon Ikujima of Nagasaki, who learned also from the Namban people in Satsuma. Coral works were originally introduced by Chinese. The manufacture of carved red lacquer and carving and gilding lacquer figures were also introduced by the Chinese, through the aforementioned two artisans, Toshichi and Kanshichi. Embroidery came from the Chinese in the era of Teikyo (1684–87), and tin works in the era of Genroku (1688-1703). Figured mattings were introduced by the Siamese. The art of making hosiery was first learnt by a Japanese, when a prostitute at Maruyama of Nagasaki was told how to make the stuff by a Dutchman in the Kyoho era (1716–35). The Dutch residents at Dejima are said to have greatly benefited in the supply of their own needs by the spread among the Japanese of the manufacture of the stuff. As for the introduction of European medicine, such names as Genpo Nishi, Junan Handa, and Masamoto Kurizaki have been remembered up to this day. Such subjects of Western learning as astronomy, geography, and mathematics were introduced into the country by Kichizayemon Hayashi, and Yasuzayemon Ogushi brought out a new style of ships by studying the forms of Dutch and Chinese craft.

In view of the fact that all these were the results of intercourse with foreign countries, Japan would have been much farther advanced in civilization before the visit of Commodore Perry's fleet if the Tokugawa had not followed the principle of seclusion.

LIMITATION OF EXPORTS AND SHIPS SAILING ABROAD.—The Shogunate, which had regarded with a sense of uneasiness the nation's increasing acquaintance with strange things, and which feared that the Japanese, who were showing such activity outside the country, would eventually rise in revolt against their Government, often issued an ordinance in the reign of Hidetada, the second Shogun, prohibiting Christian missionaries from entering the country. The first Shogun Iyeyasu prohibited the propagation of Christianity, but he did not go so far as to prohibit foreign trade, which he knew was profitable to the country. Even Spanish and Portuguese traders were treated with leniency, and the Anti-religion Act was not rigorously enforced. But the generosity and wisdom shown by Iyeyasu had now become things of the past. The authorities of the Shogunate, who were wooden-headed warriors, were resolved to close the country not only to Christianity, but also to everything foreign at all cost. Thus resolved, in May of the 11th year of the Kanei era (1634), they enacted a Prohibition Act and caused it to be made public in the form of a notice in the port of Nagasaki. The Act read: "The visit to Japan of Christian missionaries, the taking out of the country of Japanese arms, and the sailing abroad of the Japanese except on the hoshosen (licensed ships) are prohibited under heavy punishment." The second item, or the prohibition of the taking out of the country of Japanese arms, was directed against the purchase by China of Japanese arms; for, besides being the object of unbounded admiration amongst the Chinese for the exquisiteness of their manufacture, Japanese swords were much in demand in that country, which was seething with civil disturbances. In fact, the port of Hakata owed much of its prosperity to the export of arms to China. The Shogunate placed its ban on this trade for fear that it would strengthen China and weaken Japan, and at last extended the embargo to all sorts of pictures of battles and warriors, the idea being that even the sight of these pictures would help the Chinese to progress in the art of fighting. Neither did they stop there. The export of pictures of the manners and customs of the Japanese Court was forbidden on the ground that it was a disgrace for the country to make other people acquainted with the conditions of life in the Court. The Nagasaki people, who had comparatively advanced in thoughts through their early contact with foreigners, laughed up their sleeves every time such ridiculous orders were issued by the Central Government, but they had to obey the command nevertheless.

ABSOLUTE SECLUSION.—As stated above, the Prohibition Act, promulgated in May of the 11th year of Kanei (1634), excluded the hoshosen, or the Japanese merchantmen, holding the charter granted by the Shogunate. But two years later, or in the 13th year of the Kanei era, the Government absolutely prohibited the going abroad of the people by issuing the Act shown below. Those Japanese who had already gone abroad could not return to their country without exposing themselves to the danger of receiving capital punishment. Thus the era of absolute seclusion was forced upon the nation. The Act of the 13th year of the Kanei era runs as follows:—

1. Japanese ships shall by no means be sent abroad.
2. No Japanese shall be sent abroad. Anyone violating this prohibition shall suffer the penalty of death, and the shipowner and crew shall be held up together with the ship.
3. All Japanese residing abroad shall be put to death when they return home.
4. All Christians shall be examined by official examiners.
5. Informers against Christians shall be rewarded.
6. The arrival of foreign ships must be reported to Edo, and watch kept over them.
7. The Namban people (Spaniards or Portuguese) and any other people with evil titles propagating Christianity shall be encarcerated in the Omura prison as before.
8. Even ships shall not be left untouched in the matter of exterminating Christians.

9. Everything shall be done in order to see that no Christian is survived by descendants, and anyone disregarding this injunction shall be put to death, while proper punishment shall be meted out to the other members of his family according to their deeds.

10. Children born of the Nanban people (Spaniards or Portuguese) in Nagasaki and people adopting these Nanban children into their family shall be put to death; capital punishment shall also be meted out to those Namban descendants if they return to Japan, and their relatives in Japan, who may communicate with them, shall receive suitable punishment.

11. The samurai shall not purchase goods on board foreign ships directly from foreigners.

12. The white yarns (raw silk) sent on foreign ships shall be allotted to the five privileged cities and other quarters as stipulated after establishing their prices.

13. After the settling of the price of raw silk, the sale of any goods other than raw silk may be freely carried on between the dealers concerned. It is to be added that, as Chinese ships are small and cannot, therefore, bring large consignments, the authorities may issue orders for sale at their discretion. The delivery of goods other than raw silk shall be effected within twenty days after the settling of their prices.

14. The date of departure homeward of foreign ships shall not be later than September 20th. Any ships arriving in Japan later than usual shall sail for home within fifty days after their arrival. No date is fixed for departure of Chinese ships. They shall be caused to set sail a little later than Portuguese or Spanish ships at the discretion of the authorities concerned.

15. Foreign ships shall take back with them all they are unable to sell of their cargo.

16. The arrival in Nagasaki of representatives of the five cities (representatives of the privileged silk merchants of Kyoto, Sakai, Edo, Nagasaki, and Osaka) shall not be later than July 5th. Any of them arriving at the destination later than this date shall lose the privilege of the sale of raw silk.

17. Ships arriving at Hirado shall not transact business pending the establishment of prices at Nagasaki.

EFFECTS UPON TRADE OF THE PROHIBITION OF SAILING ABROAD.—The motive of the Shogunate in issuing the Act prohibiting the sailing abroad of the people was not simply its detestation of Christianity, but also the fear that, if left free to expand their influence abroad, ronins would eventually menace their own country. Particulars are given under another chapter dealing with the reign of Shogun Iyemitsu.

The Act of Seclusion of the 13th year of the Kanei era soon caused marked changes in the trade of Nagasaki. Japanese merchants had been able to purchase foreign goods at moderate prices from Portuguese, Spanish, English, Dutch, and Chinese traders, who competed amongst themselves in disposing of their articles. This can be illustrated by the diary kept by Richard Cocks of the English factory in Japan, in which Gonroku Hasegawa, Magistrate of Nagasaki, is styled cunning and untrustworthy in his desire to see competition in the sale of goods to Japanese purchasers. On the other hand, Japanese merchants had been able to maintain their prices owing to the fact that foreign traders purchased Japanese goods in competition with one another to ballast their ships. When the Act of Seclusion was issued the English traders had already left the country, being unable to compete with the Dutch; but the Act drove out of the country Spanish and Portuguese traders, limiting trade to Dutch and Chinese merchants. The result was that Japanese merchants lost opportunities of buying foreign goods at moderate prices and selling native goods at good prices, and consequently the price of foreign goods soared. Referring to this situation in his article on the reform of the trade of Nagasaki, Arai Hakuseki, the famous scholar and statesman, says, "The prices of foreign goods have been doubled." Secondly, Japanese merchants had been used to sail for South China, and even as far as the Malay Peninsula and the South Seas, on licensed ships or private vessels, and bring back with them a handsome amount of gold as the result of selling Japanese products. But the Act in question rendered it impossible for them to continue such adventure, which had been profitable to the country as well as to themselves. Excepting in the case where a few Japanese boats secretly continued their trade, this highly lucrative commerce had to be left in the hands of the Dutch and Chinese, which caused a shrinkage in the markets for Japanese goods, and gave the greater share of the trade to the merchants of these two countries. Thirdly, traders had been the only channel through which the nation could get knowledge of things abroad. By the promulgation of the Act of Seclusion Japan was deprived of the means of knowing what went on outside the borders of her own country. This had its effect on trade also. The native traders, who could no longer personally ascertain the extent of the demand and the tastes of consumers in foreign markets, were obliged to rely entirely on orders placed by Dutch and Chinese merchants. Politically, the country was in a pitiful state of blindness as to the condition of the world outside. In the fourth place, the adverse change brought about in the foreign trade of the country led to an increase of the outflow of specie and the decrease of inflow. It was chiefly the result of the closing of the country that, as referred to later in the history of the trade of Nagasaki, the outflow of specie tremendously increased after the 18th year of the Kanei era (1641). In the fifth place, the traders of Nagasaki, who had hitherto identified themselves with the principle of Free Trade, were forced to find some measures to make up for the official restrictions put upon them. By force of sheer necessity, and thanks to the interference of the Central Government, the traders of Nagasaki, several thousands in number, later formed themselves into a strong union. This is an important fact in any observation of the course of the trade of the port after the Kanei era. The abnormal condition of the trade consequent upon the closing of the country was relieved, though not wholly satisfactorily, by the establishment of the system of markets in the 12th year of the Kanei era (1635), and of the system for the limitation of the volume of trade in the 2nd year of the Teikyo era (1685).

ORIGIN OF NAGASAKI.—During the era of the Tokugawa the port of Nagasaki performed wonders in self-government. As in the case of many other towns there are various legends told of the origin of Nagasaki. One of them says that Nagasaki started from Fukayeura, which was granted to one Kojuro Nagasaki by the first Ashikaga Shogun in acknowledgment of services rendered in the cause of Ashikaga against Hojo. But this version appears absurd, since it is incredible that the Shogun Ashikaga, who had chosen Kamakura as the seat of his new Government, should have ever given to one of those who had rendered meritorious services such a remote country place as Fukayeura in the far-away districts of Kyushu. The only authentic fact known in history in regard to the origin of Nagasaki is that when the Portuguese, coming down from Hirado, found a very good harbour in Nagasaki and attempted to open it to foreign trade, a certain Jinzaemon Nagasaki was Lord of Fukayeura. The name of Nagasaki comes from the name of this lord of Fukayeura.

The Lord of Omura, who was overlord of this Jinzaemon Nagasaki, and who had for years been subject to attack from Ryuzoji and Matsura of Hirado, raised public loans for the purpose of obtaining arms from the Portuguese, with the result that the ownership of Nagasaki was at last made over to the Portuguese, as we have seen already.

The occupation of Nagasaki by the Portuguese was followed by the establishment of schools, churches, and charity asylums, while, on the other hand, it steadily attracted merchants from various quarters. A mere fishing village in the 1st year of the Genki era (1570), it became a very flourishing trading port with as many as twenty-six streets.

THE PEOPLE OF NAGASAKI RULED BY FOREIGNERS.—As the port of Nagasaki supplied itself with various facilities for business transactions such as were wanting in other ports of the country, all the trading gravitated there; Hirado, Usuki, and other ports of Kyushu began to decay, and Nagasaki became the only entrance to the country for medicine and foreign merchandise, including arms. It attracted not only foreign traders, but also adventurous native merchants and ronins, who had been struggling for existence; and in these circumstances the port of Nagasaki developed a peculiar social condition. The city was no longer a fief of Omura; it was practically a protectorate of Portugal. The inhabitants were Roman Catholic in religious belief, and bound to pay taxes to the Roman Catholic Church. Notwithstanding this, however, they were Japanese subjects. This peculiar form of society gave rise to a sort of self-government represented by several executives, who were called by the name of the chief. These chiefs were vested with the rights of the collection of taxes, the police administration, and the mobilization of troops in case of attack by other feudal fiefs. Their authority rested partly upon the confidence of the Roman Catholic Church and partly upon the confidence of the native inhabitants. In respect of being vested with the police authority, they were to the inhabitants what the chiefs of Japanese associations are to Japanese residents in China and Manchuria. They were selected from among the leaders of settlers from such places as Hakata, Shimabara, Sakai, Omura, Hirado, Yokobuchi, etc., and generally commanded the respect of the people for reputation and character.

In Fukabori, three miles away from Nagasaki, there lived one Shigetaka Fukabori, who belonged to Ryuzoji of Hizen Province. In the 6th year of the Tensho era (1575) he made an inroad upon Nagasaki at the head of over 300 men with the object of capturing the city, which was, in fact, growing in prosperity as a trading port. The chiefs of the city quickly collected more than 400 men, and succeeded in driving the invaders out. One of the chiefs, Sobei Takagi by name, fell in the fight. When later Fukabori made a descent upon the port, the chiefs beat the hostile fleet by mounting guns on board warships which they had held in readiness (these ships were known by the Portuguese name of fusta).

HIDEYOSHI RECOVERS NAGASAKI FROM THE PORTUGUESE.—In the 15th year of the Tensho era (1587) Hideyoshi was down in Hakata, Kyushu, on his way to Satsuma leading an expedition against Lord Shimazu, who was disregarding the Act for the prohibition of the propagation of the Roman Catholic doctrines which had been issued in the preceding year. The lords of the districts and the chiefs of Nagasaki all came and waited upon Hideyoshi. The fact that Nagasaki alone was represented by chiefs as distinct from lords, and that they were not accustomed to the etiquette of the samurai, was soon noticed by Hideyoshi, who inquired of his attendants the reason for this peculiarity. When told that Nagasaki was not a territory of Japan, and that those who were known as chiefs were nothing but executives controlling the city in obedience to the command of the Roman Catholic Church, and that the Catholic Fathers in conjunction with the native converts were so severely persecuting Buddhists as to destroy temples by fire, Hideyoshi became white with indignation, and immediately ordered Lord Omura to bring him a register in order to ascertain the status of Nagasaki. On examination it was found that Nagasaki was unmistakably registered as a Christian territory. Thereupon Hideyoshi, who would have not an inch of Japanese territory placed under alien ownership, sent such feudal lords as Todo-Sadonokami and Terazawa Shimanokami to Nagasaki to recover the place from the hands of the Roman Catholic Church. Nagasaki, which was thus restored to Japan, was made public territory, and Nabeshima-Hidenokami appointed deputy. Simultaneously the following prohibition was issued :—

1. The divine country of Japan shall not be stained with the wicked teaching of Christian countries.

2. It is a violence unheard of in the past that the people of villages and counties of the country should have been persuaded to accept the faith of Christianity, and that temples and shrines were destroyed. The administration of villages and counties has been vested in the officials since the old days. It is reprehensible that they should have their own way instead of following the orders from the Central Government, and managing the affairs under their control in such a way as to be conformable to the spirit of these orders.

3. In attempting to juggle with their converts by resorting to various tricks and desecrating Buddhism, which is the religion of Japan, the Christian missionaries have committed a great sin which cannot be forgiven. The propagation of Christianity cannot be permitted in Japan. Therefore the Christian missionaries should leave the country within twenty days from this day. Any of their followers of the faith who may demur to this injunction shall, of course, be subjected to punishment.

4. The interdict shall not be applicable to foreign ships, inasmuch as they have been allowed to visit the country exclusively for trading purposes. They may continue trading permanently.

5. Any classes of people, including, of course, merchant, may freely visit Christian countries so long as they do no harm to Buddhism.

It will be seen from the above interdict that Hideyoshi had no intention to prohibit trade with Spaniards and Portuguese.

Toan Murayama appointed Deputy of Nagasaki.—The chiefs of Nagasaki who waited upon Hideyoshi were four in number, namely, Kanyemon Takagi, Ryotetsu Takahashi, Sotaro Goto, and Soga Machida. On returning to Nagasaki they caused Toan Murayama to go and pay his homage to Hideyoshi, in order to appease his anger excited by their uncouth manners and speech. Toan, a native of Nagoya, Owari Province, was engaged in the making of European-style sweetmeats—keeping, in addition, a restaurant. It may be added that he was popularly known as Koshichiro, by which name he was called in childhood, and was very popular among the citizens for his common sense and politeness. He was a convert to the Roman

Catholic Church, taking the name of Antoine. Though he was rather ugly in appearance, he had a special talent for winning the hearts of men. It was for this reason that when he offered to wait upon Hideyoshi on their behalf the chiefs readily consented to his offer. He was sent to Hideyoshi with a lot of rare treasures as presents, and, as was the case with Sotin Shimaya, a business magnate of Hakata, and many other bright and adventurous merchants of the city—amongst them Okiyoshi Suyetsugu, father of Heizo Suyetsugu, who later became Magistrate of Nagasaki—Koshichiro got access to Hideyoshi, and was clever enough to win his favour. Mispronouncing his Christian name, Hideyoshi called him Toan, and he changed his name Koshichiro to Toan. Hideyoshi became very fond of him, and once asked him what he would choose above anything else ; Toan said he would be happy if he were granted the privilege of controlling all the people resident in twenty-three streets and other places of Nagasaki. Readily consenting to this, Hideyoshi told Toan to cause the people to pay each 6 momme of silver as a tribute, which the recipient got reduced to 3 momme as he thought 6 momme too high. Then he caused all the inhabitants of the city to send to Hideyoshi 25 kwamme of silver as a tribute. The debt of Nagasaki to the Catholic Church was redeemed by annual instalments, the funds being collected from the people by the chiefs.

Thus Nagasaki changed hands—first from Nagasaki to the Roman Catholic Church, and then to the Central Government of the country. But all the while the administration of the city was in the hands of the chiefs. Toan Murayama, and even the magistrate, held their position only by the favour of the chiefs. Nagasaki had now become a public territory, but it was still practically under the rule of the chiefs as before, and may be said to have enjoyed self-government by elders rather than the people's self-government pure and simple. Toan Murayama amassed a huge fortune, chiefly from the revenue of the municipal taxes. With the exception of an annual contribution to Hideyoshi of 25 kwamme of silver, all taxes paid by the citizens went into his pocket. By the 12th year of the Kambun era (1674), or eighty-five years later, the city had greatly expanded, representing 9,393 houses, 40,025 population, and 79 streets. The annual tribute to the Central Government had also been increased to 50 kwan 90 momme. It is no wonder that vast wealth should have been accumulated by the chiefs, who held in the hollow of their hands the administration of this flourishing city. In later years these chiefs were known as machidoshiyori, or town elders.

MAGISTRATE AND DEPUTY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF TOWN ELDERS. The magistrates appointed and sent by the Central Government were mostly the direct retainers of the Shogunate, and were not only poor, but also little accustomed to matters of business. Consequently they were compelled to leave all city affairs to the town elders. Some of the magistrates would attempt to effect reform in the administration of the city, but seldom succeeded, for though they were able to judge right and wrong, they were pitiably lacking in the knowledge of profit-and-loss questions. In most cases their attempt at administrative reform only brought a hornet's nest about their ears, and finally compelled the Shogunate to remove them from the office. If, therefore, the magistrate wished to keep his place, he was forced simply to watch the doings of the town elders with folded arms. In these circumstances the town elders exercised remarkable influence, accumulated a stupendous amount of wealth, and lived very luxuriously. As stated already, the town elders, when called chiefs in the days of the administration of the Roman Catholic Church, were four in number, but this was now increased to nine in order to meet the expansion of the city and the increase in the number of settlers. Every section of the town was represented by what was known as otona serving the town elders. The otona, or representative of the street, was assisted by kumigashira in seeing after the affairs of his street. This kumigashira was elected by the land-owners in the street, who were called kashomochi. Five streets formed themselves into a union, which was called gochogumi, or an association of five streets; while a union of five houses went by the name of gonin-gumi, or an association of five men. These formed by themselves a unit of self-government: every time the magistrate announced an order from the Shogunate it was communicated to the otona from the town elders, and from the otona to the kashomochi and the kumigashira. Citizens could approach the magistrate only through the town elders. It will thus be seen that the town elders were practically chief executives. Later it happened that the trade of the port also came under their control.

HIDEYOSHI AHEAD OF IYEYASU IN THE SPREAD OF THE COTTON AND SILK INDUSTRIES.—The manufacture of raw silk already existed in ancient times in this country. Since, however, the dark ages in our history the industry had been confined to well-to-do farmers in some provinces. They reared silkworms, reeled the yarn, and wove stuffs therewith, chiefly for their own use. Seldom, if ever, had silks been placed on the market until the Chinese raw silk was imported into the country by Portuguese ships. This importation of raw silk, combined with the importation of the seeds of cotton and cast-iron, caused a revolution in our industrial world. From the abundant supplies of raw silk at cheap prices sprang the manufacture of silk-stuffs, which brought fame to Nishijin in Kyoto. The word "nishijin" means a western camp, and the place was so called because it was the seat of the western camp in the disturbance known as the Onin Rebellion in Japanese history. For the same reason later there sprang up in Hakata, Kyushu, the manufacture of a silk-stuff known as Hakata stuff. The industry showed appreciable development in all other places, which were furnished with the imported raw silk by Nagasaki. As the growth of the industry naturally excited a demand for raw silk, the farmers began to devote their leisure hours to sericulture. The uniform control of the country by Hideyoshi, and the subsequent peace ensured by Iyeyasu, especially contributed to the mutual development of agriculture and industry. Formerly the use of cotton wadding for protection against cold had been limited to the upper classes, and the cover was of floss-silk. The middle and lower classes were ignorant of cotton, and were compelled to be content with something like cotton made from the ears of a kind of reed. Now that the seeds of cotton introduced by Portuguese had swiftly spread throughout the whole country, the people of all classes of society were enabled to share in the benefit of cotton as a means of protection against cold. In addition, the spinning of cotton yarn gave a profitable work to the female members of the households in the farming districts, and the cloth they wove was increasingly placed on the market. Thus cotton and silk yarns caused a far greater innovation in society than could be laid to the credit of Nobunaga or Hideyoshi, or even Iyeyasu. But most of the historians have been too busy giving prominence to the records of heroes and nobles to take notice of this important fact.

Appointment of Merchants for the Sale of Raw Silk.—The raw silk carried by Portuguese ships was called shiroito (white yarn), as distinguished from the home-made yarn, which was yellow in colour, and was one of the most important imports of those days. In view of the growing consumption of the white yarns in Japan, in the 7th year of the Keicho era (1602) Portuguese imported into Japan large consignments of the goods, which, however, proved an overestimate of the demand. The Portuguese importers waited in vain for the goods to move off until the following year, and at last they approached the Shogunate through the Magistrate of Nagasaki with a request for the purchase of the consignments. The Shogun Iyeyasu, who saw an opportunity of promoting the textile industry of the country, caused Magistrate Ichian Ogasawara, of Nagasaki, to appoint a certain number of merchants of Kyoto, Sakai, and Nagasaki, to purchase those stocks of white yarn from the Portuguese, and distribute them to the various districts of the country. In the 9th year of the same era Portuguese ships again brought consignments of the white yarn, and offered them for sale at cheaper prices than on the previous occasion. The merchants who had made purchases of the imported yarns in accordance with the command of the Shogunate applied to the authorities for the sole right to purchase the new arrivals, because they feared that if they were put on sale at a cheaper price than they had paid for the goods two years before at the command of the authorities, they would lose money on their bargain. The Shogunate not only readily consented to their solicitation, but also granted them a privilege for the sale of raw silk and silk fabrics to be thenceforward brought by Portuguese ships on condition that they should establish standard quotations and distribute the goods at that figure to the three cities of Sakai, Kyoto, and Nagasaki. This system of the sale of yarn was called itowari (allotment of yarns), and these privileged merchants itowari-toshiyori (yarn-allotting elders).

Silk Merchants obtaining Privilege to strike Coins.—The silk merchants, or those who had been authorized to buy and sell imported raw silk, were shrewd enough to obtain the privilege to strike coins in addition to the monopoly of the sale of raw silk. It is uncertain whether this privilege was granted to the merchants of Kyoto, Nagasaki, and Sakai, or confined to those of Kyoto alone. But this much is certain, that the Kyoto merchants obtained the privilege of striking coins by establishing a money guild. The following records contained in a book on commercial affairs written by Takafusa Mitsui, forebear of the present house of Mitsui, deal with the privilege acquired by the silk merchants :—

(1) MONOPOLY OF THE SALE OF RAW SILK.

The merchants having the privilege for the sale of raw silk obtained another privilege for striking big and small coins, which they enjoyed for fourteen or fifteen years. According to the system of the monopoly of the sale of raw silk, the privileged merchants of Kyoto had a share of 100 maru of silk supplied from Nagasaki at cost price, and the profit on the goods, less sundry charges, was to be divided among the group. As the group was very numerous, no single member could sustain himself by the sale of raw silk alone unless he had large means or in cases where the sale of the goods yielded very handsome profits. As the result of a conference on the measures to be taken to supplement their scanty revenue from the sale of raw silk, these privileged silk merchants took upon themselves the striking of coins. They spared no effort in the affair, and as they had many experienced assistants, they were able to save no inconsiderable amount of sundry expenses. As they feared that, when put in circulation all at once in Kyoto, the new coins would depreciate in value, they sent them by ship to the western or northern parts of the country, and there exchanged them for grain. The goods thus purchased were sold in other places, where they commanded better prices. As the group was, as stated above, large in number, they could divide the work satisfactorily, and the striking of small coins alone brought them no small profit. But there was still greater profit in store for them. A veteran adviser, Nagasakiya-Chushichi by name, conceived the idea of turning his intimacy with Inagaki-

Tsushimanokami, Wakadoshitori (Vice-Prime Minister) in the Shogunate, to the best possible account for this group of privileged merchants, and proposed to the Shogunate to pay a larger tax in return for permission to strike bigger coins. The Government, which was then in straitened circumstances, fell in with the proposal. As expected, the business proved very lucrative, and hardly a year had passed when they had gained enormous profits. So much so that, like the silver guild of Edo, they established ranks amongst themselves. But their boom days were to be short-lived, for in the spring of the following year the system of making the bigger coins was discontinued with the change of the Shogun, with the result that this money guild came to a standstill and ran deeply into debt. Thanks to reforms being effected in various directions in Nagasaki, it appears that the raw silk under the system of monopoly has come to be disposed of at the cost price in recent years instead of levying a tax upon it. As, however, a tax is now imposed upon the total amount of every line of goods in foreign trade, owing to a difference in the price of copper, the yield on the sale of raw silk under the monopoly system has correspondingly diminished.

As will be seen from the above records, the silk merchants who struck bad coins did not use them in such places as Kyoto and Osaka for fear that they would depreciate in value, but were cunning enough to take them to remote country places and there exchange them for commodities of exactly the same value commanded by good coins. The book quoted above does not tell how they acquired this privilege of striking coins. But it may probably be that they persuaded the authorities into the belief that by taking up the responsibility for purchasing and distributing raw silk, they were running considerable risk, and that the privilege was granted as a make-weight for that responsibility. How greatly they profited by this privilege can be gathered from the fact that they contributed a large sum of money to the Shogunate when later the privilege was restored. This occurred in the 5th year of the Hoyei era (1708), or the year preceding the death of the fifth Shogun, when a merchant of Kyoto, Nagasakiya-Chyushichi by name, persuaded Wakadoshiyori Inagaki-Tsushimanokami Shigetomi to give permission to strike coins in return for a payment of 200,000 ryo. It may be added that Nagasakiya-Chyushichi was a descendant of one of the silk merchants. On January 28th of the same year the Shogunate issued the following ordinance regarding the circulation of new coins :—

> The big coins which are to be struck in Kyoto hereafter shall be circulated freely in any place of the country, together with the coins that have hitherto been in circulation. The big 1 sen coin shall correspond in value to 10 mon represented by the coins now in circulation.
>
> The present coins shall be used together with the big coins to be struck in the exact ratio of 3 kwan 900 mon to 4 kwan-mon per 1 ryo in gold. The big coins shall be put in circulation from the coming April.
>
> To make any imitation of the big coins shall be regarded as contrary to law.

Extension of Share in the Benefits of the Monopoly in the Sale of Raw Silk.—Learning that the monopoly of the sale of raw silk was a very lucrative business, merchants of Edo approached the Shogunate with a request for a share of the privilege. This soon caused merchants of Osaka, such as Kawasakiya-Sogen, Yodoya-Koan, etc., to apply to the Government for the same privilege. The result was that in the 8th year of the Kanei era (1631) the Shogunate allotted the sale of raw silk to the merchants of Nagasaki, Kyoto, Sakai, Osaka, and Edo according to the following proportions: Kyoto, 100 maru; Sakai, 120 maru; Edo, 100 maru; Osaka, 50 maru; Nagasaki, 100 maru.

One maru was 50 kin, and 1 kin was 160 momme in weight. Chinese and Portuguese merchants were required to deliver raw silk to the Japanese merchants with a copper stamp for every 1 maru of the goods. In exchange for the goods, they were to get a receipt with the impression of this copper stamp, to be later exchanged for cash.

These copper stamps, which were not exclusively used in raw silk transactions, often represented a character, or characters, of literary significance, so that they not infrequently appealed to the fancy of men of letters and artists, who used them for sealing their productions. It may be added that the above-mentioned figures for the allotment of raw silk to the five places were not meant to be literally followed, but given as the proportion of shares, and that consequently the amounts of stocks of raw silk allotted to those places differed according to the volume of imports.

Silk Merchants gaining Huge Profits.—To limit the various lines of business to privileged merchants was the keystone of the economic policy pursued in the days of our Feudal Government. This system was seen already in the days of Ashikaga. For instance, the pawnbroking business in Kyoto, in which the Ashikaga had the seat of their Government, was limited to a certain number of merchants only. This system was intended to protect merchants, representing various lines of business in a limited scope of society, against keen competition, which might otherwise arise and put them in difficulties; but the principal object of the Government in extending this protection was to subject the merchants to taxation. In the case of pawnbrokers, they had their godowns made the incidence of taxation. The merchants of Kyoto and Sakai, who had been accustomed to this system, approached the Tokugawa Shogunate without the least hesitation with a request for the monopoly of the foreign trade of the country, and the Government granted the privilege to them withou weighing the importance of the question. The result was, as was afterwards proved, far-reaching. Raw silk, or white yarn as it was called in those days, was the most important import of the country, and not only this, but also raw silk of the yellow colour, white crapes and white figured satin and other silk fabrics came within the circle of their monopoly. In short, almost all the staple exports were monopolized by the silk merchants. Referring to the trade of Nagasaki, *Nagasaki Records* says that "when Genzayemon Kawaguchi was magistrate in the 2nd year of the Teikyo era (1685), the volume of imports was limited to 3,000 kwamme in silver for Dutch ships, and 6,000 kwamme for Chinese ships, and that heretofore the volume of transactions had been limited for both Dutch and Chinese ships to one-third for yarns, one-third for drugs, and one-third for piece goods for free transactions, as distinguished from those confined to privileged silk merchants." From this it can be concluded that the silk merchants monopolized about two-thirds of the trade of Nagasaki; and how lucrative the monopoly was can be gathered from the fact that a keen contest for the privilege arising among Sakai merchants placed the city in a turmoil, exhausting the energies of all its able men and its wealth in lawsuits lasting scores of years.

ABOLITION OF THE MONOPOLY OF THE SALE OF SILK.—In the 1st year of the Meireki era (1655) the system of the monopoly of the sale of raw silk was abolished in favour of free transactions. Prior to this, the silk merchants of the five places offered to purchase the arrivals of consignments at an unusually low level. The Portuguese and Chinese importers, who were naturally displeased with this attitude on the part of the Japanese merchants, reduced the imports the following year to an almost negligible quantity. Thereupon the Japanese merchants scaled up the level of price offered in order to restore the normal amount. Relying on this change of attitude, the foreign importers brought several hundreds of kin or raw silk in autumn and offered them for the same price as the spring goods, but the Japanese would only pay a very low price. Each party insisted upon its offer being accepted and would not budge; and, finally, the foreign ships stopped over the year in the port of Nagasaki, in defiance of the Japanese law. Owing partly to this violation of law by the foreign merchants, and partly to the apparent profiteering of the Japanese merchants, the Shogunate immediately abolished the system of the monopoly of the sale of raw silk. Simultaneously, the Government appropriated 5,500 kwamme of silver from the Treasury of Osaka and purchased all the stocks of raw silk, and disposed of them to merchants of Nagasaki and other places at the cost price. From that time until the 1st year of the Teikyo era (1681), covering a period of thirty years, the trade of Nagasaki was open to all merchants instead of to privileged ones only.

Appearance of Extended Form of the Sale of Monopoly.—This free-trade policy was followed by serious consequences in the form of an incessant outflow of gold and silver, and excess of imports, to find a remedy for which had since taxed the energies of political economists for succeeding generations. After the removal to Nagasaki from Hirado of the Dutch firms, the port of Nagasaki was yearly visited by not less than five or six Dutch merchant ships, the number not infrequently reaching more than ten. The cargoes brought by these vessels were valued at from 9,000 to 10,000 momme of silver, according to the *Nagasaki Records.* As trade was open to all native merchants, foreign articles found quite an extensive market there in Nagasaki. The result was that for twenty-six years, from the 18th year of the Kanei era to the 7th year of the Kambun era (1667), an enormous quantity of silver was sent abroad, and that the market suffered heavily from shortage of the metal, which could only come from the limited productive capacity of the mines. Trade with Portugal and China had now been open for a hundred years, but the market had never suffered from the volume of the foreign trade as it had been quite limited. Until the beginning of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the excess of imports over exports had been settled with gold and silver. As, however, later an embargo was placed on the export of gold, the balance of trade had to be settled with either silver or copper. This partly accounted for the growing scarcity in the supply of silver. In contrast to the Portuguese, who, thinking only of immediate profit, tried to secure the highest possible price for their goods, Dutch merchants offered their goods at moderate prices. From the necessity of competing with Dutch merchants, Chinese merchants also offered the goods at the lowest possible price, so that the demand for foreign articles enormously increased. This was another cause of the excessive outflow of silver. When, in the 8th year of the Kambun era, Gonzayemon Kono and Zinzaburo Matsudaira were appointed Magistrates of Nagasaki, they noticed with surprise that silver was sent out of the country in large quantities. On examining the official books, they found that in the past twenty years as much as 600,000 kwamme of silver had found its way abroad. This worked out at a yearly average of 30,000 kwamme, while the silver coins struck at the official mint amounted to only 3,000 kwamme a year. At this rate, in a few years the country would have been denuded of silver. It is, therefore, no wonder the authorities were in serious consternation. As a first step towards remedying the grave situation, they exhorted the merchants of the city to try to purchase foreign goods at the lowest possible price; but even experienced merchants knew not how to comply with this official injunction. When in the 12th year of the

Kambun era Chuzayemon Ushigome was appointed Magistrate of Nagasaki, he found that the system of Free Trade tended to force up the price of imports through the competition in bidding among the merchants of various places of the country, and he established what is known in history as shiho baibai (municipal scale). Under the system, imports were to be sold at a valuation made by merchants belonging to the Nagasaki Shiho Kaisho (Nagasaki Municipal Chamber of Commerce). The whole country was divided into five business districts, namely, Nagasaki, Kyoto, Edo, Osaka, and Sakai. These were again subdivided into the smaller districts, and the volume of goods to be distributed to each of these smaller districts was fixed; and trade in these goods was limited to those merchants who had been concerned therewith, numbering 6,646. This system was, after all, a kind of monopoly, or the application of the monopoly of silk to all imports. The details of specifications are appended :—

Total number of men, 6,646, classified as follows :—

IN EDO.

Number of merchants, 58.
Silver, 546 kwan and 600 momme.

Divided as Follows :—

171 kwan and 600 momme of silver, 17 large merchants.[1]
117 kwamme of silver, 24 medium merchants.
72 kwamme of silver { 8 onando-kata (Treasury officials).
8 gosaiku-kata (design official).
2,000 kin (pound) of white raw silk, gosaiku-kata.
186 kwamme of silver, 7 men at the Dry Goods Bureau.

AT SEVEN COURTS IN EDO.

Number of merchants, 273.
Silver, 1,296 kwan and 501 9/10 momme.

Divided as Follows :—

144 kwan and 800 momme of silver, 10 large merchants.
492 kwan and 300 momme of silver, 105 medium merchants.
6 kwan and 700 momme of silver, 1 medium merchant.
(This 1 medium merchant is to be appointed by and by).
452 kwan and 701 9/10 momme, 157 small merchants.
200 kwamme of silver, merchants in Suruga-cho.
(These merchants in Suruga-cho are to be appointed after the case is fully judged at the Court.)

The following are in the provinces :—

5 kwan and 700 momme of silver, 1 medium merchant, Omi Province.
2 kwan and 200 momme of silver, 1 medium merchant, Iyo Province.

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[1] According to the *Nagasaki Records*, those merchants fixed over 40 kwamme of silver were considered as large merchants; those between 8–40 kwamme, medium merchants; and those less than 8 kwamme, small merchants.

43 kwan and 400 momme of silver, 2 medium merchants, Sanuki Province.
1 kwan and 200 momme of silver, 1 small merchant, Sanuki Province.
3 kwamme of silver, 1 medium merchant, Buzen Province.
12 kwan and 200 momme of silver, 10 small merchants, Buzen Province.
6 kwamme of silver, 1 large merchant, Bungo Province.
26 kwan and 200 momme of silver, 6 medium merchants, Bungo Province.
7 kwan and 650 momme of silver, 3 small merchants, Bungo Province.
71 kwan and 900 momme of silver, 4 large merchants, Hizen Province.
361 kwan and 800 momme of silver, 73 medium merchants, Hizen Province.
331 kwan and 818 85/100 momme of silver, 111 small merchants, Hizen Province.
6 kwan and 486 8/10 momme of silver, 4 experts in pottery chemicals in the Hizen Province.
(This amount of silver given by pottery experts.)
23 kwan and 500 momme of silver, 3 large merchants at Hirato.
93 kwan and 400 momme of silver, 23 medium merchants at Hirato.
92 kwan and 346 2/10 momme of silver, 32 small merchants at Hirato.
6 kwan and 7 momme of silver, 1 medium merchant at Hirato.
(This 1 medium merchant is to be so ordered by and by.)
200 kwamme of silver, merchants in Suruga-cho.

MERCHANTS IN KYOTO.

Number of merchants, 139.
Silver, 1,296 kwan and 624 75/100 momme.

Divided as Follows :—

832 kwamme of silver, 44 large merchants.
264 kwan and 100 momme, 50 medium merchants.
43 kwan and 868 7/10 momme, 16 small merchants.
129 kwan and 650 momme for the merchants newly removed to Kyoto.

AT SEVEN COURTS IN KYOTO.

Number of merchants, 173.
Silver, 627 kwan and 326 49/100 momme.

The following are in the provinces :—

3 kwamme of silver, 1 medium merchant, Izumi Province.
4 kwan and 900 momme of silver, 3 small merchants, Izumi Province.
10 kwamme of silver, 3 medium merchants, Aki Province.
6 kwan and 500 momme of silver, 2 small merchants, Aki Province.
72 kwan and 700 momme of silver, 3 large merchants, Chikuzen Province.
152 kwan and 100 momme of silver, 28 medium merchants, Chikuzen Province.
78 kwan and 312 4/10 momme of silver, 27 small merchants, Aki Province.
99 kwan and 900 momme of silver, 29 medium merchants at Chikugo.
79 kwan and 81 3/10 momme of silver, 33 small merchants at Chikugo.
30 kwan and 100 momme of silver, 9 medium merchants, at Karatsu.
43 kwan and 502 6/100 momme of silver, 29 small merchants at Karatsu.
16 kwamme of silver, 3 medium merchants at Omura.
26 kwan and 31 8/100 momme of silver, 8 small merchants at Omura.
5 kwan and 200 momme of silver, 2 small merchants at Amakusa.

OSAKA MERCHANTS.

Number of merchants, 117.
Silver, 866 kwan and 189 72/100 momme.

Divided as Follows :—

464 kwan and 900 momme of silver, 25 large merchants.
296 kwan and 100 momme of silver, 55 medium merchants.
35 kwan and 961 7/10 momme of silver, 19 small merchants.
69 kwan and 278 momme of silver, 19 other merchants.
(The above 19 merchants are those newly removed to Osaka.)
Besides the above, 21 kwan and 200 momme of silver (given in ox-hide).

AT SEVEN COURTS IN OSAKA.

Number of merchants, 182.
Silver, 865 kwan and 105 4/10 momme.

The following are in the provinces :—

1 kwan and 200 momme of silver, 1 small merchant, Iwami Province.
18 kwan and 300 momme of silver, 7 medium merchants, Suwo Province.
8 kwan and 455 8/10 momme of silver, 4 small merchants, Suwo Province.
79 kwan and 400 momme of silver, 5 large merchants, Nagato Province.
3 kwan and 81 momme of silver, 1 small merchant, Nagato Province.
50 kwan and 500 momme of silver, 12 medium merchants, Nagato Province.
10 kwan and 920 momme of silver, 3 other merchants, Nagato Province.
(The above 3 merchants are those newly removed to the Nagato Province.)
177 kwan and 500 momme of silver, 10 large merchants, Higo Province.
98 kwan of silver, 25 medium merchants, Higo Province.
75 kwan and 965 momme of silver, 34 small merchants, Higo Province.
14 kwan and 100 momme of silver, 2 large merchants, Satsuma Province.
27 kwan and 2,650 momme of silver, 7 small merchants, Satsuma Province.
6 kwan and 800 momme of silver, 1 large merchant at Shimabara.
87 kwan and 400 momme of silver, 24 medium merchants at Shimabara.
113 kwan and 720 4/10 momme of silver, 37 small merchants at Shimabara.
69 kwan and 300 momme of silver, 4 large merchants, Tsushima Province.
21 kwan and 700 momme of silver, 4 medium merchants, Tsushima Province.
1 kwan and 500 momme of silver, 1 small merchant, Tsushima Province.

MERCHANTS OF SAKAI.

Number of merchants, 285.
Silver, 2,916 kwan and 176 15/100 momme.

Divided as Follows :—

2,037 kwamme, 46 large merchants.
730 kwan and 200 momme, 128 medium merchants.
107 kwan and 5 15/100 momme, 50 small merchants.
41 kwan and 976 momme, 11 other merchants.
(The above 11 merchants are those newly removed to Sakai.)

AT SIX COURTS AT SAKAE.

Number of merchants, 12.
Silver, 77 kwan and 417 6/10 momme.

The following are in the provinces :—

42 kwan and 200 momme of silver, 2 large merchants at Fushimi.
9 kwamme of silver, 2 medium merchants at Fushimi.
6 kwamme of silver, 2 medium merchants, Ise Province.
5 kwan and 365 momme of silver, 2 small merchants, Kii Province.
3 kwamme of silver, 3 medium merchants, Harima Province.
6 kwamme of silver, 3 medium merchants, Bitchu Province.
4 kwan and 152 6/10 momme of silver, 1 small merchant, Bitchu Province.
1 kwamme of silver, 1 small merchant, Shima Province.

MERCHANTS OF NAGASAKI.

Number of merchants, 5,412.
Silver, 10,144 kwan and 401 25/100 momme.

Divided as Follows :—

2,225 kwan and 500 momme of silver, 98 large merchants.
2,988 kwan and 200 momme of silver, 353 medium merchants.
4,920 kwan and 617 7/10 momme of silver, 4,960 small merchants.

Besides—

148 kwan and 5 21/100 momme of silver, 43 shagreem dealers.
160 kwan and 131 momme of silver, 28 aloe-wood incense dealers.
50,074 kin (pound) of sugar, 45 confectioners.
3,000 kin (pound) of tin, 3 tin dealers.
49 kwan and 200 momme of silver, 54 hides (cut to pieces) dealers.
26 kwan and 860 36/100 momme of silver, 22 clothes (cut to pieces) dealers.
25 kwamme of silver, 10 inspectors of ox-hides.
50 kin of white raw silk, 1 weaver.
19 kwan and 216 34/100 momme of silver, 9 Nagasaki Kawashita men.
(The above 19 kwan 216 34/100 momme of silver are given in ox-hides.)

The above dealers carrying on business hereditarily, having petitioned to be granted above merchandise, have been given the licence for the same by the authority after due examination and inspection were made.

Total number of men, 6,446.
Total amount of silver, 1,823 kwan and 243 27/100 momme.

Divided as Follows :—

6,365 kwan and 700 momme of silver, 322 large merchants.
5,503 kwan and 790 momme of silver, 864 medium merchants.
6,405 kwan and 387 4/10 momme of silver, 5,388 small merchants.
244 kwan and 855 momme of silver, 58 merchants newly removed here.
36 kwamme of silver, 4 Treasury officials.

59 kwamme of silver, 4 official designers.

17 kwan and 620 momme of silver, 4 other merchants.

(The above 4 merchants are to be so ordered later.)

100 kwamme of silver, 10 eldermen at five districts.

(At the rate of 10 kwamme of silver each.)

180 kwamme of silver to the men dealing with the affairs with regard to the foreign ships coming into the port.

55 kwamme of silver for house rent at Dejima.

3 kwamme of silver to Otona at Dejima.

1,700 kin (pound) of red raw silk to interpreters at Dejima.

(100 kin of red raw silk is given to each man, it being fixed at the current price, and an increased amount of silver is given to each man in order to make the shortage of salary good.)

1,500 kin (pound) of red raw silk to three managers of the cargoes in the Dutch ships.

(The three men being the managers with regard to the cargoes loaded into the Dutch ships, 500 kin of red raw silk is given to each of these managers, the price thereof being reckoned at the current price of the day.)

2,500 kin of red raw silk to the 5 handwriters at Dejima.

(500 kin of red raw silk is given to each of the 5 handwriters, the price of red raw silk being fixed at the current price of to-day.)

500 kin of red raw silk to 1 expert in gold coins at Dejima.

(Price of red raw silk is counted at the current price of to-day, and is given to this expert.)

117 kin to 1 foreman at the mint of gold coins, given in the same manner as the above example.

500 kin of red raw silk to 35 workers at the mint of gold coins, given in the same manner as the above example.

600 kin of red raw silk to the keepers of the hotel for the Dutch in Edo, given in the same manner as the above example.

400 kin of red raw silk to the keepers of the hotel for the Dutch in Kyoto.

400 kin of red raw silk to the keepers of the hotel for the Dutch in Osaka, given in the same manner as the above example.

3,900 kin of red raw silk
4,550 kin of white raw silk } to 26 inspectors of raw silk at the five places.

(175 kin of white raw silk and 150 kin of red raw silk given to each of these judging men, the price of raw silk being counted at the current price of to-day.)

400 kin of lacquer to 5 inspectors of lacquer.

(80 kin of lacquer given to each inspector of lacquer in the same manner as the above example.)

1,200 shagreens to 4 inspectors of shagreen.

(300 shagreens given to each inspector of shagreen in the same manner as the above example.)

560 kin of tea-cup chemicals to 6 inspectors of tea-cup chemicals.

(93 kin of tea-cup chemicals given to each inspector of tea-cup chemicals in the same manner as the above example.)

2 kwan 500 momme of silver to 5 inspectors of aloe-wood incense.

(500 momme of silver given in aloe-wood incense, and the price of aloe-wood incense being fixed at the current price of to-day.)

200 ox-hides to 2 inspectors of ox-hides at Nagasaki.
(100 ox-hides given to each inspector of ox-hides, the price of ox-hides ,being fixed at the current price of to-day.)

The above are given by the Government to the officials and judging men of the merchandise.

Merchants are divided into three classes, large merchants, medium merchants, and small merchants, according to the amount of merchandise which they are dealing in, the standard being as shown below :—

Amount of silver, from 18 kwamme to 33 kwamme, large merchants.
Amount of silver, from 8 kwamme to 17 kwamme, medium merchants.
Amount of silver, from 3 kwan 500 momme to 5 kwamme, small merchants.

Standard of the classification of merchants is fixed as above, and such merchants as dealing in silver, say from 5 kwamme to 500 momme of silver, shall be classified as small merchants.

REVISIONS AND CHANGES IN THE REGULATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN TRADE.—Toward the 2nd year of Teikyo (1685), when the fifth Tokugawa Shogun, Tsunayoshi, put the so-called Humane Regulations into strict practice in Edo, and men were suffering under his merciful despotism, the faithful officials in the Shogunate were anxious lest the foreign trade at Nagasaki should, after all, bring loss to Japan and the country should thus be impoverished. Kawaguchi Genzaemon, the Nagasaki Tribune, was instructed to restrict the Dutch within 3,000 kwamme of silver, and the Chinese within 6,000 kwamme of silver; and it was further ordered that one-third of the goods in both the Dutch and Chinese ships should be white raw silk, one-third drugs, and the remaining one-third miscellaneous goods; at the same time the old institution of business in Nagasaki under the city control was abolished, and everything done direct between sellers and purchasers, while the old Itowarifu Institution (selling raw silk by tickets) was revived. In the 11th year of Genroku (1698), thirteen years later, Nagasaki set up a sort of monopoly system, changed the name of Nagasaki Shiho-kaisho to the Nagasaki Kaisho (Nagasaki Chamber of Commerce), and ordered all the merchants to transact their foreign trade through this chamber, which managed all sales and purchases of foreign merchandise and was responsible for all profits and losses. The Nagasaki authorities also curtailed the volume of business to be done by the Nagasaki Kaisho, restricting the cargoes of Chinese ships to 8,000 kwamme of silver and Dutch ships to 50,000 ryo of gold in a year.

POLICY OF GOLD RETENTION.—In its fear that the Nagasaki trade would bring loss to Japan and take away too much gold and silver, the Shogunate contemplated a policy of gold retention, and devised a means to use, instead of the precious metals, so-called kamban or tallies; and in business transactions Japanese did not hand over gold or silver to the Dutch, but only this kamban, literally signboard, and the Dutch could, in their turn, buy Japanese goods with it. Kaempfer, who came to Japan in 1690, and a Dutchman called Thunberg, who came in 1775, both mention kamban. Thunberg says that the use of kamban had never changed at Nagasaki since Kaempfer's time, and thus there is good reason to believe that both the Government authorities and merchants in general were long very anxious to retain gold and silver in the country, and the use of kamban was of old standing in the trade of Nagasaki. According to Kaempfer, the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Nagasaki authorities under it made some discrimination between foreign merchants, and imposed a much higher tariff upon Chinese merchants than the Dutch, who came so far across the stormy ocean, while the Chinese were quite near and could easily reach Japan without risk. Thus the Shogunate ordered the Nagasaki authorities to deliver to Chinese merchants the copper that they bought at the rate of 100 kin (pound) for 150 momme of silver, while the Dutch merchants paid only 65 momme of silver; and though this is one of the most remarkable examples of discrimination, it shows that the care and attention of the Tokugawa Shogunate extended into minute details of the foreign trade.

Japanese Sentiments toward Chinese and Dutch.—A sentiment of racial exclusiveness was common to all nations, and though the Tokugawa Shogunate favoured the Dutch merchants in their commercial policy, discriminating between them and the Chinese, yet the Dutch were not Orientals, and few in number in comparison with the Chinese, who were of the same race as the Japanese. Despite, therefore, the Shogunate's policy favouring the Dutch merchants, the Japanese in general were not friendly with them, but entertained warm feeling for the Chinese simply because they were of the same race. Records tell us that from January to December, in the 7th year of Kyoho, 20,738 Chinese visited the brothels of Maruyama, Nagasaki, while the Dutch visitors numbered merely 270. The brothel houses charged Chinese only 5 momme of silver for the night, and the Dutch as much as 60 momme of silver. A prostitute in the Chikugoya House at Maruya begged for the head of Bintoku, a Chinese who had been executed for coining, and gave him a funeral. All of which points to the fact that socially Japanese were not very friendly with the Dutch, but were very close to the Chinese.

Shogunate's Policy, and Regulations of the Shotoku Era to restrict the Foreign Trade at Nagasaki.—In 1741 (4th year of Shotoku), one who was at the same time a scholar and a statesman was in charge of financial and diplomatic affairs in the Shogunate and made many reforms. Arai Hakuseki turned first to nursing the finances of the Government, and reminting all the debased gold and silver coins, changed them to good ones, in order to relieve the Shogunate from the financial embarrassment which had troubled it ever since the Genroku Age. Thinking that the sole cause of this embarrassment was the foreign trade, which tempted people to buy useless things, the Shogunate sent to Nagasaki Lord Sengoku Tambanokami as the regular envoy, and Ishikawa Sanemon as his counsellor, and, reforming many of the old trade institutions, there set up new institutions, the volume of trade being regulated as follows :—

The total amount of copper to be sent to Nagasaki in one year shall be within 4,000,000 to 4,500,000 kin (pound) ; the amount of trade to be done by the Chinese shall be restricted to the cargoes of thirty ships and of a value amounting to 6,000 kwamme of silver, for which 3,000,000 kin (pound) of copper shall be given in one year.

The amount of trade to be done by the Dutch shall be restricted to the cargoes of two ships of a value of 3,000 kwamme of silver, for which 1,500,000 kin of copper shall be given in one year. No Chinese ship other than those licensed by the Tokugawa Government shall enter Nagasaki, and if such unlicensed ship enters the port no trade shall be permitted. All the duly licensed foreign ships that enter the port shall be allowed to make trade, and their goods shall surely be bought by the Japanese merchants. The Nagasaki Shiho Kaisho (chamber of commerce of Nagasaki city) shall monopolize all the trade in Nagasaki, and no free trade shall be allowed as in the Genroku Age.

The institutions and regulations of the 4th year of Shotoku were very precise, and though there were much change in the volume of trade reckoning in gold and silver after their proclamation, they continued in force until the restoration of the Meiji era, and it may be of interest to reproduce them in full :—

REGULATIONS ABOUT THE COPPER SHIPPED TO NAGASAKI.

1. The total amount of copper to be shipped to Nagasaki from all the provinces shall be within 4,000,000 to 4,500,000 kin for one year. The amount of copper to be produced from the mines in the provinces, and also the amount used in the country, varies year by year, but taking a general average of the amount of copper shipped from the provinces to Nagasaki every year, it is provisionally fixed here as 4,500,000 kin. In case the production of copper from the mines in the provinces decreases some year and does not reach the said 4,500,000 kin, the authorities at Nagasaki shall make due arrangements as to the proportion to be delivered to foreign merchants.

2. The total number of Chinese ships that can enter the port of Nagasaki and make trade there is limited to thirty ships, including comparatively large ships and junks, and the amount of trade they can do there is limited to

6,000 kwamme of silver in money value, for which the Japanese merchants are to give 3,000,000 kin of copper. The regulations with regard to the number of Chinese ships, classification of such ships, and amount of trade in silver value, are fixed on the basis of the yearly average, the reason being that when the central authorities called for the opinions of Nagasaki officials their opinions were divergent, and the central authority, acting on the majority of the opinions, fixed the regulations given above. It may be that when the Chinese ships enter the port of Nagasaki they will bring different commodities, and some commodities may be more in amount than the Japanese merchants expected to have and other commodities less, but the articles of the Regulations are a standard to be observed permanently, and the magistrate of Nagasaki must duly instruct his officials with regard to them and see that they take due measures that such important articles as drugs may surely be obtained by the Japanese merchants. The Magistrate of Nagasaki must always call for the opinions of officials with regard to the trade at the port, and impress upon them that it is necessary to lessen the import of useless articles and increase that of useful commodities, so that in some cases it may be necessary to lessen the amount of commodities from one ship and to take more from another, or perhaps increase the import of cheaper articles and lessen that of expensive articles. The regulation as to the number of Chinese ships entering the port of Nagasaki, viz. thirty, and as to the total value of commodities for trade not exceeding 6,000 kwamme of silver, for which 3,000,000 kin of copper shall be given by the Japanese merchants, must be faithfully observed, and the central authority controlling the local authority at Nagasaki is to keep the above principle in mind and give due consideration to it.

3. The number of the Dutch ships that can enter the port of Nagasaki and make trade there is limited to two, and the amount of trade is limited to 3,000 kwamme of silver in money value, for which the Japanese merchants are to give 1,500,000 kin of copper.

As to the regulation with regard to the commodities that the Dutch merchants are to deliver to Japanese merchants in exchange for the 3,000 kwamme of silver worth of copper, it is published elsewhere, but as it is known that there is a fixed practice between the Dutch and Japanese merchants that the former can deliver any kind of articles at their desire in exchange for the copper, it is ordered here by the central authority that such commodities are to be taken from the Dutch merchants according to the former practices of trade.

The above regulations are now issued, and the articles regarding the amount of copper to be shipped to Nagasaki from the mines in the provinces, and the number of foreign ships entering Nagasaki for trade purposes, are strictly to be observed, and the trade is to be carried on according to the purport of these articles. In case the amount of copper to be shipped to Nagasaki shows some decrease in comparison with the average amount of every year, the central authority in charge of trade affairs at Nagasaki is to instruct the Nagasaki authority to make due arrangements for it so as not to hinder the foreign trade at Nagasaki.

(Signed) THE ROCHU (Executive Lords in the Shogunate).

January 11th, 5th year of Shotoku.

TO THE LORDS HISAMATSU BINGO-NO-KAMI AND OOKA BIZEN-NO-KAMI.

REGULATIONS ABOUT THE NUMBER OF FOREIGN (EXCLUDING DUTCH) SHIPS, CLASSIFICATION OF MERCHANDISE IN THE SHIPS, AND AMOUNT OF SILVER VALUE OF MERCHANDISE IN SUCH SHIPS.

7 Nanking Ships. 5 Ningpo Ships. 1 Fudasan Ship.

Of the above thirteen ships it is regulated that the value of merchandise in each ship shall be 200 kwamme of silver, and in case the Fudasan ship does not bring produce suitable for Japanese to import, it will be well to exclude it from account, and to increase the number of ships from other countries so that the above number of ships shall be made good, and to this the authority in charge of foreign trade shall give due consideration. In case the ships from another province, not mentioned above, bring in their home produce that may be useful for Japanese people, it is well to increase the number of foreign ships that can enter the port of Nagasaki and make trade there, or to take that ship into account of the above number of ships, and if so the number of ships from Ningpo and Nanking shall then be reduced so as not to increase the number—thirteen—and to this the central authority in charge of these affairs shall give due consideration.

2 Amoy Ships. 4 Formosa Ships.

Of the above six ships it is regulated that the value of the merchandise in each shall be 30 kwamme of silver, but in case the Formosa ships do not bring in produce good and necessary for Japanese people, it is well to exclude one Formosa ship from the account and to increase the number of ships from the other province, to which the central authority in charge of these affairs shall give due consideration.

2 Canton Ships.

Of these two ships it is regulated that the value of the merchandise in each ship shall be 250 kwamme of silver.

1 Onshu (a province in China) Ship.
1 Tanzan (a place in China) Ship.
1 Fukushu (a province in China) Ship.
1 Shoshu (a province in China) Ship.
1 Tonkin Ship.
1 Cambodia Ship.

Of the above six ships it is regulated here that the value of the merchandise in each ship shall be 200 kwamme of silver, and in case any of the above ships do not bring produce good and necessary for the use of Japanese people, but a ship from another country enters the port with good and wholesome merchandise, the local authority at Nagasaki is allowed to make due arrangement, by the permission of the central authority in Edo, to increase and decrease the number of the foreign ships that can enter Nagasaki and make trade there. The central authority in charge of such affairs is to give due consideration and make proper arrangement, and so instruct the local authorities at Nagasaki.

1 Konan Ship. 1 Siam Ship. 1 Javanese Ship.

Of the above foreign ships it is prescribed that the value of the merchandise in each ship shall be 300 kwamme of silver. Two Siamese ships used from of old to come to the port of Nagasaki, and the ships being larger than those from other countries and able to bring in more merchandise, the result will naturally be that Siamese merchandise will increase, and the number of ships from other countries be lessened by degrees. In consideration of this it is now decreed that only one Siamese ship can enter Nagasaki, but if it is found afterwards that the Siamese ship always brings in merchandise good and necessary for Japanese people, and the decrease in the number of Siamese ships will result in the want of necessary good in Japan, it will be well to change the number of foreign ships that can enter Nagasaki, exclude from account the ships from another country and allow two Siamese ships to enter the port as before. The central authority in charge of these affairs, keeping the above in mind, are to give due consideration and take proper measure when they think it necessary to do so.

The total value of the cargoes in the foreign ships that are allowed to enter Nagasaki is fixed at 6,000 kwamme of silver, as is precisely laid down above, and the value of cargoes in all the ships from foreign countries is also fixed in the above regulations. It may be that the price of commodities vary every year in foreign countries, and therefore the price of commodities brought to Nagasaki by the foreign ships might vary also; but as there is fixed, as above, the total value of such commodities to be imported at Nagasaki, it is proper for the foreign traders not to bring to Nagasaki more than the value of 6,000 kwamme of silver, and the Nagasaki authorities should instruct the foreign traders in the purport of the regulations, so that they will not bring over to the port of Nagasaki too many commodities. Ships coming to Nagasaki from Konan, Siam, and Java are generally large, and quantities of coarser goods are loaded in them so that there may be more cargo in the ships than the fixed amount, and the value may exceed that prescribed in the regulations, but if there are some surplus goods put into bags those goods may be exchanged for Japanese goods.

As to the ships coming to Nagasaki from Onshu, Tanzan, Fukushu, Tonkin, and Cambodia, they do not come to Nagasaki with unfailing regularity every year, and therefore if it happens that some of these ships do not come to Nagasaki, and in consequence some copper that was already appropriated for transactions with them is left over, it shall be sold to a ship-owner from some other country, provided that total value of the aggregate amount of the foreign goods shall never exceed 6,000 kwamme of silver; but if it is found that by so doing the total value of foreign goods exceeds 6,000 kwamme of silver, on no account shall it be permitted to import any more foreign goods, however much surplus goods are brought in by foreign ships. If such be permitted, there will be no end of foreign ships always bringing too much cargo, and consequently the value of imported foreign goods will exceed 6,000 kwamme of silver. Besides, it is necessary for all the officials dealing with trade affairs to keep it in their mind that if the regulations are strictly observed for many years the foreign ships will not fail to come regularly every year, bringing in the due amount of commodities, so as not to exceed 6,000 kwamme of silver in the aggregate total value, and anyhow all the said officials must remember that the essential thing is strictly to observe the purport of the regulations now revised. New orders will be given out by His Highness, now and then, when it is necessary, but, the articles in the regulations now newly revised being models for others to be adopted in future, all the interested officials are to be careful in the execution of their duties, strictly observing the purport of the regulations.

(Signed) THE ROCHU (Executive Lords in the Shogunate).

January 11th, 5th year of Shotoku (1713).

TO LORDS HISAMATSU BINGO-NO-KAMI AND OOKA BIZEN-NO-KAMI.

REGULATIONS ABOUT BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS OF THE DUTCH.

1. The number of the Dutch ships coming to the port of Nagasaki shall be two ships and no more for one year.
2. The total value of the merchandise to be brought over by the above Dutch ships shall never exceed 3,000 kwamme of silver. The exchange rate between gold and silver shall follow the precedent, that is, the rate fixed heretofore.
3. Of the total value of merchandise of 3,000 kwamme of silver it is regulated here that the Dutch merchants receiving 1,500,000 kin of copper shall pay in turn 120 kwamme of silver for the Japanese goods they buy, also 100 kwamme of silver as the balance of business transactions at Dejima, and will take home all that is left of the above 3,000 kwamme of silver.
4. The Dutch merchants shall never adopt the business method of "tendering" when they buy goods from Japanese merchants.
5. The Dutch merchants shall purchase the Japanese goods at the proper price, taking into consideration that there are fluctuations in the prices of Japanese commodities every year.

The above five articles in the regulations are strictly to be observed by the Dutch merchants, who shall at the same time be careful not to bring over to Japan, nor to take home from Japan, any prohibited commodities. The Dutch merchants shall at all times be ready to have their goods duly examined by the Japanese officials in charge of these trade affairs.

The local authority at Nagasaki is to instruct all the Dutch merchants coming to Nagasaki in the purport of each article in the regulations now revised.

(Signed) THE ROCHU (Executive Lords in the Shogunate).

January 11th, 5th year of Shotoku (1713).

RUMOURS THAT CHINESE MERCHANTS ARE SECRETLY COMMUNICATING WITH THE JAPANESE AUTHORITY AGAINST THEIR HOME GOVERNMENT.—In Ming times the Chinese Government had strictly warned off from their ports all Japanese ships not properly licensed to enter, and the Shogunate now acted in a similar manner, at the same time confining the number of ships to thirty. Merchants who were not lucky enough to receive a licence, and made the voyage from China in vain, were naturally jealous of their competitors who had been duly licensed, and made false reports to their Home Government that Chinese merchants trading in Japan had been seduced by the Japanese Government into an anti-Chinese attitude and were at heart

Japanese subjects. The Chinese Government, with its traditional fear of Japanese pirates and the ambition of the Japanese Government, swallowed the story whole. When their merchant ships returned from Japan they seized them, and finding the trade licence granted by the Shogunate, destroyed it and forbade the ships to visit Nagasaki again. Later, when all the circumstances with regard to the grant of trade licences at the port of Nagasaki became clear, they found that they had been deceived by the slanderous reports of other Chinese merchants. The ships were then released to ply between China and Nagasaki, and engage in trade at Nagasaki as before.

The Nagasaki Kaisho.—Frequent mention has been made of the Nagasaki Kaisho, but no precise explanation of its system and function has yet been given. What was meant by the Nagasaki Kaisho, and who were the members of it? Nagasaki Kaisho means literally meeting-place or gathering hall of Nagasaki, and was a sort of Chamber of Commerce controlling all the trade affairs at the port. Its head was called at first the Director of Trade Affairs with China and Holland. The title was afterwards changed to Investigating Official (Shirabe-yaku), and finally to Kashirayaku, which corresponds to the president of a bank or association of to-day. This office was filled by two senior eldermen of Nagasaki city, and under them were officials called gimmiyaku (investigating officials), ukeharaiyaku (receiving and paying officials), yakushoban (ward officers), hitsusha (writers), itowarifu-shukuro (silk ticket issuers), and shikasho-shukuro (eldermen of the four districts), besides the judges of miscellaneous commodities, who were present when transactions were made. These city eldermen inherited their rights and privileges since the time when the place was yet the settlement for foreign Catholic believers, and the town officials also held their positions by hereditary rights. Under the town officials there were the teppo-kata (musketeers), giving military service, and the osendo-kata (ship controllers), controlling ships entering and leaving the port, besides others—such as tomiban (distant view warder), tojinban (warder of Chinese), funaban (warder of ships), machitsukasa (town inspector), chirashitsukai (messenger of miscellaneous business), and kakimono-aratameyaku (document examiner). For the Chinese trade there was a daitsuji (senior interpreter), shotsuji (junior interpreter), and tokan (keeper of the hotels for Chinese), and for the Dutch a daitsushi, shotsushi, dejiman-okumigashira (foreman at Dejima). The number of municipal trade officials in Nagasaki in the 5th year of Hoei was 1,702, drawing as salary and rations in rice 957 koku, and 3,201 kwamme of silver. In the 3rd year of Keio there were 1,436 drawing 13,110 koku of rice, 6,423 ryo of gold, and 45 large silver coins. These men were not Government officials directly under the Shogunate, and in fact nothing more than officials in a self-governing body; yet they made up among themselves a small Government, and all the offices were filled up by hereditary right, so that, though the city of Nagasaki was a self-governing one, yet, since these offices were hereditary, the Government had the patriarchal form. These town officials, of course, controlled the Municipal Government at their will, and the Nagasaki municipal office monopolized all the foreign trade of the country—that is to say, the eldermen of Nagasaki city monopolized all the foreign trade of Japan—with the result that they made immense fortunes. According to the record of 6th year of Kansei, Nagasaki acquired from foreign trade 16,504 kwan and 961 momme of silver, and the deputy sent by the Shogun, the directors of the Nagasaki Kaisho, and other officials drew in salaries and rations and repairs to the city office 3,258 kwan, 759 momme of silver, or 20 per cent. of the total income Nagasaki derived from its foreign trade. Besides, the town officials, who were called jiyakunin, had other sources of income under different names, such as :—

Taiyogin (*money lent or given by Government*) : Some amount of money was lent or given by the Central Government through their Nagasaki deputy regularly every year, or now and then to Buddhist temples, Shinto shrines, and also to jiyakunin (town officials) in the city of Nagasaki.

Kayakuryo (*additional salary or allowance*) : When machitoshiyori (eldermen of the city) did some service other than their regular duties as eldermen, a certain amount of money was given them in addition to their regular salary or allowance.

Shomo (*literally desire for things*) : The jiyakunin (town officials) at Nagasaki, when they found among the commodities brought in by the Chinese and Dutch ships some that seemed likely to give them good profits, were privileged to buy them at cost price, and could then sell them to merchants in Osaka and Sakai at a good profit. At first they used to buy a small amount of such goods, but then when they had once tasted the immense profits, they began to buy and sell on a large scale, so that it became a source of enormous gain.

Presents : The jiyakunin were also privileged to receive gold and silver and certain articles as presents from the Chinese and Dutch merchants, and Japanese merchants too, on all national holidays and other special occasions, and considered them as part of their income to which they were entitled by hereditary right. The regular salary of the machitoshiyori (eldermen) in Nagasaki city which they were publicly given by the Central Government was between 70 bales of rice (5 men's ration of rice) and 20 kwamme of silver at the highest, and 15 men's ration of rice and 15 kwamme of silver at the lowest, the difference being made according to the relative standing of their families. When one of these eldermen was on duty for one year under the name Toshiban (duty for one year), he was given by the Central Government a special allowance of 25 kwamme of silver for the year. It is true their official pay does not seem extravagant, yet their actual income was five or six times as much as it appeared, and they were able to lead extravagant and sumptuous lives. The men under them were equally fortunate, as will be seen from the figures given below.

Otona (*subordinates*): There were 77 men holding office under the machitoshiyori, called otona. Each of these men received 4 kwamme of silver as his regular remuneration every year, but four among them who were in the position of foremen were given 5 men's rice in addition, and those who were on one-year duty as toshigyoji (manager for the year) were given in addition 9 kwamme of silver besides their regular remuneration. Other employees, such as tsuminiyaku (shipping men), tachiai (witness), tawaramonokata (inspector of bag goods), kaisho-metsuke (inspector at the Kaisho), and togin (expert in Chinese silver) were all given special allowances in addition.

MEN UNDER THE OTONA.—There were 154 kumigashira (foremen) under the otona, each receiving 300 momme of silver, for the year, and with special allowance when they were giving some other service. Besides these men there were hiyukitsukai (every-day messenger), hitsusha (writers), etc., all receiving sufficient remuneration. And it is worthy of mention that all the offices of machitoshiyori and others under them were inherited. The balance-sheet of the Nagasaki Kaisho bears a singular resemblance to that of a prosperous commercial company of to-day, dividing the enormous profits into numerous items, many of which are similar in origin and nature. Withal, these men gave small thought to the Shogunate or the state, and had little respect for the high officials appointed by the Central Government. The fact that they were Nagasaki men was enough for them. As may be well believed, the officials of Edo were much dissatisfied with his parochial attitude.

KASHO-GIN AND KAMADO-GIN.—How did these Nagasaki citizens live under such self-government. The Nambanjin (southern barbarians), the name generally applied to the Portuguese and Spaniards, at first lodged here and there in private houses, and by and by it became a custom for them to pay to their hosts one-third of the money they realized by selling their goods, besides the regular lodging charge, because the host acted as intermediary in their business and received some percentage in return. In time it developed into a hard-and-fast custom that, no matter whether the hosts of lodging-houses acted as intermediaries or not, they took a certain percentage of the profits gained by the Chinese and Dutch merchants. In early days there was no hotel in Nagasaki that was fitted for the lodging of foreign merchants, and even though there were, it was impossible to give accommodation to all who arrived. The private citizens of Nagasaki, therefore, began to open their houses to the foreign merchants in the hope of getting the one-third share of their profits, and a situation soon arose in which those who were not fortunate enough to get a foreign merchant as a lodger grumbled vigorously and complained of the unfair division of the profits of the foreign trade. To satisfy the grumblers, in the 18th year of Kanei, kosen bunpaiho (distribution of commission) was adopted, under which the host of the merchants pocketed 3 kwamme of silver out of his one-third of the profit, and divided the remainder among the men living in the same town block. However, even this was not enough, for, naturally enough, the merchants lodged near the shore, and the more distant parts of the city could not share in the commission, as no one would take a lodging there unless compelled.

The citizens concerned felt themselves aggrieved, and said so loudly. Another method of the distribution of the profits among the citizens in general was then devised. Except in the town blocks, where the foreign merchants themselves desired to lodge, and so informed the town officials, each town block in turn was to give lodging to the foreigners, and thus divide the profits evenly among all the citizens. This last method continued until the Tokugawa Shogunate later forbade all the foreign merchants to live scattered over the town, and both the Chinese and Dutch merchants were obliged to have their own stores and residences in certain prescribed districts in Nagasaki. When the citizens of Nagasaki were thus cut off from their accustomed commission the Municipal Government devised a method of distributing among all the citizens the profits to be derived from the foreign trade, and called it joseigin (silver given for assistance). Under this method a certain part of the profits that the Nagasaki Kaisho obtained from the foreign trade was to be distributed among all the citizens every year under the two names kasho-gin and kamado-gin, of which the former meant the silver to be divided among the land-owners and the latter that to be divided among those who rented houses and lived in the city. The record of the 6th year of Kansei tells us that the total amount of this joseigin was 869 kwan and 510 momme of silver to be divided among

9,000 to 10,000 houses in the city; and judging from the fact that by this time the Nagasaki trade was declining, and yet there was such a handsome distribution of profits, one begins to realize what it must have been when trade was very prosperous. Nagasaki was under direct control of the Shogunate, and therefore the citizens had, since the city was founded, to pay only jishi-gin (residential land-tax) to the Shogunate directly, and were exempted from all other taxes and services; and since they pocketed such handsome profits from their foreign trade, they may be called the most fortunate people in the country.

Jishi-gin, the residential land-tax, or rather a residential tax, was levied in August every year, and those who owned houses or residential grounds were liable. The rate was 4 momme of silver for every 6 feet of street frontage in the outer town, and 6 momme in the inner. The depth of a house was not considered unless it was more than 15 ken (90 feet), but if it exceeded that even by an inch the tax was doubled (Kaempfer).

INCOME TO THE STATE FROM THE NAGASAKI TRADE.—The Nagasaki citizens made so much money simply because they monopolized all the profits of foreign trade, which should have been spread over the whole country, and when we ask how much taxation Nagasaki paid to the Tokugawa Shogunate for their monopoly, the answer is this—that it was very small indeed. At the beginning, when the port of the Nagasaki was opened for the first time, the Shogunate imposed upon the city a certain amount of tax, but the amount being very irregular, there is no record remaining now for students. When the enormous profits of the Nagasaki Kaisho became publicly known, the Tokugawa Shogunate ordered the Nagasaki Kaisho, during the Shotoku era, to pay a yearly tax of 50,000 ryo of gold. Later Edo, on account of the shortage of silver and copper, was obliged to interfere with the foreign trade at Nagasaki, and restrict its volume so that the profits of our trade with China and Holland greatly declined. In 1741 the Shogunate gave orders to reduce the volume of trade at Nagasaki by one-half, and thinking that the Nagasaki Kaisho would be able to pay such a large tax as 50,000 ryo of gold, released it from the necessity. In the 5th year of Empo (year 1746) the Nagasaki Kaisho was in arrears to the Shogunate in a sum of 213,500 ryo of gold for copper from the copper mines under the direct control of the Shogunate, and the Government agreed for payment to be made in yearly instalments of 15,000 ryo of gold, beginning with the 1st year of Kanei (year 1748).

But this yearly instalment to be paid by the Nagasaki Kaisho was afterwards changed to a permanent payment, and the Government ordered the Kaisho to pay after the 7th year of Meiwa (year 1770) 20,000 ryo of gold every year, adding 5,000 ryo to the yearly instalment of 15,000 ryo under the name of special tax. This amount was increased year after year. In 1776 it was raised to 27,000 ryo, in 1785 to 30,000. In 1788 Edo suddenly changed its policy and reduced the sum to 15,000 ryo. Ten years later the tax rose to 27,000 ryo, and in 1810 stood once more at 30,000. In 1827 the balance-sheet of the Kaisho showed a deficit of 2,710 kwamme of silver, and the Shogunate released it from the tax. In 1863 Edo unexpectedly demanded a yearly payment of 20,000 ryo. It is clear there was no standard for the taxation levied upon the Nagasaki Kaisho, but it was only a rough estimate on the part of the Tokugawa Government; but the figures below will show how much assistance was given by the Nagasaki Kaisho to the finances of the Tokugawa.

NAGASAKI JONOKIN (TAXES PAID BY THE CITY OF NAGASAKI).

1,173,000 ryo of gold. Total amount of regular tax paid from the year 1762 (the 12th year of Horeki) to the year 1846 (the 3rd year of Koka).

155,363 ryo of gold. Increased amount of tax paid during the years from the year 1770 (the 7th year of Meiwa) to the year 1776 (the 5th year of Ansei).

9,256 ryo of gold. Temporary payment of tax, because of extra ships coming into the port in the year 1801 (the 1st year of Kyowa).

5,000 ryo of gold. Temporary payment of tax, because of an increased profit obtained in the trade with Chinese ships, in the year 1802 (the 2nd year of Kyowa).

13,000 ryo of gold. Temporary payment of tax, because of more amount of silver obtained in the trade, in the year 1804 (the 1st year of Bunkwa).

50,000 ryo of gold. Temporary payment of tax, owing to the fall in price of rice, in the year 1805 (the 2nd year of Bunkwa).

70,000 ryo of gold. Temporary contribution to the Shogunate in the year 1807 (the 4th year of Bunkwa).

12,000 ryo of gold. Temporary payment of tax in the year 1808 (the 4th year of Bunkwa).

221,000 ryo of gold. Total sum of increased amounts and temporary payments of the taxes paid from the year 1809 (the 6th year of Bunkwa) to the year 1828 (the 11th year of Bunsei).

10,000 ryo of gold. Temporary payment of tax made, because of temporary profits obtained in the trade with extra ships coming into the port, in the year 1809 (the 6th year of Bunkwa).

15,400 ryo of gold. Payment of tax on the profits obtained in the trade with the foreign ships specially permitted by the Shogunate to come into the port in the year 1811 (the 8th year of Bunkwa).

Total 1,734,019 ryo of gold, detailed as—
753,871 ryo of gold in gold and silver coins.
395,342 ryo of gold in copper in miscellaneous forms.

557,953 ryo of gold in Chinese gold and silver and Dutch silver coins.
26,840 ryo of gold in Chinese and Dutch tin and bronze.

Besides—

325,400 ryo of gold. Payment made in Chinese gold and silver of 10,004 kwan and 462 momme, during the years from the year 1764 (the 1st year of Meiwa) to the year 1792 (the 3rd year of Kansei).

Grand total, 2,059,419 ryo of gold.

REVENUE OF THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE FROM THE EXCHANGE BETWEEN GOLD AND SILVER.—In addition to the 2,059,419 ryo of gold received from the Nagasaki Kaisho during the years from 1760 (the 10th year of Horeki) to 1811 (the 8th year of Bunkwa), the Tokugawa Shogunate had another source of revenue in the profit yielded by the exchange between gold and silver. When the so-called Namban-boyeki (trade with the southern barbarians) was commenced between the Japanese, Portuguese and Spanish both gold and silver were used in the transactions; but later the Tokugawa Shogunate, fearing that gold would become scarce in Japan, thought it necessary to prohibit the exportation of gold, and issued the necessary order. In 1664 (the 4th year of Kanbun) the Dutch merchants begged the Government to allow the exportation of 50,000 ryo of gold in exchange for silver, and offered 68 momme of silver for 1 ryo of gold. The rate in the exchange markets at Kyoto and Osaka was then 58 to 1, and the advance of 10 momme proved too great a temptation. The tribunes Kurokawa Yohei and Shimada Kyutaro permitted the Dutch to make the experiment, with the result that in the next year 30,000 ryo of gold was exported, and the next year but one 50,075 ryo of gold, so that in 1668 (the 8th year of Kambun) exportation of silver was entirely stopped, and the old system of transaction in gold was restored. But this held good only of the Dutch trade; in the trade with the Chinese silver was used as before. This extra margin of profit was called aigin, and the Government once distributed it among the Nagasaki citizens as a sort of joseigin (assistance and relief money in silver), but afterwards gave it to the Mint in Osaka. In the thirteen years beginning with the year 1672 (the 12th year of Kambun), this aigin handed over to the Mint in Osaka amounted to 100,727 ryo of gold and 3 momme of silver.

NAGASAKI CITIZENS MONOPOLIZING ALL THE PROFITS OF THE FOREIGN TRADE.—This is certainly a pretty large revenue, but small when one considers that it was the fruit of all the foreign trade for the whole of Japan, and in return for it the Shogunate surrendered to the Nagasaki citizens the entire monopoly. In fact, unconsciously Edo granted Nagasaki a monopoly like those of the East India Companies of England and Holland, with the difference that while England and Holland chartered an East India Company and granted privileges to shareholders all over the country, the Tokugawa Shogunate reserved the privilege for the inhabitants of one city. The Nagasaki Kaisho then monopolizing all the profits of the foreign trade of Japan, which should have been spread over the entire nation, and distributing them among their own citizens, earned such dividends as have no parallel in the history of commerce of Japan ; and whilst endeavouring to conceal their profits and confine the benefits to Nagasaki, the Kaisho made no bones about driving the hardest possible bargains with the foreign merchants, and looked for an excessive return on their investment. For instance, they bought the Hisha-aya silk (used for the ceremonial dress of daimyos) at 17 momme per kijaku (31 feet), and sold it for 37 to 38 momme of silver. Foreign sugar they bought at $\frac{6}{10}$ per pound, and sold at 2 to $2\frac{1}{2}$ momme of silver. Their published accounts show a profit of 45 per cent. for the Dutch trade and 17 per cent. for the Chinese, but there is good reason to believe that these figures were for consumption outside Nagasaki and much below the truth. The number of Dutch and Chinese ships coming to the port of Nagasaki every year is uncertain, but, according to the accounts of about the year 1750, profit and loss in the trade with the Dutch is shown as below :—

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGINAL COST OF THE GOODS IN ONE KARAFUNE (FOREIGN SHIP).[1]

274 kwamme of silver the original cost. Transaction finished delivering the goods of the amount, already fixed by the Ordinance, for one foreign ship.

PAYMENT.

9 kwan and 903 589/1000 momme of silver. For presents ; detailed as follows :—

395 1/5 momme of silver. For offerings and presents to the Suwa Shinto shrines and accounted as " delivered," included in the gold and silver funds of the Kaisho.

328 4/10 momme of silver. Presented to the seven Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.

330 momme of silver. Deposited as caution money in renting the ground at Shinchi, and accounted as " received " by the foremen there.

728 momme of silver. Received by the otona (town officials) in the yado-ocho and tsuke-cho districts, and also by the writers in the yado-cho district.

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[1] In the Kyoho era the total volume of trade with the Dutch was restricted to 1,200 kwamme in silver per annum. *Vide* the chapter " Nagasaki in the Age of the Tokugawa Shogunate."

3 kwan and 854 989/1000 momme of silver. Received by otona of the kumiai (partnership) otona in the foreign firms, foremen, recorders, interpreters, writers, and watchmen, and accounted as "received" by them. The sum was first received by the Kaisho.

4 kwan and 350 momme of silver. Commission for sale of copper; detailed as follows:—

3 kwan and 850 momme of silver. Received by the otona in the foreign firms, foremen, interpreters, and copper-handling officials.

263 momme of silver. Brokerage on 100,000 kin (pound) of copper to be delivered under the Ordinance.

237 momme of silver. The above brokerage was at the rate 1/12 momme of silver, but the charge was reduced lately, and this rebate was added to the silver fund of the Kaisho.

4 kwan and 100 momme of silver. Wages for the coolies.

1 kwan and 911 448/100 momme of silver. Presents on the Hassaku holidays; detailed as follows:—

128 27/100momme of silver. Presents to the daikan's office.

494 34/100 momme of silver. Presents to the shirabeyaku (directors) at the Kaisho, and to the eldermen in the eight districts.

Total, 20 kwan and 265 37/100 momme of silver. Delivered in foreign goods.

Balance, 253 kwan and 734 963/1000 momme of silver. To be paid to the foreign merchants for the goods delivered.

EXPLANATION.

110 kwamme of silver. Amount fixed by the Ordinance.

In the 5th year of Shotoku, when the new Ordinance was issued, the amounts of trade to be done in the different parts of the world were fixed; but then, when the Ordinance was revised, in the 2nd year of Kanei, all the ships from Nanking, Ningpo, and other Chinese ports were fixed to be treated as the ships from among the fixed amount of trade, with ships from Amoy, being all 110 kwamme of silver; others, than the ships from Canton and Konan, at 135 kwamme of silver; and ship from Siam and Java at the amount of 150 kwamme of silver.

30 kwamme of silver. Miscellaneous payments.

35 kwamme of silver. Kanton and Konan.

40 kwamme of silver. Siam and Java.

14 kwan and 833 3/10 momme. Presents; detailed as follows:—

6 kwan and 766 66/100 momme of silver. To four Chinese temples in Nagasaki.

1 kwan and 525 momme of silver. To the Daichuji Buddhist Temple.

541 66/100 momme of silver. To the Goshinji Buddhist Temple.

6 kwamme of silver. To fifteen small Chinese temples and sixteen temples of native gods in the quarter.

4 kwamme of silver. Price of goods sold for actual use.

Goods Sold to the Government Officials.

94 kwan and 901 663/100 momme of silver. Price of surplus goods sold. It is the practice to pay 50 per cent. premium or bonus; in case of goods on consignment the ratio is as follows :—

Cost of Goods and Premium in Silver.

303 kwan and 185 9/10 momme of silver.

8 kwan and 946 4/10 momme of silver. Presents :—

2 kwan and 381 91/100 momme of silver. To Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.

2 kwan and 330 9/10 momme of silver. Rent of the foreign firms.

4 kwan and 233 56/100 momme of silver. Received by the interpreters, clerks, and servants in the foreign firms.

6 kwan and 60 momme. Deposit; detailed as follows :—

425 momme of silver. Received by Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.

5 kwan and 635 momme of silver. Received by interpreters, clerks, and others in Chinese firms (firms) whilst the ship was in port.

13 kwan and 374 momme of silver. Expenses for goods, fuel, food, and wages for fire watchmen, ship watchmen, and messenger boy.

Sub-total, 28 kwan and 380 4/10 momme of silver.

274 kwan and 5 394/1000 momme of silver. Payment for the goods to be delivered; detailed as follows :—

115 kwamme of silver. For 100,000 kin of copper. Copper was bought at the rate 150 momme of silver per 100 kin (pound), and delivered at the rate 115 momme of silver per 100 kin, the loss of 35 momme of silver per 100 kin being made up by the Kaisho.

159 kwan and 805 394/1000 momme of silver. Sixty per cent. of the amount of goods for this is to be delivered in bag goods, and 40 per cent. in miscellaneous goods.

95 kwan and 883 236/1000 momme of silver. For 60 per cent. of goods to be delivered in bag goods.

63 kwan and 922 158/1000 momme of silver. For 40 per cent. of goods to be delivered in miscellaneous kinds.

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE SHUTSU-GIN (YIELDED AMOUNT OF SILVER) OF ONE CHINESE SHIP (PROFIT OBTAINED IN THE TRADE WITH ONE CHINESE SHIP).

Shutsu-gin (Yielded Amount of Silver).

411 kwamme of silver. By the Ordinance the price of goods to be delivered for one foreign ship was fixed at 274 kwamme of silver, and the profit estimated to be 150 per cent. on an average, which falls to all the kumi (parties) concerned.

Payments.

35 kwamme of silver. Price of copper.

It was bought in Osaka at the rate 150 momme of silver per 100 kin, and delivered to the foreign merchants at the rate of 115 momme of silver per 100 kin, and the loss of 35 momme of silver per 100 kin was defrayed from the above profit

468 75/100 momme of silver. Price of copper overweighed.
Of copper 100,000 kin to be delivered to foreign merchants it was overweighed at the rate 50 momme per 100 kin, and the above 468 75/100 of silver was paid for this overweighted loss of 312½ kin of copper.

49 kwan and 450 831/1000 momme of silver. Premium in silver.
This amount is charged upon the item, amount of silver obtained by selling surplus goods, and payment is made to the foreign merchants from the 50 per cent. profit obtained by the above selling of surplus goods.

21 kwan and 687 45/100 momme of silver. Offering (defrayed from the profit).

485 1/10 momme of silver. Presents (defrayed from the item " presents ").

4 kwan and 388 684/1000 momme of silver. Presents to the Daikwan's office (defrayed from the item " Presents on Hassaku Holidays ").

Bonus to the Eldermen at the Kaisho.

6 kwan and 400 momme of silver. Amount obtained by selling surplus goods generally used for presents.

7 kwan and 600 momme of silver. Miscellaneous expenses at the hotel.

2 kwan and 600 momme of silver. Miscellaneous expenses in the quarters adjoining the hotel.

255 3/10 momme of silver. Wages for coolies employed at the time of departure of ships.

Total, 128 kwan and 436 116/1000 momme of silver.
Balance, 282 kwan 563 883/1000 momme of silver.

The above balance is applied to the payment of taxes charged upon the port of Nagasaki—salaries to the officials, money given to the houses in the city, office expenses, miscellaneous expenses, and payments made by the Nagasaki Kaisho.

Profit yielded in the trade with the Dutch :—

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF TRADE WITH THE TWO DUTCH SHIPS.

1,250 kwamme of silver. This is the amount of silver obtained in the trade actually made with the two Dutch ships, fixed by the Ordinance; detailed as follows :—

800 kwamme of silver. Amount fixed by the Ordinance.

100 kwamme of silver. Goods in addition.

153 kwan and 26½ momme of silver. Payments for the goods to be presented to the Shogun and other lords, drugs, presents for the Hassaku holidays, etc.

196 kwan and 973½ momme of silver. Surplus goods sold.

Payments.

42 kwan and 167½ momme of silver. Paid for the goods to be presented on the Hassaku holidays.

76 kwan and 491 8/10 momme of silver. Paid for the dry goods to be presented to the Shogun and the lords in the Shogunate; detailed as follows:—

75 kwan and 420 momme of silver. Paid for the goods to be presented to the Nishi-no-Onmaru (western castle and the dealing place of the Shogun's families) and the officials in the Nishi-no-Onmaru.

685 momme of silver. Paid for the goods to be presented on the Hassaku holidays; detailed as follows:—

285 momme of silver. For 2 rolls of black woollen cloth.

400 momme of silver. For 40 small rolls of black woollen cloth.

Presented to the Officials in the Tribune's Office.

663 momme of silver. For Nagasaki sharks.

It being a custom to present sharks to the foreign interpreters, foremen, and otona at Dejima every year when the season of the Dutch trade is about to begin—5 sharks were given to each of the interpreters and otona, 3 sharks to each of the foremen, and the number of recipients being 33 altogether; 201 sharks were presented.

10 kwan and 997 73/100 momme of silver. Fixed deposit of money; detailed as follows:—

116 momme of silver. Money deposited at the place where cargo-boats are anchored.

3 kwan and 45 35/100 momme of silver. Paid to the Dutch pastor.

7 kwan and 836 38/100 momme of silver. Received as the josci-gin (assistance and relief money given by the Government for official salaries).

19 kwan and 210 momme of silver. Presents.

27 kwan and 500 momme of silver. House rent at Dejima.

14 kwan and 550 momme of silver. Commission on copper transaction. On 900,000 kin of copper to be delivered to the Dutch, and also of 70,000 kin of copper sold for gold, commission was given at the rate 10 momme of silver per 100 kin.

5 kwan and 265½ momme of silver. Presents given to the hotels at Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka.

6 kwan and 600 momme of silver. For pens, paper, ink, and boarding for interpreters' house.

1 kwan and 350 momme of silver. For quicksilver.

2 kwan and 400 momme of silver. Passage money (on board the ship *Hiyoshimaru* going to Edo).

2 kwan and 389 112/1000 momme of silver. Expenses in the tea-rooms.

319 767/1000 momme of silver. Repairs of the interpreters' houses.

8 kwan and 759 momme of silver. For sugar given to wholesale houses, dancing-girls, and coolies just before the departure of ships.

217½ momme of silver. For tailoring expenses.

When men went to Edo they were given by the Shogunate some cloth, which they had made up by tailors at Nagasaki.

60 kwamme of silver. Balance of silver; detailed as follows:—

28 kwan and 620 momme of silver. Travelling expenses to Edo, as fixed by precedent.
This amount of silver exchanged for gold of 447 ryo at the rate of 60 momme.

13 kwan and 320 momme of silver. Miscellaneous expenses while Dutch merchants were in Edo.

11 kwan and 367½ momme of silver Travelling expenses of the Dutch merchants and men accompanying them; detailed as follows:—

2 kwan and 771 momme of silver. Travelling expenses of the Dutch merchants.
1 kwan and 990 momme of silver. Travelling expenses of the Gokenshi (the official examiners) and their subordinates.
5 kwan and 1,734 8/10 momme of silver. Outfit allowances for senior and junior interpreters, writers, cooks, home interpreters, foremen, temporary servants, master-carpenters, and coolies.
911 4/10 momme of silver. Long chests to carry the presents to be made to the Shogun and his lords, and the palanquins for the Dutch merchants.

6 kwan and 332 9/10 momme of silver. Purchases made while in Edo.
4 kwan and 411 momme of silver. Repairs of the boats and the rooms for the Dutch merchants.

Total, 283 kwan and 947 99/100 momme of silver. Delivered in goods by the Dutch merchants.
Balance, 966 kwan and 52 91/100 momme of silver. Total price of goods to be delivered to the Dutch.

In addition, 30 kwamme of silver from the profit of the Nagasaki Kaisho is to be paid to the Dutch merchants as josei-gin (assisting money). The Dutch had asked for a higher price for their home-made produce, and the Shogunate compromised by allowing them this josei-gin.

PAYMENTS.

5 kwan and 980 momme of silver. 154 tan (30 feet) of silk to be made into clothes for the Dutch merchants.
1 kwan and 26 momme of silver. Pine boards to make a floor upon which copper is to be put.
61 kwan and 659 6/10 momme of silver. Cost of copper boxes, presents for the Hassaku holidays, boxes to hold account-books, baggage poles, bread and other food, patrol boats, passenger boats, ropes, mats, boxes for camphor, and wages of coolies.
120 kwan and 500 momme of silver. After the issue of the Ordinance reducing the amount of copper to be sold to foreign merchants, there was a shortage in the metal of 200,000 kin, and this amount of silver is to be repaid to the foreign merchants.

Total, 189 kwan and 165 6/10 momme of silver.
Balance, 806 kwan and 886 491/1000 momme of silver. Paid for the goods to be delivered to the Dutch.

542 kwan and 250 momme of silver. For 900,000 kin of copper as fixed by the Ordinance.
Delivered at the rate 60 25/100 momme of silver per 100 kin.

42 kwan and 175 momme of silver. 70,000 kin of copper instead of gold.

85 kwan and 869 momme of silver. For 746,692 kin of camphor.
At the rate 1 15/100 momme of silver per kin.

136 kwan and 565 49/100 momme of silver. For copper wire, relief-lacquer work, fancy-toilet articles, presents of wine, wheat, etc.

Profit in the trade with Dutch as reckoned by the Nagasaki Kaisho :—

ACCOUNTS OF THE NAGASAKI KAISHO IN REGARD TO THE CARGOES IN THE DUTCH SHIPS.

1,250 kwamme of silver (original price). For the two Dutch ships ; detailed as follows :—

87 kwan and 669 momme of silver. Received in commodities for presents and also for actual use.

7 kwan and 297 momme of silver. Payments for the goods used by the Shogunate (no profit therefrom).

25 kwan and 474 momme of silver. Price of goods divided by special contract.
Profit, 13 kwan and 628 momme of silver.

1,130 kwan and 60 momme of silver. Goods delivered to the merchants.
Profit, 3,390 kwan and 180 momme of silver.

Total of profit, 3,403 kwan and 808 momme of silver.
Grand total, 4,566 kwan and 639 momme (over 76,110 ryo of gold)

PAYMENTS.

1,888 kwan and 700 momme of silver. Price of copper, redemption money, and miscellaneous expenses.

506 kwan and 666 8/10 momme of silver. Camphor, copper wire, instruments and tools, relief-lacquer work, caskets for wine, and fancy-toilet articles.

30 kwamme of silver. Josei-gin (assisting money) given to the Dutch ships.

53 kwan and 350 momme of silver. House rent at Dejima.

90 kwan and 692 momme of silver. Miscellaneous expenses.

5 kwan and 984 momme of silver. Commissions on the deal in copper.

191 kwan and 207 momme of silver. Presents on the Hassaku holidays.

2 kwan and 527 momme of silver. Presents to the hotels at the three places (Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto).

32 kwan and 438 momme of silver. Price of sugar.

114 kwan and 192 momme of silver. Expenses of the captains of Dutch ships when they went to Edo.

3 kwan and 168 momme of silver. Wages for chief of crew and foremen of coolies.

1 kwan and 729 momme of silver. Presents made to Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines

4 kwan and 87 momme of silver. Charges for the tug-boats hired on entrance and departure of ships, and for the board of the crew while in port.
7 kwamme of silver. Money given to the eldermen, instead of raw silk.
8 kwan and 987 momme of silver. For water used.
3 kwan and 965 momme of silver. Remaining amount of silver.

Total, 2,999 kwan and 331 momme of silver.
Balance, 1,567 kwan and 310 momme of silver. Total profit of the Nagasaki Kaisho.

The above is the Profit and Loss Account of the Nagasaki Kaisho, and we will give below the Freight Account of one Dutch ship, which will serve readers for further reference :—

ACCOUNTS OF THE TRADE WITH A DUTCH SHIP.

450 kwamme of silver. Amount fixed by the Ordinance.
60 kwamme of silver. Wakinimotsu.[1]
23 kwan and 204 75/100 momme of silver. Goods for the Hassaku holidays.
89 kwan and 817 25/100 momme of silver. Surplus goods sold.
45 kwan and 922 momme of silver. Goods to be presented to the Shogun, his family, and other officials ; goods to be used by the central and local authorities.
594 momme of silver. Drugs in preparation for use.
20 kwamme of silver. Goods ordered.
986 momme of silver. Additional presents for the Hassaku holidays.
480 momme of silver. Nagasaki sharks.
2 kwamme of silver. Japanese dry goods used by the Dutch merchants.

Total, 700 kwamme of silver.

15 kwamme of silver. Josei-gin (assisting money).

Sum total, 715 kwamme of silver.

PAYMENTS.

375 kwan and 500 momme of silver. 600,000 kin of copper and trade commission.
45 kwamme of silver. 40,000 kin of camphor.
1 kwan and 262 momme of silver. Copper wire and instruments, etc.

Total, 416 kwan and 762 momme of silver.

5 kwan and 440 momme of silver. Fixed deposit.
9 kwan and 605 momme of silver. Presents.
27 kwan and 500 momme of silver. House rent.
2 kwan and 633 momme of silver. Presents to the hotels.
6 kwan and 600 momme of silver. Paper, ink, and foods.
1 kwan and 350 momme of silver. Water expenses.
1 kwan and 800 momme of silver. Passage fare.
2 kwan and 389 momme of silver. Expenses at tea-halls.
319 momme of silver. Repairs to the interpreters' hall.
172 momme of silver. Tailoring expenses
54 momme of silver. Pine boards.

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[1] Though the Dutch ships belonged to the East India Company, it was the custom for the captains to make a trade on their own account, and such goods were called Wakinimotsu.

40 kwan and 504 momme of silver. Sugar.

213 momme of silver. Repairs at Dejima.

199½ momme of silver. Trays for the presents on the Hassaku holidays, and other expenses.

1 kwan and 740 momme of silver. For daily food.

11 kwan and 553 momme of silver. Boxes for copper and camphor and ropes and mats.

5 kwan and 530 momme of silver. Wages for cooks, coolies, etc.

20 kwamme of silver. Balance.

Total, 138 kwan and 516 momme of silver.
Grand total, 555 kwan and 278 momme of silver.

72 kwan and 293 7/10 momme of silver. For goods for Hassaku holidays, for the presents, etc.

Total, 627 kwan and 572 momme of silver.
Balance, 87 kwan and 427 momme of silver.

TRADE WITH CHINESE SHIPS AND ACCOUNT OF THE NAGASAKI KAISHO.

2,740 kwamme of silver (original price). For ten foreign ships; detailed as follows :—

120 kwan and 18 momme of silver. For goods ordered by the Japanese authorities and for ox-hides (no profit), drugs sold to the physicians serving in the Shogun's Court and to the Government medical school.

4 kwan and 626 momme of silver. Profit of the above.

39 kwan and 460 momme of silver.
On which there was a profit of 19 kwan and 720 momme of silver.

12 kwan and 900 momme of silver. For alum and tea-cups and miscellaneous goods ordered by the Yakuza (medicine guild) and the feudal clans.
On which there was a profit of 36 kwan and 832 momme of silver.

2,558 kwan and 370 momme of silver. Goods delivered to merchants.
On which the profit was 4,605 kwan and 66 momme of silver.

Total profit, 4,666 kwan and 254 momme of silver.
Grand total, 7,406 kwan and 254 momme of silver. Exchanged for 123,437 ryo of gold.

PAYMENTS.

1,707 kwan and 942 momme of silver. For 100,000 kin of copper and for the Tsugunai-gin (redemption money).

954 kwamme of silver. For bag goods (exports of marine products and canned goods).

636 kwamme of silver. Miscellaneous goods.

59 kwan and 500 momme of silver. Goods sold which were to be given away.

84 kwan and 829 momme of silver. For provisions.

5 kwan and 450 momme of silver. Wages for fire watchmen.

11 kwan and 110 momme of silver. For fuel.

39 kwamme of silver. Wages for coolies in Yado-cho Street.

4 kwan and 789 momme of silver. Money given away.

74 kwan and 429 momme of silver. For the presents on the Hassaku holidays.

43 kwan and 500 momme of silver. Trade commission for copper sold.
282 kwan and 862 momme of silver. For presents made and money deposited.
13 kwan and 688 momme of silver. Residential land-tax for the foreign firms and other miscellaneous expenses.
111 kwamme of silver. Miscellaneous expenses in Yado-cho and Tsuke-cho streets.
12 kwan and 870 momme of silver. Presents to the otona, foremen in Yado-cho and Tsuke-cho streets and the writers in Yado-cho.
129 kwan and 430 momme of silver. For goods for presents, dashi-gin (money redemption), and money given to the officials in the Tribune office.
135 kwamme of silver. Dashi-gin for the white silk and money given to the eldermen in the four districts.
2 kwan and 623 momme of silver. Expenses on the occasion of departure of ships.
120 kwamme of silver. For goods used by the Government authorities.

Total, 4,384 kwan and 524 momme of silver.
Balance, 3,022 kwan and 30 momme of silver, which was the profit to the Nagasaki Kaisho.

Below is the account of the trade with one Chinese ship :—

ACCOUNT OF THE TRADE WITH ONE CHINESE SHIP.

110 kwamme of silver. Amount fixed by the Ordinance.
30 kwamme of silver. For miscellaneous goods.
14 kwan and 838 3/10 momme of silver. Donations made.
9 kwan and 903 589/1000 momme of silver. Presents made.
4 kwan and 350 momme of silver. Trade commission on copper.
4 kwan and 100 momme of silver. Wages for coolies.
2 kwan and 68 557/1000 momme of silver. Presents for the Hassaku holidays.
94 kwan and 744 563/1000 momme of silver. Surplus goods sold.
4 kwamme of silver. Sale of goods which were to be given away.

Total, 274 kwamme of silver.

47 kwan and 372 281/1000 momme of silver. Surplus goods sold, 50 per cent. higher than the usual price.
2 kwamme of silver. Goods, which were to be given away, sold at 50 per cent. higher than the usual price.

Total, 321 kwan and 372 momme of silver.
Grand total, 3,213 kwan and 722 momme of silver for ten foreign ships, and exchanged for 58,562 ryo of gold.

PAYMENTS.

1,150 kwamme of silver. 1,000,000 kin of copper.
945 kwamme of silver. Bag goods.
636 kwamme of silver. Miscellaneous goods.
Total of the above, 2,731 kwamme of silver.

89 kwan and 463 momme of silver. Money deposited.
60 kwan and 600 momme of silver. Money deposited.
59 kwan and 500 momme of silver. Silver notes paid.
57 kwan and 590 momme of silver. Provisions.

5 kwan and 450 momme of silver. Fuel.
1 kwan and 400 momme of silver. Anchorage charge.
960 momme of silver. Donations to the Shinto shrines of the Kanzaki Jinja and Ebisu Jinja.
6 kwamme of silver. Miscellaneous expenses in Yado-cho Street.
120 momme of silver. Expenses at the Hassaku season.

Total, 3,022 kwan and 193 momme of silver.

119 kwan and 720 momme of silver. Presents at the time of Hassaku holidays.

Grand total, 315 kwan and 914 momme of silver.
Balance, 61 kwan and 805 momme of silver.

There are many items very difficult to be understood by the readers of to-day, and even at the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate, when such accounts and statistics were made and published, they were thought very hard to understand.

Expenditure of the Nagasaki Kaisho.—Reports as above had to be made to the Shogunate regularly at fixed periods, and, however difficult they may be for outsiders to grasp, one thing is clear, that all the expenses for the Chinese and Dutch merchants were defrayed by the Nagasaki Kaisho, which gave the business the nature of a contract work. Accordingly, the Kaisho entered many items in the accounts, such as " water charge," expenses at tea-halls, etc., that were all very small sums ; and also such charges as " donations to Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines," and trying to make as many items as possible, and charge on the Chinese and Dutch merchants, as heavy expenses as they could. By these means they reaped enormous profits from the foreign trade at the port. The reader will naturally be inquisitive as to what was the profit of the Nagasaki Kaisho, that was so eager to exact money from the foreign merchants by making so many items in the accounts, and charging upon them all kinds of expenses, and therefore we will cite below the accounts. They are those of the years 1794 and 1863 (6th year of Kansei and 3rd year of Bunkyu respectively), when trade was not so flourishing as it once was, but here again the reader will see how complicated were the accounts, and how the Nagaskai Kaisho almost exhausted every effort to make as many items of expense as they could, and conceal from the Shogunate the actual profits, which were enormous.

ANNUAL ACCOUNT OF THE 6TH YEAR OF KANSEI (1794) OF NAGASAKI.

14,880 kwan and 300 momme of silver. Receipts for the year ; detailed as follows :—

7,923 kwan and 220 momme of silver. Original cost and profit in the trade with Chinese merchants (17 per cent. of profit).

3,692 kwamme of silver. Original cost and profit in the trade with Dutch merchants (45 per cent. of profit).

1,500 kwamme of silver. Payments for rice.

180 kwan and 530 momme of silver. Local taxes (taxes).

523 kwan and 610 momme of silver. Miscellaneous income to be taken into the business fund.

378 kwamme of silver. Taxes at the rate of 3 per cent. of the price charged to the home merchants who made successful tenders.

156 kwamme of silver. Taxes charged at the rate of 3 kin per hundred kin of goods in the Chinese ships, and called " Nimotsu sanbukakori Nyugin " (3 per cent. charged upon the goods).

393 kwan and 250 momme of silver. Collections made of miscellaneous loans.

9 kwan and 140 momme of silver. Payments received for the miscellaneous bag goods sold.

4 kwamme of silver. Ready money for repairing store in Shinchi.

110 kwamme of silver. Income yielded by confiscated estates and other properties.

7 kwan and 300 momme of silver. Wages for the clerks serving the Government rice officials.

5 kwan and 250 momme of silver. Payments made for the drug Ninjin sold.

16,504 kwan and 961 momme of silver. Expenditure for the year ; detailed as follows :—

900 kwamme of silver. Taxes paid to the Central Government, exchanged for 15,000 ryo of gold.

44 kwan and 500 momme of silver. Payments for the articles to be presented to the Shogunate by the machitoshiyori of Nagasaki city (eldermen of the Nagasaki city) at the new year season. (As it is the practice for the machitoshiyori to come to Edo in order to pay respect and tribute to the Shogunate every other year, this amount of silver is just one-half of the expenses incurred for one such visit.)

3,372 kwan and 620 momme of silver. Payments made for the copper brought, allowances made to the copper-mines, and payments made in yearly instalments.

4,038 kwan and 480 momme of silver. Payments for the goods to be sold to the Chinese merchants, and the expenses for the Chinese firms.

799 kwan and 208 momme of silver. Payments made for the goods to be sold to the Dutch ships, travelling expenses of the captains of Dutch ships to Edo, and miscellaneous expenses at Dejima.

295 kwan and 900 momme of silver. Presents made by the Chinese and Dutch merchants to the officials at the Tribune's office and Daikan's office, and also to the directors of the Nagasaki Kaisho and eldermen of the Nagasaki city, on the Hassaku holiday season.

9 kwamme of silver. For the articles presented to the officials of the Shogunate who were despatched to Nagasaki.

52 kwan and 485 momme of silver. Received by the officials under the Tribune of Nagasaki.

2,995 kwan and 320 momme of silver. Money received by the town officials of Nagasaki, rations of rice, etc.

53 kwan and 400 momme of silver. Additional salaries and bonuses.

58 kwan and 92 momme of silver. Travelling expenses.

205 kwan and 27 momme of silver. Money given to district eldermen for raw silk, etc.

20 kwamme of silver. Allowance to the Ninjin-za (guild of ginseng sellers) in Edo.

1,500 kwamme of silver. For the rice delivered in advance to the Government officials and sold to the citizens of Nagasaki.

180 kwan and 530 momme of silver. Payments of local taxes.

869 kwan and 510 momme of silver. Kamado-gin (money given to each house) to be distributed in the Nagasaki city.

25 kwan and 389 momme of silver. Donated to Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.

30 kwan and 690 momme of silver. Rice given for relief to the poor.

500 momme of silver. Josei-gin (assistance money) given to Koto (official minstrel) for his travelling expenses to Edo.

17 kwan and 495 momme of silver. Repairs of the town officials' hall and hotel charges.

450 kwan and 520 momme of silver. Donations made by the foreign ships to Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines and presents made.

34 kwan and 500 momme of silver. Money lent to Buddhist temples, Shinto shrines, town officials, and Suwamatsuri Street.

161 kwan and 55 momme of silver. Repairs of offices.

Balance, 1,623 kwan and 661 momme of silver. Excess of expenditure over receipts.

ANNUAL ACCOUNT FOR THE 6TH YEAR OF ANSEI (1859).

77,124 kwan and 90 momme of silver. Receipts for the year; detailed as follows :—

7,227 kwan and 380 momme of silver. Balance brought forward from the preceding year.

11,242 kwan and 980 momme of silver. Payments received for the goods in Chinese ships.

7,470 kwan and 372 momme of silver. Payments received for the goods in Dutch and other foreign ships.

1,346 kwan and 185 momme of silver. Payments received for the produce of the Loochoo Islands.

310 kwan and 576 momme of silver. Payments received for the tin bought by the Kin-za in Edo.

221 kwan and 150 momme of silver. Payments for the cinnabar bought by the Shu-za (cinnabar guild) in Edo.

2,310 kwan and 819 momme of silver. Payments received for copper.

2,759 kwan and 318 momme of silver. Received for rice and local taxes.

21,320 kwan and 456 momme of silver. Payments received for the Chinese silver coins, gold and silver.

124 kwan and 880 momme of silver Payments received for the iron coins.

631 kwan and 269 momme of silver. Payments received for the goods handled by the Nagasaki Kaisho.

47 kwan and 776 momme of silver. Payments received for the Sanbukakari goods (tax charged on these goods at the rate of 3 kin per 100 kin of goods).

443 kwan and 116 momme of silver. Payments received for the Sanbukakari goods.

45 kwan and 932 momme of silver. Payments received for the confiscated properties of exiled families.

1,229 kwan and 292 momme of silver. Instalment on payment of loans.

1,890 kwan and 300 momme of silver. Payments received for the goods ordered.

856 kwan and 978 momme of silver. Commissions on miscellaneous contributions.

240 kwan and 200 momme of silver. Miscellaneous revenue.

16,113 kwamme of silver. Amount of money borrowed.

1,331 kwan and 25 momme of silver. Income from employment of money at hand.

72,340 kwan and 909 momme of silver. Expenditure for the year; detailed as follows:—

74 kwan and 948 momme of silver. Taxes paid.

2,486 kwan and 258 momme of silver. Local taxes paid and payments made to the Government for the rice bought by the Nagasaki Kaisho.

3,350 kwan and 641 momme of silver. Payments for copper.

6,801 kwan and 712 momme of silver. Payment made for bag goods and other miscellaneous goods.

174 kwamme of silver. Payments made for ginseng taken by the Shogunate for the original plant.

1,110 kwan and 448 momme of silver. Payment made for the produce of the Loochoo Islands.

10,643 kwan and 532 momme of silver. Payments made for the goods brought over by foreign ships.

6,784 kwan and 394 momme of silver. Exchange fund for Chinese silver coins.

19,251 kwan and 427 momme of silver. Exchange fund for gold and silver notes.

3,919 kwan and 836 momme of silver. Expenses in relation to Chinese ships and firms.

48 kwan and 279 momme of silver. Expenses in relation to foreign settlements and loadings of foreigners.

368 kwan and 147 momme of silver. Expenses for the purchase of the ground of the foreign settlement and filling in of the foreshore and engineering work there.

76 kwan and 265 momme of silver. Payments made for the goods used by the Government.

21 kwan and 800 momme of silver. Expenses of performing masses at Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.

403 kwan of silver. Contributions made to the Tribune's office.

12 kwan and 290 momme of silver. Contributions made to the Government officials despatched from Edo.

173 kwan and 9 momme of silver. Contributions, allowances, travelling expenses of the Government officials on duty at Nagasaki.

283 kwan and 133 momme of silver. Salaries for the managers of Itowarifu, miscellaneous expenses and price of raw silk paid.
323 kwan and 65 momme of silver. Salaries for the town officials and allowances.
11 kwan and 700 momme of silver. Salaries for the purveyors sent from Edo.
91 kwan and 528 momme of silver. Presents made to the Tribune and other officials under him.
233 kwan and 647 momme of silver. Donations and presents made by foreign ships to Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.
30 kwan and 610 momme of silver. Travelling and hotel expenses of the eldermen of Nagasaki city who went to Edo to pay respect to the Shogunate.
98 kwan and 642 momme of silver. Miscellaneous expenses with relation to Chinese ships, the Yado-cho and Tsuke-cho streets.
902 kwan and 220 momme of silver. Kamado-gin (money given to each house in Nagasaki city) and relief money given.
349 kwan and 54 momme of silver. Repairs of offices.
34 kwan and 500 momme of silver. Payments made for the goods purchased by the Government offices.
914 kwan and 594 momme of silver. Miscellaneous expenses at the Government office.
107 kwan and 340 momme of silver. Expenses at the Do-za (copper guild) in Osaka.
18 kwan and 657 momme of silver. Expenses at the Ninjin-za (ginseng guild) in Edo.
17 kwan and 708 momme of silver. Expenses for the Dutch interpreters stationed at Uraga.
20 kwan and 923 momme of silver. Expenses for entertaining foreigners.
154 kwan and 679 momme of silver. Expenses at the Minato Kaisho (chamber commerce at the port).
28 kwan and 388 momme of silver. Expenses at the Guard house of Ushibuka.
14 kwan and 714 momme of silver. Expenses at the Osato branch office of the Nagasaki Kaisho in Bungo Province.
314 kwan and 213 momme of silver. Expenses in learning and experimenting on industrial and technical arts.
184 kwan and 99 momme of silver. Expenses of the ship *Kwanko-maru* and other ships.
705 kwan and 552 momme of silver. Expenses in learning and experimenting on the industrial art of iron-working at the ironworks.
43 kwan and 986 momme of silver. Expenses at the tea manufactories.
10 kwan and 4 momme of silver. Printing expenses.
78 kwan and 8 momme of silver. Expenses at the jails.
74 kwan and 508 momme of silver. Expenses for relief of shipwrecked Coreans.
13 kwan and 779 momme of silver. Profit in selling unhulled rice and put into the sinking fund.
7,262 kwan and 174 momme of silver. Repayment of the principal and interest of loan.
1,143 kwan and 356 momme of silver. Repayment of temporary loans.

Balance, 4,183 kwan and 181 momme of silver.

REVISED BUDGET OF EXPENDITURE FOR THE 3RD YEAR OF BUNKYU (1863).

25,565 kwan and 877 momme of silver; detailed as follows :—

1,200 kwamme of silver. Exchange for 20,000 ryo of gold paid for taxes.

212 kwan and 933 momme of silver. Local taxes paid.

3,692 kwan and 111 momme of silver. Payment made for copper and allowances for the copper-mines.

4,036 kwan and 86 momme of silver. Payments made for bag goods.

278 kwan and 830 momme of silver. Payments made for camphor.

88 kwan and 200 momme of silver. Payments made for ginseng taken by the Government as original plant allowance for the Ninjin-za (ginseng guild).

915 kwan and 784 momme of silver. Payments made for the produce of the Loochoo Islands.

17 kwan and 232 momme of silver. Payments made for quicksilver used at Hirado.

4,529 kwan and 370 momme of silver. Expenses of Chinese ships and Chinese firms.

1,012 kwan and 7 momme of silver. Expenses of Dejima and Dutch ships.

40 kwan and 436 momme of silver. Presented to the Government officials despatched from Edo, and payments made for the goods ordered by the Nagasaki Kaisho.

464 kwamme of silver. Contributions made to the salary of the Nagasaki Tribune.

353 kwan and 977 momme of silver. Salaries and allowances for the Government officials on duty at Nagasaki; expenses of coming and departure of the Government officials and boarding expenses of the Government officials despatched to Nagasaki.

353 kwan and 857 momme of silver. Salaries, allowances, and bonuses for the town officials of Nagasaki.

260 kwan and 27 momme of silver. Salaries for the eldermen of Nagasaki city and payments made for raw silk.

84 kwan and 529 momme of silver. Relief money, salaries of the officials and clerks of the Nagasaki Kaisho, and miscellaneous expenses.

1,442 kwan and 72 momme of silver. Payments made for rice.

475 kwan and 692 momme of silver. Travelling expenses of the Dutch merchants going to Edo and for the articles to be presented to the Shogunate.

80 kwan and 400 momme of silver. Travelling expenses of the eldermen and town officials of the Nagasaki city, all going to Edo, for the articles to be presented to the Shogunate, and miscellaneous expenses.

51 kwan and 896 momme of silver. Travelling expenses in general.

155 kwan and 8 momme of silver. Repairs of office and furniture.

462 kwan and 449 momme of silver. Miscellaneous expenses.

65 kwan and 238 momme of silver. Expenses at the jails and gathering halls.

31 kwan and 174 momme of silver. Expenses in practising gunnery and archery.

903 kwan and 914 momme of silver. Kamado-gin (money distributed to each house in the Nagasaki city) and relief money.

209 kwan and 902 momme of silver. Presents made by Chinese and Dutch ships to the Nagasaki Tribune and other Government officials.

287 kwan and 696 momme of silver. Donations, contributions, and presents made by Chinese and Dutch ships to Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.

23 kwan and 660 momme of silver. Salaries and allowances for the priests at Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines and expenses for masses and festivals.

24 kwan and 376 momme of silver. Expenses of clearing the port and dumps in the city.

865 kwan and 636 momme of silver. Loans made and transferred, etc.

259 kwan and 322 momme of silver. Payment made for rice to be stored.

Actual Profit of the Nagasaki Trade kept secret.—The above accounts, which were made public, seemed to show frankly all the profits derived by Nagasaki from its monopoly of the foreign trade of Japan, but this was very far from the fact, and there were many channels of profit besides those publicly admitted. When the Tokugawa Shogunate tried hard to restrict the volume of trade at Nagasaki by means of Government ordinance, smuggling increased enormously, and entirely neutralized the efforts of Edo, besides being highly profitable to the smugglers. Besides, the Kaisho, making false reports in the accounts of trade tenders to the Tokugawa Shogunate, concealed the greater part of their gains, so that there were, in fact, both inside and outside accounts dealing with Nagasaki trade. As we have seen, after the Keicho era the balance of foreign trade was paid in gold and silver, and later in copper, as gold and silver became scarce in course of time. In the 6th year of Horeki a price for copper was fixed, and it was exported at the rate of 150 momme of silver per 100 kin of copper; neither was this price changed for about fifty or sixty years. However, during the years of the Horeki era, the current price of copper in our markets was 100 kin of copper for 352 momme of silver, and, despite this current home price, the Nagasaki Kaisho fixed the export price of copper at the rate of 150 momme of silver for every 100 kin of copper—only half the current market price. Why did they do so? At this time all the mines in the country were owned by the Tokugawa Shogunate, and, though there were different methods of the sharing of the product, such as Shichiko and Sammin (seven to the State, three to the worker) and Goko and Gomin (five and five), yet the Tokugawa Government always left it to the general public to open the mines, and levied a certain percentage of produce as a tax. The above price of copper for exportation was based upon the actual amount that the Shogunate was receiving from all the copper-mines in the country, without considering the capital invested, or the rate of interest paid upon it, or the miscellaneous expenses incurred by the Government in relation to the copper-mines. On this basis they fixed the price rate for export at 150 momme of silver per 100 kin of copper. Did the Tokugawa Government actually receive the price of the copper that was sold to the foreign merchant at the rate of 150 momme of silver per 100 kin? They did not. The copper from the mines purchased at 150 momme of silver was sold to the Dutch merchants at 60¼ momme, involving a loss of 89¾ momme per 100 kin. To the Chinese it was sold at 115 momme, with a loss of 35 momme per 100 kin of copper. According to the Ordinance issued by the Tokugawa Shogunate in the 3rd year of Enkyo, with regard to the foreign trade at Nagasaki, the amount of copper to be exported to the two countries Holland and China was restricted to 3,000,000 kin; and though this amount was further decreased in the 2nd year of Meireki to 1,300,000 kin to the Chinese and 80,000 kin to the Dutch, making a total of 2,100,000 kin, yet in fact the sagacious Nagasaki people, devising means not to lessen the export amount, were exporting the same 3,000,000 kin of copper as before; and on this amount the Tokugawa Shogunate was wittingly incurring a loss of 17,000 kwamme of silver in every year, which is quite unintelligible to anyone from the commercial point of view. Many people have laboured to understand why and how the Shogunate left this great problem of foreign trade without being thoroughly investigated, and was willing to sustain enormous loss of trade every year, but no one has found the clue to the labyrinth. There is more or less reason to think that Edo was willing to sell copper to the Chinese and Dutch merchants at a much cheaper price than in the home markets in order to make these foreign merchants instrumental in importing gold into Japan, and Dr. Kudo Shuan, attending physician to Lord Matsudaira Mutsuno-kami Shigemura, announced during the years of Tenmyo era his opinion that it was necessary to sell copper at a cheaper price to foreign merchants in order to import gold into Japan; but when it is considered that the Chinese imported much more gold into Japan than the Dutch, but the Tokugawa Shogunate sold copper to the Dutch at 60 momme per 100 kin while selling it to the Chinese merchants at the much higher price of 115, the theory does not hold water. At first the difference between the export price and home market price of copper was called nechigai (difference of price), and the burden of the loss was imposed upon the shoulders of the Itowarifu merchants (merchants who had the privilege of issuing the tickets, or rather licences, to buy and sell raw silk), so that the latter became unable to obtain as large profits as before; but later they were relieved, and the Tokugawa Shogunate bore all the loss resulting from the copper trade with Chinese and Dutch merchants.

False Figures with regard to the Nagasaki Trade.—As we have seen, the Tokugawa Shogunate bought from the mines the copper produced there at the rate of 150 momme of silver per 100 kin in spite of its current home price being 350. The mines very often petitioned to have the price raised, but the Shogunate never granted that petition, nor does it seem ever to have given it any consideration ; so that merchants and others who were serious enough to give due consideration to this problem were puzzled as to what was the intention of Edo in never granting the petition, seeing that the enormous loss continued year after year. There were many rumours abroad about it, and in some mines the workers rebelled. The Shogunate officials, who objected to raising the price of copper, clearly did not understand the problem, in spite of all their efforts at investigation; for when any official once entered this economic labyrinth of Nagasaki trade, so cunningly built up by the town officials of Nagasaki, he could not extricate himself, and remained in the dark all his life. After the town officials of Nagasaki secured the monopoly of white raw silk imported from China, they made strenuous efforts not to lose any chance of monopoly; and when, after many years, and even generations, of effort, they finally secured the monopoly of foreign trade for all Japan, they proceeded to make all the accounts and trading methods very complicated, so that no outsider could understand them. The Nagasaki people were very cunning and sagacious, and evolved theories on both politics and commerce that served them in their business of monopolizing profits, and spread them with such effect that Edo could not punish them, even though there were irregularities and fraudulent actions in their business methods. The first principle of commerce that they devised to bolster up their system was that the foreign trade was for the interest of all Japan; and then they began to insinuate in the proper quarters that a patriarchal government was necessary to put into practice this first principle of commerce; so that the Nagasaki trade, being for the interest of the whole nation, it was necessary for the Tokugawa Government to overlook and excuse the Nagasaki people, even though there were many irregularities and blameable actions on their part, because the Nagasaki trade, being for the interest of the whole nation, and the Tokugawa Government being the patriarch of the country, Edo should be as lenient and merciful to Nagasaki as a patriarch to the members of his family. From this starting-point they worked up to the stage in which Edo was to protect not only the home merchants, but also the foreign merchants, for both were working in the interests of all Japan. Dutch merchants were as a matter of course fortune-hunters, and came as far as Japan after profits; and, in spite of the immense profits they reaped, the town officials of Nagasaki shared with them some percentage of their own profits, included in their accounts as an item josei-gin (assisting or encouraging money). Of course the Dutch India Company never saw the colour of this money—it was just pocketed by the Dutch skippers—and it was the game of Nagasaki people to be always allied in secret with the captains of foreign ships and to share with them all undue profits. Always on the specious ground of national interests, they persuaded the Shogunate into selling copper at half the current home price, and shouldering an enormous annual loss. Was not the Shogun a patriarch who should never stop at any sacrifice in the interests of his people? The result of all this intrigue was that the Tokugawa Shogunate, suffering a huge loss from the copper trade in Nagasaki every year, handed all the business profits which resulted from the copper trade to the people of one small locality named Nagasaki. Is it even certain that the town officials at Nagasaki were honest enough to sell copper to the Dutch merchants at the rate of 60 momme of silver per 100 kin and to the Chinese merchants at 150 momme? There is good reason to believe that they did not necessarily do so; in fact the fixed price of copper was of a very elastic nature, and only served to enrich the town officials of Nagasaki and nothing more. It may appear at first sight that the elastic nature of the price of copper at Nagasaki had only a slight effect on the foreign trade, but in fact it had a momentous result. In the 7th year of Empo the import of the four Dutch ships was 5,480 kwan and $231\frac{15}{1000}$ momme of silver in value, and at the rate of 1 ryo of gold for 68 momme of silver the total value was $80,591\frac{1}{5}$ ryo of gold; and while we paid for our imports with 2,385,000 kin of copper, it was mentioned in the *Oranda-Shobai-Oboicho* (the memorandum of the trade with Dutch) that, the transaction being made at the rate of $1\frac{15}{100}$ momme of silver per kin of copper, the total value of the copper was 2,742 kwan and 750 momme of silver, equal to $40,334\frac{1}{2}$ ryo of gold. But although all the mines sold copper to the Shogunate at the rate of $1\frac{1}{2}$ momme of silver per kin, the market price of copper was much higher than that; and even if we suppose that it was delivered to the Dutch merchants at the rate of 1·5 momme per kin, the total value of 2,385,000 kin of copper would be 3,577 kwan and 500 momme of silver, or, in gold, 52,600 ryo; but as we are told that the Dutch exported to the value of 29,799 ryo in gold, the remaining 50,792 ryo of gold should have been cancelled by the exported goods and other items. Then, if we assume that copper was exported to the value of 103,392 ryo of gold, or, again, if copper and all other exported goods were counted together, the trade balance was favourable for one country, and there should have been an excess of exports over imports ; but according to the trade record for that year, it showed an adverse balance of trade, and there was an excess of import over export. All of which clearly points to the fact that the trade accounts published by the Nagasaki Kaisho were false, and no credit could be given them at all.

False Figures shown in the Account of Trade with Korea. Another example can be given to show how clever Nagasaki was at hoodwinking the central officials who were bold enough to try to find the clue to the financial labyrinth in which they hid their real profits. As it was reported to the Tokugawa Shogunate that much gold and silver was exported yearly to Korea, Edo, by an order issued August 9, 1683, forbade Nagasaki to export to Korea over 18,000 ryo of gold a year ; but afterwards, when the new gold and silver coins were minted, as the intrinsic value of these new coins was inferior to that of the old, and in consequence their purchasing power was smaller, the Government issued a new order in November 1700 that it was permissible to increase the volume of trade with Korea to 30,000 ryo of gold, provided that this limit of trade shall be changed ten years later. Later, in the Shotoku era, the Shogunate gave permission to export to Korea 2,000 kwamme of silver. The reason why the Tokugawa Shogunate made such restrictions upon the trade with Korea was simply because they did not like to send so much gold and silver abroad, but the figures given in the accounts of trade with Korea were entirely false and increditable. The Nagasaki Kaisho had been used to present to the Tokugawa Shogunate 607 kin of Korean ginseng every year since the 1st year of Manji (the year 1658), and the value of the yearly tribute was said to be 5,463 kwamme of silver, making the price of Korean ginseng 9 kwamme of silver per kin. The current price in Nagasaki of Korean ginseng was 1 kwan and 200 momme of silver per kin, and even the best and rarest quality fetched only 5 kwan and 250 momme. Assuming, then, that the Nagasaki Kaisho made a most careful choice of the Korean ginseng to be presented to the Shogunate, and could pick out as much as 607 kin of the very best kind, the value would only have been 3,186 kwan and 75 momme of silver : the Government was defrauded to the extent of 2,276 kwan and 250 momme of silver. Korean ginseng was a commodity very familiar to Japanese in general ; and if even when dealing in such a popular commodity, the value of which was so well known, there was such bare-faced fraud, had a close examination been made into all the items appearing in the accounts of trade at Nagasaki, numberless cases of exaggerations and frauds would have been disclosed.

The Tokugawa Government despatched an official, Sakuma

Jimpachi, to make a thorough investigation about the circumstances with regard to the foreign trade at Nagasaki and in the Tsushima Province, and in his report it was mentioned that the Nagasaki Kaisho was putting false figures into the trade reports as they are given above.

GROWTH OF SMUGGLING.—The second means by which the Nagasaki people acquired large profits and enriched themselves was smuggling. Smuggling had long prevailed on the coastline of the Japan sea. Formosa had been well known for illicit traffic between Japan and China, and after the island was legalized by the Tokugawa Shogunate as a regular trading place, many other seaport towns became the homes of smugglers. The Shogunate officials were always strict against smuggling, and issued ordinances forbidding it; while the following letter addressed to Lord Omura, of Hizen Province, by the executive lords of the Shogunate, shows that the Government forbade also the export of Japanese arms:—

> By order of His Highness the Shogun, we beg to transmit to you the following instructions:—
>
> It has come to the notice of His Highness the Shogun that some people are trafficking in human flesh and sending men and women to foreign countries, and the lords in the provinces must take every care to stop this traffic. No swords, long and short, or other Japanese arms, must ever be exported to foreign countries.
>
> It has come to the ears of His Highness the Shogun that foreigners disguised as Japanese are doing piracy on the seas, and it is ordered by His Highness that the lords in the provinces should do their utmost to stop such violence.
>
> The above being the order issued in accordance with the desire of His Highness the Shogun, Your Lordship is requested to make it known to all the people in your province.
>
> (Signed) LORD DOI OI-NO-KAMI
> LORD HONDA KODZUKE-NO-SUKE
> LORD SAKAI UTA-NO-KAMI
> } The Executive Lords in the Shogunate.
>
> *July 25th.*
>
> TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD OMURA MINBU-NO-TAYU.

The above order was issued by the Tokugawa Shogunate in order to forbid smuggling and piracy by foreigners disguised as Japanese, and especially the export of Japanese swords and other arms; and though the year of issue of this Ordinance is not given, as it is signed by Doi and Honda, it must emanate in some year between the Keicho and Genwa eras. It did not serve its end in suppressing smuggling, as with the forced restriction of the volume of foreign trade no road was left open to the numerous keen merchants but smuggling, and the number of illicit traders increased enormously—especially in Nagasaki, where they were great speculators, and developed what was almost a mania for smuggling. As has been said repeatedly, the Nagasaki people were monopolizing the enormous profit of the foreign trade; and yet their greed so grew now that the profit obtainable by regular trade became too commonplace a thing, and the merchants who were satisfied with that only were the plodders, while the keen blades were all eager to engage in smuggling in order to obtain the far greater profits it afforded. There was in Nagasaki at that time a certain Chinese called Rinyukwan, who had lived long in Nagasaki, and was so much Japanized as to be called by his Japanese neighbours by the Japanese name of Kouta Hachibei. This man was a notorious smuggler, and tried once, in the 1st year of Shoho, to export Japanese swords to China. He was discovered and on the point of being executed, for the Shogunate was very severe against smuggling; but happening to hear that a Christian fellow-countryman of his was about to visit Japan, he informed against him, and was released and rewarded with an office as a Kirishitan-metsukeyaku (detective of Christians).

In the 8th year of Kambun (1668) the smuggling of Ito Kozaemon achieved notoriety. He was a merchant at Hakata in Chikuzen provinces, and the family had for generations been engaged in foreign trade—Ito Kichiji, the father of Kozaemon, having greatly extended the business by daring ventures. When Kozaemon became head of his house, he opened branches in Nagasaki, Hirado, and Goto, and conducted a big shipping business with forty or fifty ships. The gold coins he struck (Ito's gold coins) circulated in Kyushu on a parity with the Government gold coin. Foreign trade always interested him, and when the port of Nagasaki was opened, he invested largely in the public works there, and was rewarded by the Government with a certain percentage of the city taxes. Neither did he neglect home trade, for he rendered great financial assistance to Lord Kuroda of Chikuzen, who rewarded him with fifty men's ration of rice in perpetuity, which in that age of military despotism was considered a very exceptional reward for a mere chonin (city man). This Ito rendered great services to Japanese industry by importing pig-iron from China and India. Of all the industries of Japan the art of forging swords was most well developed from olden times; and the work was almost unparalleled in the world, so that the Chinese in their admiration said that Japanese swords would cut iron as easily as hair, and both they and the Koreans were very anxious to import these weapons. This traffic was strictly forbidden by the Tokugawa Government; but the ingenuity of smugglers, both Japanese and foreign, laughed at the law, and many Japanese swords were secretly exported to Korea, China, and other foreign countries. Withal, there was only placer iron in Japan; and, in view of this shortage of raw material, the demand for swords was greatly in excess of the supply, and we could not satisfy the demand of Koreans, Chinese, and other foreigners until the Portuguese merchants began to supply pig-iron from China and India, which greatly stimulated our industry, and the working of iron was improved and developed. The so-called Nambantetsu—the iron brought over from the southern barbarian countries—had been long popular in Japan, and the name associated with the idea of excessive hardness; but in fact this Namban iron did not come from the southern barbarian countries but from China and India, and it was called Nambantetsu because the Namban—literally southern barbarians, but really the Portuguese or Dutch frequenting Japan for trade—brought it from China and India to Japan. Iron was scarce in England, and therefore even as late as the 16th century the English farmers using wooden shovels could not cultivate more than 1 acre of field a day; but Japan made so earlier development in the iron industry that there were no wooden shovels seen even in the Middle Ages, which also points to the fact that Japanese had excellent abilities in iron-working. Now that we could rely on an ample supply of pig-iron from China and India, and could display our ability in iron-work as freely as we would, our industry was greatly stimulated and developed. When the modern history of Japan is studied, and the origin of the progress made during modern times is carefully traced, the import of iron, white raw silk, and of cotton cloth into our country show up as three vital factors. Pig-iron from China and India was imported by the Hakata merchants to Hakata first, and, when the port of Nagasaki was opened, Nagasaki also, and so we find many small ironworks and forges at Hakata and thereabouts in the later years. Ito Kozaemon was the first and greatest importer of this Chinese and Indian iron.

REAL PERSON OF THE WELL-KNOWN PIRATE KEZORI KYUEMON.—Ito Kozaemon not only imported iron, but exported it when manufactured, and from the necessity of exporting iron implements and tools he became at last a smuggler. His smuggling ships, purporting to be Government craft owned by Lord Matsudaira of Chikuzen Province, sailed everywhere and did an extensive business, which brought such immense profits to Ito that he became one of the richest men in Kyushu. He was said to be worth about 50,000 kwamme of silver, or half the wealth of the Konoike family of Osaka, then the richest in Japan. His style of living at Hakata was gorgeous and extravagant, and his great wealth enabled him to make friends among the high officials under the feudal lords there, though his social rank as a mere townsman gave him no position outside what his wealth brought him. He was even allowed to use a palanquin in the streets of Hakata, and his life would have ended amid such prosperity had not the origin of his great wealth been disclosed by accident. In August 1667 one of his ships was wrecked and came ashore at Waninoura in Tsushima. When examined by the port officials the vessel was discovered to be packed with swords, daggers, armour, and guns. The officials knew very well that if they reported the affair to Nagasaki it would be smothered up, thanks to the bribes sure to be freely distributed by Ito's branch office; so they despatched a messenger to Lord Hayashi Tango-no-kami, the Daikan (high official representing the Shogun) at Funai in Bungo, where the influence of Nagasaki people could not reach, and asked for his instructions. They also took steps to arrest two men called Sosuke and Kanzaemon, clerks of Matsuura Shobei, of Hirado, who was related to Ito Kozaemon, and Rokuzaemon and Denzaemon, both working as Kozaemon's clerks. Now that the whole business had come out, and was discussed all over Kyushu, Lord Kuroda and his chief retainers were puzzled what to do; for Kozaemon was not only a great buttress of the finances of the Kuroda clan, but also made notable contribution to the foreign trade of Japan. However, they could see no way of evading the law. They were driven finally to arrest and execute the great merchant, who was followed in death by his father-in-law, who committed suicide, and a girl named Teika, from Maruyama in Nagasaki, who threw herself into the sea. Investigations were not extended very widely, on the ground that it would entail a great many criminal cases, and it was generally believed, with very good reason, that Kuroda shared in the profits of Ito's smuggling. Kuroda and his officials then made no further inquiry into this smuggling case; but the Daikan of the Shogunate took another view, and after thorough investigation, crucified five men, beheaded fourteen, exposing their heads on the gate of the jail, and exiled fifty-one.

In fact the smuggling business of Ito Kozaemon was on a very extensive scale, Osaka, Nagasaki, Hirado, Hakata, and Amakusa being all involved. Chikamatsu Monzaemon's pirate chief Kezori Kyuemon, in his play *Hakata Kojoro Namimakura*, is simply Ito Kozaemon, and no fiction of the playwright's brain.

SMUGGLING OF SUETSUGU HEIZO, WHO WAS THEN THE DAIKAN OF NAGASAKI.—In the 4th year of Empo (1677), that is, ten years later, the Daikan of Nagasaki (Shogun's deputy at Nagasaki), Suetsugu Heizo himself, was arrested for smuggling, to the stupefaction of the whole country. The father of Suetsugu Heizo, Kozen, had served Toyotomi Hideyoshi as a Government purveyor, and when Nagasaki city was established he was one of its founders. When Suetsugu Heizo succeeded his father, the office of Nagasaki Daikan was filled by Murayama Toan, who owed his appointment to the influence of Heizo's father; but this Murayama Toan "scorned the base degrees by which he did ascend," made a large fortune by abuse of his position, and treated with disdain even the Suetsugu family, who had been his benefactors. Heizo was much incensed, and determined to try to replace Toan in his office of Daikan. Heizo accused Toan to the Shogunate, but Toan defended himself vigorously, and Heizo stood to lose, when he was lucky enough to discover that Toan's son, who had been exiled as a Christian, had secretly returned to Japan, and was in Osaka Castle with Hideyori. More than that, Toan was secretly sending arms and provisions into the Osaka Castle to help the Toyotomi family. Heizo at once laid these facts before the Shogunate; all the members of Toan's family were put to death, and Heizo was appointed Daikan of Nagasaki, and to pay to the Shogunate a residential land-tax of 50 kwamme of silver every year. Suetsugu Heizo now led a very successful double life, carrying out the orders of the Tokugawa Shogunate as the Daikan of Nagasaki, and smuggling on a large scale, until he was discovered and punished in the 4th year of Empo. He and his son Heibei were exiled to Oki; his mother, a relative named Suetsugu Sanjuro, and Shimada Jirokechi to Iki; his retainers, Kageyama Kudayu and Shimoda Yazaemon, crucified; two others beheaded, and all severely punished. The tale of how Heizo's goings on were brought to light is interesting. Heizo's people had got into touch with Chinese merchants in a joint smuggling enterprise, but the ship was wrecked in the Amoy Sea and boarded by pirates. In these circumstances the Japanese confessed that the vessel belonged to the Daikan of Nagasaki, and the pirate leader, who was an old Ming supporter, and hoped for Japanese aid in the restoration of the dynasty, released the ship and cargo, and gave all the help he could in their smuggling enterprise. However, it was impossible to keep this a secret, and Chinese ship captains, visiting Nagasaki, babbled of it so that it finally came to the ears of the Government. The wealth of Suetsugu Heizo when confiscated was colossal and included :—

8,700 kwamme of gold; 30 boxes of gold, each containing 3,000 ryo; 10 boxes, each containing 1,000 large gold coins; 10,000 kwamme of silver (this sum loaned to many persons); a sword and a short sword made by Masamune; 1 godown containing swords and short swords; aloe wood: one piece 14 feet by 6 inches, seven pieces 9 feet by 5 inches, and smaller pieces; 5 wooden clogs made of aloe wood; 5 long chests containing red sandal wood; 3 boxes of coral; 3 boxes of branch coral; 17 tea-pots of Seiko ware; 5 pots, very old; 75 new foreign tea-cups; 500 tea-cups; 5 casks of Chinese wine; 700 hanging pictures by Chinese artists; 1,500 boxes of Chinese articles; 600 boxes of coloured dishes, plates, and other articles ; 1 large agate ink-slab ; 17 folding-screens ; 5 long chests containing old Chinese brocades ; 200 swords and short swords ; various other articles in the godown, estimated at 600,000 ryo of gold.

In money alone Heizo was worth about 6,338,000 yen of our money, and is said to have lived like a feudal lord with a fief of 1,000,000 koku. Of course he was the Daikan of Nagasaki, and no one could rival him there, and as he was a good friend with Teiseiko, the famous Chinese pirate, he was always in secret communication with him. Together they made Hian Island, outside of the port of Shoshyu, their base of operations, and engaged in smuggling on an extensive scale. The Dutch soon found out this, and, lying in wait, they robbed the Japanese of their goods. That Hamada Yahei, the Japanese, later attacked the Dutch in Formosa, killed many and robbed their goods, was because he had suffered from their actions on Hian Island, but as it was a question of smuggling he could not give his reasons openly.

Lord Mori borrowed Money from Suetsugu Heizo.—Many daimyos borrowed from Suetsugu, and the following bond of debt shows that even such a great feudal lord as Mori, ruling over the two provinces of Nagato and Suwo, did the same :—

BOND OF DEBT CERTIFYING THAT LORD MATSUDAIRA CHIYOKUMA BORROWED MONEY TO MEET HIS NEEDS.

250 kwamme of silver in Chogin (silver coin) amount of debt.

We hereby acknowledge that, in order to meet the needs of our clan, dating from the time of Lord Matsudaira Nagatonokami, we borrowed the above sum of money on behalf of our Lord Matsudaira Chiyomaru.

We are to repay 10 kwamme of silver every year for every 100 kwamme of silver of the silver of the above debt, 4 kwamme of silver for the interest, and 6 kwamme of silver to wipe off the principal. As the principal will be thus lessened every year, we shall strike a balance every time just before the yearly instalment is due, but there shall be no change made in the rate of payment—that is, 10 kwamme of silver for every 100 kwamme of silver of the debt every year. And to show that we are sure and firm in the fulfilment of our promise, we hereby sign and seal.

Kodama Awaji-no-kami
Sugimori Hyogo-no-kami
Katada Awano-kami
Chief Retainers of the Clan of Lord Mori.

December 13th, the 1st year of Sho-o.

To Suetsugu Heizo, Esq.

It was not Lord Mori alone who borrowed money from Suetsugu Heizo. There were few feudal lords in the Kyushu and middle provinces who did not do the same, and the reader can readily understand how delighted many were at the fall of the house and their consequent freedom from debt.

Foreign Merchants borrowed Money from the Merchants in the Kyushu Province.—Ito Kozaemon, of whose business career and smuggling we have spoken already, was a grandson of Suetsugu Kozen, the father of Suetsugu Heizo, and as both Ito Kozaemon and Suetsugu Heizo were huge smugglers and punished for smuggling, no one will doubt that there was a close connection between the two; but, to tell the truth, it was not Ito Kozaemon, Suetsugu Heizo, and their followers and partisans alone who were smugglers. There were few successful merchants in Nagasaki who were not mixed up in it. Between Korea and Kyushu is Shinseito—Holy Isle, or Isle of Silence—and when the Tokugawa Shogunate entirely closed the country, forbidding foreign trade and communication, this small island became the gathering place for smugglers, where they met secretly and carried on their nefarious business. Indeed, the island is said to have got its name, "Isle of Silence," on account of these secret meetings, about which all were pledged to silence. Thus the port of Nagasaki, just as the earth sucks up all the rain, absorbed all the profits of trade with foreign countries, and at the same time imbibing foreign civilization, transmitted it all over the country. The profits of foreign trade were so great that men dared even to pledge their wives, children, and family estate to raise money to engage in it, and would pay 35 to 50 per cent. for accommodation. It is interesting to observe here that it was not small Japanese merchants alone that borrowed money from rich merchants in Nagasaki; but there were not a few Dutch who did so too, showing that money was needed in many directions. Some debt bonds are still extant.

MEMORANDUM.

Total, 2 kwamme of silver in Chogin (silver coin).

(No risk on the sea.)

Packages shall be delivered as sealed by the wholesale house.

The above sum of money is lent by the Sumikura firm to Chawanya Doin, who will take it to Tonkin, China. The rate of interest for the above money loaned is fixed at 38 per cent. of the principal for a year, and 10 per cent. more shall be paid in case of arrears. As soon as the principal and interest on the loan are repaid by Chawanya Doin, I shall give them to Kicho Nyudo, the creditor, to testify to which I append my name and seal below.

Takagi Goroemon Masatsugu (Seal).

February 26th, 10th year of Kanei.

To Torii Gombei.

FOR THE BOND OF DEBT.

Total, 1 kwan and 500 momme of silver in Chogin (silver coin).

The above sum of money loaned, at 50 per cent. on the principal. Kobama Minbu borrowed the above sum of money from you, and he took it to Siam by a Japanese Goshu-en Bune or licensed ship. When he returns home to Japan he shall without fail pay you 2 kwan and 250 momme of silver for the principal and interest inclusive, and in case of arrears 10 per cent. more. We further promise hereby that, should we fail in payment of the above principal and interest, we will deliver up to you Yohei's wife and his house and premises, and shall make no complaint whatever against your demand. To testify to which we sign and seal as below.

MATAZAEMON.
YOHEI of the Nakama-cho Street (Seal).

January 2nd, 4th year of Kambun.

To MORII GOMBEI.

Hassaku-gin has been often mentioned. This was a sort of tax to be paid by the citizens of Nagasaki, and simply a fund collected from citizens who owned hereditary residential ground or dwelling-houses in the city, in order to make presents to the Tribune of Nagasaki, and from under-officials to their seniors. It was customary to make such presents on the holiday of the first day of August every year, and the name of Hassaku-gin is derived therefrom.

The rate was 6 momme of silver in the outer town, and 9 to 10 momme in the inner town, according to the width of the house. Supposing there were an average of fifty tax-paying houses in each district, the total would be 26 kwan and 300 momme of silver. In later years all such taxes were imposed on the Chinese and Dutch merchants.

CHAPTER XLV

AGE OF IYETSUNA, THE FOURTH TOKUGAWA SHOGUN

Ronins numbered about 100,000 at the Time of Iyetsuna.—The problem of the ronins worried the Tokugawa Shogunate terribly, and for this reason they sacrificed the profits of the foreign trade, entirely closed the country, prohibited Christianity, established the five-men group systems, and set up barriers. All this, with the result of the Shimabara Insurrection, apparently eradicated Christianity and solved the ronin problem; yet it was, in fact, impossible to destroy all the ronins, who like dead leaves in autumn never cease to fall one after another. It is only human nature that the samurai, who retained their posts and were full fed, with nothing to occupy them in the piping times of peace, should become corrupt and enervated, while those thrown upon the world, with nothing but their own wits between them and starvation, seized every opportunity to put them into practice. Some put their economic knowledge at the service of feudal lords; others established schools of military tactics, fencing, the Chinese and Japanese classics and so forth, and attracted many disciples and pupils. The number of these men was very large, and when Tokugawa Yorinobu of Kii offered to gather 100,000 ronin and lead them to China to set up again the overthrown Ming Dynasty we may presume he knew what he was talking about.

Revolt of Yui Shosetsu.—The third Tokugawa Shogun, Iyemitsu, died in 1651 (Keian, 4th year), and was succeeded in January by his eldest son, Iyetsuna, then a boy of twelve years of age; but soon after, in July, a chief of ronins, named Yui Shosetsu, revolted against the Shogunate, and though he was soon captured and the revolt suppressed, yet it was a sign that the powerful Tokugawa Shogunate had its vulnerable points. It is true the Government was all-powerful as ever, but it was so only because the foundations had been laid so securely. There was no improvement to be observed in either administration or politics, save the agricultural administrations of some of the provincial feudal lords, and the luxurious modes of living which the long-continued peace and prosperity had brought with them sapped the old samurai spirit of bravery and perseverance, and the fundamental principle of sound politics showed signs of cracking. Even among the high lords of the Shogunate men with broad and far-seeing minds were few, and the petty and crafty ruled the roost. Not a few people began to fear for the future of the Tokugawa Shogunate. At this juncture Matsudaira Sadamasa, the lord of Kariya Castle in Mikawa Province, invited to a banquet Masuya Danjo-no-suke Masatoshi, whose sisteri was the mother of Iyemitsu, Nakane Osumino-kami Masashige, Miyag Echizennokami Kazusuke, Ishigaya Samon-shogen Sadakiyo, Makino Oribe Naritsune, and Hayashi Doshun, and after the banquet was over the host Sadamasa, handing a letter addressed to Lord Ii Naotaka and Abe Tadaaki to his guests, took his son, Kichigoro, to the Saikyoin Buddhist temple in the Toeizan at Ueno, where they both entered the secluded life. This letter was a very significant one, and in it he fully pointed out the evils of the administration of the Shogunate, and impeached Matsudaira Idzuno-kami and Sakae Sanukino-kami, the executive lords, for their unprogressive and easy-going policy, for their arbitrary and yet careless ways, and for forgetting the spirit of their forefathers, whose perseverance and faithfulness enabled them to build up the everlasting Tokugawa Government. When this letter was publicly read in the Shogunate Council the high lords treated it with disdain, and said the writer must have been crazy; but in fact the letter laid bare the truth, and painted a real picture of the situation, in which a set of petty politicians were ruling the whole country in the name of a boy of twelve years old. Yui Shosetsu chose this time, when uneasiness was widespread, to try to upset the Government. This man was the son of a dyer in Ashiarai village, Utogori, Suruga, and from his boyhood had been fond of reading military handbooks. His father had wanted to make him a Buddhist priest, but the young man declined and came to Edo as a ronin. There he made the acquaintance of an old man, who claimed to be descended from the famous warrior, Kusunoki Masashige, who adopted him as his son, giving him the name of Kusunoki Masayuki, or Shosetsu. He then set up a school of military arts and sciences, which attracted many students, and his fame spread so wide that many feudal lords invited him to their mansions to hear his lectures on the military sciences. In course of time he fell in with a ronin named Marubashi Chuya, who was a master of the spear, and became the student of Shosetsu in military science. The two men became close friends, and eventually plotted together to gather a number of ronins and overturn the Tokugawa Government. Their first step was to get access to Tokugawa Yorinobu of Kii, younger brother of the second Shogun, Hidetada, who was much respected by all daimyos, and of great influence in Shogunate circles. Yorinobu was never averse to ronin, and so the two men got into touch with him. Their plan was for Chuya to take charge of the conspiracy in Edo, and Shosetsu in Suruga. Iyemitsu was on his deathbed, and in the confusion sure to follow on his decease the powder magazine in Koishikawa was to be exploded and fire set to the city in many places. As folks were hurrying to the palace the rebels were to waylay and shoot them down, while Chuya himself, leading a troop of men carrying lanterns with the Tokugawa crest, as if they were followers of Yorinobu, was to enter the castle and kill the young Shogun. At the news of the outbreak in Edo, Shosetsu and his men were to capture Shizuoka Castle and seize all the treasure on Kunozan, the first burial-place of Iyeyasu. Both the coups accomplished, they anticipated being joined by all the discontented from all over the country.

There were about 2,000 in the plot altogether, but before the time was quite ripe they were betrayed by one of their number, Okumura Gonnoji, a retainer of Matsudaira Izu-no-kami, and Chuya and his following in Edo were instantly apprehended, while troops were sent off to Shizuoka to make sure of Shosetsu, who on receipt of the news that everything was divulged committed suicide. Some fifty of the conspirators—men, women, and children—were crucified, decapitated, or killed themselves. Tokugawa Yorinobu is said to have been in complete ignorance of the conspiracy, but it is probable that he knew something about it and would have been ready to turn its success to his own advantage.

REVOLT OF HETSUGI SHOZAEMON.—Just one year later a second conspiracy, headed by Hetsugi Shozaemon and the remnants of the faction of Shosetsu, planned to start fires around the Zojoji Temple in Shiba, where a memorial mass for the wife of the second Shogun, Hidetada, was being held, and in the ensuing confusion shoot down the high lords and officials and capture Edo Castle. This plot, too, was betrayed, and the plotters were crucified or beheaded. The Government was much exasperated by these successive revolts, and considered the expulsion of all ronins from Edo; but Lord Abe Tadaaki, the executive lord in the Shogunate, dissented on the ground that the ronins stayed in Edo because they were anxious to get employment under the feudal lords, and if the Shogunate expelled them all it would be simply driving them into bushes and woods, where extreme poverty and embarrassment would surely drive them into secret plotting. It would be far better to permit them to reside in Edo, and enable them to obtain the means of sustenance. This opinion carried the day, and the ronins were tolerated in Edo as before, though under very strict supervision. It had been driven home to them by the failure of the conspiracies of Shosetsu and Hetsugi that they could do nothing against the all-powerful Shogunate, and some entirely gave up their dangerous ideas and entered the service of feudal lords, while others became merchants or artisans so that the ronin problem that had long worried the Tokugawa Government was solved at last; after the two abortive plots of Yui Shosetsu and Hetsugi Shozemon.

THE LEARNED KUMAZAWA BANZAN SUSPECTED AS A DANGEROUS MAN.—The ronin problem thus settled, it seemed as if there was nothing remaining to worry the peace of mind of the officials in the Shogunate, but there arose a new cause of anxiety more serious to them than the ronins. When it was a question of suppressing armed revolt, the powerful Shogunate found it a comparatively easy task, but revolting thought was a very different matter.

During the examination of Marubashi Chuya, after his apprehension, he was asked if he was not a Christian, to which he replied in the negative, and went on to say that he was a follower of the doctrines of Kumazawa Jirohachi, better known as Kumazawa Banzan, and widely respected as a great scholar and original thinker. Others of Shosetsu's faction were also disciples of the same man. Kumazawa Banzan was born in Kyoto and served Ikeda Mitsumasa, of Okayama, from the age of sixteen; and though much favoured by his lord and often offered promotion, he always declined every time on the ground that he was too young and unlearned. Afterwards, begging for leave of absence, he attended many famous schools, studying finally under Nakai Toju, of Omi, known far and wide as the Sage of Omi.

Now having become a great scholar, his former lord, Ikeda Mitsumasa, called him back into service, and entrusted him with many important affairs, among others the organization of relief in the famine in Bizen and Bitchu in 1653 (2nd year of Sho-o), when about 90,000 people were starving. In this he was very successful, and in addition he introduced many reforms into the administration. Kumazawa Banzan was really a very learned scholar, with original ideas on all points discussed in the Chinese and Japanese classics he knew so well, but he did not see eye to eye with Lord Hayashi, who was, so to speak, Minister of Education in Edo, and favoured the theories of Shu (a great scholar in modern China and commentator on Confucius) and the maintenance of the power of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Kumazawa, following Mencius, evolved a theory largely democratic in its principle and based upon historical facts, so that he and his ideas were looked at askance by those who were only eager to follow in the steps of Iyeyasu and judge every theory by Shu's principles. There was, however, no denying the fact that his administration was highly successful in every respect, and his fame spread far and wide, so that one year when he came to Edo the feudal lords and their retainers were all eager to listen to him and thronged his house. The official world was aghast that a mere scholar could obtain such widespread popularity, and suspected him of being an element to disturb the peace of the country, while Lord Hayashi held his theories to be as dangerous as those of Christianity. The discovery that Shosetsu and his followers had found their inspiration in the teachings of the scholar proved the last straw, and official warning was sent to Ikeda Mitsumasa that Kumazawa was held to be a dangerous character. Thus warned Ikeda began to lose faith in Kumazawa, and the other retainers who had been on bad terms with him began openly to reproach him until he was finally expelled and retired to Kyoto, from where he was again driven out on the charge that his teaching was disturbing the good manners and customs of the Court nobles; and this great but ill-starred scholar was banished from Kyoto in the year 1666 (6th year of Kanei), and died all alone at Koga, in Shimoosa Province, in 1691.

YAMAGA SOKO EXPELLED, TOO.—The Tokugawa Shogunate, in whose eyes every one who gained a reputation for learning, talent, or wisdom was hateful, now found another victim to succeed Kumazawa Banzan, in the person of Yamaga Soko. Yamaga Soko was the son of a retainer of the Lord of Kameyama Castle, in Ise, who, after various adventures, settled in Edo as a physician. There Soko entered the school of Hayashi Razan at the age of nine, and by the time he had reached eleven he knew as much as the oldest pupils in the school, and was competent to give lectures on the Chinese classics.

When he was sixteen he began to study military sciences under Hojo Awanokami Ujinaga, and originated a theory of his own, embodying a new gun theory into the old one, and calling it the new Yamaga Theory on military sciences. He became widely known, and Asano Nagatomo, the lord of Akō Castle, in Harima Province, engaged him to instruct his young samurai, with a fief of 1,000 koku. In 1660 he resigned his post under Lord Asano, and opened a school in the capital, to which his fame attracted about 5,000 students, so that he became very rich and lived like a small lord of 5,000 or 6,000 koku. When he was more than forty years old, he began to have grave doubts whether Shu's principles were directly drawn from Confucius, and in three volumes called *Seikyo Yoroku* (*Outlines of the Holy Doctrine*), he traversed the philosophy of Shu. Here was a chance for his enemies. The officials of the Shogunate already suspected him because of his popularity, and now his attack upon Shu scandalized Lord Hayashi, while his old teacher, Hojo Ujinaga, had been very jealous of Yamaga's new military theories. Accused of writing "useless books," he was expelled from Edo in 1666 (6th year of Kaei), and sent to Akō, that is, the fief of his former lord, Lord Asano, and there he spent the remainder of his days in peace and ease.

Growth of Yakko Parties.—The Tokugawa Government did not tolerate anyone outside their charmed circle who dared to win popularity and influence, and were indefatigable in arresting all such, thus suppressing all the ronins and scholars. But they were unable to suppress the democratic spirit that was taking deep root among the citizens, and begot the bodies of chivalrous men. When Tokugawa Iyeyasu first entered Edo, it was a mere fishing town, and in a short interval of sixty years from Iyeyasu to Iemitsu, this petty place developed into a great, wealthy, and prosperous city. Tiled roofs replaced the old pebble and oyster-shells, and the houses of rich merchants took the shape of strong and beautiful granaries. The policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate brought about the strongest centralized government Japan has ever witnessed, and it was a rule that all the feudal lords should have a residence in Edo, and serve the Shogun there in turn, returning to their own territory after they had fulfilled their term. These feudal lords found it convenient to have their wives and children reside in Edo, and also to leave there some of their chief retainers to take charge of important affairs in the city. Thus Edo, that in Iyeyasu's time was a city for the Tokugawa family, had now become a great Imperial city, made up of the mansions of the feudal lords, residences of the hatamoto and other samurais, and houses of the merchants who swarmed to this centre of politics, which was also the centre of wealth, material resources, luxury, beauty, ease, money-making, and craftsmanship, and acted as a magnet to attract the country-folk whose one wish was to abandon the plough and come to Edo. Both the samurais and citizens of Edo began to be proud of living in the capital, and the samurais, priding themselves on their direct service to the Shogun, despised the country lords, while the purse-proud citizen looked down on the samurais and farmers coming to Edo from the country. Thus both classes discriminated against the country-folk, and, flattering themselves that they were of a different calibre altogether, formed the groups of so-called " chivalrous men," the hatamoto making one group, their retainers another, and the citizens a third—Otokodate, Ropposha, or Yakko, all three meaning " chivalrous men."

Vendetta and Chivalrous Parties.—The simple and primitive houses of Iyeyasu's Edo were now changed to the neat and beautiful houses of Iyetsuna's city, but in spite of so much outward change and improvement, the mental state, manners, and customs of the citizens remained just as barbarous and sanguinary as they were in the time of wars and battles.

In 1663 (3rd year of Kanei), in the Shogunate of Iyetsuna, there was great debate in the Cabinet councils regarding the revision of the

19 Articles of the Military Caste Regulations, and while Hoshina Higonokami and Matsudaira Shikibunotayu were strongly in favour of an article forbidding junshi, or suicide, upon the death of one's lord, many other lords objected, and a compromise was arrived at, that, though the article was not inserted clearly in the Regulations, yet it was to be understood that verbal instructions forbidding junshi should be given to the feudal lords, and all the samurais, when called up, to be told of the revised Military Caste Regulations. Public opinion clearly was on the side of junshi; for although the Shogunate had often previously denounced it, even now it was not possible to forbid it in black and white.

As might be expected from a society thus constituted, vendetta was looked upon as one of the first duties of man, and the Government too gave it public recognition, but, recognizing that if the duties of revenge was inherited by sons and near relations, there would be no end to a vendetta, the Shogunate afterwards forbade it. Nevertheless, this did not prevent vendettas, in 1634 (11th year of Kanei), and 1672 (12th year of Kambun), the former known as the Igagoe vendetta and the latter Okudaira Gempei's vendetta on the Joruri Hill, Ushigome. Unnatural vice was prevalent among the samurais and feudal lords, and the unhappy objects of it were frequent causes of bloody strife. So evil were the times that men would take up their stand at a street corner on a dark night and try their skill with the sword, or the temper of their weapons, by cutting at the heads of passers-by. The whole country had been at peace for over half a century, but manners had not been mollified, and the samurais, living upon hereditary feuds and having no family anxieties, were so wild, riotous, and violent that they made their own gangs, and infested the streets, to the great disturbance of the citizens, who partly to resist these violent samurais, and partly envious of them, made up their own gangs and bodies, and endeavoured to develop their muscular strength, and learn fencing. Obstinate and bloody fights between the samurai and citizen gangs were a frequent sight in the streets, both parties calling themselves " Chivalrous Men."

Among these gangs the Daijingi party, Shojingi party, Kichiya party, Tetsubo party, Token party, Zarugaki party, and Sekirei party were best known, and among their heads there were Mizuno Jurozaemon (a hatamoto with feud of 5,000 koku), Miura Kojiro, Kagatsume Kainokami, and Sakabe Sashiro—all hatamotos. Facing them there were those who had been ronins, but were now called machiyakko (town lads), led by Banzuiin Chobei, Token Gombei, Hanaregoma Shirobei, Umeno Ichirobei, Shinin-no-Kozaemon, Meido Kohachi, and Kobotoke Kahei, who were so proud of their courage, resolution, and chivalry that they would not recede one step even before a minister or great general, and especially made it their motto or pride to assist the weaker and fight the stronger. These machiyakko originated what was called the yakko style, shaving their beards, wearing rough, stiffly starched cotton clothes, a fine wrap and a fine belt, carrying a sword, and talking in a harsh and nasal voice, denominated roppo kotoba (chivalrous men's words). There were found among them not a few gamblers, blackmailers, and even robbers, but the Edo people delighted to imitate them, and when Token Gombei, a well-known machiyakko leader, dressed his hair to show a wide expanse of forehead, the people adopted the fashion, calling it Token Hitae (Token's forehead). A certain Karigane Bunshichi tied up his hair with motoyui (starched white threads), and the citizens tumbled over one another to copy the "Bunshichi" motoyui. The Tokugawa Shogunate, which had rooted out the Catholics and ronins, was driven to issue a new regulation strictly forbidding the general public to imitate machiyakko in their manner and style, or to carry swords longer than 20 inches, while, on the other hand, it made serious efforts to arrest violent samurais, idlers, intimidators, etc., so as to kill the troubles in the egg.

POWER AND INFLUENCE OF LORD SAKAI TADAKIYO, SURNAMED GEBA-SHOGUN (DISMOUNTED SHOGUN).—The reason why the Tokugawa Shogunate were eager to destroy the ronins, suppress the machiyakko, and forbade the town citizens and country farmers to wear long swords, was because they were anxious to disarm these people, and thus check the natural transfer of strength and power into the hands of the common people, and they did not know that concealed within the Shogun's own palace was something much more formidable.

Iyetsuna's Age was very peaceful throughout, and there was not much chance for able and competent men to show their powers. The elder statesmen and senior lords in the Shogunate all died one after another, and, in consequence, all the power fell into the hands of Lord Sakai Utanokami Tadakiyo, who was at that time the Tairo (premier) in the Shogunate, and was so much courted by all the feudal lords and other samurais of high rank that his mansion was thronged daily, and he was not only surnamed Geba-Shogun (dismounted Shogun), but afterwards publicly addressed so in letters. Sakai was not the man to hide his light under a bushel, and once when a feudal lord had invited him to his house, and it suddenly came on to rain, his host hurriedly made a long-covered passage between the front gate and entrance-hall, so that Sakai and his party might arrive dry foot.

In conversing with Sakai afterwards, a certain lord touched upon this, and gave it as his opinion it was too much to prepare so suddenly and hurriedly a long roofed passage even for the lord premier. Sakai differed completely, and said that as he was the deputy of the Shogun, to whom the same respect should be paid as to the Shogun himself, even a passage with a tiled roof would not be too much. The callers upon the Tairo were so numerous that in order to obtain an interview men lodged overnight somewhere near his front gate to be on hand early, when the portal was opened in the morning, and even then would sometimes wait all day for an interview.

In the May, 1680 (8th year of Enho), the Shogun Iyetsuna was critically ill, and the high lords of the Shogunate were gathered to discuss the succession. Sakai proposed to follow the example of the old Kamakura Shogunate, and ask for the Imperial permission for a Prince of the Imperial Family to come to Edo and succeed to the office of Shogun, as Iyetsuna had no son, and as successor Sakai recommended Prince Arisugawa.

Sakai, of course, knew that the Shogun had a younger brother, but he was also aware that one of Iyetsuna's concubines, Sawaki Maruko, was pregnant, and his idea was to retain his power by making a prince of the blood Shogun before the lady was brought to bed; then, if the child proved a boy, the prince could be deposed and the boy succeed. The lords of the Council were struck dumb by this proposition, and the only one who dared to raise a voice in opposition was Hotta Bitchu-no-kami Masatoshi, who supported the claim of Iyetsuna's brother, the Lord of Tatebayashi Castle.

It is indeed remarkable that in an age when all the feudal lords placed the interests of the house of Tokugawa before everything, that all the lords in Shogunate were silent about Sakai's proposal, Hotta was the only man who had the courage to oppose the all-powerful Sakai. Strong in his loyalty, he visited Iyetsuna the same evening, and got his agreement to the succession of his younger brother, and at once sent a messenger to Tatebayashi to summon the lord of the castle to Edo. This scion of Tokugawa, the fourth son of Iyemitsu, answered the call, and eventually succeeded his brother as the fifth Shogun Tsunayoshi.

CHAPTER XLVI

THE LUXURIOUS AGE OF GENROKU

Population of Edo in the Genroku Age.—With the advent of the fifth Shogun Tsunayoshi, we enter on the Genroku Age, famous for its prosperity and splendour, although the name Genroku was only actually given to the period from 1688–1703. The age of economic development is that of Tenwa (1681–3), during which the agricultural administration of the Tokugawa Government was most extended and developed, with the result that fresh fields and farms were opened up everywhere, and new village communities were established; Tenwa was followed by Teikyo (1684–7), and then came Genroku. Tsunayoshi received the posthumous name of Jōken-in, and lacquered articles and other objects of art that were made in his age were called Jōken-in ware, and were very highly valued. Maps of old Edo city in the 4th year of Empo (1676) show that the extent of the city at that time was no smaller than in the last year of Keio (1868), that is, just a half-century before the time of writing (1920), and if there was any change in these two hundred years between Empo and Keio, it was only in the internal arrangement and not the extent. We have already seen how, when Iemitsu returned to Edo after an audience with the Emperor in Kyoto, he distributed 5,000 kwamme of silver among the Edo citizens, returned as occupying of 35,419 houses. The average of statistics over a half-century show that each house contained $4\frac{1}{5}$ persons, so the number of ordinary citizens in Edo was 148,719. In the census of 1673 we are told that the total population of Edo was 353,582, excluding a good number of wandering priests, beggars, and pedlars. The census of the Temmei era (1781–88) gives, besides the ordinary citizens of Edo, about 14,500 people in the licensed quarters, 52,430 Buddhist priests, 7,230 itinerant priests, and 3,580 Shinto priests, which means that there were about 60,000 to 70,000 non-working people in Edo, beside the ordinary citizens. To these figures we must add 250,000 to 260,000 samurais always in Edo, and we arrive at a total population of over 600,000 in the Genroku era, when the Tokugawa Age was at the height of its prosperity.

Suicide of Sakai Tadakiyo, the Premier.—As described in the last chapter, Hotta Masatoshi recommended Tsunayoshi to the dying Iyetsuna against the will of the all-powerful Premier Sakai, and on account of his great services to Tsunayoshi and the house of Tokugawa, all the power of the Shogunate fell naturally into his hands. When Tsunayoshi heard that Sakai Tadakiyo had intended to invite one of the royal princes to succeed the fourth Tokugawa, he was of course mightily indignant, and as soon as Sakai resigned his office of Tairo (Premier), and retired to his house at Sugamo, Tsunayoshi confiscated his mansion just outside the Otemon (Great Gate), and gave it to Hotta Tadatoshi. Sakai, anticipating his approaching fate, committed suicide, and his family pretended that he had died by natural causes, refusing point-blank to allow the body to be examined by officials of the Shogunate.

CHARACTER OF TSUNAYOSHI AND HIS REFORMATION.—Opinions vary as to the character of Tsunayoshi, some attributing to him wisdom and insight, others saying he was only of average intelligence, while a third party liken him to the Emperor Genso, of the To Dynasty, China, who was first wise but afterwards foolish; but there is no doubt that he was just an average man and a sincere believer in the ethics of Confucius, who was eager to follow the examples of wise monarchs of old and to put into practice all their maxims. As soon as he succeeded to his office, he at once put Hotta Masatoshi in charge of all farming and agricultural affairs, and Hotta showed great diligence in developing agricultural administration and protecting the farmers, issuing many ordinances, in one of which the farmers are described as the basis of the country. In his eagerness to encourage thrift, Tsunayoshi broke up the merchantman, *Ataka-maru*, that was built in the time of the third Tokugawa Shogun, Iemitsu, on the ground that it was the largest ship ever built in Japan, required a crew of several hundred, and cost in annual maintenance a sum equal to the income from 100,000 koku. If a stop was to be put to luxury, it was proper for the Shogunate to set the example. The following sumptuary regulations were also a product of these early days :—

> Hereafter no woman shall wear clothes embroidered in gold or other medium or of a coloured design ; no person shall wear silks which cost over 200 momme of silver ; no one shall invent new methods of dyeing or design new patterns. Hereafter even the retainers under the feudal lords, Nō players and artists, shall be forbidden to wear long swords. The pages and maid-servants, who are no higher in their position than mere servants in the palace, shall hereafter wear only cotton clothes, but those serving in the middle inner court and tea halls, and their seniors in position, are allowed to wear silk clothes. The citizens, even such as Goto and others serving in the Government mint, shall not hereafter wear long swords. Even the Hoin and Hogan (official professional men) and Court physicians shall hereafter not wear white silk clothes, except at Court receptions. No retainer under the feudal lords shall hereafter wear clothes of blue and yellow colour.

Merchants and manufacturers shall never make agreement between themselves to fix the prices of commodities; neither shall the house-owners do so with regard to rent.

Of the above regulations, some are very likely to foster thrifty habits and others not so, but on the whole they were serviceable, and there is no doubt that Tsunayoshi and his lords were very eager to encourage economy. The ordinance as to periods of mourning issued in February 1684 was pure Confucianism. Tsunayoshi had been told that some scholars in China, hearing that there was no fixed regulation in Japan with regard to the mourning period on the death of parents, despised the Japanese, and as soon as he became the Shogun he at once followed the example of China, and issued an ordinance regulating the period of mourning upon the decease of one's parents, which shows that the fundamental principle of politics under the fifth Shogun was based upon Confucianism.

Lord Hotta Masatoshi killed in the Shogun's Palace.—Just when Hotta was at the summit of his influence in August 1684 he was stabbed in the palace by Inaba-no-kami Masayasu, a junior lord and relative of his own, whom he himself had promoted. Inaba was killed on the spot by three other lords, but his motives seem very obscure. Hotta is said to have felt so secure in the gratitude of Tsunayoshi that he became arrogant and dictatorial, and treated even the Shogun with disrespect, but the real reason for his murder is to be found in the fact that he was a man of strong conviction, who, when he had once made up his mind, went on his way regardless of the opinion of others, thus arousing the dislike of the easy-going, convention-loving old officials. It is true also that he never hesitated to speak his mind to the Shogun, who showed no particular grief at his death, and allowed his family to sink into poverty.

Tsunayoshi encourages Confucianism.—With the death of the premier Tsunayoshi was free to do whatever he liked, with mixed results on his administration. On the good side were his efforts to bring about civil enlightenment and mollify wild thoughts, manners, and customs, to effect which he encouraged the reading of books and study of Confucian ethics, and rewarded those who showed filial piety, and faithful wives and widows. We hear of a farmer called Goro, of Imaizumi in Suruga, whom the Shogun released from tax-paying for his filial piety, and, moreover, had his life written by the official scholar Hayashi Nobuatsu, and published at the Government expense. He also issued a new edition of the *Commentaries on the Four Scriptures of Confucianism.* In 1690, the Shogun himself lectured before all the feudal lords on the Daigaku (First scripture of Confucianism), and commenced a course of monthly lectures in which he gave instructions regarding literary and warlike acquirements. Hayashi Nobuatsu was also bidden to open a lecture course, and all the lords and retainers were requested to attend. In February 1691 he took the opportunity of the solemn opening ceremony of the Taiseiden Shrine of Confucius, which he had constructed, to ennoble the scholar Hayashi Nobuatsu, which greatly encouraged other men of his class, who were henceforth ordered to wear their hair as other men did, and not shave the head like priests.

Law for the Protection of Animals.—In his eager desire to soften the rough manners and customs of the day, Tsunayoshi extended his protection to animals, and tried by strict penalty to prevent cruelty to dumb creatures. Historians have told us that this step was due to the influence of a Buddhist Priest, Ryuko of the Gojin Temple, who worked upon the Shogun's superstition and the fact that he was born in the year of the Dog, according to the Chinese calendar, making him believe that for the sake of his happiness in the future world he should give special protection to dogs. This is a fundamental mistake. Tsunayoshi was much too strong a believer in the ethics of Confucius as expounded by the Chinese scholars of the age of So to be led by the nose by a Buddhist priest. His ambition was to do something to foster civil enlightenment, and kindness towards animals appealed to him as one means towards his end. It must be remembered that these were days when samurai made nothing of cutting down defenceless people in the streets just for practice and the citizens constantly staged bloody street brawls. It was the Shogun's idea to stop all these outrages by severe penalties, and then gradually turn the minds of men to cherish humane sentiments. His famous regulations called for benevolence to all animals, and not dogs only. A regulation was first issued in January 1687, "when animals are suffering from sickness at hotels, inns, and hostelries, no one is allowed to abandon the animal and throw it out of the house. If anyone is guilty of such inhumanity, he or she is surely to be punished." In July 1685 orders were given not to confine dogs in order to prevent them from running about the streets when the Shogun was passing in procession, and next year that due care should be taken that dogs should not be run over by wagons, as was often observed. The bad custom of torturing, hurting, or killing animals was not easily to be suppressed, and Tsunayoshi thought it necessary to set an example to the country of what it meant to disregard his regulations. A cat had died or been killed in the palace kitchen, and on the ground that the Keeper of the Kitchen, a samurai named Amano Gorotayu Masakatsu, was responsible, he was exiled to the island of Hachijo, and his two sons detained in the mansion of a feudal lord. In April 1687 ten men were exiled who abandoned sick horses to die, showing that dogs only were not the object of protection, and though a certain Hashimoto Gonnosuke was sentenced to death for having wounded a dog in 1690, in June the same year the following orders were given to Ishide Kantayu, the Keeper of Jails :—

> As deaths among the prisoners show a tendency to increase, the keeper of jails shall take due care to ventilate the jails properly and make latticed windows for that purpose. The prisoners shall have a bath five times every month. Hitherto one thick cotton garment has been issued to every prisoner, henceforward it shall be two in autumn every year.
>
> In case of a traveller suffering from illness in a hotel or on the street, proper medical care and nursing shall be given by those who find the said traveller or are told of him. They shall communicate with the relatives or friends of the sick man, and report in detail to the office of the local authority that due protection may be afforded to him.

There were certain disorderly customs in Edo which the Shogun dealt with at the same time. When there was a marriage in the town, young lads used to throw water on the streets, nominally to congratulate bride and bridegroom, but, in fact, out of pure mischief, and young girls, often even boys, were teased by the lads on the streets. These bad customs having been brought to the attention of Tsunayoshi, he issued the following regulations :—

> It is strictly forbidden hereafter to strew water on the street and embarrass those taking part in a marriage ceremony.
>
> If anyone teases or interferes with young girls and little boys on the street, or is drunk and disorderly, no matter whether he is a citizen, a samurai, or a retainer in the service of an Imperial prince, he shall be arrested at once and report made to the Office of the Tribune.

Again, in 1694, the following regulations were issued :—

> The Government believes that every one realizes how anxious His Highness the Shogun is for all to be humane to animals, and even if such an order is not expressly given out, it is highly desirable for men to be benevolent to their brethren, human to animals, and honest toward one another. All the chiefs and heads of the hatamotos and samurais, who are fully aware of His Highness' views on benevolence and humanity are therefore ordered to instruct the men of their groups, or under their direction, and make them clearly understand the purport of the orders lately given out by His Highness. All patent medicine vendors are strictly forbidden cruelly to drive about dogs, cats, and rats, to make a show and attract public attention to their patent medicine. Bird's nesting in Edo city is forbidden, and anyone who loads a horse too heavily shall be punished.
>
> No one shall abandon a child, and anyone who finds it difficult or impossible to bring up a child, shall appeal to the local authority, and the child shall be brought up under the care and guidance of such authority.

The above regulations show that Tsunayoshi was anxious to uproot the barbarous manners and customs prevalent at that time, after the ages of wars and battles, and that his intention was not so narrow and limited as only to be humane to animals. His views were much more broad, but it was his great misfortune that he had no minister who understood his true intent. The petty officials who slavishly obeyed orders, and only partially understood the Shogun's mind, tried to put the regulations into practice literally, and the true purport of the orders came to be misconstrued so completely that, connecting it with his birth in the year of the Dog, people said that the Shogun was thus interceding with Heaven for his happiness in the future world. One evil begot another, and finally the regulations became insupportably cruel. The officials were so foolish and lacking in common sense as to form a register of dogs, their colour, owner, and so on, to prevent citizens from killing them. Regular inspection was made and stringent regulations issued against one dog being substituted for another that had disappeared. The year after the humane regulation was issued, a man-servant of Hoizumi Ichiemon, a guard of the Koishikawa Palace, was exiled to Hachijo Island for having killed a dog, and his master, Hoizumi Ichiemon, deprived of his fief; Sakai Hakuryu, a law-court official, was confined to his own house for having idly looked on at a dog-fight, in the garden of the law court, in which one dog was killed by the other. A certain hatamoto, Akita Awajino-kami Suehisa, with 500 koku of fief, and an office as Attendant in the Shogun's Middle Inner Court, was exiled with his son to Hachijo Island, and his family was abolished, because one day the son, a boy of twelve or thirteen years of age, shot a sparrow in the garden of his own house. The bird dropped into the garden of their neighbour, who, fearing for himself and his family, reported to the court that the sparrow had not been killed by any of his family, but by the son of his neighbour. Thus the Humane Regulation issued by the fifth Shogun, Tsunayoshi, proved the means of extinguishing human life, and the machinery by which one group of men entrapped another and vile informers battened upon the wealthy. One remarkable result of the legislation was that all over the town there were set up little guard-houses with tubs of water to pour over fighting dogs; but as it was known afterwards that even with such preparations dogs were killed or wounded, the Government at last made three large gardens for dogs, each covering an area of 160,000 tsubo (about 16 acres), at Okubo, Yotsuya, and Nakano, into which all the masterless dogs were taken and supplied with much better food, housing, and bedding than middle-class citizens could afford. So comical were the doings of Government officials in Tsunayoshi's Age, but the following documents go beyond comedy and reach tragedy:—

REPORT.

I, Ihei, house-owner, living at the 1st chome of Honzaimoku-cho Street, humbly report to the authority of the august local government that as I was informed at daybreak this morning that the crying of dogs was heard under the floor of the residence of a man called Shoemon, to whom I am renting the house, I immediately went there; and taking up the floor planks found below on the ground that a bitch of the colour of a white spotted tiger had given birth to two pups, and therefore I at once reported it to our Five-men Company and the leader, all of whom came instantly to the place to be witnesses. Then, sending for a dog doctor, I took the best possible care of the animal and reported it to the Guard-House. Finally, I now ask for inspection by the august authority.

CERTIFICATE OF INSPECTION.

A bitch, of the colour of a white spotted tiger, and of medium size, and two bitch pups, one white, spotted with black, and the other black. Three dogs in all, a bitch and two pups.

With regard to aforesaid dogs, Shoemon, the occupier of the house; the house-owner; the local Five-men Company and the chief; Densuke, the dog doctor; and Buhei, his assistant, all witnessed and made examination and found that all the dogs are strong and in good health, and though close inquiries were made as to the owner of the dogs, no such owner was to be found, nor anyone who knew before about the bitch.

IHEI, the House-owner.
SEIEMON, of the Five-men Company.
ICHIBEI, of the Five-men Company.
SHINSUKE, of the Five-men Company.

And approved by

SEGAWA KOEMON } Inspectors from the
MASUI SOTAYU } Guard-House.

October 20th, the 2nd year of Hoei.

Such a comedy was of daily occurrence everywhere in Edo, and was equal to allowing fierce animals to be preying on human beings, doing nothing to arouse in men benevolent and humane thoughts.

IMPOSITION OF TAX ON ACCOUNT OF DOGS.—To maintain such an administration for dogs was costly, and Hagiwara Ominokami Shigehide, Lord Treasurer of the Shogunate, ordered all the Daikan (Deputy Tribune), in the Shogun's own fief in the eight Kwanto provinces, to pay a tax of 1 koku for every 100 koku, and all the Edo citizens on the main streets to pay 3 bu of gold for every 1 kwan of their premises, fixing the total amount of tax for every cho (a town district); and though there was, of course, a difference of value between such buildings and premises, there was found some means to assess the value among the town citizens.

LIFE IN EDO WAS LIKE THAT IN A MOURNING PERIOD.—In these evil days people began secretly to call the Shogun, Inu Kubo (the

Shogun for dogs), but Tsunayoshi's intention was not to protect dogs only, but all kinds of animals, including even shell-fish, and orders were issued forbidding the eating of birds, shell-fish, lobsters, shrimps, etc. Yet, in fact, only the sale of birds in the markets was prohibited, and fish were overlooked. The feudal lords constantly received from their country domains all kinds of delicious birds, feasted on them in secret and buried the feathers; but the Edo citizens suffered severely under the oppressive government of the Shogun—who was in reality most merciful, benevolent, and highly valued learning and knowledge—and were all obliged to live just as in a mourning period. When we remember that this administration was continued for over twenty years, from 1688 to 1708 (5th year of Hoei), in which year Tsunayoshi died, we must realize how painful life was in Edo.

Sudden Rise of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu to Power.—Warned by the experience of his brother with Sakai Tadakiyo, and of himself with Hotta Masatoshi, after the assassination of the last named, Tsunayoshi decided to act as his own prime minister; and, therefore, though he appointed Makino Sadanari, who was his chief retainer when he resided in Tatebayashi Castle, to the office of Osoba-goyonin (Lord Attendant), and gave him a rank equal to that of Rochu (state minister), he did not entrust him with the management of important affairs. He had, however, always had a favourite, one Yanagisawa Yataro, who held a small office with a salary of 150 koku; and, the year after the murder of Hotta Masatoshi, he suddenly promoted this Yanagisawa Yataro, and gave him the title of Dewano-kami, at the same time appointing him Osoba-goyonin (Lord Attendant), so that everyone wondered why this man received so sudden a rise in life, and scandal attributed it to Yanagisawa having seduced the Shogun by means of a beautiful woman. There is no need to look for any unnatural reason. Tsunayoshi had seen the effects of giving the Tairo too free a rein, and was well enough read in Chinese history to take as his model the first Emperor of the Ming dynasty, who had reversed the practice of the So Dynasty and appointed to military, civil, and diplomatic posts his own personal attendants, whom he commanded absolutely. For this reason Tsunayoshi made his Osoba-goyonin equal in power to a Rochu. For long enough no Rochu could keep his place unless he was on good terms with the Osoba-goyonin, or of so strong a character as to keep the Lord Attendant in his proper place. Now that the fifth Shogun raised the rank of Lord Attendant to the level of that of a Rochu, the Rochu became merely figureheads, and there was no need for Yanagisawa to fortify his position through the wiles of a woman. As Lord Attendant to the Shogun, with the same power as a Rochu, he had little to fear. This Yanagisawa Yataro had served Tsunayoshi since he was a boy of seven, and been one of his students in Chinese classics and literature. Needless to say, when Tsunayoshi became Shogun, and condescended to lecture on Confucianism, Yanagisawa Yataro was one of the most diligent attendants; and as he was eleven years younger than the Shogun, prudent, obedient, the admirer of his character, and so devoted to his master as to copy him in everything, he made an ideal Osoba-goyonin. Akimoto Takatomo, who had been promoted to be a Rochu from a Wakatoshiyori (junior lords in the Shogunate), and was beaten in the struggle for power with Yanagisawa, has left the following characterization of him:—

> When Yanagisawa Yataro was about to enter the Shogun's presence he would ask the Shogun's pages what sort of clothes His Highness was wearing that day, thick or thin, and himself donned similar garments before going in to his audience. Then, if the Shogun felt hot, Yanagisawa felt the same, and so he never failed to push open the door and let in cool air when the Shogun was feeling too warm. He goes into such minute details in his service to the Shogun as I can never attain as a state minister.

Yanagisawa behaved more like a page, or an attendant, than a state minister; but what the Shogun Tsunayoshi really wanted was not a man who would stand on his dignity as a minister, but a good, faithful attendant. Yanagisawa was all this, and gave every satisfaction to the Shogun, who in 1690 gave him a fief of 35,000 koku as the lord of Kawagoe Castle in Musashi, with a high rank at the Imperial Court. Next year he did him the unprecedented favour of visiting his house in Edo, giving him as presents a sword of Masamune, a short sword of Enju Kumitoshi, 200 large gold coins, and 50 suits of clothes. At the same time he granted an audience to Yanagisawa's mother and wife, and gave them gold coins and silk dresses. Not content with that, he summoned nine of his host's retainers to his presence, and listened to a discussion between Ogyu Sorai and Hosoi Kotaku, who were both well-known scholars at the time and followers of Yanagisawa, upon the true meaning of the word "respect." To Yanagisawa's son, Hyobu, he condescended to give a lesson upon the Daigaku (First Scripture of Confucianism), and on the day of his visit increased Yanagisawa's fief by 20,000 koku at some places in Izumi, Omi, and Sagami. Hitherto such visits had been confined to the mansions of the lords of Kii, Owari, and Hitachi Provinces, who were all the near relatives of the Tokugawa family and called the Three Families, or to such great princes as Lords Shimazu, Daté, and Maeda; and when the Shogun showed such favour to a mere feudal lord, who was no more than the Lord Attendant, it caused a great deal of gossip. In 1694 Yanagisawa Yataro was made a Rochu, then the senior Rochu, while keeping his office as the Lord Attendant and the lord of Kawagoe Castle, with 80,000 koku of feud; and when his son-in-law, Matsudaira Ukyonotayu Terusada, was appointed to be the Shogun's Lord Attendant, all the political power in the Shogunate fell into the hands of the Yanagisawa family. In 1698 he was raised to the office of Tairo (Premier), with the Court rank of Sakon-e-no-gon-no-shosho (Acting Major-General of the Imperial Bodyguards). In the Shogun Tsunayoshi's eyes, Yanagisawa Yataro was a model of sincere and faithful loyalty, and to enhance his reputation he granted him the family name of Matsudaira, and, giving him one character of his own name, ordered him to change his first name to Yoshiyasu. Yanagisawa's son, Yasuaki, was ennobled as Isenono-kami, and ordered to change his name to Yoshisato. Kai had always been considered a place of strategical importance, and never granted to any feudal lord before, but now Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu was made lord of Kai, and with a nominal revenue of 151,288 koku, and actually over 200,000 koku. Two years before the death of Tsunayoshi the privilege of minting gold coin at Kofu in the Kai was granted to the favourite. It was all very astonishing.

Merits and Faults of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu.—What had this man done to merit such unparalleled promotion which advanced him from petty official to Tairo in seventeen years? Very little. His faults far outweighed his merits. As President of the re-minting bureau, he undertook to relieve the financial embarrassment of the Shogunate, resulting from the luxury of previous Shoguns and the reckless lavishness of Tsunayoshi, and by debasing the gold and silver coinage he threw the currency system into confusion. The sufferings of the people under the humane regulations were cruel: property was confiscated, houses were destroyed, lives were sacrificed. In and around Edo, 6,737 people were punished under the regulations, and adding those who suffered in the Shogun's own fiefs the number reaches 8,634. Yanagisawa never lifted a finger to remedy this, and was only eager to agree with whatever the Shogun put forward. We must admit that he was a good patron to scholars of the time, among whom Ogyu Sorai and Hosoi Kotaku were most prominent, and from this point of view he was somewhat better and a little wiser than the eunuch politicians in the Ming Dynasty of China. So much must be said in his favour.

Shogun Tsunayoshi's Filial Piety.—The Shogun Tsunayoshi was lavishly generous, not only to Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, but upon all the feudal lords, hatamotos, samurais, and common citizens he showered rewards, the total number of recipients from the Genroku era being 7,694, and the amount of treasure thus disposed of reaching

194,340 ryo of gold and silver coins. It is generally agreed that he was too lavish in his gifts of the precious metals; built and repaired Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples apparently at random, and thus exhausted the Treasury of state; but in its origin his lavishness sprang from a good motive, that of filial piety. Tsunayoshi's mother was the sister of Kitakoji Kunaitayu Michiyoshi, a Court noble in Kyoto, and first entered the Shogun's Inner Court as a lady-in-waiting to Lady Oman-no-kata, who then monopolized the favours of the third Shogun, Iemitsu. In time the Shogun looked upon the maid with a very kindly eye, and she was given the name of Lady Otama-no-kata, and after Iemitsu's death Keishoin. Tsunayoshi overflowed with filial piety, and obeyed his mother in everything. Every day he sent to inquire about her health, and often went himself to her apartments in the Sanno-Maru (the Third Inner Castle). Daily he would send her rare curios and clothes, paint something for her, or even dance to amuse her. We are told how, when he bid his parent to dine with him, he himself carried in the table and served the old lady, a thing unprecedented in the private life of feudal lords in Japan. This Lady Keishoin was a staunch Buddhist, and contributed largely to building and repairing funds, and the Shogun did the same to delight his mother. To minister to the Shogun's passion for his mother, Yanagisawa secretly petitioned the Imperial Court to grant to the Lady Keishoin the Court rank of Juichi-e (the first order of dignity and rank) on the ground that she was the mother of the reigning Shogun, and the petition was granted. Juichi-i was the highest order granted to any subject, and it was really too much to ask for it for a woman, who was, after all, only a concubine of Iemitsu; but Tsunayoshi was exceedingly delighted, and placed more and more confidence in Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu. The Lady Keishoin was naturally very grateful to her intercessor, and when Tsunayoshi gave him a part of the province of Kai and entitled him lord thereof, Keishoin asked why he had not given the whole province to such a faithful servant. Could he not do as he wished in everything? Tsunayoshi smiled, and answered that even the Shogun himself cannot do everything just as he likes. Tsunayoshi's faults, then, came largely from his filial piety, and here we must observe that just as the administration of merciful government sometimes results in oppression, so evil may be done of good motive and also of good will.

MERCHANTS WHO WERE EXILED FOR LUXURY.—With the long years of peace, luxury reached great heights, and Tsunayoshi, eager to discipline the age and arouse in the public mind a desire for plain living and high thinking, issued sumptuary edicts and expelled from Edo many rich merchants guilty of too overt a display of wealth.

One day, soon after his accession, he was passing through the streets to visit the family mausoleum, and among the spectators who always turned out in large numbers to view the stately procession of the Shogun, he observed a richly dressed woman, attended by five maids, seated upon a gay rug, and burning costly incense while she looked on leisurely at the parade. Inquiry revealed that she was the wife of Ishikawa Rokubei, a wholesale merchant of Terifuricho, Nihombashi-ku, known widely for his immense wealth, and the owner of six residences in Edo besides his shop. He had the presumption to call his house in the Honjo district shimoyashiki (suburban residence), a name reserved for the houses of feudal lords, and the luxurious extravagance of his wife was the gossip of Edo. When all this came out, the Shogunate instantly confiscated his houses, premises, and all his property, and Ishikawa Rokubei and his wife were expelled from Edo, and were not allowed to live nearer than twenty-five miles, on the charge that it was unpardonable for him to call one of his villas shimoyashiki, which name was only granted to a suburban residence of a feudal lord, and such presumption as to sit on a rug while viewing the Shogun's parade was highly reprehensible. Such were the reasons publicly given, but, of course, it was the policy of the Shogunate not to tolerate anyone whose wealth might become a menace to the political power of the house of Tokugawa. There were at this time many big merchants in Edo who lived more luxuriously than even feudal lords could afford to do, and were escorted through the streets by as many servants as a daimyo; the difference between the parades of feudal lords and wealthy merchants being only that the train of the daimyo could carry spears, while that of the merchant could not. Edo people used to call the latter Amaryu parade (parade of rain-dragons), because a true dragon has a sharp point like a dagger at the end of its tail, while an Amaryu dragon has not. Most of these millionaires were Government purveyors, and as they frequented the residences of the powerful lords in the Shogunate, and used to bribe their retainers and officials with rich gifts and presents, their luxury and presumption was overlooked; but those who were not Government purveyors and yet lived so luxuriously as to attract public attention, were sooner or later punished, just as Ishikawa Rokubei had been.

CONFISCATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF FIEFS MADE IN SUCCESSION.—It was the merchants alone whom the Shogun visited with such severe penalties, but his eagerness to reform public discipline, combined with his changeable temper, led him to punish so many of the feudal lords and hatamoto that they amounted to several hundreds. Twenty feudal lords had their fiefs confiscated or reduced, the total of confiscation and reduction amounting to 1,400,000 koku. It is said that not one of those punished was falsely accused, a sufficient comment on the corruption of the times. In 1696 Rokkaku Echizen-no-kami Hiroharu, a koke, that is, one whose feud is very small but whose rank is high as a nobleman, was discharged from his office, and 700 koku lopped off his fief on the charge of sending a gift to the Shogun's mother, through one of her favourites, and trying to get access to her; and the following order was issued in the same month by the Shogunate :—

> Those desirous of making presents to the Lady Midai (the Shogun's wife), the Lady Keishoin (the Shogun's mother), the Lady Ofukuro (the late Shogun's wife), and the Lady Tsuruhime (the Shogun's daughter), are first to ask permission from Yanagisawa Dewanokami and Matsudaira Ukyonotayu and to follow their instructions; and no present shall be made to the ladies mentioned above without the agreement of Yanagisawa Dewanokami and the Matsudaira Ukyonotayu.
>
> Those who receive gifts from the aforesaid ladies mentioned are to offer thanks for them through Yanagisawa Dewanokami and Matsudaira Ukyonotayu.
>
> Those desirous of making presents to the Shogun and to the ladies mentioned out of gratitude for the grant of succession to a house, increase of fief, raising of rank and office, or on account of coming to Edo to serve the Shogun, are to do so through Yanagisawa Dewanokami and Matsudaira Ukyonotayu only.

By these ordinances, the fifth Shogun, Tsunayoshi, made serious efforts to check the evils of favouritism, but with the corruption of the public mind all his well-meant efforts failed.

IMMORALITY AND LUXURY IN THE SHOGUN'S INNER COURT.—In spite of Tsunayoshi being so strict about other people, his private life was exceedingly wild and dissolute, and he had very perverted tastes. According to the *Sanno-geki* or *Sanno-gaiki* (*Outlines of History of the Three Monarchs*) :—

> Among the Shogun's pages there were about forty or fifty who were very much favoured by him for their good looks, and for about twenty of his chief favourites a house was built in Lord Yanagisawa's premises, as if they were members of the Yanagisawa family or their relatives. Some of them were married, but the greater part were bachelors, and they lived under a strict daily rule which regulated their rising, going to bed, study, and work. In their exits and entrances they never cast a glance at anyone, and were forbidden to talk or correspond even with their parents, brothers, or sisters. Almost all of these men were of noble birth, and there were among them even feudal lords of over 10,000 koku. Lord Naito Masamori, the lord of Annaka Castle; Mizuno Katsunaga, the lord of Yuki Castle; Honda Tadamune, the lord of Nishidai Castle, were among the Shogun's pages, and lived in the so-called "House of Handsome Boys" on the premises of Lord Yanagisawa, in company with the sons of Court nobles of Kyoto, such as Nagasawa Sukechika,

the son of Lord Toyama Saisho; Maeda Katanaga, the son of Lord Oshikoji Saisho; and Maeda Harunaga, his brother.

Tsunayoshi was very fond of the Nō Dance, and summoning to his Court well-known masters of the art, he granted to about forty of them the rank and title of hatamoto, and called them "Attendants in the Kiri-no-ma Hall." He then selected out of the sons of feudal lords and hatamotos those who were well-trained in the dance, and made them "Attendants in the Tsugi-no-ma Hall." To complete his plan, he called in well-known Nō actors to train the Attendants in the two halls, granted them the samurai rank, and called them "Attendants in the Oroka Hall." The Shogun was so infatuated that not only did he look on at these men dancing, but danced himself before them; and in imitation of their master the feudal lords and samurais began to follow his example, vying with one another to learn to dance. Tsunayoshi appears never to have realized that by encouraging this effeminate art he was sapping the old samurai spirit, and turning his hardy followers into a race of dancing-masters and flatterers. Nay, more, he ordered the feudal lords and hatamotos to send their sons and brothers to the Kiri-no-ma Hall to learn this elegant art, and from this order sprang the so-called "Genroku Dancing," as described in the *Tokugawa Jikki* (*Official History of the Tokugawa Shogunate*) :—

> Sixteen of the Shogun's pages, all dressed in purple-coloured brocade, embroidered with gold and silver threads, with broad sleeves, wearing swords decorated with gold and long crimson cords, came out to the Dancing Hall, and when they began to dance to the sound of flutes and beat of drums, their good looks, the beautiful hues of their dresses and swords, dazzled men's eyes, and the whole Hall seemed to be lightened up.

Carried on the wave of these manners and customs the samurais, who one or two generations ago had borne with such pride long and heavy swords, now began to wear a slender decorated blade, and the old hardy spirit seemed to have died out and left nothing to take its place.

REVENGE OF THE FORTY-SEVEN RONINS.—However, even in such an age there were many of the old samurais surviving since the Genwa and Kanei Ages, and others who had pride in keeping up the old samurai spirit, and watched with deep grief the degeneracy of the day; and when Oishi Yoshio and forty-six ex-retainers of Asano Takumi-no-kami Naganori, the lord of the Akaho Castle in Harima, broke into the mansion of Kira Kotsukenosuke Yoshihide at Honjo in Edo in 1702 (15th year of Genroku), and cut off his head in revenge for their late lord, you may imagine how delighted were these old samurais and all other men who cherished their samurai spirit, and how they cried out that the old samurai spirit was still alive and the backbone of the country. The story is, of course, a very famous one. In 1701 the Shogunate appointed this Asano Naganori and Daté Ukyonosuke Muneharu, lord of Yoshida Castle in Iyo, to take charge of the entertainment of the Messengers from the Emperor, who were to come from Kyoto to Edo on March 14th. In all questions of etiquette they were to consult Kira Kodzuke-no-suke Yoshihide, head of the so-called Koke nobles. This Kira, though well versed in the knowledge belonging to his position, was in the habit of taking handsome presents, without which he would do nothing. Asano failed to placate him properly, and Kira, in the presence of other lords in the palace, reviled Asano so unmercifully that he could not contain himself, and drew his sword upon his tormentor in the palace of the Shogun, a terrible crime. Kira was saved from instant death by the intervention of those present, and Asano was deprived of his fief and ordered to commit hara-kiri the same night.

His chief retainer, Oishi Yoshio, was in the castle of Ako at the time, and when the commissioners from Edo arrived to take possession, after consultation with his fellow-retainers, he quietly surrendered the castle, begging one of the commissioners to intercede with the Shogunate for the succession of his late lord's younger brother, Asano Daigaku. He then collected forty-six retainers of the same mind as himself, and they took oath that if Asano Daigaku were allowed to succeed then they would rest quiet, otherwise they would have the head of Kira in revenge. They forthwith dispersed in various directions to avoid suspicion, and Oishi disported himself in the gay quarters of Kyoto for the same reason. In July 1702 the Shogunate released young Asano from confinement, and ordered him to be attached to Asano of Aki, chief of all the Asano families, thus extinguishing the hope of restoration to Ako. Matters thus brought to a head, Oishi and his forty-six coadjutors suddenly attacked the mansion of Kira in Edo, broke in and cut off his head, which they took to the Sengakuji Temple at Takanawa, and offered before the tomb of their late lord, thereafter waiting obediently for orders from the Shogunate.

The Government hesitated at first, for all highly admired the devoted loyalty displayed by the forty-seven, but finally the opinion that the law ought to be upheld gained the day, and it was decided to order them to commit hara-kiri. The Shogun himself did his best to find a way out of the difficulty, and save the lives of the loyal band, and even paid a visit to the Abbot at Nikko, Prince Koben, and hinted that he would veto the decision of the Council if the Prince interceded.

The Abbot did not rise to the occasion, and there was no means for Tsunayoshi but to confirm the sentence of hara-kiri. The story of the forty-seven ronins has become immortal, sung by poets, told by historians, embalmed by playwrights, and their spirit yet remains alive and displays the crystallized essence of the samurai spirit. The Kira family was immediately abolished, but afterwards the Shogunate restored the Asano family of the Harima Province, giving a feud of 5,000 koku to Asano Daigaku, Asano Naganori's younger brother, so that the object of Oishi Yoshio and his forty-six was finally attained after their death.

NATURAL CALAMITIES AND EARTHQUAKES IN THE HOEI ERA.—It has been the fashion to blame Tsunayoshi, saying that he abused his power, pardoning, punishing, killing, and destroying just as he liked, and was so absurdly loose in his conduct of the administration that he picked men out of the gutter, so to speak, and raised them to be great feudal lords; but such was the natural course when the Shogun was the real master of the country, and he himself managed all the important state affairs, and therefore it is more reasonable to blame the system of despotic government than Tsunayoshi himself. Tsunayoshi was not, of course, a great man, but he was sincere in his admiration of the ethics of Confucius and his desire to enforce them. He was by no means such a holy and wise monarch as the fabulous Emperors Gyo and Shin in the ancient history of China, but he really wished to abolish the rude and sanguinary habits and customs handed down since the establishment of the Japanese Empire, and if he could have found wise helpers and able ministers his government would have been above the average. It was his misfortune that he had no talented statesmen in the Shogunate under him, and so his administration, though merciful, effected little but misgovernment. His last days were miserable. In the year after the affair of the forty-seven ronins wonderful natural phenomena were witnessed, and wild rumours spread, until there was a great earthquake in Edo on the 22nd of November, which caused the earth to gape and brought down houses in ruins together. This was accompanied by a tidal wave that came from Shinagawa, just outside of Edo, and cost 32,000 lives in Edo alone. Neither did catastrophe stop there. On the 29th of the same month a great fire spread from the mansion of Lord Tokugawa in Koishikawa, and after burning up the Hongo, Yushima, Asakusa, and Yanagiwara districts, it spread to Honjo and destroyed the Ryogoku Bridge. About 1,300 lives were lost. Because of all these natural calamities, the Shogunate changed the name of the era from Genroku to Hoei, in the hope that it might bring better fortune. Vain hope; the earth was convulsed again in October of the 4th year of Hoei, and though the quake in Edo was not so severe as the former one, yet in Osaka 600 houses collapsed and 3,020 people were killed. While every one was aghast at this succession of disasters, there was an eruption of Mount Fuji on the 22nd of November, 1707, which did great damage in the provinces of Sagami and Kai at the foot of the mountain. The ashes were carried to such a distance that in Edo, Mito, and the provinces of Awa, Kazusa, and Shimoosa it was so dark even in daytime that candles had to be lighted, and the famous Arai Hakuseki lectured in the Shogunate court by artificial light. The people suffered greatly from these falling ashes, and about eighty-two feudal lords, besides the lord of Owari, were absent from the regular meeting to be held on the 28th day. The cost to the Treasury of the Shogunate was immense, and their expenses on relief and repairs, including also the loss of income, reached about 500,000 ryo of gold. To add to their embarrassment, in 1708 there were dreadful rains all over the country, and the provinces around Kyoto, suffering especially, could not pay the land-taxes.

Last Days of Tsunayoshi.—Tsunayoshi's own son had died in infancy, and he adopted Tsunanori, the son of the lord of Kii Province; but when this young man also died of smallpox in 1704, he adopted Matsudaira Tsunatoyo, the lord of Kai, and changed his name to Iyenobu. On the death of his mother, Tsunayoshi, following the Confucian tradition, made up his mind to observe the mourning period of three years, and, confining himself in the Inner Court, refused to see any feudal lords, and entrusted Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu with the direction of all state affairs. Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu took charge at first, but fearing that after Tsunayoshi's death he might suffer for such arbitrary behaviour, he asked Iyenobu to give final decisions, and this was the beginning of the decline of his power. A year later, Tsunayoshi suggested that he might surrender the office of Shogun to Iyenobu, in return for a fief of 1,000,000 koku in Suruga, Totomi, Mikawa, Shinano, and Echigo, and the rumour ran that Tsunayoshi intended to leave the fief to Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu after his death. However, he died as Shogun from smallpox in 1709, at the age of sixty-two. Gossip says that he was stabbed by his wife, who afterwards killed herself, in the fear that, under the thumb of Yanagisawa, he was about to disinherit Iyenobu, and power would pass from the hands of the house of Tokugawa. This may be a mere wild rumour, but it is easy to understand that there was dissension between Tsunayoshi's party and Iyenobu's party in the Inner Court of the Shogun.

Distribution of Memorial Gifts by Iyemitsu.—In countries where a Parliament holds the power of the purse, whether a monarch is thrifty or extravagant does not matter much; but in despotically governed countries the personal habits of the monarch are of vast importance to the people, whose pockets are directly touched. In feudal times in Japan a thrifty habit in their ruler was looked upon as a blessing, and the very foundation of a beneficent administration. The first Tokugawa Shogun was so economical that his followers dubbed him a miser, and his successor, following his example, lived a very simple life. With the third Shogun, Iyemitsu, all this was changed. Iyemitsu was a luxurious liver, and loved to lavish gifts on every one. Under him state expenditure increased prodigiously, but as there was much accumulated treasure he himself did not suffer from financial embarrassment. This legacy he left to his successor. As a sample of his lavish generosity, we will give below the list of gifts he distributed among his relatives and feudal lords as mementoes of his father, the second Shogun, Hidetada, in 1632, soon after his father's death :—

200 large gold coins and 10,000 large silver coins to the Empress Dowager.
500 large gold coins and 20,000 large silver coins to the Lady Tenji-in.
10,000 large gold coins and 10,000 large silver coins to the Lady of Takata.
100 large gold coins and 1,000 large silver coins each to the mother and wife of Ikeda Shintaro Mitsumasa.
100 large gold coins to the lady consort of His Highness Kujo Yukiii.
200 large gold coins and 100 large silver coins each to the wives of Matsudaira Tadamune, Kato Tadahiro, and Mori Hidenari.
100 large gold coins and 1,000 large silver coins to the wife of Hosokawa Tadatoshi.
100 large coins each to the wives of Mori Hidemoto and Koide Yoshihide.
100 large gold coins and 1,000 large silver coins to the wife of Nabeshima Katsushige.
100 large gold coins and 100 large silver coins each to the mother of Matsudaira Awanokami Tadahide, and the wives of Matsudaira Uyemonnosuke Tadayuki, Kyogoku Tadahiro, and Kato Akinari.
100 large coins each to the wives of Matsudaira Tadayoshi, Arima Toyouji, Arima Naozumi, the Lady of Ichiba (Iyeyasu's sister and Tsutsui Sadatsugu's wife), and the mother of Okubo Tadatomo.
200 large gold coins to the Abbess Jokoin-ni of Wakasa Province.
2,000 ryo of gold to the mother of the lord of Kii Province (Achano-tsubone).
100 large gold coins to the mother of Asano Nagaakira.
2,000 ryo of gold to the Lady Kagano-tsubone (Iyeyasu's mistress).
3,000 large silver coins to Matsudaira Mitsunaga.
1,000 large silver coins each to Matsudaira Naomasa and Matsudaira Teruzumi.
500 large silver coins each to Matsudaira Naomoto and fourteen other feudal lords.
300 large silver coins each to Kuroda Takamasa and twenty-one feudal lords.
200 large silver coins each to Goto Moritoshi and eleven other feudal lords.

100 large gold coins to the Abbess Seiun-in-ni (formerly Hidetada's mistress).
2,000 large gold coins each to the Ladies Man-hime and Tatsuhime, the daughters of Maeda Toshitsune.
10,000 large silver coins to Daté Masamuné.
5,000 large silver coins each to Matsudaira Tadamasa and eleven other feudal lords.
3,000 large silver coins each to Matsudaira Tadahide and eight other feudal lords.
2,000 large silver coins each to Kyugoku Takahiro and eight other feudal lords.
500 large silver coins to Hosokawa Sansai.
200 large silver coins each to Oda Nagamasa and eight other feudal lords.
30,000 large silver coins to the lord of Owari Province.
70,000 large silver coins to the lord of Hitachi Province (lord of Mito).
5,000 large silver coins to Ii Naotaka.
3,000 large silver coins to Matsudaira Tadaaki.
1,000 large silver coins each to Matsudaira Tadatsugu and fifteen other feudal lords.
300 large silver coins each to Toki Yoriyuki and fourteen other feudal lords,
2,000 large silver coins each to Sakae Tadayo and Doi Toshikatsu.
1,000 large silver coins each to Sakae Tadakatsu, Nagai Naotoshi, Aoyama Yukinari, and Naito Tadashige.
500 large silver coins each to Inouye Masatoshi and twenty other feudal lords.
200 large silver coins each to Kusakabe Muneyoshi and one hundred and twenty other feudal lords.
300 large silver coins each to Honda Tadasuke and sixteen other feudal lords.
100 large silver coins each to Kamio Moriyo and twenty-three other feudal lords.

Besides the above, there were individual gifts as follows: One of 50 ryo, seven of 100 ryo, five of 80 ryo, six of 70 ryo, four of 60 ryo, two of 50 ryo, five of 100 large silver coins, two of 100 ryo, twelve of 60 ryo, fourteen of 200 large silver coins, eighteen of 100 large silver coins, twenty of 50 large silver coins, one of 100 large gold coins, two of 50 large gold coins, three of 30 large gold coins, and ten of 20 large gold coins. Hayashi Doshin, Nagayoshi Nobudzumi, and about one hundred others also received 5 large gold coins. The amount of gold and silver coins distributed among the above feudal lords and others as a memento of the second Tokugawa Shogun, Hidetada, comes to 28,110 gold coins, equal to 281,100 ryo, and 384,152 large silver coins, weighing 17,200 kwamme, besides 6,950 ryo of small gold coins, a clear proof of what a spendthrift Iyemitsu was.

GREAT CONFLAGRATION AT EDO.—After the death of Iyemitsu, the Treasury of the Shogunate was scantily supplied. Still, when Tsunayoshi succeeded, he distributed the treasure of the late Shogun liberally among his relations and retainers, in all 1,300 great plates of gold, 800 small plates, and 309,500 great plates of silver.

In 1656 there was a big fire in Edo, destroying forty-eight streets between Nihombashi and Kyobashi, and in January of the succeeding year the greatest conflagration with which Edo has ever been visited broke out in Hongo. It did untold damage. Edo Castle and many mansions were destroyed, and 108,000 people are said to have lost their lives. The records tell us of 500 mansions of feudal lords reduced to ashes, 300 shrines and temples, 10,000 godowns, 60 bridges, and nearly 100 miles of streets.

The houseless were temporarily cared for in nine temporary houses, and it is recorded that they had to eat the Government ration off broken tiles, as all the crockery was destroyed. The Shogunate was afraid that with such an awesome calamity, wild rumours would spread abroad and internal trouble break out, and therefore dispatched two officials from Edo to Osaka, informing the local authorities on the road that the Shogun was unharmed, so that the country-folk, who were wondering at the event, and fearing something worse might happen, would be calmed. At the same time they regulated the rate of wages, placing the maximum for a coolie at 70 mon of copper coin a day; a skilled carpenter, tiler, and stonemason, 3 momme of silver a day, and their food; a skilled sawyer, 2 momme of silver a day, with food; and a skilled plasterer and matmaker, 3 momme of silver, with food. This was, of course, to prevent profiteering out of the calamity. Feudatories descended from old Tokugawa adherents were granted loans as follows :—

10,000 to 15,000 koku, 150 kwamme of silver.
16,000 to 25,000 koku, 130 kwamme of silver.
26,000 to 35,000 koku, 150 kwamme of silver
36,000 to 45,000 koku, 170 kwamme of silver.
46,000 to 55,000 koku, 200 kwamme of silver.
56,000 to 65,000 koku, 230 kwamme of silver.
66,000 to 75,000 koku, 250 kwamme of silver.
76,000 to 85,000 koku, 270 kwamme of silver.
90,000 koku and upwards, 300 kwamme of silver.

To those who had no fief but were paid a yearly allowance of rice, money was lent on the following scale :—

15 ryo of gold for every 100 koku of yearly allowance of rice.
100 ryo of gold for every 1,000 koku of yearly allowance of rice.
150 ryo of gold for every 1,500 koku of yearly allowance of rice.
500 ryo of gold for every 5,000 koku of yearly allowance of rice.

To the people in the burnt-out districts of Edo the Shogunate distributed 10,000 kwamme of silver:—

In the Time of the Fourth Shogun the Treasury of the Shogunate began to Run Dry.—The loans detailed above were to be repaid within ten years, but afterwards finding this almost impossible, the Shogunate forgave the debt altogether. As we have seen, in the great fire the main castle was burnt, and the gold and silver in the Shogunate's treasury being destroyed, the borrowers were handed their money at Osaka, or at Shizuoka if the amount was smaller than 1,000 ryo. This open-handed lending of money and the destruction of bullion in the great fire entirely upset the financial equilibrium of the Shogun Tsunayoshi, and besides that, the Shogunate lent in secret 70,000 ryo of gold each to the lord of Kofu and lord of Tatebayashi, both Iyemitsu's brothers, and 50,000 ryo of gold to the lord of Owari, one of the relatives of the Tokugawa family. In the 2nd year of Kambun (1662) the total amount of gold and silver in the Treasury was as given below:—

RECORD OF GOLD AND SILVER KEPT IN THE CASTLE TOWER OF EDO IN JULY, THE 1st YEAR OF KAMBUN.

1,702,222½ ryo in koban (small gold coin); of which 3,600 ryo were not mentioned in the Account-Book kept in the Sannomaru (Third Inner Castle).

Total amount, 15,521 large gold coins (oban).

Equal in value to 114,168 in koban (small gold coins) at the rate of one large gold coin for eight small.

28 gold ingots, each equal in intrinsic value to 1,000 large gold coins or 160,000 ryo in koban (small gold coin).

158 small gold ingots, each weighing 100 momme, and equal in value to 2,300 ryo of koban (small gold coin).

421 square gold ingots, each weighing 100 momme, and equal in value to 8,600 ryo of koban (small gold coin).

159 of the smallest gold ingots in the shape of a pebble, weighing 650 momme in all, and equal in value to 130 ryo of koban (small gold coin).

90 kwamme and 714 momme of gold, cast into round balls, equal in value to 9,033 ryo of koban (small gold coin).

41 kwan and 250 momme of gold kept in the castle tower.

4,400 ryo of the Koshu koban, of which 2,000 ryo are in 1 bu coins (one-quarter ryo), and equal in value to 7,689 ryo.

Grand total, 2,014,256¾ ryo in koban (small gold coin), and equal to 251,782¾ large gold coins.

There was 120,973 kwan and 913 momme of silver, so that the total of precious metal possessed by the Tokugawa Shogunate, in the 4th Shogun Iyemitsu's Age, was 2,016,976 ryo of gold and 126,899 kwan and 122 momme of silver.

Finance of the Shogunate much embarrassed in the Time of the Fifth Shogun, Tsunayoshi.—There is ample evidence that more than half the hoard of gold and silver above detailed was spent within a period of seventeen years, and when it was Tsunayoshi's turn to distribute mementoes of his predecessor, he could only present the famous paintings and writings of great masters and poets, precious works of art and rare curios to the relatives of the Tokugawa family and other feudal lords, not because he was stingy, but because the treasury of the Shogunate was wellnigh empty. Historians of later ages attribute the embarrassed state of finance of the Tokugawa Shogunate in Tsunayoshi's time to his luxury and lavishness, but this is a gross injustice to him. The fifth Shogun, Tsunayoshi, succeeded to estates already greatly impoverished, and as he was not only ignorant how to reform and improve the financial system of the Shogunate, but rather changed it for the worse, he suffered a good deal from his own fault in this respect. But, in fact, the age was advanced by this time, and though the Shogunate made great efforts to check the accompanying evils largely springing from a higher standard of living, and issued many laws of prohibition, yet they did not try themselves to return to the old simple and hard life, but swam with the tide, and, consequently, the prohibitive regulations were useless. As life in the Shogun's Court was getting more and more luxurious, the expenditure increased in proportion, and the general public, imitating the upper classes, the whole country was steeped in luxury and pleasure, so that Tsunayoshi alone was not to be blamed for the exhaustion of state finance, but the whole country itself was also responsible for it.

Theatres and Gay Quarters the Centres of Social Activities. About seventy or eighty years elapsed between the fall of the great Osaka Castle and the Genroku period, and though the farmers, who formed the foundation of national wealth and resources, swathed in a network of preventive regulations, lost their power of initiative, the merchant class made gigantic strides in developing their business, and accumulated immense wealth, which enabled them to live in a style no less gorgeous than that of great feudal lords, as did Yodoya Tatsugoro, an immensely rich merchant of Osaka, and many like him in Edo. Still, the caste system was binding all over the country, and the richest merchant had no power to resist the samurai class. The men of commerce were not permitted to wear swords nor to live in a mansion like the feudal lords, and huge millionaires were compelled to kotow to petty hatamoto with a revenue of 50 or 60 koku paid in rice. Political meetings were prohibited, and they could not form a society in the modern sense of the word. The only places where they could spend money as they wished, and indulge in as much pleasure and luxury as they liked, were the theatre and gay quarters, and for this reason the theatres in Edo made undue development, and the gay quarter became a centre of elegance and fashion in the Genroku Age. The name of Sakae-cho, where the theatres were situated, and of Yoshiwara, as the most flourishing gay quarter, resounded throughout the whole country. The well-known Yoshiwara quarter was founded in 1590, when Shoji Jinemon, a brother of one of Hojo Ujimasa's concubines, escaped to Edo after the fall of Odawara Castle and started a brothel for the samurai, who followed their lords to Edo and were temporarily separated from wife and children. This Shoji Jinemon lived at first in Gusoku-cho Street, Nihombashi district, but later moved to the Oyajibashi Bridge in the same district. Jinemon was commonly known as Oyaji (daddy), and the bridge was called after him. This man's example was followed by many, until finally a gay quarter sprang up, which was burned in the fire of 1657. The Shogunate compensated Jinemon's grandson and others in the same line of business with 3,000 ryo of gold, and ordered them to move their quarter to Senzoku, Asakusa. This new quarter got the name of Yoshiwara. When the Yoshiwara and Sakae-cho became the centres of social activity in Edo, and the gay quarter and theatres were the chief subject of conversation, and even of literature, the names of the old warriors who distinguished themselves under Iyeyasu were forgotten, and the names of the beauties of the Yoshiwara and their lovers filled people's minds, and proved the inspiration of the so-called Genroku literature. One of the most famous of these frail beauties was Takao, whose name was perpetuated in Takao the Second, Takao the Third, and so on. Of the first Takao a Genroku book writes :—

> Her person has the dignity of a Tayu (a grand master of the Court), and not only is she exceedingly beautiful in form and face, but her skill in handwriting is not excelled even by the great masters of olden times, and her skill in playing musical instruments strikes great musicians with admiration.

This beautiful Takao was painted by Torii Kiyonobu, a great Genroku artist, and, copies circulating all through the land, her beauty won all men's hearts. Daté Masamuné of Sendai ransomed one of Takao's successors and made her his mistress, and Asano Harunaga of Hiroshima and Sakakibara of Echigo followed his example, and bought out courtesans. Tsunayoshi himself, before he became Shogun, had also been the lover of yet another Takao in the Yoshiwara. People thought of nothing but the theatre and the licensed quarters, and the sons of samurai, whose forefathers lived a simple life and placed the military art above all others, spent their time studying music and singing. The daughters of the samurais, merchants, and artisans were taught to sing, dance, and play, before they learned to sew, and while they were ignorant of the names of the high lords in the Shogunate or of great feudal lords, they were well versed in the names, ages and even the crests of the actors in the theatres of Sakae-cho.

The Gorgeous Lives of Merchants.—Two merchant princes of the age were Kinokuniya Bunzaemon and Naraya Mozaemon, who were great rivals, and competed with one another in lavish expenditure, astounding even the Yoshiwara by their prodigality. One of their coterie was the well-known artist and poet, Hanabusa Itcho, who composed the "Asadzuma" song and others, which were very popular and sung everywhere, and painted a picture known as "Asadzumafune," showing a beautiful dancing woman dressed in the old Shirabyoshi style in a boat, which was widely reproduced and sold in Edo city. In co-operation with two others, this artist published a small book called *100 Women*, in which they satirized the wives and daughters of high lords in the Shogunate and the great feudatories. The too widely known song "Asadzuma" had indirectly pointed at the Lady Oden-ma-no-kata, the favourite concubine of Tsunayoshi, and the book proved too much for the Government, who exiled the artist to the island of Miyaki in 1673. This age of the fifth Shogun, Tsunayoshi, had its bad side, but it was accompanied by development in literature and fine arts, and produced the gorgeous gold lacquer that has been so much admired in later ages as the art of Joken-in-den, the posthumous name of Tsunayoshi. Yokoya Soshin, who was perhaps one of the greatest carvers in metal throughout the Tokugawa Ages, adorned the period, and it gave birth to the gay and beautiful patterns known as Genroku design. In fact, the age was epoch-making in the development of the fine arts and social activities. The Japanese lady's ceremonial dress as worn to-day was first devised in the Genroku Age. The wife of a rich merchant of Kyoto, Nakamura Kuranosuke, was in the habit of attending social meetings, where the ladies wore the gayest and most expensive brocades, in an upper garment of black habutaye silk worn over an undergarment of white. This lady's maids were all dressed in the gorgeous clothes which characterized the period, but she herself never varied in her simple black and white, however often the guests changed their clothes during the function, as was the custom. Finally, every one agreed that she had the best and most elegant taste in dress, and well they might, as she had been advised in her method of dressing by the great artist, Ogata Korin. This severely elegant style of black and white is now crystallized as the ceremonial dress for women.

Kinokuniya Bunzaemon striving to get his Name published widely.—Kinokuniya Bunzaemon was one of the greatest millionaires the confused and disorderly Genroku Age produced. In the days when the Tokugawa Shogun was a despot, managing himself all the State affairs, and pushing his divine prerogative to an extreme, it was by his favour alone that men gained power in the Shogunate and merchants could amass huge ill-gotten fortunes in a very few years. We find the following in the book, *Sixty Cho of Edo Masago* (sixty pages of tales picked up like pebbles of daily happenings in Edo) :—

> During the age of His Highness Joken-in (posthumous name of the Shogun Tsunayoshi), profits being very easily made, there were two or three large stores with open gates, like a palace, in all the main streets, which were crowded with chugen (samurais' servants), zoritori (samurais' attendants), and expensive tailors.

Kinokuniya Bunzaemon was one of the new-rich, born, it is said, at Wakanoura, and said to be a native of Katanoura, Kaiso-gori, Kii Province, but, in fact, of unknown pedigree, even the names of his parents being forgotten. There is a popular song handed down even to-day about his Mikan-bune, the ships loaded with oranges, which would seem to show that his fortune was made by selling the oranges produced in Kii Province, yet, in fact, it was only to advertise his name that he exerted himself to get this Mikan-bune song sung all over the country. His huge fortune was made as a Government contractor. He was born in the 5th year of Kambun (1615) in the Kii Province, and went up to Edo with two friends to make a fortune. One of these companions became a dealer in kettles in Hongo and the other started a hotel at Hodogaya, and both made money, but Bunzaemon changed about from one line to another, and failed in all until he hit on the idea of marketing in Edo the oranges grown in Kii. Back he went to his native province, and began to ship the fruit to Edo, and the venture is said to have brought him 50,000 ryo of profit. His next inspiration was the possibilities of the lumber business, seeing that not only was the Shogun Tsunayoshi very eager to improve the public works, but the great fires in Edo had reduced to ashes many mansions of the feudal lords. So the owner of the well-known Mikan-bune (orange ships) became a lumber merchant. To bring his name to the attention of the authorities he erected at his own expense a very beautiful stone fence around the shrine of Benten, in Enoshima, and dedicated it to the goddess, and lavished money in the Yoshiwara to popularize the Mikan-bune song. Finally he succeeded in getting access to Lord Yanagisawa Yasuaki, the First Lord in the Shogunate, and Lord Hagiwara Shigehide, the Lord

Treasurer, and by their good offices was made contractor. Thus fortified, he contracted to undertake civil works, and, buying up huge quantities of lumber, sold it to the Government at a large profit. His Government connection brought him, too, the very lucrative business of minting. His house in the Honhatchobori Street occupied one whole block, and there he lavishly entertained all the officials. The *Edo Masago* tells us that he even went so far as to change the mats every day, keeping a squad of seven matmakers always at work, and all to show his respect and attention to the officials. The stories told of this Kinokuniya Bunzaemon are mostly of his pouring out money in the Yoshiwara and his pride in showing his sumptuous luxury, and therefore he is considered to have been a mere prodigal, but this is a very superficial judgment. All he did, he did with a purpose, to gain popularity among the officials of the Shogunate, get lucrative contracts and advertise his name widely. Among the stories of his extravagances in the gay quarter of Yoshiwara, the following is one :—

> One day, when Kinokuniya Bunzaemon was taking his pleasure upstairs in a certain tea-house in the Yoshiwara, one of his friends, who was as extravagant as Bunzaemon himself, sent him, and by messenger, a manju (bean-jam bun) which was so enormous that it could not be taken upstairs. Bunzaemon at once sent for five or six carpenters to widen the staircase, and had the stupendous cake carried up. When cut up it was found to contain several hundred smaller manjus, so that every one was astonished, and wondered how any pot could have been large enough to cook such a big manju. When told that Bunzaemon had had a special pot made simply to cook this huge bun, the men were still more astonished, and admired the power of this great millionaire who could do anything he liked.

What seems to be a mere childish jest was the result of his deliberate intention to advertise his name and beat his competitor, Naraya Mozaemon, who was also a Government contractor supplying lumber, and whose wealth and power could fairly match those of Kinokuniya Bunzaemon. Another means he adopted to get the better of Naraya was to hire poets to write songs to be sung by a prostitute called Kicho, whom he ransomed from Yoshiwara and took into his house. These songs celebrated the victories of Bunzaemon over Naraya in love affairs, and as the lady, who was renowned for her beauty, hated Naraya and favoured Bunzaemon, she sang the songs with a will and soon popularized them. If this great advertiser had lived to-day, he would no doubt have worked through the daily Press.

WEALTH AND RESOURCES OF NARAYA MOZAEMON.—Bunzaemon's great rival, Naraya Mozaemon, was the second generation of his firm, and was already solidly established when Bunzaemon was struggling. The father of Mozaemon had started life as an apprentice in a lumber-yard, and set up for himself at twenty-eight years of age, becoming in a few years a Government contractor, and supplying timber to the Shogunate as his main line. He made a great success of it, and when at the age of fifty-five he divided his fortune between his two sons, he was able to give the elder one, Mozaemon, 400,000 ryo in cash alone. Just as those who are close to a Government in modern time, when it is a question, say, of extension of armament, are able to make lucrative contracts, so it was in the time of Tsunayoshi when his Government was pressing on with civil works. When a Government that favours particular contractors goes out of power, its friends are left in the cold, too. So it proved in the case of Bunzaemon and Mozaemon. When Tsunayoshi died, Yanagisawa and Hagiwara fell from favour, and Bunzaemon lost the chance of profitable contracting, went gradually down the hill, sold his great house and store, and died in extreme poverty. His rival, Mozaemon, shared the same fate, and died comparatively poor in 1733.

Actual State of Affairs in the Genroku Age.—The general trend of the age was such as we have seen it, and no regulations were capable of stemming the current. As an example, the law laid it down that all the theatres should be of one story, but two-storied or three-storied theatres were found everywhere in Edo, and wealthy citizens, with a bamboo blind screening the front of their box or sitting before a gold screen, watched the performances. Edo life reached a pitch of sumptuousness under the lavish Tsunayoshi, which made it clear that a terrible reaction must come. It was as dangerous as driving a blind but spirited horse to the edge of a cliff. The basis upon which the Government rested was too shaky. From the ancient Monarchical Age to that of the Ashikaga family, no matter whether the Government was strong or weak, its financial basis was taxing the whole nation, and though there were differences of method—the Government in the Monarchical Age, for instance, directly taxed the people in general, while in the Feudal Ages taxes were imposed upon the feudal lords—yet it was merely a difference of form, and the fundamental principle was to tax the whole nation. The vicious method of taxing only part of the country was commenced by Toyotomi Hideyoshi first, and then followed by Tokugawa Iyeyasu. Hideyoshi, when he was the actual ruler of the country, had a large fief of 2,000,000 koku of his own, besides controlling two or three important ports and very productive gold- and silver-mines at many places in the country, and adopted the policy of not taxing the feudal lords; and when Iyeyasu succeeded and had a fief of 4,000,000 koku, or twice as much as Toyotomi Hideyoshi's, and also controlled some important ports, productive gold- and silver-mines, and rich forests, he distributed the rest of the land among the feudal lords, and continued to collect no taxes from them. The Tokugawa Shoguns certainly levied labour and materials on the feudatories when they constructed Edo Castle, Shizuoka and Nagoya Castles, or repaired them, so that the resources of some feudal lords were often wellnigh exhausted, and they suffered very much from it, but in general, as it was the fundamental policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate not to tax the daimyo, they were in the happy position of taxing their own people, and thus supporting samurais under them, and their burden was very light, as they had no necessity, or rather no duty, to pay taxes to the Central Government. The Tokugawa Shogunate made the fatal mistake of thinking that, with their fief of 4,000,000 koku and their rich and productive mines, they could sustain the whole administration of the country ; but mines can be worked out, and expenses have a habit of growing ever larger as the administration extends its activities, and the revenue of the Shogunate did not keep pace with the increased expenditure, which under their age-long policy they could not meet by taxing their feudatories.

The truth is, Iyeyasu was dazzled by the stupendous treasure hoarded by Hideyoshi in Osaka Castle, and astounded by the output of the gold- and silver-mines, and thought he had found the purse of Fortunatus and was quite safe in following the pleasant path of not irritating the feudatories by taxation. Even Tokugawa Iyeyasu was, after all, merely a great general, and not a statesman whose foresight sees a hundred years into the future and makes preparation for it.

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE OF THE TOKUGAWA GOVERNMENT.—The Tokugawa family's own fief was 2,600,000 koku after they destroyed the Toyotomi family of Osaka, and in about one hundred years, during which period the Shogunate destroyed many old feudal families whose power was a menace to theirs, and created many small feudal lords from among their old adherents, increasing and decreasing their fiefs, their own fief had grown to about 4,300,000 koku, which was kept in the hands of their family until the restoration of the Meiji era. The gold- and silver-mines that were brought under the direct control of the Tokugawa Shogunate during the time of Iyeyasu produced an enormous amount of those precious metals during the first twenty or thirty years after the establishment of the Shogunate, but as the output then began to show an annual decrease, it will be the best method for students of the financial strength of the Tokugawa Shogunate to look up the statistics of receipts and expenditure just before its downfall. In the year 1664 (4th year of Kwanbun), when

Tokugawa Iemitsu became the fourth Shogun, the total number of the feudal lords was 217 and the total amount of their fiefs was 15,951,397 koku, and according to the statistics of the year 1722 (7th year of Kyoho), the figures were as given below :—

The number of all the feudal lords, including the relatives of the Tokugawa family, was 264, and the total amount of their fiefs was 17,550,100 koku.

The number of the Hatamoto and other followers of the Tokugawa family was 2,670, with aggregate fiefs of 2,637,530 koku.

The number of those who received salaries in rice from the Shogunate but were not given any fief was 19,839, and the total amount of rice thus paid out by the Tokugawa Government was 477,830 koku and 76,950 koku, making a grand total of 554,780 koku.

The number of officials employed by the Shogunate was 1,058, with a payment in rice of 54,830 koku in all.

The total of the payment in rice to officials serving in the castles of Osaka, Nijo, and Sumpu (Shizuoka) was 75,700 koku.

The total of the payment in rice to the women in the official ranks and to the maidservants in the inner courts of the Shogun was 13,350 koku, with an additional allowance of 64,270 ryo of gold and 656 kwan and 8 momme of silver.

According to the Government statistics of the year 1757 (7th year of Horeki)—that is, thirty-five years later—the total amount of the fiefs under the direct control of the Tokugawa family was 4,420,900 koku, and the statistics of the year 1861 (1st year of Bunkyu), one hundred and four years later, taken by Lord Oguri Kodsukeno-suke, the accountant tribune of the Shogunate, show the following distribution of land and rice among the feudal lords, Hatamoto and other officials, with the exception of the incomes to the Imperial Family and those of the Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines :—

Land under the direct control of the Shogunate, 4,143,559 koku.
Feuds of the three Tokugawa families at Mito, Owari, and Kii, 1,727,918 koku.
Total amount of the fiefs of all the feudal lords, 20,090,751 koku, of which the amount of regular fiefs was 16,437,475 koku ; the amount of sundry fiefs, including newly opened land, 14,464,276 koku ; amount of the fief allotted to So Tsushima-no-kami excluded.
Fief of Lord Tayasu and Hitotsubashi, 228,842 koku.
Fief of the Hatamoto and other officials, 2,872,412 koku.
Payment in rice to officials, rations for 29,897 men.
Aggregate amount of rice given, 1,460 ryo (exchanged to gold).
Amount of the fiefs included and also of the fiefs given to the branch families, 1,506,748 koku.
Amount of rice given in payment to officials, 1,352,760 hyo.
Rice given to officials, 30,898 koku, and 1,460 ryo of gold in addition.
Definite amount of rice given yearly, 7,800 hyo.
Amount of rice temporarily given, 98,774 hyo and 10,368 rations.
Amount of rice specially given to those in the Government service, 93,232 koku.

Aggregate amount of rice given to special councillors, 409,732 koku, of which 396,332 koku was for those in the country and 7,400 hyo from the rice in the Government granaries.

Amount of rice given in payment to officials in charge of public works, 767,536¼ koku, of which 458,669 koku is for those in the country, and 288,226 hyo is the rice in the Government granaries, and 20,640 hyo the amount of rice rations for 4,128 men.

Grand total, 29,507,240 koku.

1,754,960 hyo of rice in the Government granaries and rations for 45,387 men.

What was the Actual Income of the Fief of 4,000,000 Koku of the Tokugawa Family?—According to the above table, it is seen that of total fiefs of 29,500,000 koku in the whole country, the Tokugawa Shogunate possessed about 4,140,000 koku, but what was the actual income from this 4,000,000 koku is a question only to be settled after careful study. The tax system of the Tokugawa family, mainly following the example of the Toyotomi family, was on the principle of four to the lord and six to the farmer, and this remained in force for a while after the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate, but, later on, in the eras of Genroku and Kyoho, when the financial embarrassment was keenly felt, the Shogunate changed the four and six to five and five.

Even this newly adopted principle was not put into uniform practice all over the country; and according to the difference of place and circumstances, there was also a difference in the rate of taxation. Moreover, the so-called koku-taka (amount of koku) was not the amount of cleaned rice, but the amount of unhulled rice, and there was a divergence in the amount of rice obtained when the husk was stripped off—in some cases, 6 go from 1 sho, in others 5 or 5½. The amount of cleaned rice per sho of unhulled rice was not then definitely fixable, yet it seems as if the Tokugawa Government levied about 35 koku of cleaned rice on every 100 koku of land. There were further differences in the method of collection, some taxes being collected in the form of actual rice and others in money. The Government statistics of the year 1863 gave the following figures for the total income of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the same year:—

600,630¼ ryo in gold, and 249 mon of copper coin.
3 kwan and 195 momme, and 6 fun in fine metal bars (solid).
38,372 kwan and 401 momme of silver.
136 kwan and 547 momme of Haifuki silver (placer silver).
4,504 kwan and 508 mon of copper coin.
744,001 koku of rice.
445 koku of wheat.
4,448 koku of cock's shin (*panicum frumentaceum*).
632 koku of salt.

The Tokugawa Shogunate had accepted the responsibility of government and the power accompanying it, relying entirely on their own resources, which unhappily proved inelastic. They were now burdened with the responsibility without the power of imposing taxes upon the feudal lords in the country.

Besides the Tokugawa family, there were such great feudatories as Maeda of Kaga, 1,000,000 koku, and Shimazu of Satsuma, 900,000 koku nominally, but actually much more! In both cases these princes had other sources of income, especially Shimazu, who monopolized the trade with the Ryukyu Islands. With all their wealth, these great princes had to govern only their respective provinces, and their responsibilities and burdens were light ones. From the point of view of fiefs, the Tokugawa Shogunate was merely one among the great feudal lords, and therefore it was natural that the family began to feel very keen financial embarrassment in the year 1695—that is, in the 8th year of Genroku.

Re-minting of Gold Coins proposed because of the Financial Embarrassment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.—Immediately after the fifth Shogun, Tsunayoshi, took up his office, he was anxious to visit the Nikko Mausoleum, and ordered the necessary preparations to be made. The expenses of the journey were estimated at 100,000 ryo of gold, but as there was not so much in the Treasury, the high officials were obliged to report so to the Shogun, who was very much dissatisfied, and as he seemed inclined to blame the lords of the Treasury, the high officials came together to discuss the situation. At this council Hagiwara Shigehide, Lord Accountant of the Shogunate, advanced the opinion that the financial embarrassment was due to the shortage of currency, and if they let down the gold coinage with an alloy of copper it would be very easy to increase the amount of gold coins and relieve the financial stringency. Abe Masataka, of Musashi, concurred, and the step was decided upon. Of course, people said that Hagiwara's motives were interested, and he expected to feather his own nest in the process of re-minting, but it is not necessarily so. It was a common fallacy of the time that all the gold and silver coins issued by the Shogunate, whatever their intrinsic value, would circulate at par if the Shogunate forced the public to accept them, just as the token money of to-day rests on the financial credit of the state. It was not only the belief of military lords, but of those who had some idea of political economy. The peaceful and prosperous time enjoyed since the end of the great Osaka war had greatly developed the commerce of the country, and more currency was actually needed to keep pace with the advanced state of trade and commerce, and it was apparent to every one that by some means the amount of currency must be increased. To do this, an increasing output of bullion from the mines was necessary, but the contrary was the case. The gold- and silver-mines in Sado, which were the richest and most productive of all the mines in the whole country, and produced such an enormous amount of the precious metals during the years of the Keicho era that the gods of the mines were thought to be on the side of Tokugawa Iyeyasu, began to fall off, though not until the time of the third Shogun, Iemitsu, when the output steadily decreased, until the mines of Sado produced no gold for fifty-three years, from 1641 (18th year of Kan-ei) till year 1694 (7th year of Genroku).

Produce of the Mines outside Sado Province.—Much stress has been laid on the produce from the Sado mines, but all the other mines turned out very little gold in these years. Of these mines, statistics are very vague, and the actual output is not precisely known, but in general we can judge by the following table that it showed yearly a decrease after the era of Kan-ei (1624–43) :—

PRODUCE OF GOLD DURING THE YEARS BETWEEN 1624 (1ST YEAR OF KAN-EI) AND 1630.

551 kwan and 800 momme from the mines in Satsuma Province.
84 kwan and 30 momme from the mines in Idzu Province.
5 kwan and 240 momme from the mines in Buzen Province.
2 kwan and 770 momme from the mines in Bungo Province.
6 kwan and 790 momme from the mines in Suruga Province.
47 momme from the mines in Hida Province.
1 kwan and 470 momme from the mines in Tajima Province.

Total, 752 kwan and 147 momme.

Yearly average, 100 kwan and 740 momme.

PRODUCE OF GOLD DURING THE YEARS BETWEEN 1699 (12TH YEAR OF GENROKU) AND 1703.

171 kwan and 300 momme from the mines in Satsuma Province.
4 kwan and 300 momme from the mines in Kai Province.
4 kwan and 600 momme from the mines in Buzen Province.
33 kwan and 700 momme from the mines in Bungo Province.
33 momme from the mines in Tajima Province.
930 momme from the mines in Musashi Province.
90 momme from the mines in Idzu Province.
340 momme from the mines in Hida Province.

Total, 214 kwan and 66 momme.

Yearly average, 43 kwan.

PRODUCE OF GOLD DURING THE YEARS BETWEEN 1711 (1ST YEAR OF SHOTOKU) AND 1720.

107 kwan and 800 momme from the mines in Satsuma Province.
2 kwan and 700 momme from the mines in Buzen Province.
120 momme from the mines in Bungo Province.
4 kwan and 480 momme from the mines in Idzu Province.
1 kwan and 430 momme from the mines in Hida Province.
740 momme from the mines in Tajima Province.
4 kwan and 580 momme from the mines in Suruga Province

Total, 122 kwan and 50 momme.

Yearly average, 24 kwan and 400 momme.

PRODUCE OF GOLD DURING THE YEARS BETWEEN 1716 (1ST YEAR OF KYOHO) AND 1727.

75 kwan and 700 momme from the mines in Suruga Province.
220 momme from the mines in Buzen Province.
590 momme from the mines in Idzu Province.
770 momme from the mines in Kodzuke Province.
190 momme from the mines in Tajima Province.
7 momme from the mines in Hida Province.

Total, 77 kwan and 480 momme.

Yearly average, 6 kwan and 450 momme

It is evident that if the produce of the gold- and silver-mines of the country showed such a decrease year after year, the gold and silver coins possessed by the Shogunate, the owner of these mines, will simultaneously decrease in proportion to it, and form a problem, not only for the Tokugawa Shogunate, but for the entire nation, because a largely increased currency was an imperative necessity in view of the great expansion of trade and commerce.

Scheme to Debase the Coinage and thus Increase the Quantity in Circulation.—In the age of the fourth Shogun, Ietsuna, it was decided to debase the quality of the gold and silver coins, and thus to increase their quantity, and the book *Sankwa-Dzue* narrates the following episode regarding the decision. During 1661–72 those who were privileged to take part in the minting of gold and silver coins held a conference, and concurred in the opinion that if a certain amount of silver was to be put into every small koban (1 ryo of gold in value), and the gold coin was re-minted, the quantity of gold coins would be increased by it, and no one would raise a question about such a trifling debasement. They saw a chance of profit in re-minting the gold coin, while conveniencing and benefiting the country and doing the Government a good turn by increasing their store of gold coin, and agreed that if only Lord Tsuchiya Tajima-no-kami Kadzunao among the Rochu (state ministers) fell in with their suggestion their plan would come to fruition. A representative was sent to enlighten him. Tsuchiya received the petition, but returned no answer. Day after day passed, but still no word came, and finally, thinking perhaps the affair had been overlooked, the go-between visited Tsuchiya and asked for his answer. The minister replied that they had been greatly mistaken to lay such a petition before him. . . . His Highness the Shogun was very much grieved by the fact that of late the gold coins had been losing the element of pure gold of the best quality, and were not so yellow as the gold coins of old, but rather whitish. It was impossible and unpardonable to debase the quality of the gold coins, and their petition would never be granted, and was returned herewith.

This incident occurred in the latter part of the Kwanbun era, and though the finances of the Shogunate were beginning to show weakness in the early part of the same era, so that all the bar-gold in Osaka, one bar making 1,000 large coins, was brought to Edo, yet certainly there was some reserve of gold in the Treasury at the time; but when Tsunayoshi succeeded to the Shogunate the exchequer was so empty that he could not follow the example of the former Shoguns, and distribute mementoes of his predecessor among the relatives of the Tokugawa family and other feudal lords. It was in these circumstances that the debasing of the gold coins was suggested, in order to make up the shortage of currency, and it is not necessarily true that the members of the Kin-za Gold-Minting Guild petitioned for the re-minting through sheer greed, though it is a fact that, the work of the Kin-za being very much lessened, their profit was very small at that time. The privileges of the Kin-za was the grant to them of a certain percentage of the profits derived from the minting of gold and silver coins—a very lucrative business, of which the first essential was a constant supply of the precious metals. When the output from the mines decreased, as we have seen, of course the profit of the Kin-za fell proportionately, which induced the members to contemplate some device to ensure their gains.. Now that the finance of the Shogunate began to show signs of extreme embarrassment, they thought it high time to suggest that the quality of the gold coins should be debased by putting in more silver and copper than before and increasing their quantity. The financial embarrassment of the Shogunate would be thereby relieved, and there would be a good percentage of profit for the guild. This suggestion had been rejected by Lord Tsuchiya Kadzunao, which shows that the finances of the Shogunate were not so seriously embarrassed then as in the time of the fifth Shogun, Tsunayoshi, who could not even find the money to pay for his trip to Nikko. And now Itami Shichibei, the elderman of the Gin-za (silver minting guild) and three others handed in to the Shogun the following petition, in which they minutely discussed the necessity of debasing the quality of silver coins and thus increasing the quantity of silver currency.

PETITION.

We very humbly beg in this petition to make report about the actual state of affairs at the Gin-za and also to ask for permission in the following matters :—

The Haifuki silver (placer silver) produced in the mines in the provinces decreases year by year. According to regulations the Gin-za pays to the august authority of the beneficent Government a tax in accordance with the quantity of silver sent here to the Gin-za, and in recent years we have been paying 500 chogin (large silver coins), which shows a great decrease both in the tax and the volume of business here at the Gin-za. With the volume of business thus lessened, our profit has fallen off so much that we cannot carry on any longer, and therefore we beg that the august authority will permit us to put more copper into the chogin and Kodama silver coins, and thus increase the number of silver coins circulating in the country. If our petition be granted, we intend to increase the amount of copper at the rate of 10 momme for every 100 momme of the Haifuki silver, and will take the best care and attention to make distinction between the chogin and the Kodama silver coins. We also beg that the Government will issue an ordinance and announce to the general public that they shall make no discrimination between the new chogin, containing a larger proportion of copper, and the old chogin. If such discrimination is made and the price of the new chogin discounted, it will be a great hindrance in business transactions and bring about much trouble in all the markets.

The aforesaid 10 momme increase of copper-silver applies to the Government Haifuki silver, but as there is a difference in the finances of the Haifuki silver according to the mines producing them, we shall take the greatest care to fix the fineness of the silver coins in uniformity, with the Government Haifuki silver as the standard.

As to the details of the future debasing of the silver coins, we shall be careful to make such debasement of all the new silver coins to be minted hereafter, in accordance with the standard of debasement of the Government Haifuki silver, and we shall be willing to pay the taxes, as regularly as heretofore, upon our business at the Gin-za.

We finally beg again that the august authority of our beneficent Government will grant us the above petition.

(Signed) ITAMI SHICHIBEI
SUETSUGU YAKURO
KYOYA SEIGORO
KOMINAMI REHEI
} at the Gin-za.

TO LORD MATSU MINO-NO-KAMI.

Here we have the Gin-za the first to propose the re-minting of the silver coins, and the Kin-za being already so eager that they advanced their proposition to re-mint the gold coins as early as in the era of

Kwanbun, at once agreed to combine its forces with the silver men, and, both parties insisting on their proposals, they were finally successful in persuading the Shogunate, and got the re-minting put into practice. People said that Hagiwara Shigehide was bribed by the Kin-za and Gin-za, and rendered them much assistance in their movement, but it was not true; and though it may well be said that he did not understand the principles of political economy, and was thus misled by the Kin-za and Gin-za, yet it is unfair to believe that he was greedy of money and saw a chance of lining his own pocket when he advocated the debasing of the coinage. The plain truth is, that after the re-minting of the coins was decided on, relations were created between Hagiwara and the Kin-za and Gin-za, and he thus naturally received some presents, or, if you like, he was bribed, but, fundamentally, he was from the beginning mistaken in his views on the finances of the Shogunate. When the re-minting of the gold and silver coins was finally decided in 1695, the Shogunate, thinking it a very important and serious affair, appointed Yanagisawa Yosuaki to take charge of everything, and Hagiwara Shigehide, the accountant tribune and also the vice-president of the Re-minting Bureau. It has been said that it was just at this time that the Tokugawa Government minted into coins a large number of bars of gold, one bar making 1,000 large gold coins, that had been taken in Osaka Castle when it fell, but, as a matter of fact, the bullion had been brought to Edo long before, and more than half of it minted. Now the coins minted from these bars were debased. The results of the debasement were shocking. The new debased coins drove out of circulation the good old coins; the circulation of the new coins was hindered in many ways, with the accompanying result of a sudden rise in prices, and because of only the bad coins and false coins remaining in the markets, a tremendous economic confusion was produced, for which readers will refer to the chapters on Monetary System.

FAILURE OF THE RE-MINTING POLICY CAUSED THE SHOGUNATE TO TAX THE FEUDAL LORDS.—Foiled in their effort to swell their exchequer by debasing the coinage, the Shogunate decided upon taking a bold step, and for the first time imposing a tax upon the feudal lords. The following proclamation was issued on the 7th of January in the 5th year of Hoei (1708):—

> As is well known to all, the expenditures of the Shogunate have shown much increase in recent years, and, moreover, it has been necessary to give relief to the villages and towns in the three provinces of Musashi, Sagami, and Suruga, suffering from the effect of natural calamities. It has therefore been decided to impose an income tax upon all men in the country at the rate of 2 ryo of gold for every 100 koku of fief or private property, and the

feudal lords are requested to collect these taxes from their subjects and pay them into the treasury of the Shogunate. As the provinces are at different distances from the seat of the central Government, delay in the payment to the Shogun's treasury is allowed until all the collections are made. Nevertheless, as regards the taxes on an area of over 10,000 koku, the feudal lords are to pay in advance to the Central Government on behalf of such tax-payers on or before the last day of March this year, and in the case of areas under 10,000 koku, on or before the last day of June this year. In the case of groups, the director or the head of such groups is to make the same payment in advance as the feudal lords, on behalf of those forming such groups, and in case there is no such director nor head the members themselves are to notify the authorities beforehand with regard to the date of payment, and pay in the tax on or before that date. Those whose fief is under 50 koku are exempted from the duty of paying this tax, as also are all the estates belonging to the Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.

The above proclamation shows clearly how weak and lacking in determination was the policy of the founder of the Shogunate, and the vulnerable points in the Tokugawa system and organization are plainly exposed. If the first Shoguns had had sufficient foresight to make a custom of taxing feudatories in accordance with the extension of political and administrative affairs, as they could easily have done when all the feudal lords were trembling before their terrible and invincible power, there would have been no necessity to debase the gold coinage. Now that the power of the Shogunate was declined, military preparations neglected, and the old samurai spirit was either lost or weakened, taxation of the feudal lords was decided upon; both the reasons given and the means adopted were weak. Although the Shogunate pretended that money was needed in order to give relief to the sufferers from the eruption of Fuji, yet, in fact, the fundamental reason for levying the taxes was that the expenditure of the Shogunate was yearly increasing, as admitted at the outset of the proclamation. Further, in spite of the imposition of taxes upon the feudal lords, the Shogunate ordered the feudatories to collect the taxes from their subjects, thus shifting all the burden on to them, hoping that as the daimyos were not personally touched by the levy, they would not oppose the tax. Such was their cunning and cowardly method, but the spirit of the age had so far declined that there was no one among the feudal lords ambitious enough to seize the opportunity, and there was no hindrance in the collecting of the tax, which was all smoothly paid into the Treasury of the Shogunate. It would have been very good policy if the Tokugawa Shogunate had made the tax an annual one, and thereby permanently solidified their finances, but they lacked the courage, and being satisfied with the result as a temporary makeshift, they postponed such a fundamental change of policy to the next generation.

Monopoly of Employment Office.—The Shogunate being so much embarrassed in its finances, the officials had to make up their incomes somehow, and an easy method was found in the sale of monopolies. Among many others, the monopoly of employment was granted by the Shogunate to four men, in November 1695, in the following memorandum:—

> MEMORANDUM.
>
> Special licence for opening and keeping the employment office is given to the four men, Tarobei of the 3rd chome of the Odemma-cho Street, Gorobei of the 7th chome of the Sanjikkenbori Street, Mobei of the Toriabura-cho Street, and Shozaemon of the 7th chome of the Sanjikkenbori Street, and from the 3rd day of this month all those earning daily, weekly or monthly wages are ordered to go first to the above-mentioned employment office and, obtaining there a ticket, are to do as the men of the office instruct; and it is further ordered that the aforesaid wage-earners shall pay to the employment office 22 mon of copper coin for a ticket every month.
>
> Among those who are employed at a rice-cleaner's, those who have made a contract of work over a half-year are exempted from this rule, but those who are working for one month or less are all required to obtain the ticket at the employment office.
>
> No one is allowed to be employed without a ticket, and ticket-holders must carry it at their waists.
>
> Eldermen of a town block and all the house-owners are to observe the above rule strictly and notify it to all of their tenants. As to the standard of the daily wages of labourers in general, they are to go to the employment office and to enquire and to do as the men of the employment office tell them. Anyone who violates the rule above, or works without the ticket, or has a ticket but does not carry it at his waist, is liable to punishment.

The grant of such a monopoly licence as the above at once suggests that there was a certain amount of money paid to the Shogunate as a temporary tax by the licences, but unhappily for students no such record is to be found.

New Monopoly in the Nagasaki Trade.—The total amount of the trade at Nagasaki with the Chinese and Dutch ships was estimated to be 9,000 kwamme of silver, but in September 1695 a certain merchant of Edo, called Fushimiya Shirobei, petitioned the Shogunate for a licence to exchange copper for silver, in case there was any surplus cargoes of silver over the fixed amount of 9,000 kwamme. The petition was granted at once, the amount of trade to be done by Fushimiya Shirobei fixed at 1,000 kwamme of silver, and his tax assessed at 100 ryo of gold every year. The tax upon the total volume of business at Nagasaki, estimated at 9,000 kwamme of silver, was 40,000 ryo of silver; the 1,000 kwamme increase granted to Fushimiya Shirobei was one-ninth of the whole trade, so that a tax of 100 ryo of gold was absurdly light, and there is no doubt that he paid some other temporary tax, of which, however, no record exists for the reference of students.

Taxes upon the Hakuza and Breweries.—In the June of 1696 the Shogunate granted the monopoly licence of Hakuza to Jiemon, the elderman of the town block Hamacho, and Tojuro, the elderman of the town block Okecho, with all the privileges in the gold- and silver-foil business, and also on October 27, 1697, the Shogunate granted four common citizens, Mikiya Rihei, Hachizaemon, Jizaemon, and Chusuke, the right and also the duty of collecting taxes from all the breweries and wine-dealers in the city, and paying them into the Shogunate. These four men ordered all the wine-dealers in Edo to raise the price of Sake (Japanese wine) by 50 per cent., and apply that 50 per cent. to the tax. On August 29, 1700, Magome Kageyu, the elderman of the Odenmacho Street, Miyabe Matashiro, the elderman of the Kodenmacho Street, and Komiya Seiemon, the elderman of the Minami Senmacho Street, were put in charge of all the wagons and palanquins in use in Edo, with orders to collect a tax of 1 momme of silver for one wagon, and 3 bu (75 sen) of silver for one palaquin per month.

Establishment of the Zeniza and Doza and Taxation of Second-hand Clothes Dealers.—On February 5, 1625, the Shogunate gave a special permission to the Nagasaki-ya of Kyoto, one of the licensed dealers in silk thread, to set up a zeniza, and mint a large copper coin of 10 mon, and imposed a tax of 200,000 ryo of gold upon that house for the monopoly. It seems at first sight that a tax of 200,000 ryo of gold was too heavy for the licence, yet when it is considered that the actual expense of coining one 10-mon copper coin was not more than 5 or 6 mon, this business was not an unlucrative one. On December 14, 1701, the Tokugawa Shogunate permitted the setting up of a zeniza in Osaka, where the small copper coin, the Kwanei tsuho, was minted. In the same year Hikozaemon, elderman of the town block Tomizawa-cho, was made the representative of all the second-hand clothes dealers, who had all to get a ticket issued by Hikozaemon and pay 5 bu of silver for it. Shortly before, the three citizens, Nakamura-ya Kiemon, of the Hatagocho street, Kanda, Sakae-ya Sankuro, of the Aioi-cho street, Honjo, and Kurumaya Kyuemon, of the Tacho street, Kanda, had been made the representatives of all the pawnbrokers to take charge of all that line of business, but soon afterwards the representation system of both the pawnbrokers and second-hand clothes dealers was abolished by the Shogunate.

Monopoly Systems in the Genroku Age.—The Tokugawa Shogunate had already set up many monopolies, such as:—

The Kin-za, set up in the early part of the Keicho era (1596–1614).
The Gin-za, set up in March, 5th year of Kwanbun (1665).
The Nagasaki Ito-warifu (privilege to issue tickets to thread dealers).
The Shuza (monopoly of the sale of cinnabar), set up in the 14th year of Keicho (1609).
The Kasho-bune (passenger-boat).
The Hakuza (monopoly of the gold and silver foil business).
The Hiyatoiyoza (monopoly of employment office).

It was only when too late that the Tokugawa Government began to realize that their reliance upon the vast treasure left behind by the Toyotomi family had been their bane, and that their monopoly system and debasing of the coinage had irreparably ruined their finances. It was then too late, and the spectres of Toyotomi's warriors who had fallen in the Osaka campaign, and had witnessed the power of the house of Tokugawa built up apparently on the gold torn from Osaka Castle, must have smiled when they saw the great house tottering, simply because of financial embarrassment.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE GENROKU AGE.—It is a common error of historians to say that because the Shogun Tsunayoshi was so extravagant and gay, therefore the mental tendency, manners, and customs of the Genroku Age were all frivolous and dissolute. This Genroku Age was epoch-making in industrial development, and economic organization began to take shape and entered the stage of monetary economy. The standard of living was greatly elevated among the people, and although it is true that the improvements in Edo brought undue profits to the Government contractors, who lavished their gold in gorgeous living, which has been greatly exaggerated by posterity, after all, the extravagance and sumptuousness of the Shogun Tsunayoshi were signs of the elevation of the standard of living in general, and, in fact, not the cause of the dissolute and frivolous manners and customs of the age but the effect. During the Tokugawa Age, Japan had always an adverse balance of trade until the time of the fourth and fifth Shoguns, of which the principal cause, with its consequence of a drainage of gold, was that Nagasaki imported large quantities of Shiraito (that is, white raw silk). But as all this Shiraito silk was woven in the country to make clothes for the upper classes, the attention of the people was drawn to sericulture, which in course of time so developed that the product was sufficient, and it was not necessary to depend upon foreign countries for the supply of raw silk, imports of which ended in the Genroku Age.

SERICULTURAL CONFERENCE IN THE GENROKU AGE AND BOOKS ON SERICULTURE.—In 1672 all the dealers in silkworm eggs of the provinces of Shinano, Kozuke, Shimotsuke, Mutsu, Musashi, and Sagami had a conference, and made an agreement with regard to the scope and method of developing their business, fixing the size of egg-cards at 12 inches by 7½. This was not only the first meeting of the dealers in silkworms, but it was perhaps the beginning of a convention of all the business men in the different provinces. In 1712 a certain Baba Shigehisa, of the Momonoe district in Kozuke Province, grieved with the fact that in spite of the development of sericulture there was no handbook, published *Sanshi-nenkwan* (*Year Book on Sericulture*), the first of its kind ever issued in the country, and showing how keenly interested the people were in the subject. In the 3rd year of Genroku (1736–41), twenty-seven years after *Sanshi-nenkwan* was published, silk weavers went from Kyoto to Kiryu, in Kozuke, and taught there how to weave good silk called sha-ayaginu. In due course the industry grew, and the silk garments produced there became widely known as Kiryu dry goods. Yuki, in Shimoosa, had been a silk-growing place from of old, but one year all the mulberry trees were washed away by a flood, and the folk moved to Danzaki, in Iwashiro, and turning a Buddhist temple into a temporary nursery, started a silkworm egg industry there, and soon made Danzaki famous for producing the best eggs in the country.

CHAPTER XLVII

INFLUENCE OF MONEY IN KYOTO AND OSAKA, OF WHICH THE POLITICAL POWER WAS VERY JEALOUS

Development of Osaka.—While the peculiarities of Tsunayoshi's administration in Edo earned his Government the contradictory name of Merciful Oppression, the economic system in Osaka made vast strides—so much that one citizen, Yodoya Tatsugoro, lived more luxuriously than a prince with a fief of 1,000,000 koku, and the Shogunate, astonished at this sinister phenomenon, broke up his family by force. Throughout the whole of Japan there were about 300 feudal lords large and small, who all occupied a strategical point, and built a castle, around which people settled and a town appeared; yet the latter depended on the former, and was not necessarily a commercial centre. Osaka differed. Before Toyotomi Hideyoshi constructed his castle it was already a fairly flourishing town called Ishiyama, with the Ishiyama Castle built by the Hongwanji Buddhist Temple around, where farmers and merchants gathered to attend to trade. From the beginning it was destined to be a great flourishing city before it was a castle, town, or a town under the walls of a castle. When Hideyoshi reared the great castle on an unprecendentedly large scale, and made it the centre of all State affairs, commercial, financial, civil, and diplomatic, Osaka made wonderful progress, as it was in the heart of the most civilized, enlightened, as well as enterprising part of the country; and though, of course, the city suffered severely in the first and second Osaka wars, it soon regained its former prosperity under the rule of the Tokugawa Government.

Osaka in the Early Part of the Tokugawa Age.—When the saint Rennyo was Abbot of the great Hongwanji Buddhist Temple, Osaka was merely a part of Ikutama-sho (Ikutama district), and when the Hongwanji moved into Ishiyama Castle, Ishiyama and Osaka were two names for the same place. In the Toyotomi Age the quarter east of the East Yokobori moat was called Osaka, including Ikutama, Tamatsukuri, and Watanabe, and the quarter west of the East Yokobori moat was called Semba (shipping quarter), and Shimo Semba (lower shipping quarter), and was not included in Osaka city until the Tokugawa Shogunate combined the two Semba, but divided them into the north and south districts Kitagumi and Minamigumi. The eighty street blocks that were moved from Fushimi city formed the

Fushimi-gumi, into which the Tenman-gumi was afterwards incorporated, and thus Osaka was divided into three parts, Minamigumi, Kitagumi, and Temman-gumi, called the Osaka Sango (the three parts of Osaka). After the fall of the Toyotimi family the city became a part of Matsudaira Shimoosa-no-kami, Tadaaki's fief of 100,000 koku, who made many improvements, and appointing from among the citizens of high birth and wealth, eldermen trusted them to carry out a form of self-government. These eldermen were the merchants of the Itowarifu, established in 1703 to control the import of raw silk from China, who were called Machikata Shihaiyaku (managers of the town affairs), and also the Motojime-shu (controllers). The duty of the Motojime-shu was to collect taxes from the Osaka citizens, and pay them to the local authority, and in case there were any arrears they were responsible. Lord Matsudaira summoned the 21 Motojime-shu, and made them again the Machikata Shihaiyaku with power to appoint or dismiss eldermen of town-blocks. The city thus turned into a self-governing body, Yasui Doton—one of the Motojime-shu was entrusted with the work of internal improvements and accomplished great things, the Doton-bori (Doton's Moat) being a surviving memorial of what he did.

NAME OF THE YODO-YA APPEARS FOR THE FIRST TIME.—In spite of Matsudaira Tadaaki's efforts to rebuild the prosperity of Osaka, after the fall of the Toyotomi family, it did not prove a very easy task, and the fact that a house of 4-ken frontage, and 15-ken depth sold for 45 momme of silver in 1616 shows how property had fallen in value.

RECEIPT FOR 1 MOMME, 1 FUN AND 5 RIN.

This receipt is given for the above sum of money—that is, one-fortieth of the value of the house of 4-ken frontage and 15-ken depth, and its premises, on the north side, 2nd chome, the south Kyutaro Street, sold to Kuroemon by the widow of Denjiro, the owner of the house and premises.

(Signed) SHIMA, SHOKICHI.
MURA GOROBEI.
MATA KUDAYU.

September 20th, the 2nd year of Genwa.

TO KUROEMON.

In taxing the city, Matsudaira followed the Toyotomi system, and classified the value of residential ground according to the degree of prosperity of the quarter, the assessment varying from 870 to 4,500 koku per kwan (a little less than one-quarter acre). The total assessment was about 6,200 koku, of which the lord collected eight-tenths. The price of rice was fixed at 20 momme of silver per koku and the total revenue came to 178 kwan 928 momme of silver

Besides this residential ground-tax he levied a tax on the sale and purchase of houses and premises, namely, one-fortieth of the value under the name of Chokiri-gin, what we should call a registration tax nowadays, and this was handed over to the Motojime-shu and applied to the expense of the town administration. In 1619, when Matsudaira Tadaaki was moved to Koriyama in Yamato, and the city of Osaka came under the rule of the Jodai of the Shogunate (Lord Tribune of Osaka under the direct control of the Shogunate), the name of the Motojime-shu, of whom there were 21, was changed to So-toshiyori (chief eldermen), and the rate of the Chokiri-gin was raised from one-fortieth to one-twentieth. In 1634 Iyemitsu visited the cities of Osaka and Sakai on his way to Kyoto, and exempted the Osaka citizens from the duty of paying the residential ground tax, and promised that the expenses of constructing bridges in Osaka should hereafter be borne by the Shogunate. In addition, he presented 40 kwamme of silver to the Osaka citizens and 20 kwamme of silver to those of Sakai, and on this occasion the name of Yodo-ya appears for the first time in the public records, for Yodoya Tatsugoro was among the three Osaka citizens chosen to thank the Shogun on behalf of the city. In this age, even the most prominent and wealthy citizens were not granted family names, and in order to curry favour with the Osaka people who had been so deeply attached to the Toyotomi family, the Shogun called the four most respected citizens—Kawara-ya Toemon, Amagasaki-ya Mataemon, Yodo-ya Tatsugoro, and Kubodera-ya Kubei—and asked what he could do for them. All except Yodoya asked for permission to have a family name, which was granted at once, and in consequence the Kubodera-ya became Yasui; Kawara-ya, Terashima; and Amagasaki-ya, Amagasaki. Yodo-ya Tatsugoro alone thought differently, and, perhaps following the example of the old hero, Minamoto-no-Tametomo, who declined the Imperial offer of official title and rank at the Court, and said that he was satisfied to keep his surname Chinzei Hachiro, did not ask for any family name, and was content to go on with that of his house of business, Yodoya.

Osaka in the Kan-ei Era (1624–43).—The name Yodo-ya seems to have come from Yodo, a suburb of Osaka. During the Tensho era (1573–91), a certain Yodo-ya Ryoan, it was said, was a war contractor for Toyotomi Hideyoshi and made a huge fortune, and later added to it by opening up a tract of land called Naka-no-shima. Just as the Doton-bori (Doton's Moat) in Osaka commemorates Yasui Doton, the existence of the Yodoya Bridge in Osaka is a permanent monument of the fame of its constructor, Yodoya. In tracing the history of this Yodoya it is necessary to study a little the state of things in Osaka in this age. According to the statistics of the year 1626 (3rd year of Kan-ei), the financial state of Osaka was as under. Of koku, 411,276 of fief in Settsu Province, which consisted of 12 gun (counties) divided into 899 son (villages), the feud under the direct control of the Shogunate was 145,420 koku, in which there were :—

Settsu grazing ground, 9 places ; the Kawachi grazing ground, 3 places.
West houses and premises, 2,813 tsubo (tsubo = 6 square feet).
East houses and premises, 2,965 tsubo.
Land for the Nishi-gumi Yoriki (premises for the samurai called the Yoriki) was 30,000 tsubo, divided into lots of 500 tsubo for each Yoriki.
Land for the Nishi-gumi (Doshin, private under Yoriki), 20,000 tsubo, divided into lots of 200 tsubo for each Doshin.
Government salt and Soy warehouses, 1,201 tsubo.
Government stores at Nanba, 17 in number.
Government stores at Takatsu-shinchi.
Government stores at Tamatsuko, 24 in number, containing koku 180,000 of rice, and also beans and malt and arms, weapons and guns.
Government stores at the Nishimaru (the western castle), 29 in number, containing 200,000 of rice.
Gun-powder magazines.
Mansions of the feudal lords, 111 in number, of which 69 were vacant and 14 rented to ordinary tenants.
Fishing boats and ships, 5,463.
Population, 279,610, including 991 Buddhist priests.
Fortune-tellers, 20.
Pariah people (Eta), 3,158.
Number of houses in all three districts, 18,473.
Number of services of men in the three districts, 20,788.
Number of bridges, 132.
Number of bridges constructed by the Government, 11.
Number of the Sotoshiyori (chief eldermen), 14 ; number of the Sodoi (town representatives), 17 ; and the Kwaisen Toshiyori (managers of transport ships), 6.
Tax upon municipal ferry boats, 195 momme 7 fun and 5 rin of silver to be paid into the Government Treasury.
Tax upon pilot boats, 580 momme of silver.
Tax upon mud-carrying ships, 35 momme and 2 fun of silver.
Tax upon fishing boats and ships, 260 momme of silver.
Above three taxes paid to the Gobansho (guard house).
Tax upon 200 Fushimi ships, 100 large silver coins, paid to the tribune of Fushimi.
Tax upon the ships plying between Osaka, Tsunoku, and Kimura, 400 momme of silver, besides 50 Government ships.
482 ryo of gold, the expense for the large rivers passing through the Osaka city, for which 50 ships and 100 coolies are always kept.
Residential ground-tax from the Dojima Shinchi and other places of 4 kwan 386 momme, 7 fun and 4 rin of silver and 91 momme 7 fun and 3 mo of silver in addition.

Rice dealers, 52.
Rice brokers, 1,304.
Houses, with the privilege of issuing shares and stocks of breweries, 706.
Hotels and inns, 211.
New brothel houses, 10.
Tea houses, 45.
The Dojima Shinchi Town, newly opened in the 3rd year of Tenwa.
The Horie Town, newly opened in the 11th year of Genroku.
The Takatsushinchi Town, newly opened in the 19th year of Kyoho.
Book stores, 50.
Druggists dealing in Chinese drugs, 273.
Druggists dealing in patent medicine, 4.
Dealers in miscellaneous kinds of oil, 294.
Kumano nuns, 48.
Yamabushi (itinerant priests), 97 at the Head Temple and 36 here in Osaka.
Theatres, 15, which are divided into the following three kinds :—

Theatre producing actors and actresses, charging 1 kwan and 300 mon for a first class box, 1 kwan and 50 mon for second class, and 50 mon each for third class, all in silver, beside 22 mon of silver for the ticket.

Puppet theatres show, charging 990 mon of silver first class, 905 mon of silver second class, and 33 mon of silver third class, beside 20 mon of silver for the ticket.

Marionettes' theatre, charging 200 mon first class and 50 mon third class, besides 10 mon of silver for the ticket.

Jails with an area of 829 tsubo, total expense of which was 759 ryo of gold, the rations being 5½ go of rice per day for male prisoner, 3½ go for a female prisoner, 1 sho of soy and salt for every hundred prisoners, and 250 momme of fuel to each prisoner.
Execution grounds, 5 in all.
Pawn shops, privileged to sell their shares, 667.
Bathing houses, privileged to sell their shares, 24.
Boiled food sellers, privileged to sell their shares, 211.
Itinerant Buddhist priests, 4.
Roman Catholic believers, 153 (not necessarily the believers, nor their children, but having blood relation to believers).
Tea houses, with the right to sell their shares, 211.
Brothels, 31.
Pariah district, 13,200 tsubo (area); of which 7,550 tsubo is Government ground and 1,680 tsubo is the ground upon which tax is imposed.
Government officials, 200 men in all in the four offices.
Shinto shrines, 11.
Buddhist temples, 313.

The item "service" given above means the duty of giving service to the Government, including payment in money in place of service, and also the service of coolies; and comparing the number of houses (18,473) with the number of services (20,788) it is clear that every house was charged with more than one service. In the olden times it was the custom to charge one service upon every house, no matter whether large or small, but with the growth of the gulf between rich and poor, when one man owned two or more houses and called them one, the number of services of course decreased, and with it the Government revenue. To safeguard itself the State changed the arrangement, so that, irrespective of the increase or decrease in the number of houses, there was no change in the number of services, and the revenue was steady. It seems this arrangement had long been in practice in Osaka, and the opinion that it was first put into force about the year 1652 (in the Sho-o era) is not true. At the same time it must be remembered that during the Tokugawa era the number of houses was not the actual number really existing, and if one man possessed many houses it was counted as one house in spite of the law regarding service. In the year 1768 (5th year of Meiwa) the Tokugawa Government revised the service regulations as follows for the three districts of Osaka :—

Service in the Kita-gumi district : 8,066,716 service, of which 480,850 were freed from the duty.

Service in the Minami-gumi district : 9,021,632 service, of which 748,980 service were freed from the duty.

Service in the Tenman-gumi district : 3,728,599 service, of which 564,145 service were freed from the duty.

Total, 19,022,972 services.

According to the statistics referred to above the number of houses in the Kita-gumi district was 8,066, but as the number of new houses built by the old house-owners was above 480, it is clear that the tax was not imposed upon these new houses.

Self-Government System of the Osaka City.—The third year of Kan-ei, being the year 1623, was only twelve years after the fall of Osaka Castle, and it is wonderful how soon the city recovered from the result of the war, and regained her former state of prosperity as is shown by the above statistics, and especially noteworthy is the fact that the population of Osaka city was 280,000 in the third year of Kan-ei. About 1625 the population of Edo was only 150,000, excluding all the men in the samurai class; and despite the fact that Osaka suffered so much from the results of the Osaka war, for a great number of the houses were burnt, and the people scattered during the first and second Osaka wars, it far outnumbered Edo in population in the 3rd year of Kan-ei. During the era of Genroku and Hoei the population increased to 380,000. Our statistics show that there were 132 bridges in Osaka, and that the number built by the Tokugawa Government was 14, which throws a light on the development of the self-governing system in the city. It was during this time that an Osaka citizen, Yodoya Tatsugoro, opened up and cultivated a marshy tract called Naka-no-shima (Middle Isle) that had the aspect of a small reedy isle, and built at his own expense a bridge still known as Yodoya Bashi to connect this Naka-no-shima with the old city. We have seen that the Doton-bori (Doton's Moat) in the south district was cut by the Osaka citizen, Yasui Doton, who gave it his name and called it the Doton-bori. As many of the canals and moats were thus cut and the bridges built by the rich citizens in Osaka, or by the combined capital of the citizens in general, the Tokugawa Government did not interfere at all and left the self-government of Osaka to develop in the natural way. When Iyemitsu visited Osaka he promised that the Government would hereafter construct bridges in the city, and lighten the burden of the citizens in public works; but the number of the bridges thus constructed at the expense of the Tokugawa Government was only eleven—all other bridges, over one hundred in number, being built by the Osaka citizens themselves. And not only the bridges, but also the streets were made and improved by the citizens, and the practice that the land-owner has to bear the expense of improving the road facing his land long remained in force in Osaka.

YODOYA TATSUGORO SET UP A PRODUCE EXCHANGE.—Self-government in Osaka was thus so far developed in this community that an extraordinary man, Yodoya Tatsugoro, was born, or rather produced. During the Tensho era (1573–91) the number, both the samurais and common citizens, was so enormously increased that there was not enough rice in Osaka, and to meet the need Toyotomi Hideyoshi ordered Lord Maeda of Kaga to supply to Osaka 100,000 koku of rice every year. Lord Maeda saw that he would have to call in the aid of the merchants, and ordered Yodoya Ryoan, who controlled the rice market of Osaka, to take up the business, and supply to the city 100,000 koku of rice every year, which he did. It is not known how he could bring so large a quantity of rice to Osaka, and whether he transported it from Echizen to Lake Biwa, and then through Otsu to Osaka; or from Tsuruga in Echizen by ship to Shimonoseki, and then from Shimonoseki to Osaka. Anyhow, he showed himself a man of extraordinary ability, talent, and wealth. Tatsugoro's father, Ryoan, we have seen to be a keen man of business and of great public spirit, and his grandfather also, Yosaburo Joan, was a bridge builder, constructing the Joan bridge in Osaka, and our Tatsugoro himself showed that he had inherited their ability and public spirit. Seeing that all the feudal lords, first under the Toyotomi family and then under the Tokugawa family, were gathered in Osaka, and were all under the necessity of making Osaka the centre to sell the rice in their granaries and thus to obtain coin, he established the produce exchange in Osaka in order both to facilitate the movements of rice and other produce and to fix the prices. In the Toyotomi Age, as in the ages of the first and second Tokugawa Shoguns, economic knowledge was not a strong point with the feudal lords, and not one of them set up his own granary in Osaka, though almost all of them did so in the middle of the Tokugawa era. In the meantime they had to sell their rice through the large merchants in Osaka, a few of whom made large profits in selling the cereal consigned by the feudatories. Among them was Yodoya Tatsugoro, who in the Tenwa era (1681–3) made his own house an open market. The Osaka people, who never missed a business opportunity, were very keen on it, and rice broking flourished, creating at once over 1,300 rice brokers, and over 50 money-exchangers giving them cash accommodation. Furthermore, as the country was well settled by this time, and all the feudal lords had confidence in the permanence and stability of the Tokugawa Government, they began to build granaries in Osaka, and ordered their people at home to send their produce to Osaka. As the quantity of rice and other cereals increased in Osaka, the power and wealth of the Osaka rice market increased in proportion, and it began to be considered the heart of the entire city; and Yodoya Tatsugoro, being the sole promoter of this great work, and also head and shoulders above his contemporaries, his earning power, wealth, and influence were far greater than those of any other merchant in Osaka.

THE KURAMOTO AND SPECULATION IN RICE.—The reason why the Kamigata people (people in the provinces around Kyoto and Osaka) occupied a specially important position in the economic history of Japan has been given in previous chapters; and now was the time when their business cunning enabled them to outwit the unbusinesslike daimyo and so manipulate the rice market that they ruled the quotations all over Japan. The feudatories set over their granaries in Osaka officials called Kuramoto; but these gentlemen were soon seduced by the wiles of the Osaka rice merchants, who got the whole business into their hands, and even received the name of Kuramoto, while the true Kuramoto called themselves Rusuyaku (official in charge in the absence of the lord). The so-called Kuramoto proceeded to speculate freely in futures, issuing such bills of rice which did not actually exist, until in 1653 the Shogunate interfered and forbade time bargains in rice.

MEMORANDUM.

It is said that the rice merchants specially permitted by those in charge of the granaries of feudal lords to transact business for the Kuramoto are making false reports to the officials that they, the merchants, have sold koku 10,000 of rice in the form of settlement dealing, but in fact these merchants do not make actual delivery in rice, but only deliver the bill and receive a deposit corresponding to one-third of the price of the rice thus sold, while keeping the rice in the granary. The result of this is that however prolonged may be the term of delivery there is no loss to the seller of rice, and therefore he takes every means of prolonging the term of delivery. It was believed that such methods will attract people to the business, and therefore it has not been strictly prohibited, and the result has been, according to other merchants, a new business in the sale and purchase of bills of rice. The seller receives a deposit from the buyer of one-third of the price of the rice thus sold, and hands the latter a bill, promising to deliver the rice at a fixed time, but very often the rice is not delivered at the fixed date. Such a method of transacting business may be permitted to the merchants, but the official Kuramoto cannot be allowed to indulge in it. If the official Kuramoto do not strictly observe the regulation and transact business in such a way, it shall be reported to the lords whom they are serving, and the regulation put into force.

(Signed) Matsudaira Hayato. Soga Tanba.

March 22nd, the 3rd year of Sho-o.

Prosperity of Osaka Produce Exchange.—Rice broking became a craze in Osaka, and the manipulation of the market raised the price very high. In 1663 a very bad harvest was expected, and Osaka raised the price from 43 to 45 momme of Keicho silver per koku. Everyone was aghast, and at the order of the Shogunate the tribune in Osaka summoned the chief citizens of the town blocks where the granaries of the feudal lords were situated, and made inquiry into their practices and issued the following regulation. The term of time bargains was limited to ten days, and a strict record of buyers and sellers, dates and prices was ordered to be kept. This limit of ten days had more or less effect, but the interference of ignorant Government officials could not check the activities of the keen-witted Osaka merchants.

As regards the transactions in rice, whatever quantity the feudal lords who have granaries in Osaka may sell, such feudal lords are to take the rice out of the granaries and deliver it at once to the purchasers. As regards the date of delivery, it has already been forbidden to delay the term of delivery more than thirty days, under penalty of punishment of the broker, but as there are many complaints now about the high price of rice, which is caused by such an extended term of delivery, it is ordered by the authority to change hereafter the date of delivery and to limit the term within ten days. When the price of rice comes down, a new regulation may be issued, but until such new proclamation shall be made the term of delivery shall be limited within ten days.

Whatever quantity of rice the feudal lords may keep in their granaries in Osaka, the merchants are to make bargains on the basis of the actual amount of rice in store, and the date of delivery shall be limited within ten days, as laid down above.

In the case of rice purchased on condition that the whole amount shall be delivered within thirty days, and some part of the whole amount is in store, the purchaser, no matter whether the term of thirty days is unexpired or not, shall at once fix the price, pay it to the seller, and receive the rice.

No broking in bills of rice is permitted, nor is anyone allowed to start a rice market, and if an employee or employees of a merchant violate this regulation, the merchant himself shall be responsible for it and be punished.

In all the granaries of the feudal lords, in the gathering places of the rice merchants in the town blocks, or even in the houses of managers of companies dealing in rice, it is ordered to keep a book, in which the names of both sellers and buyers, amount of rice bought and sold, and date of such transactions shall be recorded, and such managers as are mentioned above are in turn to examine such books and complete the delivery of rice within the prescribed term of ten days.

The above articles are strictly to be observed by the officials in charge of the granaries of the feudal lords, the merchants who are entrusted with the work of kuramoto, the representatives of the rice markets, and also by all the rice merchants, and if anyone violates the regulation he is, as already proclaimed, and also in accordance with the relative gravity of his offence, to be punished with death or be imprisoned. In such case the other members of the five men companies, and the managers of the companies dealing in rice, whatever excuse they may make, shall be responsible to the officials in charge of the granaries of the feudal lords, and such merchants, and also the managers of the market, who took part in the bargain, shall be reported to their respective lords and punished in accordance with the relative gravity of their misdemeanour.

Every one shall bear the above articles in mind and take strict care not to violate any one.

(Signed) HIKOSAKA IKI, the Tribune.

September 28th, the 3rd year of Kan-ei.

We thoroughly understand the purport of the above articles and shall pay strict attention not to violate any one above specified, and as evidence that we do thoroughly understand the purport of the above regulation we sign and seal as hereunder.

Names of merchants doing duty as Kuramoto.
Names of the representatives of the same.

We certify here, at the gathering place of rice merchants, that the above signs and seals are true ones.

Names of the brokers in rice.
Names of the wholesalers in rice.

Things went on so until the beginning of the 18th century, about the eras of Genroku and Hohei, when the Fifth Tokugawa Shogun, Tsunayoshi, was ruling the country. The feudal lords imitated the Shogunate in enterprise and luxury, and were similarly financially embarrassed, so that they were fain to ship their rice to Osaka, and draw money in advance from the rice merchants to fill up their empty exchequers.

A certain rice merchant named Kambei at Dojima, Osaka, formed a company of twenty-five men to find the necessary capital, and through Aiki Samontaro, the machi-yoriki (an official under the city tribune), he was favoured with a contract for the transportation of produce to be shipped to Osaka by the feudal lords. He received in advance the rice tickets issued by the clan officials, and then, devising a means to use these tickets as checks, he lent the money on these checks. At the same time the tickets were bought and sold, and made instruments of accommodations, which so greatly convenienced the feudal lords and rice merchants that all used these means for their transactions in rice, and thus the prohibitive regulation issued in the 3rd year of Kan-ei was disregarded.

However, a time came when a bad crop caught Kambei short, and he could not deliver up to his contract. The Government stepped in, and punished him and his associates for contracting to sell rice which he had not got, or could not get, which put an end to such transactions for the future.

Relations between the Rice Exchange and the Gold and Silver Exchange.—Speculation in rice was not utterly stopped, but was indulged in under miscellaneous forms. There are many circumstances in which the price of rice moves up or down, and when the seller and buyer are both firm in their belief that the price will go up or come down in the near future, the quotation stops at one point and never fluctuates, which condition we call Kuraidzunari. Just as in war, when the strength of the opposing armies is fairly matched, and each party tries to find out a weak point in the other, and does not move until it is found, similarly, when the price of rice is stationary, and shows no signs of fluctuation, the speculators in rice turn their eyes from rice to some other commodities such as gold and silver, and stir up the quotations in order to influence the price of rice. Gold coin was the standard currency in Edo and silver coin in Osaka, and the exchange rate between gold and silver being subject to fluctuation, money changers during the Genroku Age always employed swift couriers between Edo and Osaka who brought the latest rate. When the exchange rate of silver against gold is coming down, it is natural that more silver will be wanted, but the demand for rice is as before, and therefore the price of rice in silver goes up. Conversely, when the exchange rate of silver against gold goes up, less silver can buy the same amount of rice as before, and, of course, the price of rice in silver comes down, which accounts for the keen interest taken by rice dealers in the variation in the precious metal. To meet their requirements, means of communication were greatly improved between Edo and Osaka, and in Osaka itself there arose a business called Joya, a sort of intelligence office reporting the quotations at the Dojima rice market to Semba and Nagabori. The merchants went on to start in every town on the five main roads of the country a system called Tsugitate, which resembled a stage-coach station, and by this means communication was made within two days and a half, and three days and a half with places about 100 ri (a little less than 250 miles) distant from Osaka. For instance, news was received at Niigata from Osaka in three days, the Tsugitate charge being 3 ryo and 2 bu of gold, at Sakata in 4 days, Tsugitate 4 ryo of gold, at Akita in 4 days and a half, the charge being 4 ryo and 2 bu of gold, and at Shimonoseki in a day and a half, the charge being 100 momme of silver. Because of such quick means of communication, the rice merchants of Osaka not only controlled speculation in gold and silver, but also the heart of the entire economic field of Japan, and in consequence the problem of the rice market in Osaka was no longer a little problem to be dealt with by the petty officials under the Lord Tribune of Osaka, but a very great problem for the State itself that was to be deliberately considered and well studied from the standpoint of the highest policy of State.

Confiscation of the Yodoya Properties.—The Tokugawa Shogunate in these ages was very sensitive and suspicious of the power and influence of men outside their own charmed circle, and used every means to destroy the germ of such power and influence before they could become an actual menace to the Tokugawa Government. They closed the entire country, and sacrificed all the trade profits with foreign lands because they feared that the ronins abroad would come back to Japan. They prohibited Christianity because foreigners would be coming into Japan, and rebellious ronins might obtain support some way or other from foreign Governments, and plot against the State. In the eyes, therefore, of such a sensitive Government the Osaka merchants were detestable, not less so than the ronins, for the Shogunate suspected that the Osaka people had not forgotten what they owed to the Toyotomi family, and owed a grudge to its destroyers, the house of Tokugawa. The third Tokugawa Shogun Iyemitsu had done his best to placate Osaka with tax exemptions, gifts of silver and promise of help in public works, and now the Tokugawa Government found that the great city, absorbing the gold of feudal lords, and controlling the rice markets not only of Osaka, but of the whole country, was drawing to itself the wealth of all the provinces in Japan. The citizens, then, sumptuous in their mode of living, firm in their own self-confidence, and harbouring many ronins and scholars, became an object of suspicion to the Tokugawa Government, the House of Yodoya most of all. This family had always played a leading part in Osaka affairs, and dealing in actual rice, not as Kambei did in options, they controlled an enormous amount of the cereal, and lived in a way that made their contemporaries gape. From the time when Iyemitsu visited Osaka in the 11th year of Kan-ei (1634), and the then representative of Yodoya had declined the gift of a family name, the Tokugawa had looked with jaundiced eyes on this great commercial house, and suspected it of harbouring too grateful feelings for the downfallen Toyotomi. The 5th Shogun Tsunayoshi was always jealous of anyone who acquired wealth and power, and did not spare even his relative, Tokugawa Mitsukuni of Mito, so he was not at all likely to tolerate a mere merchant who was bold enough to live at the same rate as a daimyo of 1,000,000 koku. On the charge of living a luxurious life inappropriate to his rank in society, all the wealth of the house, then represented by Sakuroemon, a youth of nineteen, was confiscated, and so formidable and invincible was the power of the Shogunate that even this great millionaire did not dare to dispute the edict, but obeyed in silence. Saburoemon's life was spared through the intercession of Abbot Yawata, for the family had always been generous supporters of Buddhism, but one of his managers was decapitated, and certain people who had swindled Yodoya out of large sums of money on the plea that they could save the house from confiscation were crucified.

Stupendous Wealth of the Yodoya House.—There are many stories of the value of the property of the Yodoya House at the time of confiscation, and nothing certain is obtainable about its value, but according to an old record preserved in the house of Mr. Otsu Seizaemon of Matsusaka, Ise Province, it is detailed as follows :—

LIST.

Store-houses, 730; 10 containing beans; 80, red beans; and the rest rice. The value of the contents of one granary is estimated at 1,000 ryo of gold. Total, 730,000 ryo of gold.

Gold-leaf folding screens, 150, besides numberless less valuable screens. Each of these 150 gold-leaf screens is estimated at 100 ryo of gold. Total, 15,000 ryo of gold.

Large junks, 250, with capacity of from 500 to 1,000 koku each. The value of each junk is estimated at 1,000 ryo of gold. Total, 250,000 ryo of gold.

Large junks belonging to the wife of Yodoya Saburoemon, 27, each estimated at 500 ryo of gold. Total, 13,500 ryo of gold.

Ships with glass ports. Value cannot be estimated.

Dolls dressed in brocade clothes. Number and value uncertain.

Flower carpets manufactured in the Ryukyu Islands, 550, each valued at 1 ryo of gold. Total, 550 ryo of gold.

21 Solid gold hen with 10 chicks. This kind of bird is found also in the mansion of Lord Matsudaira Kagano-kami. Value of each bird is estimated at 300 ryo of gold, and each chick at 100 ryo of gold. Total, 7,300 ryo of gold.

14 solid gold macaw. Lord Matsudaira Kagano-kami possessed seven such birds of solid gold, and because Yodoya owned twice as many, Lord Matsudaira hated the house, which was one cause of its ruin. Value of one bird is estimated at 1,000 ryo of gold. Total, 14,000 ryo of gold.
15 solid gold sparrows, each estimated at 100 ryo of gold. Total, 1,500 ryo of gold.
51 doves made of solid gold and silver, each valued at 100 ryo of gold. Total, 5,100 ryo of gold.
37 tea-cups, each valued at between 1,200 ryo and 1,500 ryo of gold. Averaging the value at 1,300 ryo of gold, the total is 48,000 ryo of gold, beside numberless tea-cups, each valued between 50 ryo and 70 ryo of gold, in all about 70,000 ryo of gold. Total, 118,000 ryo of gold.
6 branches of coral, beside numberless pearls. Value unascertained.
173 rubies, agates, pieces of amber, etc. Total, 150 ryo of gold.
10 coral dishes, valued at 3,000 ryo of gold.
20 rosaries of coral, valued at 5,000 ryo of gold.
10 paintings by the Emperor Kiso of China, valued at 20,000 ryo of gold.
Quicksilver, 150,000 pounds, valued at 25,000 ryo of gold.
233 paintings by Kano Bokkei, besides 500 other paintings, each valued at 500 ryo of gold. Total, 350,000 ryo of gold.
700 swords, each valued at 300 ryo of gold, besides numberless swords and daggers, each valued between 5 ryo and 100 ryo of gold. Total, 350,000 ryo of gold.
6 pieces of bar gold in bamboo form, each valued at 1,000 ryo of gold.
Chosen Ninjin (Corean ginseng), 77 pounds, one pound valued at 800 ryo of gold. Total, 58,000.
Shinsha (cinnabar), 70,000 pounds, valued at 58,000 ryo of gold.
5,000 rolls of velvet, each 20 ken (ken of 6 feet) long and 50 ken wide. Value unascertained.
2,000 rolls of China brocade of poppy colour, each 15 ken long and 8 ken wide. Value unknown.
10,000 pieces of black Chinese silk, each 20 ken long and 5 ken wide. Value unknown.
Shokko brocade of China, 10 rolls. Value unknown.
Telescopes and spectacles made in China, 170. Value unknown.
100 rolls of Chinese brocades.
3,500,000 ryo in gold coin.
1,500,000 kwamme of silver, at the rate of 60 momme for 1 ryo. Total, 14,166,000 ryo of gold.
Copper coins, 550,000 strings, each string weighing 5 kwamme. Total, 550,000 ryo of gold.
480 carpets, each valued at 1 ryo. Total, 480 ryo of gold.
96 sliding doors made of crystal. Total value unknown.
Checker board of solid gold made in China, 3 inches thick. Value unascertained.
Ink stone made in China (when this ink stone is rubbed, water springs out by itself). Value unknown.
Wash-basins made in China, carved gold and silver work. Value unknown.
Amount of money lent to feudal lords, about 100,000,000 ryo of gold.
Amount of money lent to court nobles, 8,000 kwamme of silver. Total, 133,330 ryo of gold (at the rate of 60 momme for 1 ryo of gold).
Amount of money lent to samurais. Total, 200,000 ryo of gold.

Houses and Premises.

House and premises, one block square, 12 in Osaka.
House, 18 ken frontage, 10 ken depth, 20 in Osaka.
House, 10 cho frontage, 5 cho depth, 30 in Osaka.
House, 20 ken square, 350 in Osaka.
Feud at Yawata, over koku 2,000.
Farms and fields at Yawata, 500 cho (cho = ½ acre).
Houses at Fushimi, 130.
Farms and fields in the Yamato Province, over 1,300 koku.
Farms and fields at Sakai, 25 (with 45 tenants) (with a house 25 ken square at each place, and hills with large woods).
Forests in the Idzumi Province, 18 cho (with about 5,000 large woods).
Farms and fields in the Kawachi Province, 32 (with 350 tenants).
Farms and fields on the boundary of the Yamato Province, 22 (with 180 tenants).
Farms and fields in the suburbs of Osaka, 105 (with 550 tenants).
Farms and fields on the boundary of the Kawachi Province, 50 (with 300 tenants).

The Yodoya house has lasted for generations, and the wife of Yodoya, of the 5th generation, was a daughter of a certain feudal lord. When she died all her things in daily use were buried at the foot of an artificial hill in the garden. This was opened and clothes of the value of 20,000 ryo of gold extracted. All the above are estimated at 18,216,000 ryo of gold.

Total of the money loaned, 101, 533, 300 ryo of gold.

Grand total, 121,867,610 ryo of gold.

As to the total value of the Yodoya property opinions differ; the estimated values of various rare and precious articles are not creditable, and there are also some mistakes in the calculation. On the item 14 " Insubari wild geese " (translated above as 14 solid gold Inko birds), opinions are also divergent, but in *Genroku Hoei Chinwa* (rare stories in the eras of Genroku Hoei) is the following passage, " there were fourteen solid gold saké-holders : seven in the mansion of Lord Matsudaira Kagano-kami, and fourteen in Yodoya House," and though the names are different, yet there is no doubt that both were rare articles made of gold, and the very fact that Yodoya possessed more such articles than a great feudal lord with a fief of 1,000,000 koku seems to have been the chief offence. The item 100,000,000 ryo of gold in loans is very doubtful, and some say that it is a mistake for 10,000,000 ryo, while others believe it to be correct on the ground that as a great deal of the money lent to feudal lords and others was not repaid, the interest grew and grew until it finally reached this immense sum of money. In short, though the exact amount of money loaned is not ascertainable, yet it was certainly a stupendous sum, and afforded another reason for the Shogunate to break up the house.

WHAT WAS THE CAUSE OF THE CONFISCATION OF THE YODOYA PROPERTIES ?—We know that the Tokugawa Shogunate, hating the luxurious living and arrogant manners of the Osaka merchants, employed spies to make inquiry into the private lives of the citizens, who were correspondingly cautious in what they did, but Yodoya Saburoemon was only nineteen years of age and very ignorant. When he saw even feudal lords bowing to his money bags, he did not conceive it possible that he had anything to fear from petty spies, and rejected all advice on that head. In those days, however, the power of the Government was quite irresistible, and at the will of the Tokugawa Shogun the power of great wealth fell into pieces at a single blow. All the Osaka merchants were struck with terror, and very careful to show that they were of thrifty and economical habits, which helped to increase their wealth, and the eventual result of the confiscation of the Yodoya property was that the power of wealth grew enormously, and rivalled the power of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the feudal lords, who in turn became very jealous of it. After the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate the feudatories acquired the habit of getting temporary accommodation from merchants, who, led on by visions of easy profits, became in time purveyors to the daimyos. All went well until the feudal lords began to realize that the merchants were making too much profit, when they promptly refused payment of both principal and interest (Okotowari, or refusal). The merchants had no recourse, for in no court could they bring suit against the daimyo, neither had they military power to enforce payment. Okotowari simply spelled ruin to the merchant, and that it was not uncommon is proved by the fact that Mitsui Takafusa (ancester of Baron Mitsui) in his *Chonin Ko* (book of reference for merchants) warned his successors against entering into business relations with feudal lords, for he realized that the political power was jealous of the power of money.

The confiscation of Yodoya was followed by similar cases in Edo, which affords an additional proof with what jaundiced eyes the Shogunate looked upon wealth when accumulated in the hands of the commercial classes.

PROSPERITY OF KYOTO DURING THE GENROKU AGE.—Knowing what we do of the prosperity and actual state of things in Osaka, we might naturally be inquisitive as to how it was with Kyoto, and it is surprising to find that the population of Kyoto was greater than that either of Edo or Osaka in the Genroku Age. The records differ a little in their estimates of population in Kyoto, yet they agree that it was greater than that either of Edo or Osaka, which we can confirm by the following statistics in the *Rakuchu Rakugai Sochosu Yakadzu Aratame Nikki* (census book of the population and number of house of Greater Kyoto):—

RAKUCHU RAKUGAI SOCHOSU YAKADZU ARATAME NIKKI (14TH YEAR OF KAN-EI), 1637.

202 cho (town block),	5,296 houses, managed by Shinshiro Elderman.
77 cho	2,213 houses, managed by Ranzaemon Elderman.
31 cho	860 houses, managed by Gozaemon Elderman.
148 cho	5,793 houses, managed by Shirobei Elderman.
56 cho	653 houses, managed by Choemon Elderman.
101 cho	2,757 houses, managed by Seibei Elderman.
53 cho	2,101 houses, managed by Matabei Elderman.
28 cho	504 houses, managed by Kuhei Elderman.
30 cho	590 houses, managed by Jirobei Elderman.

The above are the numbers of cho and houses in Kami-kyo (upper Kyoto), the former 726 and the latter 19,198, including 129 Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.

176 cho (town block),	5,006 houses, managed by Mohei Elderman.
101 cho	2,996 houses, managed by Sahei Elderman.
98 cho	2,873 houses, managed by Nehei Elderman.
121 cho	3,738 houses, managed by Ichiemon Elderman.
68 cho	1,892 houses, managed by Gozaemon Elderman.
46 cho	1,070 houses, managed by Kuzaemon Elderman.
14 cho	376 houses, managed by Choemon Elderman.

The above are the numbers of cho and houses in Shimo-kyo (lower Kyoto), the former 624 and the latter 12,006, including 99 Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.

60 cho	897 houses, in the Higashidera district.
61 cho	1,137 houses, in the Nishidera district.

Total, 1,507 cho, 39,220 houses, of which the brothel quarters occupy 6 cho, with 150 houses managed by Mohei.

Total number of the Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines in the Rakuchu district is 228; number of cho in the Rakuchu district, including the parts in the two Buddhist temples, is 565; and the number of cho in the Rakucho district, 69.

Sum total of the above, 634 cho.

Number of cho and houses in the Rakugai (suburban district):—

51 cho, 1,055 houses, managed by Matsumura Yozaemon.
38 cho, 1,016 houses, managed by Igarashi Shirobei.
75 cho, 1,775 houses, managed by Matsuo Uhei.
30 cho, 791 houses, managed by Hagino Yohei.

Total number of cho, 194; number of houses, 4,637.

Six cho—Mibu-mura, Shinsenou, Kawarashi-machi, Taishogun, Shirobei—have a population of 8,690.

Five cho—Kitagion, Yamato-machi, Chion-in Monzen (front of the Chion-in Buddhist temple), Awataguchi-mura, Nanzenji Monzen (front of the Nanzenji Buddhist temple)—contain a population of 6,960 (3,045 males and 3,951 females).

The population of Mibu-mura, Nakadojo-mura, Nishi-hachijo-mura, Hagashimonzen-mura, Nishikujo-mura Yatsutsuka, Fudo-mura, part of the Hachijo Bomoncho on the Omiyadori, Kakiuchi-cho, Shioya-cho, Hachijo-noboru-Daikoku-cho, Ishibashi-Noboru-Nakacho, Keikai-cho on the Omiya-dori, is 6,822, of which 3,563 are males and 3,259 females.

The cho and population in the quarters Gion-mura-Minami-cho Kodaiji-monzen, Yasaka-Honkanji-monzen, Kiyomidzu-monzen, Jihoin-monzen, Wakamiya-Hachiman-monzen, Ken-ninji-monzen, Honpukuji-monzen, and Daibutsuji-nai, are 76 and 11,017 (5,765 males and 5,252 females).

The population in the Niimura-Shiho is 32,639 (17,872 males and 15,767 females).

Of the record above, there may be a few errors in the details, but the totals were not mistaken, and reckoning that the number of people in one house was 4 2/10, we arrived at a total population in Kyoto of about 240,000. The *Heian Tsushi* (outlines of the history of Kyoto), summing up all the records, has the following on the total population of Kyoto at this age :—

Age.	Population.	Number of House.	Reference Books.
11th year of Kanbun..	410,089	37,087	Kyoto-yakusho-muki Oboigaki.
5th year of Kanbun ..	352,344	—	Manten-nichiroku Gyokuro-so.
9th year of Kanbun ..	—	39,230	Kyoto-yakusho-muki Oboigaki.
2nd year of Enho ..	408,723	—	Manten-nichiroku Gyokuro-so.
1st year of Genroku ..	—	39,072	Kyoto-yakusho-muki Oboigaki.
9th year of Genroku..	507,548	47,000	Yoshufu-shi.
13th year of Genroku	—	33,896	Kyoto-yakusho-muki Oboigaki.
1st year of Shotoku ..	350,988	—	Kyoto-yakusho-muki Oboigaki.
1st year of Kyoto ..	350,367	—	Kyoto-yakusho-muki Oboigaki.
14th year of Kyoho ..	374,449	—	Getsudo-Kenbunroku.
3rd year of Kan-in ..	526,225	128,175	Setsu getsu-kwa.

It seems to have been the custom at one time that in cases where a house-owner possessed more than one house, the Government registered it as one house only, and so the number of the houses in Kyoto was not so great before the Kan-in era as the above statistics show; but after the Kan-in era the method was changed, and each house registered, no matter who was the owner, and, of course, the number of houses in Kyoto showed great increase after the Kan-in era as in the above statistics. Kyoto suffered very much from the wars and battles after the Onin era, and the city was burnt very often during the disturbances, but it was more populous and prosperous than either Edo or Osaka, showing that the historical greatness of Kyoto over one thousand years was not to be destroyed even by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, and that there being so large a population in Kyoto, it was yet the centre of enterprise and wealth.

RUIN OF THE RICH ISHIKAWA, KNOWN AS "MONEY-LENDER TO FEUDAL LORDS."—In the old capital, too, there were many collisions between the political power and the power of wealth. About the era of Kan-ei lived a prominent merchant, Ishikawa Jian, whose family history is almost without parallel in the history of the warlike Japanese. The progenitor of Ishikawa Jian was originally the lord of Inuyama Castle in Owari, who, although he held military rank, deserted his troops on the eve of Sekigahara, and transported all his treasure, property, and family to Kyoto, where, after leading the life of a ronin for a while, he turned merchant. This extraordinary reversal from a feudal lord, whose word was law to a merchant, who could only with difficulty enter the presence of daimyos, and had to cringe before a simple samurai, proved lucky enough for him, contrary to general expectation. He soon accumulated wealth, and his sons and grandsons being equally prosperous, there were several branch houses beside the main Ishikawa family. Ishikawa Jian was head of the main Ishikawa family two or three generations after his feudal ancestor, and sharp enough to see that by lending money to financially embarrassed daimyos, who were mere children in matters economic, he would make a much greater profit on his capital than by dealing with customers more enlightened in matters of finance. His profits were very high, first, because he demanded a higher rate of interest from feudal lords, and secondly, because the debts were discharged in rice, on the sale of which he made a further percentage. This was all very well so long as the feudal lords were paying back their debts smoothly, but as it was an age when the feudal lords had very strong military power, and the Central Government had not established any court to deal with loans made to the feudatories by merchants, it was fatal if the lords refused payment. This was what happened, and the unhappy merchant was placed in just such a situation as a money-lender who is treated to a mouthful of steel by some poor ronin in payment of his debt. Ishikawa, who had boasted of his economic abilities and laughed in his sleeve at the ignorant daimyo, found himself beaten by the power of the sword. He began by squeezing enormous profits out of his usury, but when his creditors in the western provinces, particularly Shimazu and Hosokawa, just refused to pay either principal or interest, the house declined, and was eventually ruined. Records say that the rare and precious articles that were so much admired and valued by the Kyoto people in the middle of the Tokugawa Age were mostly those sold by the Ishikawa family after its ruin.

Failure of Zenshiro, the Money-changer.—There were two brothers in Kyoto called Zenshiro and Zengoro, who were money-changers. The elder brother Zenshiro was ruined when Lord Mori of Nagato Province, to whom he lent 13,000 kwamme of silver about the era of Manji (1660), was unable to pay it back at the expiration of the term. The business of the younger brother Zengoro was on a much more larger scale, for he was looked upon as the largest money-changer in Kyoto and Osaka, and in doing business with the feudal lords, he not only employed his own capital, but also took deposits from almost all of the merchants in Kyoto, and used it in his loan business. The *Choninko* writes of this Zengoro as follows :—

> Zengoro is the principal money-lender to the feudal lords, and his way of business was such that he took deposits from his fellow-merchants and issued his cheques on the basis of these deposits. It is reported that he increased his wealth at the rate of 1,000 kwamme of silver on an average every year.

One thousand kwamme of silver is equal to about 16,600 ryo of gold, reckoning 60 momme of silver to 1 ryo of gold. Previously, few among the merchants in Kyoto were lending money to feudal lords, but when this Zengoro started his business, much like that of a bill-broker of to-day, the Kyoto merchants came to lend money to feudal lords through him. In due course the same fate befell him as his elder brother. Many feudal lords declined to repay, and the unhappy creditor ended his life travelling from castle to castle to try to get back his money. Yet another case is that of Tsuji Jiroemon of Kyoto, who, after the ruin of Zengoro, was the largest money-changer with whom every one, even the Buddhist priests, widows, and maidservants, deposited their savings in the hope of a good return. When the lords, among whom were such great ones as Lords Maeda, Hosokawa, and Asano, repudiated or postponed payment, he could not maintain his business, and went into bankruptcy early in the Genroku era.

The Great Millionaire House of Nawaya of Kyoto.—Nawaya Kuroemon and his younger brother Juroemon were the wealthiest men in Kyoto during the Genroku era, and ruled the roast absolutely. The elder brother purchased from Lord Matsudaira Kagano-kami his mansion on the Nijo-agaru Street, and the younger brother the mansion of the Lord of Sendai on the Sanho-agaru Ogawa Street, and their gorgeous lives made all Kyoto stare in amazement. The story runs that when a rich merchant of Edo once came to Kyoto, and invited these Nawaya brothers to a banquet in order to obtain their good will, he could only satisfy them by spending about 20,000 kwamme of silver for the banquet of one day. Kuroemon was financial agent for Lord Matsudaira Uyemonnosuke, and, being given a fief of 200 koku by that lord, and raised to the rank of samurai, was able to walk the streets with his servants carrying spears. Juroemon, being the purveyor to the Lord Abbot of the Sanboin Temple at Daigo, was granted the rank of a yamabushi, so that he was able to ride a horse, wear swords, and walk the streets with his servants following him with spears in their hands. Itakura Naizen-no-sho, the Lord Tribune of Kyoto, indignant with these Nawaya brothers for their luxurious lives, imprisoned them on the charge that their mode of living was improper for merchants and disturbing to good social order. They just escaped decapitation, and were ordered to repair the bridge at Uji to atone for their crimes, which they did gladly. But when the work was complete, every one called the bridge " the bridge of the Nawaya brothers," which caused their name to be bruited more widely than ever, and made the Tribune fear that his leniency had been a mistake. Their business continued to prosper until Lord Nambu repudiated a debt of 50,000 ryo of gold borrowed from their Edo house. The brothers did their best to collect the money, and Nambu promised to pay in rice, but failed to implement his promise. This was the first of a series of blows which brought the great house to the ground. According to *Choninko*, already referred to, the cause of the ruin of most of the rich Kyoto bankers was this refusal of payment by the feudal lords, and the following are further instances :—

> Fukuroya Yozaemon lent a large amount of money to Lord Matsudaira Uyemonnokami of Inaba Province, but as that lord refused payment, his house was bankrupted in the latter part of the Hoei era.
>
> Takaya Seiroku, in the Kan-bun era, lent money to Lord Nambu Daizennotayu and other feudal lords, but as the money thus loaned was not paid back, his house was ruined. The house of Futamura Toshiyasu was ruined because it lent large sums to the two great feudal lords, Hosokawa and Shimazu, who did not repay the loans.
>
> Hirano Yuken, in the Genroku Age, lent a large amount of money to Lord Tokugawa of Owari and Lord Tokugawa of Kii, who were both relatives of the Shogun, but because of these two lords refusing payments his house was ruined.

MANY WEALTHY MERCHANTS RUINED BY LORDS SHIMAZU AND HOSOKAWA.—Other stories regarding the ruin of millionaires run as follows : Itoya Jurozaemon was so rich and spent so lavishly that once he paid 1,000 large gold coins for the famous tea-pot called Misaya-katatsuki, and plated with gold the entire interior of a small shrine, Hitomaru-do (shrine of Kakinomotono Hitomaru, the greatest poet in ancient Japan), in the Myokoji Temple. This man was ruined in the latter part of the Kan-ei era because payments were refused in succession by the feudal lords in the western provinces, among whom Lords Shimazu and Hosokawa were his chief debtors. Money-exchanger Zenroku was refused payment of 10,000 kwamme of silver by Lord Mori Mimasakano-kami of Mimasaka Province, and went up to Edo to bring suit against his debtor; but as he had been granted by Lord Mori a certain amount of fief, and promoted to the samurai rank, he was severely reprimanded by the lords in the Shogunate for having brought suit against his own lord and ruined. Agata Sochin suffered the same fate when he was refused payment by Lord Daté of Sendai; Komaki Sozaemon became insolvent because his loans to many feudal lords were all refused payment; Miyake Gorobei by Lord Tachibana of Yanagawa, and Hachimonjiya Sotei by Lord Nabeshima of Hizen, were both refused payment and ruined. Mitsui Saburozaemon, an ancestor of the well-known Mitsui family, lent a great deal of money to Lord Tokugawa of Kii and Lord Hosokawa of Higo, and his house trembled on the verge of ruin in the latter part of Kanbun era when payment was refused by the above lords. It was only the existence of his branch office in Edo that saved him from utter ruin. Urai Shichirobei lent money to Lord Sakae Utanokami; Sengiriya Sozaemon, reputed the richest man in the provinces between Edo and Kyoto, gave money accommodation to Lord Ii Kamonnokami, Miki Gontayu to Lord Kuroda Kainokami, and Tamaya Chubei to Lord Matsudaira of Echizen, and Lords Toda and Hosokawa, and, all these lords disdaining to repay their debts, their creditors were ruined. Besides, Yoshinoya Sozaemon, who lent about 9,000 kwamme of silver to many feudal lords, including 2,000 kwamme to Lord Hosakawa, 3,000 kwamme to Lord Kuroda of Chikusen, and 9,000 kwamme to Lord Tachibana of Yanagawa, and was finally bankrupted because the above feudal lords all refused payment of their debt, there were numberless merchants who suffered in the same way. Among the feudal lords who acquired this convenient bad habit of repudiating responsibility for payment of money actually borrowed, and were much benefited thereby, the most notorious were Shimazu of Satsuma and Hosokawa of Higo. Mitsui Takafusa wrote in his *Choninko*:—

"Among the rest, Lord Hosokawa was for long most ill-famed, and many merchants were greatly embarrassed, and even ruined, by his refusal of payment. The latest examples are the cases of the Tsujitamaya and Iihara houses, which lent a large amount of money to that lord, and were finally ruined, solely because Lord Hosokawa refused them payment."

BANKRUPT HEIMIN (COMMONER OR PLEBEIAN) SEVERELY PUNISHED.

The Shogunate passed over the offences of the feudal lords in repudiating just debts and ruining their creditors, but readers will be astonished to hear they took a very different line towards merchants who found themselves unable to pay in full. Toward the middle of the Kan-ei era there was in Kyoto a merchant called Dzushiguchi, who was engaged in the so-called Nagasaki Toeya (business dealing wholesale in Nagasaki articles), but as he extended his trade too much, he borrowed about 1,500 kwamme of silver from his fellow-merchants and was unable to repay. The Lord Tribune of Kyoto announced that it was too audacious for a single merchant to borrow so large a sum as over 1,000 kwamme of silver, and the crime fully deserved severe punishment, and the wretched bankrupt was crucified. Again, toward the Shoho era, there was in Kyoto a merchant called Daikokuya Tokuzaemon, who also dealt in Nagasaki goods, and when he was extremely embarrassed by a debt of about 1,300 kwamme of silver, and it became known to the Lord Tribune of Kyoto, this official was again very severe against this poor merchant, beheading him and exposing his head on a cross. It may seem almost incredible nowadays that under the despotic Government in the feudal ages the feudatories, who unreasonably refused payment of their debts, were never punished by the Central Government, while the common merchants were sentenced to death when they were financially embarrassed and could not meet their bills. However strong the resentment of political power was against the power of wealth, such unreasonableness is inconceivable in the present time, but it was true in the feudal ages, just two or three hundred years ago. The famous Mitsui Takafusa, the author of *Choninko*, and a great merchant in his time, repeatedly warned the merchants not to be desirous of being the financial agents or purveyors for the feudal lords, and instructed them as follows in his book :—

> It is a common practice of the feudal lords of nowadays to tempt the merchants, when the latter are well-to-do and able to lend as much money as the lords are anxious to borrow, by making them a yearly allowance of rice, and even granting them the samurai rank. All goes well so long as the merchants are prosperous, but directly they are unable to lend more money, the lords change their attitude, grudging them the allowance of rice or stopping it altogether. In fact, the feudal lords are very much like anglers decoying fish with seductive bait, and that is why I warn my fellow-merchants not to be desirous to become purveyors for feudal lords, receiving from them a yearly allowance of rice or the temporary rank of samurai. The sole business of a samurai is to know the military art and gain a victory over the enemy. However desirous the merchant may be to take advantage of the samurai's lack of economic knowledge, to make money out of him and withdraw just at the right moment, it is very difficult, or rather impossible, for the merchant to get the better of the samurai in their commercial or business warfare, for

> the samurai is the head of the four classes of people, and his wisdom and sagacity are far above those of the merchant. He is acute enough to see into the mind of the merchant, and, feigning to be duped by him, borrows as much money as he can, and when he finds he has squeezed the merchant dry, he refuses the payment of the money he has borrowed. In business warfare between the samurai and merchant, the samurai handles a very sharp sword and the merchant has only a bamboo spear. The result can easily be foreseen. Only a fool would believe that the feudal lords would permit the merchant to make unreasonable profit. These lords promise to send their rice to the merchants in Osaka, and on that security they borrow money in advance. For the first year or two they appear to be willing to deposit with the merchants a certain amount of rice, but then as their expenses in Edo and also for their contributions to the public works increase, they borrow more and more money in advance from the merchants. Never will they pay back their debts by sending the promised amount of rice to the merchants, but sending their rice to another quarter where they may expect accommodation, they refuse the payment to the merchants from whom they have already borrowed large sums, and by whose help they have been extricated from financial difficulties. The Book of Strategy instructs us that a good general is careful to be well informed about the conditions not only of his own army but also of the opposing army, and therefore the merchant is greatly mistaken if he deals with samurai as he would with his fellow-merchants.

Profiting by the instructions of the venerable Mitsui Takafusa, the house of Mitsui never lent money to any feudal lord, except Lords Tokugawa of Kii and Uyesugi of Yonezawa. All these examples prove that the feudal lords in the despotic ages not only gloried in their exploits on the battle-fields and the deaths of their enemies, but also made it their business, when the age was peaceful and there was no more war, to oppress the merchants and refuse them the payment of money which they had actually borrowed in order to maintain their household and secure their fortunes. It is proper and pertinent to say that a greater part of the property possessed by the feudal lords was made up of borrowed money.

OSAKA RICH ALSO TORTURED BY THE FEUDAL LORDS.—It was not the Kyoto rich alone who were so oppressed by the feudal lords; those of Osaka suffered the same fate at the murderous hands of the feudatories. Kusama Isuke, who was related to the Tonomura family of Osaka, and the author of the *Sankwadzue* (cyclopædia of the three kinds of precious coin), says in so many words that the feudal lords did not pay interest for over one hundred years.

> Merchants have no hereditary fief, and therefore work very hard to earn and save money which, thanks to habits of hard work and thrift over continued generations, accumulates in a family. When those merchants lend money to feudal lords they hand over gold and silver in return for a mere sheet of paper. Is it not very risky to hand over gold and silver for a few words on a sheet of paper? Why do merchants do it? They believe that men are by nature

honest and good, and therefore all the money they lend will surely be returned by the debtor. Feudal lords also think that samurai should never be dishonest, and all the money they have borrowed shall surely be returned to the creditor, and on this mutual understanding the transaction is made. Anyone can understand that. But the officials under feudal lords seem to be ignorant about matters so clear to all men, and when the merchants go to the mansion of a feudal lord and beg for the payment of the money they have lent, the officials (samurai) serving the feudal lord come out with long swords and very arrogantly answer that they do not acknowledge the note on which the name of their lord is clearly signed and sealed, and refuse the payment. Such inhumane action on the part of the samurais serving feudal lords is quite common now, and, in fact, such is not the will of the lord himself, who may not know how his officials are dealing with the merchants with regard to the payment of his debt. It is all due to the new officials in charge of the finance of the feudal lord who, after ousting the old officials who made the contract in the name of the feudal lord, advise that it is proper for their lord to refuse the payment of the borrowed money, which has actually been borrowed in the name of the lord himself. These officials are so unreasonable and unjust toward the merchant's creditors because they are anxious to get promoted for having so successfully dealt with their lord's creditors, and by wiping out his debts consolidated his finance. When, therefore, such bad officials act for a feudal lord, all the merchants and farmers who have lent him money are very miserably ruined, for they are refused payment of money they have lent in the belief that a samurai is honest and sincere and will never fail to meet his debts. The business of a money-lender is to obtain interest, with which he has to support his family, and when he is thus refused payment of both principal and interest he is utterly ruined. Recently, there have been many reports in this city of the ruin of business houses, and when the merchant, who has lent money to a feudal lord, goes to his mansion to entreat for payment, some official comes out and says that it is a matter of which they are quite ignorant and has all been managed by the former officials, for whose actions they are not responsible. Finally they tell the merchant that he has made a careless blunder in lending so much money where there is no one responsible for it. They are never to be moved, hoping, as I have said above, for promotion for having successfully rid their lord of his creditors. Men are saying lately that the world is becoming worse and worse and this is really a terribly dark age. In all the loans it was precisely and clearly fixed at first that the interest will surely be paid at the expiration of the proper term every year, but the loans to a feudal lord are never settled at the fixed term, and when the debts have gradually accummulated, the officials say that this part of the loan is too old, and that part new, and they will pay interest on the new loans, but cannot pay upon loans made two hundred and fifty, one hundred and fifty or one hundred years ago. Even upon the new loans the rate of interest must be only 3 or 4 per cent. As to the money loaned to the feudal lord, as the creditor is a merchant whose hard work, thrifty habits, and careful management have enabled him to save up the money little by little, there is nothing which he values more than the cash that is the compensation for generations of assiduous application. When he lends such dear money to a feudal lord, it is highly unreasonable for the debtor to make such distinctions and say that this part of the loan is old or that part is new, and the debtor will pay a low rate of interest upon the new loan, but nothing on the old. Such being the case about transactions with a feudal lord, men are grumbling of late and saying that there is no creature more unreasonable and audacious than samurai, but however much they may complain, they have no means of defending their right against samurai, and are put to silence in the end. Outward conditions in Osaka city are not changed, and everything appears to be prosperous there, but in comparison with fifty years ago (about the years of Horeki Era) internal conditions have undergone a great change, and poverty is overtaking the men who were formerly rich and prosperous. It is well to remember here that the rate of interest upon the money lent to feudal lords by merchants was 10 to 15 per cent. fifty years ago.

MERCHANTS DEVISED NEW METHODS AND WON VICTORY OVER FEUDAL LORDS.—Kusama Isuke published the above treatise in the 3rd year of Bunkwa (1806), when the Tokugawa Shogunate ordered the Osaka merchants to buy up a large amount of rice, and in spite of the feudal lords being so oppressive to the merchants, there came later a time when they were obliged to bend their heads before them. For long the lords oppressed the merchants singly, yet when the latter, with organization and system, began to resist the lords, the victory was complete. In other chapters we shall tell of the circumstances in which merchants were triumphant over feudal lords in their business warfare.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THE KAMIGATA PEOPLE AND THEIR ECONOMIC TALENTS

The Kamigata People compared with the Fugger Family.—After the great victory at Sekigahara secured to the Tokugawa family complete power over the whole country, the age of peace and prosperity continued for two and a half centuries, during which time the merchants accumulated wealth and acquired power side by side with the feudal lords and other samurais. The stories of the large merchants such as Yodoya Tatsugoro, Suetsugu-Heizo, the Mitsui and Konoike families, and Tennojiya Yohei, who were most prominent in the class, remind us of the great German house of Fugger, whose business descended from father to son, and who, beginning with merchant business pure and simple, gradually took up banking and exchange and lent enormous sums to Emperors, and even to the Pope, for in just the same way our Osaka merchants were receiving large quantities of rice from the feudal lords as security for the money they advanced to them. Jacob Fugger, grandson of the founder of the family, an Augsburg weaver, extended his business all over Europe, and in 1529 the wealth of the family was reckoned at about 3,000,000 florins.

Ruin of the Millionaires who lent Money to Feudal Lords. The purchasing power of one florin at the beginning of modern history is said to correspond to 15 to 16 yen of our money in the present time, and therefore Fugger's command of wealth was very great; but, as a matter of fact, the Fuggers were not alone in succeeding in business and acquiring great wealth, for there were many in Venice and in old Italy who showed commercial talent and reaped corresponding success, especially among the Jews, though it is true that none equalled the house of Fugger. Mediæval Europe produced a great many warriors who won, as a reward of hard struggle, principalities and earldoms, in which the small states in the Continental Europe of modern history originated; and side by side with them in their acquirement of political power there were many merchants whose struggles were also rewarded with the power of wealth. It is interesting, then, to observe that the history of the Fugger family so much resembles that of our merchants who came to the front in the years after the Keicho and Genwa eras, but it is deplorable that the great merchants who were prominent during the years of Keicho and Genwa were all ruined, and none of their descendants now remain but the Mitsui and Konoike houses. Mitsui Takafusa, who was the forefather of the present Mitsui family, gives in his *Choninko* the names of the great millionaires whose houses were ruined or declined, never to rise again, because the feudal lords refused to repay the money they had borrowed from these merchants, and therefore we will cite below the names of these merchants for the reference of readers :—

Ishikawa Jian, Yorodzuya Seiroku, Fukuroya Joko, Futamura Toshiyasu (or Juan), Hirano Yuken, Itoya Juroemon, Ryogaiya Zenshiro, Agata Sochin, Komaki Sozaemon, Idzushiguchi, Hironoya Seizaemon, Daikokuya Tokuemon, Miyake Gorobei, Shinya Ihei, Yenezawaya Kyuzaemon, Nawaya Kurozaemon, Ryogaiya Znegoro, Tsuji Jirozaemon, Kaneya Katsuemon, Hachimonjiya Sotei, Hisadzumi Gonbei, Wakuya Kuroemon, Mitsui Saburozaemon, Mitsui Rokuemon, Urai Shichirobei, Chigiriya Sozaemon, Miki Gontayu, Tamaya Chubei, Uwazumiya Jihei, Mukadeya Kyuzaemon, Hanabusa Itto, Tanabeya Heijuro, Fujiya Ichibei, Tsukiya Tarozaemon, Harimaya Choemon, Satsumaya Shinbei, Iihara Jigen, Daikokuya Kyuzaemon, Katagi Kanbei, Yashiro Tarojiro, Nakagawa Seisaburo, Hinoya Chozaemon, Shibata Kunai, Hishiya Juemon, Yoshinoya Sozaemon.

Such a large number of commercial houses were totally ruined or sank into obscurity during a short interval of fifty or sixty years, about the eras of Genroku and Teikyo, thanks to the action of the feudal lords, whose dishonesty, or rather the dishonesty of the samurais under them, made them refuse repayment of money that they had actually borrowed. The list given by Mitsui contains Kyoto men only, in number forty-six, which would be very largely increased by the addition of the Edo and Osaka merchants, who were ruined by the same dishonest methods on the part of the feudal lords.

THE KAMIGATA MILLIONAIRES DEVISED MEANS TO RESIST THE FEUDAL LORDS IN THEIR BUSINESS WARFARE.—The true reason of the decline and fall of all these men was that with their newly acquired money they lived lives of such ostentatious profusion that the Tokugawa Shogunate came to hate their audacious power of wealth, and confiscated all their property. Therefore other wealthy men, warned by their fate, tried to make their method of living appear very simple, and fearing that it would invite the hatred of the authorities if they lived in large and elaborate houses, they made them smaller, but spent a lot of money on such things as leather wares, tobacco boxes, metal pipes, and short swords, and clothed themselves in Yuki silk, which appears coarse and simple, but is, in fact, very expensive. They thus made a new fashion in luxury. The Tokugawa Shogunate claimed that the luxurious and sumptuous lives of the wealthy merchants would disturb good social order, but this was mere pretence, for, in fact, the Shogunate hated anyone but the samurai to have so much power, and cruelly and harshly oppressed merchants who had acquired wealth. The relation between the Shogunate and feudal lords on one side, and the millionaire merchants on the other, was nothing more nor less than a state of warfare, and for this reason Mitsui Takafusa warned his family and relatives as follows :—

> A good general is anxious to be well informed not only of the conditions in his own army, but also of those of his enemy, as the Book of Strategy instructs us, and merchants are mistaken if they try to deal with samurai in the same way as they would with their fellow-merchants. If they do, they will surely fail in their business warfare.

The merchants at length realized that it was impossible to resist the power of the Shogunate and feudal lords and to preserve the position they were fully entitled to, if they stood alone, and they devised a means by which almost all the merchants combined their power in associations and guilds, and thus got strength enough to withstand the military power. The result of their schemes was the creation of such organizations as Toiya Nakama (wholesale merchants' association) and Dogyo Nakama (association of same trade), but truth compels us to say it was not the result of recognition by contemplation and study of the proper means to resist the military power on the part of merchants which led to the organization of such associations. The general trend of the time taught the merchants the necessity of establishing such institutions and systems as Toiya Kumiai and Dogyo Kumiai, which turned out to be a strong defensive agent against the oppressive military power, a contingency which had not been foreseen. In short, for about half a century after the years of Keicho and Genwa the rich merchants fought singly against the samurai class, were defeated and destroyed, and in the ages after Teikyo and Genroku the same class, realizing the danger of resisting the military power by their own unaided strength, combined into institutions and associations. Of course, there were some commercial institutions and associations even before the Teikyo and Genroku eras, and even after those eras there were some cases in which merchants were defeated and destroyed in single combat against the feudal lords and their properties confiscated, but in general it is true that the Teikyo and Genroku eras were really epoch-making in the matter of commercial institutions. Those which developed during the Tokugawa Shogunate, and were the most remarkable, powerful, and representative of the age, were the Toiya (wholesale house), Toiya Nakama (wholesale houses association), Kabu (shareholders' association), and Kaisho (association).

The Fall of Osaka Castle had no Effect on the Kamigata People.—Tokugawa Iyeyasu destroyed the faithful adherents of the Toyotomi family in the campaign ending in Sekigahara in the year 1600 (5th year of Keicho), and later the heir of that family killed himself when Osaka Castle was captured by the same Tokugawa Iyeyasu as the result of two Osaka wars in 1614 and 1615 (19th year of Keicho and 1st year of Genwa). The complete wiping out of the renowned Toyotomi house left a feeling of deep regret and sympathy in the minds of so-called Kamigata people, but their downfall was not accompanied by the destruction of Osaka city, and the civilization fostered and left behind by the Toyotomi family was not only never destroyed, but, taking deeper root and extending its branches under the Tokugawa Government, founded a strong economic feudalism within the Tokugawa military feudalism. The construction of the great Osaka Castle by Toyotomi Hideyoshi was not merely a fact to be recorded in the history of engineering and architecture, and simply to be noted as a great castle newly constructed, but it is a fact in the history of civilization in Japan. After our first Emperor Jimmu fixed his capital at Kashiwabara, in the Yamato Province, the Imperial capital was frequently shifted here and there in the provinces of Yamato, Yamashiro, and Kawachi, until the Emperor Nintoku settled it at Kozu in Settsu Province. This Kozu is now a part of Osaka, and it was the first time that the Imperial capital descended from mountain fastnesses and fixed itself at a place near the sea. After that, intercourse with Korea increased, and consequently Korean civilization, and also the Chinese civilization coming through Korea, reached the coast-line of Japan from Hyogo, in Settsu Province, to Sakae and Sumiyoshi, in Idzumi Province, and the standard of living became most elevated and the minds of the people most enlightened in the provinces of Yamato, Yamashiro, Kawachi, Idzumi, and Settsu, every mountain, hill, river, and canal in these territories being now marked as the site of old civilization. After the Empress Jingo attacked the three Korean countries called Sankwan, and brought them into subjection, relations between Japan and Korea were so changeable that at times Korea was very friendly and submissive to Japan, and then again hostile, but it was in the reign of the Emperor Nintoku that either by capture or of their own will the largest number of Koreans immigrated to Japan and settled around what is now Osaka. When, in the 11th year of the Emperor Nintoku's reign, the canal was cut and the embankment of Namba was constructed, the works were done by the Koreans who came to Japan to pay tribute. In the 17th year Shiragi (one of the ancient kingdoms) neglected to pay tribute, and the Emperor sent to Korea Hida-no-sukune and Sakashinokoru demanding of the court of Shiragi an explanation and an apology for their negligence. As a result of the protest, Shiragi loaded eighty ships with tribute for the Japanese Court, and though we do not know much about this tribute from Shiragi, there is no doubt that many Koreans came at that time and remained in Japan. In the 4th year of Nintoku the Emperor sent Kidzuno Sukune to Kudara (one of the three Korean kingdoms), and ordered the Court there to report about the provinces and counties in Kudara and their produce. We are told that Prince Sakeno-kimi, grandson of the King of Kudara, was insolent to our ambassador, who was greatly incensed, and took the prince in chains back to Japan. It was this Prince Sakeno-kimi who taught the Japanese the art of hawking. In the 53rd year, when the kingdom of Shiragi neglected to pay tribute, an expedition was sent to punish it, and brought many Korean prisoners back to Japan. These events are all recorded in the old book *Nihon-shoki*, and the other old record, *Sangoku-shiki*, tells us of constant hostilities between Japanese and Koreans, in which Japan was always victorious, and her generals brought many Korean prisoners back after every battle. The more wars there were between Japan and Korea, the more Koreans were transported to Japan, bringing with them the material and moral Korean civilizations. As already stated, every mountain, hill, river, and canal in the provinces of Yamato, Yamashiro, Kawachi, Idzumi, and Settsu is marked as a site of the civilization of high order that came from China and Korea, and it may be interesting to say something about these places and how they were related to this old Chinese and Korean civilization.

Tennoji Buddhist Temple, in Osaka, is a very old home of this ancient Chinese and Korean civilization. It was built about 1,300 years ago by the famous Shotoku Taishi (Prince Shotoku or Prince of Holy Virtue), who, composing for his Emperor a letter to the Chinese Emperor, the Emperor Yo of the Zui Dynasty, began: "The Emperor of the Sun-rising country begs to write to the Emperor of the Sun-setting country," and showed thereby his bold spirit.

Ikeda, in Settsu Province, is another very old site, where the famous old weavers Kureha and Ayaha, who came from the Go territory in China and taught the Japanese for the first time how to weave fine silk clothes and brocades, arrived first in Japan.

Adzuchi Yama (Adzuchi Hill) on the River Adzuchi, that flows into the River Kanzaki, was the site of the dwelling-house of the Taishokukwan Kamatari (Prime Minister Kamatari), who was a very wise minister in the service of the Emperor Tenchi about 1,300 years ago.

The River Hirano, which, rising in Hirano Village, Sumiyoshi County, Settsu Province, passes Shigino near Osaka and flows into the River Yamato, was called the River Kudara in olden times, and the plain along this River Kudara was called Kudara. Thither men from Kudara (an ancient Korean kingdom) immigrated in days gone by, and introduced the Korean civilization among the Japanese.

Kyutaro-machi, in the east district, Osaka, is called also Kutara-machi, showing that it was originally denominated Kudara-machi (town for Kudara people), and Koreans from Kudara lived there in ancient times.

The villages of Fukasaka, Tazono, Tsujinomura, and Fukudamura, in Idzumi Province, were one locality in the olden times, and called the Kawarako-no-sho (district of pottery), where the people who served the Imperial Court at manufacturing pottery on Korean methods lived.

Nichira, the Korean, seems to have been living somewhere in Osaka as we know it to-day, as his mound still remains and is well known as the mound of Nichira, the Korean, in Doshin-machi, Temma, Osaka.

The old site of the Toyoseki-no-miya Shrine at Nagara is found in the village Honjo-mura, Nishinari County, Osaka. There was the palace of the Emperor Kotoku, who make the famous reformation of Taikwa Era about 1,300 years ago.

The Shinto shrine of the god Sumiyoshi was founded in ancient times at Sumiyoshi, in Settsu Province. This god is said to rule over the sea.

The site of the mound of Otomo Kanamura is on the Sumiyoshi Road, in Settsu Province. The Otomo family long ruled the territory which contains Osaka, and one of them, who was a famous general in the ancient times, invaded Korea proper at the head of about 50,000 men, and after a successful expedition returned in triumph to Japan with many Korean captives, who were all settled down around the Osaka city of the present day.

The cliff of the Karafune-ga-fuchi is on the bank of the River Inagawa, flowing through Ikeda, near Osaka, and is the place where the Korean ships used to arrive very often.

Imaki-mura, in Yoshino, Yamato Province, was the colony in ancient times where the Imaki tribe (tribe from so-called New China) immigrated and made their own settlement.

The Katano-gori (Katano County), in Kawachi Province, was in ancient times the settlement of Kudara Korean tribes.

These are all well-known historical facts, and it is needless to dwell upon them here. The provinces of Yamato, Yamashiro, Kawachi, Idzumi, and Settsu are the original seats of Japanese civilization, which, though so greatly influenced and aided by the older Chinese and Korean civilization, yet it had its own characteristics, and in time flowered beautifully to the admiration of the whole world. Consequently these provinces are an inexhaustible mine of historical interest if we went deeply into it and unearthed more old sites and documents bearing on them; but it not being the object of this book to supply such sources of historical facts and to introduce them to the reader, we will penetrate no farther into this sphere of historical research. Students are all familiar with the historical fact that after Nara and Kyoto became in succession the Imperial capitals during the Fujiwara Age, the Central Government studied the Chinese and Korean civilizations deeply, and was so keenly stimulated with their highly advanced state in politics, administrative methods, and the general culture of society, that it was very eager to extend the new ways and means of civilization all over the Kinai Provinces (provinces around Kyoto, Osaka, and Nara), the middle provinces, and Shikoku provinces (four provinces in the inland sea, but not very remote from the Imperial capital), and to enlighten the general mind with these new ways of civilization. Their desire bore fruit in the enlightened Ocho Age (Monarchical Age), which was created later, and whose literature and social refinements in general gave very good models and patterns to the later Japan. Unhappily this Monarchical Age of general refinement did not last long, and the Monarchical Government, which was established by the Fujiwara family when they grasped the political power radically changed the Japanese world. Later the political power was transferred first to the hands of the Hojo family and then to those of the Ashikaga family ; and about the middle of the Ashikaga era we have the Onin era (1467–8), which proved the commencement of the so-called Dark Age of Japan, during which the rivalry of two great feudal lords Hosokawa Katsumoto and Yamana Sozen was the cause of continuous and prolonged civil war. When we say Dark Age it may at once remind readers of the dark Mediæval Ages of Europe, but the parallel is by no means complete. The Dark Age in Japan is so called because during that period the political power was contended for, and in consequence there were wars and battles everywhere throughout the country, but in fact during these ages the people in general of the provinces Kinai (five provinces around Kyoto), Chugoku (middle provinces) and Shikoku (four provinces in the Island of Shikoku), where the influence of the new civilization and Government authority were widespread, have already reached a high standard in agriculture, industry, and commerce. Their social system was complex, and so far advanced that they had their own self-governing bodies in their communities, and their modes of living and social institutions enabled them to have taste, hopes for the future, dignity, personal character, and knowledge—in fact, in every line of man's activity they advanced sure-footedly. When Toyotomi Hideyoshi unified the whole country, and constructed the great castle of Osaka to take up his abode there, it brought ease of mind and hope to the enlightened inhabitants of the provinces centring round Kyoto and Osaka, and gave an opportunity to these people to organize, combine, and develop to do whatever they liked best. The construction of Osaka Castle should be regarded in many points as the sign of a newly arisen generation with the promise of prosperity and grandeur. The industrial and fine arts produced in the age of Toyotomi Hideyoshi were called Articles made in the Momoyama Age and have been much admired by later generations, but it is not only these industrial and fine arts that are worthy of the admiration of posterity ; in all respects the Momoyama Age really marked an epoch in the economic history of Japan.

WITHOUT THE KAMIGATA PEOPLE THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO ECONOMIC HISTORY IN JAPAN.—Edo Castle was in many ways a good contrast to Osaka Castle. The construction of Edo Castle was due to the fact that it was politically necessary for Tokugawa Iyeyasu to build a castle there to govern the Kwanto Provinces, which were given him by Toyotomi Hideyoshi. In the Minamoto and Taira Age the Minamoto family ruling over the eastern provinces was triumphant over the Taira family, whose power was based on the south-western provinces and destroyed it; but it only proved that the rough and barbarous easterners could gain battles against the much more refined westerners, and was after all only a temporary war victory and nothing more. The seat of the Central Government was changed again soon after the Ashikaga family came into power, and as the Shogunate established itself in Kyoto, the balance of power again preponderated towards the west, and the Kwanto Provinces lacked sufficient depth and originality to create a civilization characteristic of the eastern provinces. Just as Edo Castle had no high mountain behind it, nor any large river around it, and the castle itself stands out abruptly in the large plain, there was no characteristic environment around Edo which could produce a special note in civilization. The construction, therefore, of the great Edo Castle was nothing more than a fact in a history of architecture, and the engineering, decorations, and designs which went to make it were begotten of the south-western civilization, while the commerce and public works which distinguished Edo after the castle was completed were all those of the men from the south-western provinces. More than that, even the orders and mandates regarding politics and administration that were issued from the inside of the castle almost all sprang from the brains of men from the south-west.

COMPARISON BETWEEN KAMIGATA PEOPLE AND THE JEWS.—Europe passed through the same stage when the struggle for power was settled by force of arms, and the strong and weak points of political systems were well tested. Then she entered on a new stage of business and commercial warfare when economic systems and commercial methods were thoroughly explored. During that period every nation in Europe was influenced by the sagacity and ingenuity of the Jews, upon whose economic acumen and business genius they all depended. In spite of the dislike and contempt in which the Jews were held by Europeans for over 1,000 years, because they were racially distinct, were not followers of Christ, and had a different mode of life, Jewish ingenuity and force of character were by no means destroyed. Once they entered the fields of commerce and business they made strongholds wherever they went, and such was their success in trade, commerce, and finance, that if the commercial and economic systems of modern Europe were to lose the sagacity, fertility of resource, and hard work of the Jews there would be nothing worth admiration in their vast economic world.

It has been unfortunate for the Jewish people that, hindered by history and tradition, they could have no power in European politics, but upon the commerce and economics of Europe that now form the foundation of European politics their power and influence have been supremely great; and now that political power is won not by arms alone, but largely by the power of money, the financial strength of the Jewish people has come by degrees to exercise a momentous influence upon the politics of the world. The reason why the Jewish influence came to be so prominent in all the financial and economic affairs of the world may be that they are specially gifted to control commercial interests, or it may be that, oppressed in all other directions of politics and religion, their economic talent has been specially developed, or it may be because their history was very old, the standard of their civilization very high, and their ways and means of living strongly individualistic. But the weightiest reason for the growth of the Jewish power and influence in recent times is that they were not welcome in any country, and, thus detached from the local interests, they had to earn their living in isolation, which caused them to put commercial profits before anything, and develop thus their commercial talents, ways, and means. With these few words about the Jewish people and their gradually growing power and influence upon the politics, finance, and economics of modern Europe, it will be instructive to study why the Kamigata people were so prominent in the economic history of Japan, for there are many points that were common both to the Jewish people and our Kamigata people in their histories, situations, and environments. The Kamigata people, that is, the people in the provinces around Kyoto or the older Imperial capital, Nara, had the oldest civilization in Japan, just the Jews had a very old civilization. The provinces were the most densely populated in proportion to their area in Japan. This was the land where warriors rose and fell, and this was the scene of their fierce struggles. Every time there was such a struggle the Kamigata people saw their territory, the provinces around Kyoto, Osaka, and Nara, made the centre of warfare and burnt and devastated. Even the Imperial Family, upon whom their loyalty and respect were concentrated, were slighted and restrained in their freedom by the rough and barbarous samurais now from the east and then from the west. In such a changeable world, under such a Government where one ruler was always giving way to another, they had nothing else to think of except how to enrich and amuse themselves, and thus their commercial and economic talents were wonderfully developed. Neither was this mental development confined to one or two merchants or business men, but all the Kamigata people in the Kinki and other provinces developed commercial talents which they passed on to their sons, grandsons, and remoter posterity, so that commercial talent has always been associated with the name of the Kamigata people in the minds of all Japanese, and that is why we can say that, excluding the contributions these Kamigata people made to the commerce of Japan, the economic history of Japan after the Middle Ages cannot be well understood.

Enterprises of Chaya Shirojiro.—The Kamigata people were willing to be obedient to the political power, and they never took such violent steps as to try to overthrow a Government or to resist it by force, for they were clever enough to discover ways and means by which they could utilize the other man's political power to bring them commercial profits. When, therefore, the whole country fell into a state of general confusion and disorder in the later years of the Ashikaga Age, and it was generally believed that only great military power could protect men's right of existence in such a chaotic age, they did not combine themselves to form such a military power for their own defence, but, steadily and peaceably looking out for sources of commercial or business profits, they secured the monopolies and commercial rights given below :—

In the provinces of Omi, Ise, and Yamashiro these Kamigata people secured and instituted for themselves a great many commercial privileges by the name of the Za (literally seat, but in fact a group of men with some business privilege).

They secured and instituted for themselves the right to control the roads from Nara to the Mino Province, forbidding other people to pass there. Finding that placer-gold was very inconvenient to transport they began to melt it and mint gold coin.

They were so clever and business-like that, hearing that there were large commercial profits obtainable from the foreign trade at the ports of Hakata and Nagasaki, many removed there with their families and entered the new business there.

It was these Kamigata people who, aiming at free cities as in Europe to be opened in a corner of Idzumi Province, opened the port of Sakae and made it a self-governing municipality.

It was they who made their markets so very flourishing that the feudal lords of the localities realized the necessity of protecting them. They further opened the markets and ports, and established the institutions called the Raku-ichi (free market) and the Raku-tsu (free port), based on the free-trade principle.

The records regarding the work and enterprise of individuals among the Kamigata people, whose genius, which was specially fitted for commerce, made great contribution to the trade and commerce of Japan, are highly interesting. Chaya Shirojiro was a mere merchant in Kyoto, who was not worthy of special mention except that he once made a present of tea to the Ashikaga Shogun Yoshiteru, but his extensive knowledge of commercial affairs enabled him to obtain the entire confidence of Tokugawa Iyeyasu, and, after serving Iyeyasu for a short time as a purveyor of dry goods for the Tokugawa family, he began to do his master great service by acting as his messenger to the Court nobles and even to the Imperial Court, a sort of non-official ambassador. After a while he was entrusted by Iyeyasu with such important affairs as to report to him secretly about the state of things in the south-western provinces, and he also took up a very important position as the exchange-business manager for the Tokugawa family, Government purveyor, and man in charge of Foreign Affairs; and letters sent to this Shirojiro by the Governor-General of Cochin-China show that trade between Tonkin and Japan was maintained by Chaya Shirojiro, and also that he was not only a mere foreign trader. Much more than that, he was the man in charge of the business relations of the Tokugawa family with the South Sea Islands and the diplomacy incidental to the trade. Chaya Shirojiro not only reaped large profits from his foreign trade, but also he possessed a share in Itowarifu (right of taking commission on the raw silk dealing business), and was among the most successful merchants of this age.

About the era of Tensho there was a certain shipowner called Kadoya Shichirojiro, at Ominato, in Ise Province, who was engaged in the water transportation business between Odawara and Hamamatsu for the two noble families of Tokugawa and Hojo. When Oda Nobunaga was killed by Akechi Mitsuhide in the 10th year of Tensho, Tokugawa Iyeyasu happened to be in the vicinity of Sakae city. On receipt of the news he crossed the Iga Pass, and visited Oda Nobuntaka at Kanbe, in Ise Province. Then, reaching the shore of Shirokonohama, he ordered this Kadoya Shichirojiro to prepare for him a junk loaded with brushwood, and, hiding himself at the bottom of it, he escaped to Tokoname, in Owari Province. Feeling indebted to this Kadoya Shichirojiro, he rewarded him by giving him a licence under which his ship, with a capacity of 400 koku, was free to ply to all ports in his provinces, and should be subject to no taxes. Later, when Iyeyasu, from lord of Mikawa and Suruga, became the actual ruler of the whole country, the Kadoya's ship with its licence, called a Red Seal Licence, was free to ply between all the ports in Japan without restriction of tax or dues.

Such are the histories of two large merchants who were directly related to the Tokugawa Shogunate, which go to show that the foreign and other extensive commerce was in the hands of the merchants of Kyoto, Osaka, Sakae, and of the provinces of Omi and Ise.

Ise-ya Houses in Edo.—When the Tokugawa Shogun constructed Edo Castle he was anxious to attract merchants from the provinces in order to make the city flourishing, but the country people were naturally stay-at-home, and not inclined to migrate in large numbers to Edo, in spite of the special attractions held out by the Shogunate. It was the merchants of Ise Province alone who moved in large numbers to Edo, so that by the time the moats around Edo Castle were all cut, houses with a shop curtain stamped with the characters Ise-ya (Ise house) were found in every street in the city. Indeed, the Edo people said that the commonest things in Edo were Ise-ya and dogs' droppings. After the Ise merchants there came a great number of merchants from Omi, and there were many branch offices of the merchants of Kyoto, Osaka, and of the provinces of Omi and Ise, soon after Edo had properly assumed the shape of a large city.

Bills of Exchange invented by the Mitsui Family.—About the year 1620 (6th year of Kan-ei) a Kyoto merchant named Yashiro came to Edo for the first time. Taking his stand on the Tokiwa Bridge he showed to the passers-by one or two rolls of dry goods hung over his arm, and in time he became very popular among the samurais, who all vied to buy his goods. His next step was to make a large cross of bamboo, upon which he hung many rolls of cloth and sold them, and he was so successful in his business that he built a large store and house on the 2nd chome, Honcho Street, and became a rich merchant. The story of this Yashiro Tarojiro is only one proof that the Edo merchants lacked sagacity and commercial talents to take advantage of the great castle and city, which had suddenly come into existence around them, and reap the profits themselves; but surrendered to the Kamigata people the advantage and the profits of which they could make nothing themselves, for about the time when the above street merchant from Kyoto was successful others from

Kyoto and Osaka crowded into Edo, among whom there came out a great merchant who invented an extraordinary new method in business. At this time the so-called Tenryo, the territories under direct control of the Shogunate, were scattered here and there all over the country, and the officials called the Daikan (Shogunate deputy in a small locality) collecting the taxes from the localities, or selling rice paid as tax by the local farmers, had to send to Edo the gold and silver thus obtained. But as there were about thirty or forty Daikans in the south-western provinces alone, and they had all to send gold and silver to Edo, the expenses at every town on the road for fresh coolies and horses were heavy. Now comes along a merchant who thought out a method of transmitting this gold and silver by bill. He undertook to receive the gold and silver in Osaka, and on his own responsibility and liability to pay the total sum of money to the Shogunate within sixty days in Edo, so that the Shogunate would be saved all the above expenses, and the merchant would have the use of the money during this term of sixty days, both the Shogunate and the merchant benefiting equally. When the Shogunate was petitioned by the merchant to adopt this method of sending gold and silver by bill it allowed itself to be persuaded, and thus a method of settling accounts by bill was adopted. The man who devised this method was Mitsui Hachiroemon, the forefather of the present Mitsui family.

Mitsui Hachiroemon was a native of Matsusaka, Ise Province, and as he had already by this time stores both in Kyoto and Osaka doing good business there, he opened a shop in Suruga-cho in Edo as soon as he was granted by the Shogunate permission to carry on this bill of exchange. He worked it in this way. He used the cash he received in Osaka to buy dry goods, which he brought from Kyoto to Edo, and then, selling the dry goods in Edo, he paid to the Shogunate the money due to it. The bills were payable in sixty days, but as it took only fifteen days or twenty days at longest to send money from Osaka to Edo, Mitsui Hachiroemon was able to make a profit both in the interest on the money and also in his business, so that with this advantage over other stores he was able to sell his wares at cheaper prices. His business soon prospered exceedingly, and he was able to carry on in a manner quite different from other merchants, who only tried to cozen their customers. Mitsui, on the contrary, adopted the fixed price system, payment in cash.

THE KIN-ZA WAS THE ENTERPRISE OF KAMIGATA PEOPLE.—Gold and silver were minted into coins, and became the medium of commercial transactions for the first time in the later years of the Muromachi Age, and the inventors of the system were the Kamigata men. Minting of gold coin was the enterprise of Goto Mitsutsugu, a goldsmith in Kyoto, who buying placer or bar gold in the provinces, minted it into gold coin. Minting of silver coin was the enterprise of the Ḍaikokuya, owned by a Chozaemon of Sakai, who, just as Goto Mitsutsugu, bought placer or bar silver in the provinces, and minted it into coin. When gold and silver coins were minted for the first time they circulated as a medium of exchange only on the liability of the above two rich men and no more, but later, when the Ashikaga Shoguns, and then the two Regents, Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi recognized the credit of Goto and the Daikokuya, and granted them the privilege of minting gold and silver coins, a coinage had become indispensably necessary to the general community. Toyotomi Hideyoshi granted the privilege to the Goto family of minting gold coin on the payment of a yearly tax of 1,000 large gold coins, and to the Daikokuya family of minting silver coin on the payment of a yearly tax of 10,000 large silver coins. The former privilege he named Kin-za, and the latter Gin-za. The gold and silver coins, then, that began to take the nature of legal tender money from Oda Nobunaga's time, became purely legal tender in the time of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and no other gold or silver coins being allowed to be minted in competition with those minted by the above Goto and Daikokuya families, gold coins with the name Mitsutsugu stamped on them, and silver coins with the name joze, became the sole legal tender, and circulated through the whole country. Goto Mitsutsugu, who was thus privileged to mint gold coins, was originally a farmer born at Sakamoto in Omi Province, who came early in life to Kyoto. While engaged in his coinage work, Kin-za as Hideyoshi called it, the world was changed, and the Tokugawa family came to rule over the country. When the Shogunate was established in Edo he followed Tokugawa Iyeyasu, the First Shogon to Edo, and was granted by him the privilege of minting gold coin, establishing his Kin-za in a big house outside the Tokiwa Bridge. Though the Kin-za was under the control of an official in the Shogunate, it was only nominally so and in fact, grasping in his hands the right of minting all the gold coins to be circulated in the whole country, this Goto Mitsutsugu had great influence over the finances of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Just as the Tokugawa family ruled politically over the whole country, this Goto family controlled its finances, and their power, wealth, and glory were even greater than those of the great feudal lords with a fief worth 1,000,000 koku a year. It was in 1601 (the 6th year of Keicho) that, in accordance with the representation of Sueyoshi Kanbei Toshikata, Shogun's deputy in the locality of Otsu, the Shogunate established the Gin-za in Edo, and minting silver money, announced the official exchange rate between gold and silver coins.

The *Tokugawa Jikki* (real history of the Tokugawa Dynasty) says of this coinage of silver :—

> From time immemorial silver coins were circulated in the coarse form called Haifuki, which means that silver ore is melted, beaten flat, and cut into small pieces, but, as there was no fixed rate of exchange between silver and gold, people were troubled when transacting business. Therefore Sueyoshi Kanbei Toshikata represented to the Shogunate that the price of silver being so different at different times and in different places, the prices of commodities were equally different, and that it was necessary that the central government should fix the price of silver. The Shogunate agreed with Sueyoshi Kanbei and established the Gin-za, appointing the said Sueyoshi Kanbei Toshikata director, and ordering him to take charge of minting affairs, together with Goto Shozaburo Mitsutsugu. The fineness of the silver coins was fixed anew and the small silver coins, the Chogin and Kotsubugin, were minted. These small silver coins were circulated and an order issued that the other silver coins, the Haifuku-gin and Tsubushi-gin, should all be brought to the Gin-za and converted to the new coins. When all such old silver coins and silver ore from the mines had been minted to an enormous amount and put into circulation, prices of commodities came to be well settled, and both the gold and silver coins circulating very smoothly, the whole nation rejoiced with the coinage system of the Central Government, and all were united in praising their beneficent administration.

It is not true that silver coins began to circulate for the first time in the Tokugawa Age, there already having been the silver coins minted by Gin-za in Kyoto during the Toyotomi Age, but just at this time the exchange rate between gold and silver coins was definitely fixed, and the two coins began to be used as legal tender, and we see in it another example of the economic talent of the Kamigata people.

PAPER MONEY AND THE GIN-ZA WERE DEVISED BY THE KAMIGATA PEOPLE.—The great economic invention of paper money convertible into silver coin was made for the first time by Kikyo-ya Goroemon and Kinokuniya Tozaemon, two merchants in Osaka. In the 3rd year of Genwa (year 1617), when the Edobori Canal of Osaka was cut, payment was made in silver notes. The face of this silver note bore in writing the amount of silver coin for which it could be exchanged, and also on the top a representation of the god Hotei, upon whose two shoulders were written the characters " Silver Note." On the back was the legend " Silver note for the work of cutting the Edobori Canal, Osaka City, Settsu Province, which all the people can use as a permanent treasure." Below were the names Kikyoya Goroemon and Kinokuniya Tozaemon, which signifies that these two men were perhaps the contractors for the canal or the capitalists responsible for this canal work. Paper money was issued for the first time in our country in the reign of Emperor Godaigo, about the year 1330, but it ceased to circulate without coming into general use, and the fact that this paper money was issued on the credit of private citizens and circulated, widely shows very evidently how economic talent was the general possession of the citizens of Osaka.

Business Enterprises in Edo were mostly undertaken by the Kamigata People.—When the officials of the Shogunate investigated the family histories of principal merchants and landlords in Edo in the year 1827 (10th year of Bunsei) it was found that, excluding the families of so-called Nanushi (eldermen on the town blocks), who were of old related to the places where they had been living since the time of their forefathers, and also the artisans, all the families of the principal merchants were descended from forefathers who migrated to Edo from the provinces of Omi, Ise, Yamato, and Yamashiro, though some were found to have sprung from the provinces of Hizen and Mito. A further proof that commerce in Edo was nothing more than the commerce of the Kamigata people. From the very beginning in Edo it was a business custom that all the commodities were sold wholesale by the toiya (wholesale houses) to the retail merchants, and in course of time the toiya came to have a sort of monopoly right. These monopolies were based upon share stocks, and the combination of these share stocks came at last to create an association of the same trade, so that an economic feudal system grew up within the wall of the military feudal system. In time these associations of the same trade developed banks to act as their monetary organs, all these business schemes being devised by the western Kimigata people. For instance, the Orange-toiya in Edo was originated by the merchants who migrated to Edo from Kii Province, and the Tokumi-toiya (ten combined wholesale houses) was started by Osakaya Ihei, a merchant in the Nihonbashi district, whose forefather came from Osaka.

Enterprises of the Kamigata People.—It is recorded of the business methods of the Kamigata people that, buying first the merchandise of Omi Province, they went to Shinano, where they sold the goods they bought in Omi and bought the staple products of Shinano; then, entering Echigo, they disposed there of the goods they brought over from Shinano, and again buying the Echigo products, sold them in Echizen, and thus their method of business was chiefly peddling. The reason why so many pedlars came out of Omi is explained by the fact that when the share right in the za (privileged company or association) was instituted by the Kamigata merchants, many such za combined and occupied for their own use certain roads in the five Kinai provinces and thereabouts, which they improved and utilized for their peddling journeys. In the middle of the Ashikaga

Age the centre of these pedlars in Omi was Sakata-gori and Aichi-gori (counties of Sakata and Aichi), which after the Toyotomi Age was changed to Gamo-gori and Kazaki-gori, whence emerged the diligent and clever merchants of Yawata and Hino. Omi pedlars were so energetic and hard working, that even at the beginning of the Tokugawa Government, when communication was very imperfect because of the bad roads, they came peddling to the provinces of Mutsu, Dewa, Echigo, Shinano, and Echizen, and also to the provinces on the Tokaido. In fact, the rich merchants in Omi were hardly ever at home, but travelled on business throughout the year, leaving their families behind them. When they opened branch stores in Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto they never employed women, but had men only to do all the work, even cooking and cleaning, and while in the shop the master and servants wore only cotton clothes; whence arose the saying Sen-ryo Tenbin of Omi (a carrying pole of the Omi men is worth 1,000 ryo of gold), which means that the Omi men would rather carry a pole loaded on both ends with merchandise and go a-peddling than have 1,000 ryo of gold and remain at home. But diligence was not the quality of Kamigata people alone, for they shared it with the north-eastern people and the south-western people alike. Their main characteristics were ability and ingenuity, by virtue of which they could invent a system, set up an institution, and work them both to advantage. Thus it was that they had already instituted the za, the Raku-tsu (free port), and Raku-ichi (free market), already made gold and silver legal tender, and issued paper money to make good the shortage of currency, and also invented a bill of exchange system. In fact all the economic institutions worthy of mentioning, specially in the economic history of Japan, were devised and put into practice by the Kamigata people. The diligence, ingenuity, perseverance, and thrifty habits of the Kamigata people enabled them to be as successful in their business and commerce as ants are at last successful in building their ant-hill; and had there been no Kamigata people to take a hand in Japanese trade and commerce, the economic system of Japan, controlled by the brave but stupid north-easterners and the fierce Kyushu people, and going from failure to failure as a result of their rough-and-ready and unpractical business ways, would never have emerged from its primitive state. The country then is, in this sense, under a great debt to the Kamigata people for their splendid contributions to the advancement of our trade and commerce.

THE WHOLE COUNTRY CONTROLLED BY THE KAMIGATA PEOPLE.—The Tokugawa family and other feudal lords won scores of victories, and when they constructed Edo Castle, they made Edo city symbolical of the age, all other cities and towns in the country being small Edos. Favouring the Kamigata people because of their diligence and thrifty habits, they invited them to their cities and towns to make them flourishing and prosperous by their commercial ability. The Kamigata folk were humble and obedient to the invitations of Shogun and feudal lords, and crowded into their cities and towns; but it was surprising to all the people to find that after half a century the feudal lords were so tightly enmeshed in the system, institutions, and regulations established by these Kamigata people that they could not move hand or foot. The Tokugawa Shogunate and feudal lords had supposed that their military power was the supreme power, but they found that the institutions and regulations that the Kamigata people established could not be severed by the military power any more than a sword could cut water, and the result was that, though the Shogun and feudal lords had won the country by their life-and-death struggle, yet they won it only for the Kamigata people to develop their power. Though at first driven like sheep by the Shogun and the feudal lords, the Kamigata people pitted their power of wealth against the military power, and by their organization and systems encroached upon its sphere. The common citizens of Japan were united by their example to contend with the military power, so that the history of Japan for 250 years was a history of the struggles between the power of the sword and the power of the purse.

CHAPTER XLIX

POLITICAL REFORM BY A SCHOLAR-STATESMAN AND CONSEQUENT REACTION

The Sixth Shogun Iyenobu.—Had Tsunayoshi continued for twenty or thirty years the same administration which he commenced with such good intent, but which was so bad, the country could not have continued enjoying peace as it did. His sudden death saved the country from the threatening danger created by his unwise methods. Iyenobu, the sixth Shogun, who had been daimyo at Kai, was a man of sincere character, who took a serious view of his duties as Shogun, and sympathized with the people. In addition to that, he had able assistance, and therefore though his reign was only for five years, yet it was marked by beneficent administration.

From his boyhood Iyenobu had been fond of reading and reverenced the teachings of Chinese sages. Among his teachers was Arai Hakuseki, a scholar-statesman, who later acquired a unique position in the Shogun's Government and played an important rôle in Iyenobu's administration. Hakuseki was born in 1653 and educated in Edo, where, at the age of twenty-six, he became a retainer of Hotta Masatoshi, then Premier. After Masatoshi's death, however, the Hottas were poor and could not keep all their retainers, and Denzo, as he was then called, had to leave, and started a private school in Edo. At this time Iyenobu, as lord of Kai, was living in the castle of Kofu, about one hundred miles from Edo, and wanted a good scholar in his family. He asked Kinoshita Junan, who was regarded as the foremost of all the scholars of Chinese classics in those days, to select one, and Junan recommended Denzo as the best possible man for the position. He was then thirty-seven years old and was already a distinguished scholar, noted for his deep learning and far-sighted opinions on public affairs. Under Hakuseki's guidance, Iyenobu made quick progress in his studies, so much so that before he succeeded to the Shogunate he had finished reading many standard classical books. Hakuseki took particular pains in expounding *Tsugan-Komoku*, a famous book written for princes. Iyenobu then became Shogun with the best intentions, while Hakuseki, his teacher, whose position was that of a Chief Councillor, was full of ambition to practise what he had learned through books in the administration of the country. Iyenobu was also fortunate in the co-operation of another faithful servant. Mabe Akifusa had been a Nō dancer, but later held an important position in the Shogun's Government. He was straightforward, of ripe experience, and also a loyal servant to the Shogun, hating the intrigue to which so many Government officials were then addicted.

ANIMAL SYMPATHIZING ORDER ANNULLED.—The very first thing that Iyenobu did after he assumed the office proved that he knew how to govern the country. While the late Shogun Tsunayoshi was yet unburied, Iyenobu called in Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, then Prime Minister, and conferred with him before the coffin of the late Shogun, and told him he had decided on the immediate discontinuation of the animal sympathizing rule, notwithstanding the late Shogun's wishes. Yoshiyasu agreed with Iyenobu, who requested the Prime Minister to communicate his wishes to the other senior Government officials. Then Iyenobu, facing the coffin of the late Shogun, offered his apology for annulling his predecessor's legislation.

ADMINISTRATION UNDER IYENOBU.—More than 8,000 men, who had been in prison for breaking the animal sympathizing order, were set free, and, moreover, Iyenobu personally attended to cases long pending from the time of his predecessor, which were promptly settled. Of these cases, 92 were dismissed by the court of the Shogunate and 3,737 more in the different feudal fiefs, so eager was he to readjust his predecessor's maladministration. To accomplish his aim, he realized the necessity of depriving Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu of the unusual power he had had in the country during Tsunayoshi's misrule, for which he was partially responsible ; and, as the first step, he dismissed two men from important positions, Matsudaira Terusada and Matsudaira Tadakuni. The men in question, both Yoshiyasu's relatives, were in personal attendance on the Shogun in the palace, and it was through them that Yoshiyasu had exercised his influence over Tsunayoshi. What the dismissal of these two men meant was understood by the people, who saw with pleasure that Yoshiyasu's star was declining, for they were sick of his administration. Even those who were once eager to win his favour now gave him not a second thought ; and Yoshiyasu, seeing how the wind blew, retired and became a priest—a proof that he would never take part again in public affairs. Iyenobu, however, had not finished with him. He took over three mansions from Yanagisawa, two in Edo, which had been honoured with a visit of the late Shogun, and another on the bank of the River Kamo, in Kyoto. The Yanagisawas were permitted to keep for themselves one residence at Atagoshita in Edo, and one villa at Sugamo in the suburbs, and Yoshisato, heir to Yoshiyasu, was allowed to succeed to the hereditary pension of 152,188 koku held by his father.

Iyenobu also issued an order for the withdrawing of the taison (big coin). This coin was not actually worth more than 7 mon, but the late administration wanted to see it circulating for 10 mon, and had tried every means to enforce the people to take it at the higher valuation, which was no small factor in the discontent of the nation. Then he rescinded an order issued by his predecessor for the removal of many houses on Iida-machi Street, so that a residence could be built on the site. In the time of Tsunayoshi learning was so much encouraged among the samurai class, and men were so busy with reading books and in such practices, that they not only neglected, but were even afraid of practising the martial arts. Iyenobu regretted and wished to change this tendency. He issued an order encouraging the samurai class in their practice in the fighting arts as well as in scholastic practices.

On the business side, in 1712, at Arai Hakuseki's suggestion, Iyenobu established the Kanjo-Gimmi-yaku, an office whose duty it was to handle the business of the Imperial Board of Audit as well as that of the Revenue Bureau of the present day. This new office took charge, first, of the collection of taxes from the Shogunate direct territories, and overseeing the officials in charge of those territories; second, the transportation of rice collected as taxes from those territories; third, the administration of rivers and other irrigation works; fourth, ports and general communications and traffic business; and fifth, the control of gold, silver, and copper mines in different parts of the country.

The territories owned by the Tokugawa Shogunate itself were supposed to produce over 4,000,000 koku of rice annually, and in the early days between 30½ per cent. and 30⅘ per cent. of the total production flowed in to the Shogunate as yearly taxes. But in later years the officials in charge of these territories became corrupt and used to steal part of the tax-rice, giving to the Shogunate various false reasons to account for the decrease in the tax, so that in the time of Tsunayoshi the total amount of the tax which reached the Treasury was not more than 29·89 per cent. of the total rice raised in the territories in a year. By reviving the office, therefore, Hakuseki wanted to put a stop to this official corruption on the one hand, and on the other to increase the Shogunate revenue to its old amount. Two men were put at the head of the office, Sugiyama Yataro and Hagiwara Genzaemon. These two accountants travelled round, personally visiting the territories; and the year after the revival of this office the annual revenue of rice increased by 433,400 bales, while the annual expenditure for irrigation decreased by 38,000 ryo. These facts decidedly proved how corrupt Government officials had been.

Among all Iyenbou's reforms, one of the greatest was his reform of currency. At first he received many suggestions and representations that more coins of worse quality be made to take the place of those of better quality then in circulation, because, by so doing, the Government could get an additional revenue. Not only did he refuse to listen to such suggestions and representations, but he reformed the currency by circulating even a better quality of coin than that then in circulation, Accounts of his reform of the currency are given in another chapter, on the vicissitudes of currency.

First Annual Budget for the Shogunate's Finances.—Perhaps even more beneficial than the reform of currency, but less known and least appreciated, was the institution of the annual budget. Tables of figures were clearly put on record by each department, which kept a record of its disbursements, but there was no record of the expenditure of the Shogunate as a whole. Consequently, no one could tell how much came in and how much went out of the Shogunate exchequer in a year. From a financial standpoint, the Tokugawa Shogunate in those days was like a pack of wild animals, each of which has life and an organization by itself, but which as a whole has no organization at all. Some secretaries at the Accountant office kept record on their own initiative of what they knew, but their figures could not be absolutely relied on. The ordinary disbursements of the Government were rather few in number, and not so large as the amount of rice and money to be given the hatamoto samurai (direct retainers of the Shogunate) and the daikan (local governors), etc. These were not difficult to record, but the finances were not managed according to any fixed regulations or on any established principle, and there were many extra items of expenditure which were decided upon unexpectedly, in accordance with the whim of the Shogun or his high officials. What may be called extraordinary items of expenditure sometimes surpassed the ordinary items. Even though the general disbursements of the Government might be fixed for the year, these figures could not be relied on. For instance, when some work was to be done, it was usually started without any estimate of its possible cost, and nobody could tell what it would cost until the work was completed and all items of expenditures in connection with it were settled. Nor was there any means of examining whether all payments had been made legitimately, as there was no office such as the Imperial Audit Board of to-day. When Iyenobu assumed the office of Shogun, Hagiwara Shigehide, Chief Accountant, when reporting to him of a deficit in the revenue of the Government, said that the only suggestion he could make was to re-coin the currency. Hakuseki differed, and asserted the revenue was enough, if economically managed. Iyenobu was of Hakuseki's opinion and refused to re-coin the currency and debase it. In the following year Shigehide reported that, contrary to his expectations, the revenue had increased, and suggested the repair of the Shogun's palace and also the construction of a shrine to be dedicated to the spirits of his ancestors, to which Iyenobu agreed. On the former was to be spent more than 700,000 ryo and on the latter 200,000 ryo. This expenditure, however, Hakuseki hinted, offered a chance of official corruption, because the revenues and expenditures of the Government were not kept on record. He believed that as long as the finances were handled loosely, corruption would never cease among the officials of the Government. At his suggestion, therefore, an order was issued that every item of revenue and expenditure of the Shogunate be kept on record. Thus 180 years after the Tokugawa Shogunate was established, Japan had, for the first time, a complete official record for the general revenues and expenditures of her Central Government. Such official statistics as are available at present date as far back as 1722, in the time of the eighth Shogun, Yoshimune, but it was Hakuseki who, in the time of Iyenobu, adopted the system for the first time.

HAKUSEKI AT THE PINNACLE OF FAME.—At first Iyenobu thought Hakuseki was no more than a scholar, who, learned as he was, was not a practical politician. He was indeed surprised by his wise and practical view on the re-coinage of the currency when the question was under discussion among the Shogunate officials, and he himself had not known how to decide. He fell in with his views, and ever after the Shogun relied on him and always sought his counsel on State affairs, most of which were decided in accordance with Hakuseki's suggestions. Hakuseki, the scholar statesman, was ennobled as the lord of Chikugo, and from that time until the death of Iyetsugu, son of Iyenobu, conducted the affairs of the Government, and stood on the pinnacle of fame, because not only did his fertile mind evolve wise opinions on the affairs of the Government, but he also had ability to carry his opinions into practice, and the laws, orders, policies, etc., of the Government were all inspired by him. He was so earnest and energetic in conducting the affairs of the Government that he was regarded as a severe task-master by the officials of the Shogunate, and his influence became so great that even senior officials of the Government did not dare to lift a finger against him. He revised many laws and rules then in force, and caused to be issued *Buke Hatto* (Rules for Sumarai), in April 1710. The laws and rules in those days were prepared more for reading than for practical purposes, and they were, therefore, well worded, and, indeed, fine pieces of literature, but were of little practical use. But after Hakuseki published his popular explanations of laws and rules, they became more widely understood by the people than ever before.

A TRADE SYSTEM ESTABLISHED AT NAGASAKI.—Hakuseki, under his wise master Iyenobu, was in course of readjusting the administration of the country when, unfortunately, Iyenobu died of illness in October 1712. Before he passed away, the Shogun summoned the lords and samurai, and, taking out his will, caused Hayashi Nobuatsu to read it to them. In it Iyenobu, giving instances in history, warned every one how a country under a young ruler was at a great disadvantage, because men under such a ruler fought one another for power, formed cliques and intrigued against one another. He asked his lords and samurai to work in harmony and unite their efforts in the cause of the country. In announcing Iyenobu's will publicly, Akimoto Takatomo said: "In the era of Genroku gold and silver coins were re-coined and the new coins were made of baser quality. Since then the circulation of currency has not been so smooth as it used to be, and the people have suffered greatly from it. Gold and silver are a standard of currency common throughout the world, therefore Iyenobu desired to re-coin according to the standard set by the founder of the Shogunate. Such were the wishes of the late Shogun, but he died before he could realize them, and he desired his wishes to be carried out even after his death." Iyetsugu, third son of Iyenobu, succeeded his father and became the seventh Shogun when he was only four years old. Ii Naohiro, then Prime Minister, and Mabe Akifusa, Lord Chamberlain, both, according to the late Shogun's will, took charge of the affairs of the country on behalf of the young Shogun, who was of an age to fancy sweetmeats more than anything else; but the opinions of Hakuseki still ruled in everything. A great work that the latter accomplished during Iyetsugu's time was the reform of currency, whereby he made and circulated a better quality of coins in the place of the base coins made in the era of the Genroku. Another piece of good work was the establishment of a trade system in the port of Nagasaki. When he undertook the reform of currency, Hakuseki naturally made inquiries into the finances of the Government, and, to his surprise, he found that a large amount of gold, silver, and copper was being exported every year through the port of Nagasaki. Therefore, in 1714, the Government, at his suggestion, put limitations on the volume of foreign trade to be done at Nagasaki. Regulations were issued that trade with the Chinese should not exceed thirty ships, and the amount of silver that the Japanese paid to the Chinese in trade should not exceed 6,000 kwamme, of which, however, half should be paid in copper instead of silver; that trade with the Dutch should not exceed two ships, or 3,000 kwamme of silver, of which half should be paid in copper. It was also regulated that the merchandise brought by Chinese or Dutch ships should be all included within the amounts legalized, and that no part of the cargo might be taken home by the Chinese and Dutch traders. It is well that Hakuseki, in connection with his recoinage work, discovered a large amount of gold and silver exported through Nagasaki to foreign countries each year, but the figures he gave for the total volume of gold and silver exported were erroneous. Besides, he was looking at the condition of trade in Nagasaki only, while, if he had surveyed the whole foreign trade of Japan in those days, he must have found that the outgoing of gold and silver did not exceed the incoming so greatly as he thought. Among the articles imported into Japan in those days the principal was raw silk, and a great amount of gold and silver used to be paid for it. But by the era of the Genroku sericultural industry had considerably developed in Japan, and was widely engaged in. The Japanese not only did not need to import raw silk any more, but in ten or twenty years from that time Japan was exporting fabrics made of raw silk produced at home. As it was, exports soon balanced imports at Nagasaki without any of Hakuseki's manipulations. The peculiar circumstances in which trade was done at Nagasaki in those days accounted for the peculiar condition of trade there. The ban that the Tokugawa Shogunate put in 1634 upon foreign trade strictly prohibited the Japanese from going to foreign countries for trade, and our foreign trade became one-sided and restricted to imports. As a result of this ban, Japan's foreign trade was monopolized by the Chinese and Dutch traders, and no other foreign traders were permitted to compete with them. An excess of imports over exports means an outflow of gold or silver, and as the Government did not like gold and silver taken out of the country in great quantities, it ordered the Japanese merchants in Nagasaki to pay for imports in copper as much as possible. But the merchants needed assistance, or there would always have been a shortage of copper in Nagasaki, and so the Government took the responsibility of keeping a proper amount of copper there. This fact shows that foreign trade at Nagasaki in those days was a business of the Shogunate, and, in fact, the trade conditions there were like those under the East India Company, with the Government interested in it. The trade lent itself to monopoly. Therefore it was well that Hakuseki established a system for it and restricted the trading of the Dutch and the Chinese, who were monopolizing our trade. All these circumstances, as well as the development of our foreign trade, are given in detail in chapters " Foreign Trade and Nagasaki " and " Foreign Trade and the Outflow and Inflow of Gold and Silver."

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS BY HAKUSEKI.—The next reform that

Hakuseki made was in the position of the Shogun in relation to foreign countries. Until his time the Shogun was regarded as the commander-in-chief of the fighting class known as the samurai, though he was the *de facto* ruler of the country ; and in his intercourse with a foreign ruler the Shogun was not accorded the honour and respect to which he was entitled as the ruler of Japan. For instance, in a letter addressed to the King of Korea the Shogun styled himself the Taikun of Japan, and the King of Korea in his letter to the Shogun used the same title. But, according to Chinese literature and institutions, from which it was derived, Taikun is not the proper title to be applied to the sovereign of a country. Hakuseki, therefore, recommended a change, to which the Shogun agreed. He now styled himself the King of Japan in his letters to foreign countries. But Hakuseki was not satisfied with the change in title alone and wanted to introduce into the Shogun's Government such institutions and customs as are appropriate to the court of a sovereign and elevate the somewhat coarse Tokugawa Shogunate. In other words, Hakuseki wanted to pattern the Tokugawa Shogunate after the Imperial Court in Kyoto. In 1698, when he was still the heir to the Shogun, Iyenobu married a daughter of Prince Konoye Motohiro, who among all the nobles of the Imperial Court in Kyoto in those days was regarded as best acquainted with the traditional institutions and customs of the Court of Kyoto ; and when he became Shogun, Iyenobu invited Motohiro to Edo to learn from him how the Court of Kyoto was modelled, and at the suggestion of his father-in-law changed many things.

SCANDALS OF COURT LADIES.—Despite the strenuous efforts of Mabe Akifusa, Arai Hakuseki and others for the reform of Shogun's Court and for a better administration of the country, the degeneration of the people in general was great. Society was unbelievably corrupt, and, like a human body seized by a fatal disease, it was almost beyond the power of man to cure it. Strenuous and courageous as they were, the efforts of Akifusa and Hakuseki could not cure the corruption of the people, which was so general a tendency of that time, and far from blaming these men for any lack of trying, one should rather appreciate even their fruitless efforts. Iyetsugu was only four years old when he was proclaimed the seventh Shogun and was put under the care of Akifusa, who had been a mere Nō dancer before he was given a position at Court. He had character and was faithful and honest in performing his duties, and, among the thousands of hatamoto, no one could be compared with him in these respects. But he was low born and had no family connections to command the people's respect, nor had he performed any meritorious deed either in the battlefield or in the civil service. In a word, he was a faithful, honest official, but not such a shrewd statesman as could, on behalf of the young ruler, wisely direct the affairs of the country. Tenyei-in, the widow of Iyenobu, was a noble and sagacious lady, but she was the daughter of a Court noble of Kyoto, with no Tokugawa blood in her veins, and did not know much of what was going on outside her palace. Gekko-in, Iyetsugu's real mother, a daughter of Katsuta Genseki, an Edo citizen, was also living with the young Shogun in the Court. She was clever enough, but had no family connections and honours, which have always commanded such respect in Japan. She was frank of speech, fond of fine clothes and adorning herself generally—in fact, a true daughter of Edo. Naturally, she disliked to see the customs, taste, style, etc., of Kyoto taking the place of those of Edo as a result of the reforms of Hakuseki and others, and struggled to preserve a flavour of Edo, in her own room and those rooms under her control in the palace at least. Consequently she was not on good terms with Tenyei-in, Iyenobu's widow, who was all for Kyoto. The new Government was then very weak, and had any powerful lord or a group of lords rebelled, it would have been helpless. Fortunately, however, both the lords and samurai class were equally corrupted, or more of them would have thought of trading on the corruption of the Shogunate and overthrowing it. As a matter of fact, the corruption of the Shogun's Court, serious, as it was, was not known to outsiders. But none knew it better than those living in the palace, and there were many scandals within the castle, of which the most notorious was that of Yejima, Gekko-in's head-maid, a woman of much influence in the palace. She frequently managed to leave the palace on some pretext or another and spent the night out with her lover, an actor, or visited the theatre where the man appeared. Not only that, but she tempted the other Court ladies to do the same. Yejima's scandalous doings, however, were discovered, and she was sentenced to be exiled to a lonely island. Her brother, Shirai Heiyemon, who was a retainer of the Shogun, and several others were put to death. Many were exiled, including two actors and a theatrical manager. Besides, sixty-seven Court maids altogether were put into custody at the houses of their respective relatives for being mixed up in this notorious Yejima case. These maids had dared to conduct themselves so indecently because they recognized the weakness of the Shogunate, headed by a boy Shogun, assisted by a Premier to whom no one paid any attention. That sixty-seven maids were involved in the case tells us how corrupt the Shogun's Court was in those days. But it was only a rational sequence of what may be called " Edo taste " or " Down-town taste," so much cherished by Gekko-in, as against the Kyoto taste in the Shogun's Court.

HAKUSEKI'S REFORMS DESTINED TO BE DESTROYED.—In spite of the general degeneration of the people, Hakuseki and his co-workers continued in their work of reform, but these reforms of institutions and customs in the Shogun's Court to pattern them after those of the Imperial Court of Kyoto were destined to be destroyed, for the Shogunate in Edo was an institution entirely different in its origin and in its functions from the Imperial Court in Kyoto. The Shogunate started in Kamakura and did not emanate from Kyoto. Originally it was the office of the commander-in-chief of the national forces, and its laws and regulations were military in nature, and, although they might not equal Kyoto in refinement, grace, and beauty, they were appropriate to the brave, fighting class of Edo. The more closely it kept to its original institutions, customs, and tastes, and the more it kept apart from those of Kyoto, the better could the Tokugawa Shogunate preserve its strength. Were it reorganized entirely after the Imperial Court in Kyoto, the reason for its existence would cease. The statesmen of the day should have remembered how the Hojo rule fell as a result of effecting reforms in the Kamakura Shogunate patterned after those of Kyoto. But they did not, and their reforms were likewise destined to be destroyed in case a thoughtful Shogun or Prime Minister should later hold the reins.

IYENOBU'S WORK UNDONE.—In due course the man who was to undo the reforms of Iyenobu and Hakuseki appeared in the person of Yoshimune, the eighth Tokugawa Shogun and brother of Tokugawa Yorinori, then lord of Kii. At first he was a small lord, possessing a territory worth only 30,000 koku of rice in Nibu county in Echizen Province, but after his brother's death he succeeded him as Lord of Kii. When Iyenobu was dying, his son and heir, Iyetsugu, was still young and delicate, and it was his wish that, in case Iyetsugu died prematurely, Yoshimune should succeed, as he was his nearest blood relation and, at the same time, the wisest of them all. Upon Iyetsugu's death, then, Tenyei-in, Iyenobu's widow, according to her husband's wishes, caused Yoshimune to succeed. As a small feudal lord, Yoshimune had had frequent chances of acquainting himself with the people ; he knew something of their actual condition, and was not so liable to be affected by the exotic Court atmosphere. It must be admitted he was somewhat eccentric and narrow-minded, and, though he was sometimes inspired with good ideas, he lacked statesmanship. As soon as he assumed the office, Yoshimune dismissed Mabe Akifusa and Honda Tadayoshi, both of whom held important positions under Shogun Iyenobu, and also Arai Hakuseki, whose official position was that of lecturer to the Shogun, but who was the *de facto* Prime Minister of the Shogun's Government. In their place he appointed as Chamberlains—an important post in those days—Ogasawara Shuzen, Arima

Jirozayemon, and Kono Kakubei, whom he brought with him from Kii. He also undid the reforms effected by Iyenobu in the Shogun's Court. In reviving the old military rules, Yoshimune said that the samurai should wear plain clothes, as decided by the first Shogun, Iyeyasu. These actions plainly speak of the new Shogun's disapproval of the reforms of Iyenobu, and, as far as he was undoing Iyenobu's reforms, he was not necessarily wrong. But he went too far. Believing that Iyenobu had attached too much importance to culture, with the result that practice in fighting was neglected, he took just the reverse policy. In order to encourage the fighting spirit among the people, he himself practised shooting in Edo and its environments. An area of twelve and a half square miles, with Edo as the centre, was the Shogun's own hunting-ground, where ordinary people were not permitted to shoot. We are told of twelve wild bears, one wolf, and four hundred and seventy deer being taken, showing that there were deep woods near the city of Edo in those days.

Dismissed Officials given Positions.—Yoshimune had been created a feudal lord by the Shogun Tsunayoshi, and he never forgot it. What did he do to manifest his gratitude? He appointed to responsible positions in the Shogunate Matsudaira Terusada and several others who were largely responsible for the maladministration of Tsunayoshi and were dismissed by Iyenobu. Gratitude is all very well, but this was a very unwise way of manifesting it. Besides, the reappointment of these officials in the Shogunate was misleading. The other officials hastily concluded that Yoshimune's aim was the revival of the same administration as under Tsunayoshi in the time of Genroku, and were eager to undo Iyenobu's reforms and revive anything of the Genroku period, simply in order to please the Shogun. Some Ministers even proposed to abolish Hakuseki's trade system, but the notion met with a strong opposition from Minister Kuze Shigeyuki, lord of Yamato, and the matter was brought before the Shogun for a decision. On the recommendation of Judge Ooka Tadayoshi he decided not to abolish the system. In these changed circumstances Hakuseki was entirely ignored, and nobody dared to come to see him or even speak to him. Kuze Shigeyuki alone continued to visit him occasionally out of respect for his learning and meritorious public services.

Sycophants' Influence in Politics.—Yoshimune had quickly undone the political reforms of Iyenobu and tried to carry on the administration in his own way, creating a new office called the Oniwakata (master of gardens). He had brought with him from Kii a gardener, Yabuta Sukehachi by name, who was in charge of the private garden, and Yoshimune got into the habit of chatting with him and hearing the news of outside. He found this so interesting that he instructed Sukehachi and other gardeners to find out the secrets of the lords and other samurai and bring to him all the information they could get. These men were called " masters of the garden," but in fact they were spies. That a ruler should work through irresponsible private spies instead of through his regular political organization is not only an unwise but bad and even harmful political system. Under this peculiar system sycophants, who acted as political spies, acquired influence. Yoshimune has been praised for this so-called practical form of politics, yet it must be stated that, while he was attempting to secure information about the secrets of the lords through his private agents, he did not know of the serious situation in his own palace brought about through the actions of the three chamberlains, Ogasawara, Arima, and Kono, whom he had brought with him from Kii, and who were meddling in politics. Because of their connection with Yoshimune, the Government officials were afraid of them and, in the attempt to please and flatter them, brought almost every affair of the Government to the three chamberlains for a decision. The Cabinet Ministers were thus entirely ignored in affairs, but, except for Kuze Shigeyuki, none of them dared even to complain. Shigeyuki alone warned his subordinates against it. One day the three chamberlains sent for Shigeyuki to come to their quarters in the palace, as they had some important affairs to discuss under the Shogun's order. Shigeyuki refused to go and told them to come to his office in the Cabinet if they wanted to talk to him. He thus upheld the prestige of the Government against the interference of chamberlains, but after he died, in 1720, the protest died out, and the sycophant Court officials, who knew nothing of practical politics, interfered with and decided on all the practical affairs of the Government, for the first time since the beginning of the Tokugawa Shogunate. The harmful effect was felt by the Tokugawa Shogunate for several generations after.

YOSHIMUNE'S FINANCIAL READJUSTMENT.—The finance of the Shogunate was in the most serious condition at this time. Yoshimune destroyed Iyenobu's political works, but had no policy of his own. He revived the system and the customs of the Genroku period, but not the brilliancy and gaiety that adorned it, and under the same loose, disorderly financial system the Shogunate under Yoshimune suffered from a money crisis, as it did in the period of Genroku. In July 1722 an order was issued that every lord possessing a territory producing 10,000 koku or more of rice each year should contribute to the Shogunate 100 koku of rice per every 10,000 koku. In announcing the measure, Mizuno Tadayuki, Cabinet Minister, stated: " The number of the Shogun's direct retainers (hatamoto) has increased year by year, and consequently the annual revenue of the Shogunate has ceased to meet the necessary expenditures. This year the Shogunate has not yet been able to pay their salaries, and the prison administration, too, has suffered for the same reason. The measure now adopted for an additional tax from these lords whose territories produce 10,000 koku of rice or more, is necessary to meet the present deficit in the Shogunate's revenue, for otherwise hundreds of the retainers will have to be dismissed. Of course, it is embarrassing, or rather humiliating, to the Shogunate to impose upon the lords such a tax, but the measure is not only unavoidable, but indispensable to lift the Government out of its present financial troubles." His statement unmistakably shows the critical financial position, and in view of this extra tax imposed upon the lords, the period of their stay in the city of Edo, which they had to make in turn, was reduced from one year to six months. The tax order thus promulgated remained in force for nine years till 1731, when the finance of the Shogunate was readjusted and the order was abolished. When the Shogunate imposed this additional tax on the lords, the latter cut down the salaries of their respective retainers, and though the extra tax was repealed in 1731, yet some lords did not restore the salaries of their retainers to the former standard. The lords liable to the tax were 264 in number, and the annual production of rice from their territories was 12,550,100 koku. The territories owned by the principal hatamoto and other direct retainers of the Shogunate who also paid the tax produced 2,637,530 koku a year, making a total of 20,187,630 koku, 1 per cent. of which, or 201,876 koku, was paid to the Shogunate as a super-tax each year. In the nine successive years, therefore, a total of 1,816,884 koku of extra revenue flowed into the treasury, which not only relieved them from pressing anxiety, but left the Government a surplus of 35,654 koku of rice and 127,557 ryo at the end of 1731, in view of which the Government abolished the tax. Further facts in connection with this financial readjustment of the Shogunate are given in the chapter "Revenue and Expenditure of the Shogunate." Undoubtedly this financial readjustment was a success, and why was it that Yoshimune, who did not possess any special political ability, accomplished what other statesmen had failed in for many years? Of course, the Shogunate, from its nature and standing, should have resorted to taxes on the lords for its revenue instead of relying on the revenue from its own territories, and, as we have seen, during the Genroku period it had imposed a tax on the lords in connection with the eruption of Mt. Fuji. Circumstances drove Yoshimune to adopt a similar policy which the Tokugawa Shogunate was destined to adopt sooner or later for its finance.

THE SHOGUNATE TROUBLED BY THE LOW PRICE OF RICE.—The

Shogunate, because of its financial difficulties, imposed a tax upon the lords, and the latter made the people share the burden. Every one suffered equally, and, as a result, attempts were made to open new rice-fields in every part of the country, the Shogunate and the lords encouraging the idea. The first encouragement was given publicly in July 1722, when a placard was posted at Nionbashi Bridge, in Edo, urging the opening of new rice-fields, and after that several orders were issued and various forms of facilities were given for the same purpose. As a result, the area of rice-fields greatly increased, and consequently the amount of rice produced increased too, while at the same time the Shogunate economized in its expenditure. The increase in rice naturally caused the price to fall, and this was further effected by the increased value of the coins. Iyenobu had started making better quality of coins to take the place of the base coinage then in circulation, which policy was continued by Yoshimune, and consequently the value of currency went up. In the period of Genroku the price of rice was 20 ryo or 40 ryo per 100 bales, and this fell to 24 ryo or 25 ryo in 1721–2. In spite of the low price of rice, the prices of general merchandise did not go down at all, for the advance in the style of living increased the cost of production and the luxurious tendencies of the people increased demand. The chief sufferers from this peculiar tendency of the time were the samurai and farming classes. From the lords down to the principal hatamoto, they were in reality land-owners, and their income was in the form of rice. The retainers and the lower class of the hatamoto received their salaries both in rice and money, but the greater part of it was in rice. The samurai class suffered from the lower price of rice as much as the farmers did, and although the Shogunate might leave the farmers to suffer, they could not overlook the suffering of the hatamoto, the direct retainers of the Tokugawa family, as they directly affected the Shogunate. Apart from any possible far-reaching political outcome from the suffering of the hatamoto, this class of samurai had to be saved from their financial difficulties. To cope with the fall in the price of rice, therefore, the Shogunate issued the following order on February 15, 1724, in Edo, Kyoto, Osaka, Hara, Sakai, and other principal cities :—

> Since last year the price of rice has gradually gone down, but the prices of other merchandise are still on the upward grade, and the people are suffering from it. Saké, vinegar, soy, and miso (bean paste) being made of rice, their price should, of course, change with that of rice. Charcoal, firewood, fabrics, and such merchandise, and human labour have an indirect relation with the price of rice, and the price of labour is decided according to it. There are, therefore, good reasons why such products as well as various kinds of labour should be priced in accordance with the low price of rice. Orders to the above effect have been issued since last year, but have not been effective as

yet, perhaps as there has not yet been enough time for merchants to adjust the prices of their merchandise. If the same prices are maintained this year, it will indicate their intention of making unreasonable profits. The prices of merchandise should be lowered. If anyone fails to observe this order and does not lower the prices of his merchandise on and after the 1st of March, he will be punished. The above order has been proclaimed in every part of the country, and if the manufacturer does not lower the prices of his product according to the lower price of rice, it should be reported to the Shogunate by the merchants who deal with the manufactures. If these merchants fail in reporting to the Shogunate, and let the manufacturers charge for their products without regard to the prevailing price of rice, they too shall be punished.

THE READJUSTMENT OF THE PRICE OF RICE.—The above order was based upon the reasoning that, all merchandise being made by workmen, who live on rice, the price should be reduced when the price of rice is low, but without regard to the relations between demand and supply. The scheme was, therefore, impracticable. In March of the same year the Shogunate issued another order to the Magistrates of Kyoto and Osaka : " With regard to speculative transactions in rice, the practice need not be restrained strictly when the price of rice is tending downwards," etc. The idea of the Shogunate officials was to permit speculation in rice in the hope that the price might go up as a result of it. We note here that the Shogunate, which had watched with suspicious eyes and checked the speculative practices of the rice merchants in Osaka in the period of Genroku, now resorted to this very practice to raise the price of rice. The clever merchants of Osaka and Edo were quick to take advantage, and made various recommendations to the Shogunate with regard to the adjustment of the price of rice, as a result of which three merchants in Edo—Kinokuniya Genyemon, Osakaya Shinyemon, and Nomuraya Jinbei—were ordered in November 1725 to buy up the rice on the market. The order read as follows :—

> These three merchants with their own money will purchase any amount of rice both in Edo and Osaka, though, at the same time, they are instructed not to do anything in any way that may interfere with the business of other rice merchants. The Government godowns at Asakusa are rented to them and they can store there any rice they may purchase. Of course, they may sell the rice at any time as they like. From the Government's rice in Osaka they are permitted to buy as much as 100,000 bales with bills of exchange. They will pay the Government an equivalent amount out of their stock in Edo.

Though these three merchants appear to have been making purchases on their own account, they were really cornering the market with the capital supplied by the Shogunate. The policy may be compared to that of the Meiji Government in about 1877 when they supplied a few merchants with capital and attempted to cause a fall in the rate of silver exchange through their manipulations.

A Rice Exchange permitted in Osaka.—These three merchants were not only supplied by the Shogunate with capital but given a special privilege, for they received a permit from the Shogunate to establish an exchange for rice in Osaka. It was regulated that all the rice brokers had to assemble there and nowhere else for their transactions, though the dealers who used to buy at ruling market prices, the rice coming into Osaka from other districts and provinces, were allowed to carry on their transactions as before. When transactions were made at this exchange on the rice sent to Osaka from the lords in the western, northern, and other parts of the country, the three promoters of the exchange were entitled to a commission of 2 bu in silver for every 1 koku dealt in, to be paid by the final buyer. As one-half of this commission was distributed among the brokers, it appears that the qualification of the brokers was limited.

A Rice Exchange in Edo.—Following the example of Osaka, a group of rice merchants in Edo also applied for the establishment of a similar bourse, and the Shogunate issued the following order in July 1730 :—

> Rokubei, Kihei, Genyemon, Kichiyemon, Yasuyemon, Jirozaimon, Heikichi, and Ichibei. These merchants, having applied to the Government for the establishment of a place for dealing in rice futures, their application has been granted. Those who wish to carry on such transactions on rice should apply to them for the purpose.

The Shogunate exhausted every effort to adjust the price of rice, and succeeded to a certain degree, but the distress of the hatamoto was very serious, and the Government was much concerned, as the end of the year was approaching. On the 15th of December, therefore, the Shogunate announced that it would loan money to the hatamoto in the following proportions : 30 ryo to every man possessing a territory worth 500 koku or more of rice a year ; 25 ryo to those of 400 koku or up ; 20 ryo to those of 300 koku or up ; and 2 ryo to the small samurai of 20 bales of rice or more ; the loan was to be paid back in forty years. At the same time, the hatamoto were ordered to cut down their living expenses by all possible means. So numerous were the orders and notifications issued concerning the readjustment of the price of rice and the economy of living expenses that scarcely any others appeared. Yet the price of rice was still as low in 1735 as before. Thereupon in the same year an official price was set for rice, namely, not more than 1 koku 4 to for 1 ryo in Edo, and not less than 42 momme of silver per koku in Osaka. It was also laid down that if anyone should buy rice for a lesser price, he would be fined 10 momme of silver per koku, and that an inferior quality of rice could be sold for less than the official price, but if anyone should attempt to sell an ordinary quality of rice for a lower price, as if it were a worse quality, he should be punished for it. Notwithstanding, the price of rice continued as low as before, and then the Government lent money to rice dealers and permitted them to corner the market. The merchants, however, hesitated, and the Government issued a decree in November 1735, attempting to force the rice dealers to corner the market on a larger scale.

THE LOW PRICE OF RICE ATTRIBUTED TO THE VOLUME OF CURRENCY. With all their efforts, the Shogunate failed to cause the desired rise in the price of rice, and now realized that the mere issuance of official decrees was of no avail. It was their duty to find out the true cause of the low price of rice, but they did not possess sufficient knowledge, and concluded that the only possible way for them was to consult with the merchants in Osaka, who must know the truth. A conference of the rice brokers and exchange merchants in Osaka was held, and the assembled merchants were requested to express their opinions as to the cause of the price of rice. These opinions were various, but agreed in three points. After the issue of silver notes was permitted in the different territories, this paper-money took the place of the silver coins which gradually disappeared out of the market. Merchants in various districts had to take paper-money, should they dispose of their rice in their local market, and they naturally brought it to Osaka to sell it for bullion, with the result that Osaka was overstocked and the price fell. The more rice was brought to Osaka, the more silver money was taken out of the city, and scarcity of currency thus created in Osaka meant a decrease in the quantity of rice to be purchased, causing a further fall in the price of rice. In the opinion of these Osaka merchants, therefore, the first step was to stop the issue of silver notes. Then the rice merchants in Osaka should be loaned 6,000 kwamme of silver, which would be enough to purchase 200,000 koku of rice. The system under which all rice was to be dealt with through the brokers only, and no other channel, should be discontinued, so that anyone could buy rice out of the stock kept in the godowns of the Shogunate. The exchange merchants, however, in their memorandum stated: "From the era of Genroku to the era of Hoyei currency was of inferior quality and various kinds, and the people complained. In the 4th year of Shotoku the Government improved the quality of currency, at the same time adopting one standard. But about the 13th year of Kyoho, the rice crop was so good that there was a glut of it. The price of rice has fallen and the people have again begun to suffer. Though one reason is the increase in the output of rice, another is the fact that the quality of the present currency is too good as compared with the present price of rice. For instance, 1 koku of rice is sold for 30 momme of the present silver (silver of Seitoku), but for 60 momme of Hoyei silver, or a difference of 100 per cent. The fact that the value of the present currency is out of proportion with the price of rice is responsible for the present low price of rice," etc.

In 1736 the Shogunate officials attributed the then low price of rice to the volume of currency, which was then small, and they concluded that the volume of money in circulation should be increased for the purpose of raising the price of rice. But the gold output of the country was limited, and it was impossible to increase suddenly the volume of currency by turning out more of the same quality of silver coins as those made in the period of Shotoku. All they could do, therefore, was to make a worse quality of coins in the place of the good quality coins of Seikotu, and thus increase the quantity. Hakuseki's currency reform was thus destroyed completely.

THE COMPARISON OF GEMBUN GOLD AND SILVER WITH THE OLD COINS.—So the re-coinage policy of Gembun was carried out. But a strange phenomenon occurred. The inferior Gembun gold coin was made to take the place of the Shotoku coin for the reason that the latter was of too good a quality. That it was bad in quality and less in weight can be seen from the following :—

GEMBUN KOBAN (GOLD COIN OF GEMBUN).

Length	2·2 sun
Width	1·2 sun
Weight	3·5 momme

GEMBUN ICHIBU-BAN.

Length	0·5 sun
Width	0·3 sun
Weight	0·875 momme

The exchange price of the Gembun gold was 165 ryo against 100 ryo of the Keicho gold, and about 105 ryo against the 100 ryo of the Genroku gold.

Compared with the Genroku gold, the Gembun gold is a little better in quality but less in weight, and as the value of each was 1 ryo the amount of gold contained in the Gembun coin was less than in the Genroku coin. No doubt the quality of the Gembun gold was worse than that of the Keicho gold. But when the new gold was issued to take the place of the then-circulating coin, the price of rice went quickly up, as expected by the Shogunate officials, and 1 koku of rice, which was sold for about 30 momme of the Shotoku silver, now fetched about 60 momme of the Gembun silver. This is a natural sequence of the decrease in the value of money caused by the debasing of currency. It is strange that when the good coins were re-coined into worse in Genroku the public denounced the step and pointed out the possible bad outcome, but the re-coinage policy of Gembun not only did not meet with any opposition from the public, but was rather well received, it may be said, because by this policy the volume of currency was increased, removing the cause of the people's suffering, though the quality of the gold had become worse. Moreover, when a worse quality of coins made its appearance in the market, as a result of Tsunayoshi's policy in the period of Genroku, the Keicho gold and other gold coins of a good quality then in circulation quickly disappeared out of the market, but such never happened when Yoshimune pursued a similar policy in the era of Gembun.

WHY WERE THE BAD COINS OF GEMBUN WELCOMED?—Another explanation is that the economic common sense of the people was much more advanced in the time of Gembun than in the days of Genroku. In the first decree on the re-coinage plans of Genroku, which was issued in August, in the 8th year of Genroku, it was said :—

> Both silver and gold coins now in circulation having grown old; an order has been issued that these coins be re-coined. The output of both gold and silver has decreased in recent years, as has also the amount of gold and silver coins in circulation, and it has been ordered that the quality of the new coins be lowered, so that a large quantity of coins be made and put into the market.

In so far as the aim of the Shogunate in the time of Genroku was to increase the volume of currency, it was the same as the policy of the Shogunate under Yoshimune. But in September, in the 8th year of Genroku, the Shogunate issued another decree, which says :—

> When the new coins are to be exchanged . . . for the existing ones at the mints, a certain premium should be given to the bearer of the old coins.

But how much premium should be given was not distinctly stated, and this created much uncertainty in the public mind. We do not know what premium was paid to the bearer of the old coins at the Government mints, but the Shogunate is said to have made a profit of 5,200,000 ryo or thereabouts by the re-coinage of the coins. In this sum must have been included that which the Shogunate made by re-coining the gold and silver coins then in its possession, but from the fact that the cash left in the Shogunate's treasury at that time was very small, it can be stated with certainty that the greater portion of the profit came from re-coining the old coins then on the market. From the above we can also imagine that the premium given at the Shogunate mints in exchanging the old coins for the new ones was so small that it did not compensate the owner of the old coins, neither was it given in accordance with any definite rules. Therefore the people did not like the new coins and preferred to conceal the old coins in their possession rather than exchange them for the new debased coins. The motive for which Yoshimune adopted the re-coinage policy was entirely different. Cash was not necessarily scarce in the treasury. The trouble was the low price of rice and the necessity of finding a way of remedying the situation and, at the same time, of fundamentally readjusting the finances. Research proved that the source of the trouble was the shortage of currency, and the Shogunate undertook the re-coining of the old coins simply for the purpose of increasing the volume of currency thereby. Yoshimune and his officials were not prompted by any idea of profiting the Shogunate through the operation, as Tsunayoshi and his officials did in the time of Genroku. These circumstances were clearly appreciated by the people, who consequently trusted Yoshimune and his Government more than Tsunayoshi. While the rate of premium claimable by the bearer of the old coins in exchange for the new ones was not proclaimed at the time of re-coinage in Genroku, it was distinctly fixed by law in Gembun, the decree running :—

> When the new coins are to be exchanged for the old at the Government mints, premiums should be given to the bearer of the old coins at the rate of 65 ryo per 100 ryo of gold and 5 kwamme for 10 kwamme of silver.

This ratio made quite clear the quality of the new coins, and proves also that the Shogunate under Yoshimune had no idea of profiting itself as a result of its re-coinage policy, as Tsunayoshi and his Government did. It is no wonder, then, that Yoshimune's re-coinage policy was not only carried out smoothly but was well received by the general public.

THE SHOGUNATE DECLINES POLITICALLY.—Yoshimune undid what Iyenobu had done, first, by discontinuing the institutions of Kyoto, which had been introduced in the Shogun's Court ; secondly, by reappointing officials who had been responsible for the maladministration of Genroku and dismissed by Iyenobu ; and, finally, by remaking coins of a poor quality to take the place of a better quality minted by Iyenobu. Not only did he completely reverse all the policies pursued by Iyenobu, but he rebuked him for his encouragement of literary refinement among the people, and pronouncedly encouraged militarism, hoping thus to keep the fighting spirit of the samurai class in a healthy state and divert the immoral and effeminate tendency of the time. But under his rule luxury and profligacy continually increased instead of decreasing, as he expected. Edo Handayu composed the popular song called " Edo bushi," which was widely sung at the theatres as well as in the licensed quarters. One of his pupils was responsible for "Kato bushi," another popular song, and later a certain Miyakoji Bungo wrote "Bungo bushi," which spread like wildfire among the young folks in Edo. These popular songs helped largely in the degeneration of the people under Yoshimune's rule. Besides, in spite of his declaration that the administration would be strictly carried on in accordance with regulations, his chamberlains and other Court officials, because of their personal contact with him, gradually gained political influence, and began to interfere with the affairs of the Government. Even the Cabinet Ministers could not decide matters themselves, but consulted these Court officials regarding affairs of State for which they were publicly responsible. For one hundred years or so, from Yoshimune down to the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the successive Shoguns have been either almost insane or invalids, and the political power of the Shogunate was always in the hands of some sycophant Court officials, smart politicians, or some such officials, who had no real political ability. Of course, there have been exceptions, but under the pressure of the old customs and rules and the strong atmosphere of conservatism, even able men could not show their political ability and knowledge adequately. During those years the Tokugawa Shogunate could be compared with an old house in which anyone who enters will be poisoned with the atmosphere of decay. Its political history during the last hundred years of its administration consisted mainly of family troubles caused by intriguing Court ladies or ordinary official business, none of which has any political significance. The country was continuously subject to maladministration or mismanagement, or, at times, even without any administration at all, and all this reflected upon the finances of the Shogunate, the system of which had been a fundamental cause of trouble from the very first. As we have seen so often, the Shogunate depended upon the limited revenue out of its own territory, which is said to have produced 4,000,000 koku of rice a year, instead of taxing the lords according to the varying needs of the time. The Shogunate contracted, so to speak, to take charge of the administration of the country with a limited revenue from a certain fixed source, and the system could not work for ever. In fact, the finances went from bad to worse year after year, and in its latter years the Tokugawa Shogunate lost all financial strength, though it still possessed political power over the lords.

THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE'S OWN TERRITORIES AND ITS TAXATION SYSTEM.—In discussing the finances of the Tokugawa Shogunate, we must know, first of all, how much land the Tokugawa family owned and how much rice the estate brought in annually, for though, in addition to the land, the Tokugawa family owned mines, forests, and some other sources of revenue, yet these were so uncertain that the

Shogunate could not rely upon them regularly for its annual revenues. For instance, the revenue from the mines was not only irregular, but after 1627 the output of both gold and silver suddenly decreased, and copper alone was turned out of these mines, but could not be regarded as a permanent source of revenue. The land was, therefore, almost the only source on which they could rely for regular revenue. The patrimony of the Tokugawa Shogunate changed often, but at the beginning it was estimated as producing 2,600,000 koku or 2,700,000 koku annually. During the time of the second Shogun, Hidedata, the Shogunate deprived 32 lords either utterly or partly of their territories, whose estimated annual output amounted to 5,000,000 koku altogether; the third Shogun, Iyemitsu, deprived over 40 lords of their territories, amounting also to 5,000,000 koku of rice a year altogether; the fourth Shogun, Iyetsuna, deprived 22 lords of their fiefs, worth 1,200,000 koku of rice annually; the fifth Shogun, Tsunayoshi, stripped 40 lords of their domains, worth 2,400,000 koku altogether; the eighth Shogun, Yoshimune, confiscated lands whose estimated annual production of rice amounted to 270,000 koku. But most of these confiscated lands were given again to the lords whom each Shogun named from time to time from among his relations or loyal friends, or were added to existing fiefs. The territories, therefore, owned by the Tokugawa family did not increase in proportion with the confiscations. The domain was estimated as worth about 4,000,000 koku of rice annually in the time of Iyemitsu. The most reliable records available on this subject are those prepared in A.D. 1757 (7th year of Horeki). According to these, the Shogunate lands in that year were worth over 4,429,000 koku of rice annually, which, however, decreased to 4,189,171 koku 83 years later, or in 1838 (9th year of Tempo), as the records of that year indicate. The Tokugawa Shogunate always possessed territories estimated to bring in over 4,000,000 koku of rice a year, but how much actual revenue came in it is very difficult to say, for the value of a lord's domain, like the taxable value of land in our own time, was a mere estimate, and the actual revenue varied according to the laws of each period and the custom in each domain. At the beginning of the Tokugawa Shogunate, out of the total output in a territory, the people took themselves 60 per cent. and paid to the Shogunate 40 per cent. But the system changed several times until the division was 50 to 50 on the whole in 1716 or 1720. Then there is a further consideration. One sho of unhulled rice was usually regarded as containing half a sho of hulled rice. When the Shogunate officials took a survey of a piece of land, its value was estimated in the unhulled rice to be produced, and it was necessary to fix how much hulled rice there actually was in each sho of unhulled

THE SHOGUNATE'S ANNUAL REVENUE FROM TAXES DURING 126 YEARS, OR FROM THE 1ST YEAR OF KYOHO (1716) TILL THE 12TH YEAR OF TEMPO (1841).

Year.	Annual Output.	Total Revenue actually received.	Received in Rice.	Received in Money.
	Koku.	Koku.	Koku.	Ryo.
Kyoho, 1st ..	4,088,530	1,389,570	1,074,035	115,176
Kyoho, 2nd ..	4,098,371	1,365,060	1,080,090	102,494
Kyoho, 3rd ..	4,044,570	1,435,542	1,127,181	111,765
Kyoho, 4th ..	4,050,850	1,393,529	1,092,581	109,236
Kyoho, 5th ..	4,057,180	1,395,682	1,098,490	107,949
Kyoho, 6th ..	4,066,500	1,305,650	1,027,061	100,722
Kyoho, 7th ..	4,043,320	1,414,290	1,115,508	108,478
Kyoho, 8th ..	4,112,390	1,303,930	1,050,289	91,534
Kyoho, 9th ..	4,278,370	1,488,360	1,190,997	107,910
Kyoho, 10th ..	4,360,670	1,466,215	1,166,544	108,849
Average.. ..	4,360,670	1,395,782	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 33·87 per cent.

Kyoho, 11th ..	4,310,100	1,500,691	1,204,965	107,182
Kyoho, 12th ..	4,414,850	1,621,980	1,374,545	110,750
Kyoho, 13th ..	4,409,753	1,465,486	1,181,659	101,501
Kyoho, 14th ..	4,446,688	1,608,354	1,292,703	114,346
Kyoho, 15th ..	4,481,056	1,551,345	1,233,428	115,654
Kyoho, 16th ..	4,530,908	1,365,049	1,090,557	100,769
Kyoho, 17th ..	4,521,401	1,392,391	1,062,635	119,558
Kyoho, 18th ..	4,541,744	1,461,986	1,153,187	113,489
Kyoho, 19th ..	4,541,816	1,343,519	1,061,441	101,655
Kyoho, 20th ..	4,539,331	1,462,706	1,130,432	119,238
Average.. ..	4,473,764	1,477,350	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 33·02 per cent.

Gembu, 1st ..	4,565,359	1,334,481	1,018,661	115,445
Gembu, 2nd ..	4,567,151	1,670,819	1,314,779	128,643
Gembu, 3rd ..	4,580,554	1,533,133	1,181,529	127,282
Gembu, 4th ..	4,583,446	1,668,584	1,313,907	127,838
Gembu, 5th ..	4,581,523	1,492,492	1,153,881	122,431

THE SHOGUNATE'S ANNUAL REVENUE FROM TAXES—*Continued.*

Year.	Annual Output.	Total Revenue actually received.	Received in Rice.	Received in Money.
	Koku.	Koku.	Koku.	Ryo.
Kampo, 1st	4,586,472	1,570,388	1,228,550	123,445
Kampo, 2nd	4,614,502	1,419,558	1,140,592	98,989
Kampo, 3rd	4,624,664	1,636,409	1,298,149	122,666
Enkyo, 1st	4,634,076	1,801,855	1,462,749	123,262
Enkyo, 2nd	4,628,935	1,676,322	1,335,114	124,001
Average..	4,596,668	1,580,404	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 34·38 per cent.

Enkyo, 3rd	4,634,065	1,766,214	1,422,876	124,602
Enkyo, 4th	4,415,820	1,551,214	1,237,156	117,334
Kwanen, 1st	4,411,240	1,590,491	1,270,661	117,702
Kwanen, 2nd	4,397,089	1,673,573	1,353,984	117,411
Kwanen, 3rd	4,390,109	1,693,726	1,380,425	115,691
Horeki, 1st	4,394,525	1,704,660	1,389,211	115,471
Horeki, 2nd	4,409,637	1,715,630	1,398,975	115,947
Horeki, 3rd	4,413,541	1,680,002	1,365,578	115,165
Horeki, 4th	4,407,515	1,650,387	1,336,747	114,783
Horeki, 5th	4,412,347	1,642,551	1,336,213	113,371
Average..	4,428,588	1,666,845	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 37·63 per cent.

Horeki, 6th	4,406,064	1,649,384	1,331,264	116,328
Horeki, 7th	4,420,503	1,552,846	1,262,896	105,630
Horeki, 8th	4,426,889	1,649,532	1,332,456	116,202
Horeki, 9th	4,471,712	1,701,560	1,383,756	116,464
Horeki, 10th	4,461,631	1,685,345	1,369,539	115,682
Horeki, 11th	4,465,654	1,680,127	1,359,958	117,523
Horeki, 12th	4,458,083	1,674,699	1,354,852	117,320
Horeki, 13th	4,375,836	1,643,963	1,334,204	113,262
Meiwa, 1st	4,376,432	1,636,386	1,324,862	113,954
Meiwa, 2nd	4,387,292	1,594,040	1,284,248	113,332
Average..	4,425,009	1,646,788	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 37·21 per cent.

THE SHOGUNATE'S ANNUAL REVENUE FROM TAXES—*Continued.*

Year.	Annual Output.	Total Revenue actually received.	Received in Rice.	Received in Money.
	Koku.	Koku.	Koku.	Ryo.
Meiwa, 3rd ..	4,387,045	1,538,971	1,241,641	108,724
Meiwa, 4th ..	4,394,756	1,598,767	1,287,527	114,163
Meiwa, 5th ..	4,378,684	1,547,248	1,229,794	116,619
Meiwa, 6th ..	4,378,574	1,594,461	1,275,740	117,153
Meiwa, 7th ..	4,371,923	1,467,010	1,131,973	123,549
Meiwa, 8th ..	4,375,647	1,353,282	1,021,543	123,363
Anyei, 1st.. ..	4,375,961	1,525,624	1,193,539	123,271
Anyei, 2nd ..	4,378,819	1,508,026	1,175,311	123,413
Anyei, 3rd ..	4,379,699	1,530,615	1,208,170	119,349
Anyei, 4th.. ..	4,387,091	1,520,866	1,199,900	117,750
Average.. ..	4,380,819	1,518,487	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 34·66 per cent.

Anyei, 5th.. ..	4,387,201	1,569,988	1,250,265	117,405
Anyei, 6th.. ..	4,392,791	1,556,681	1,237,367	116,793
Anyei, 7th.. ..	4,372,435	1,517,858	1,190,441	118,462
Anyei, 8th.. ..	4,373,996	1,525,452	1,194,575	119,859
Anyei, 9th.. ..	4,371,639	1,427,789	1,124,839	108,691
Temmei, 1st ..	4,348,278	1,465,836	1,147,934	114,663
Temmei, 2nd ..	4,332,441	1,460,933	1,138,370	116,529
Temmei, 3rd ..	4,350,709	1,219,484	968,418	95,865
Temmei, 4th ..	4,360,521	1,492,139	1,112,935	116,465
Temmei, 5th ..	4,330,634	1,403,708	1,093,200	114,412
Average.. ..	4,362,064	1,463,986	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 33·56 per cent.

Temmei, 6th ..	4,341,213	1,081,485	851,493	83,945
Temmei, 7th ..	4,360,544	1,444,933	1,164,205	112,291
Temmei, 8th ..	4,384,334	1,433,377	1,162,389	108,395
Kwansei, 1st ..	4,384,279	1,410,414	1,118,088	108,395
Kwansei, 2nd ..	4,380,524	1,442,995	1,159,230	105,731

THE SHOGUNATE'S ANNUAL REVENUE FROM TAXES—*Continued.*

Year.	Annual Output.	Total Revenue actually received.	Received in Rice.	Received in Money.
	Koku.	Koku.	Koku.	Ryo.
Kwansei, 3rd	4,382,813	1,356,289	1,088,669	99,550
Kwansei, 4th	4,393,572	1,470,399	1,187,978	105,596
Kwansei, 5th	4,393,000	1,476,278	1,199,720	103,481
Kwansei, 6th	4,403,622	1,471,301	1,190,091	105,320
Kwansei, 7th	4,504,516	1,545,767	1,257,316	107,963
Average	4,392,941	1,413,323	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 32·17 per cent.

Kwansei, 8th	4,507,226	1,559,023	1,269,573	108,164
Kwansei, 9th	4,501,193	1,561,828	1,274,532	107,273
Kwansei, 10th	4,504,565	1,544,821	1,256,966	107,609
Kwansei, 11th	4,499,020	1,501,108	1,212,107	107,801
Kwansei, 12th	4,493,395	1,552,740	1,265,727	107,103
Kyowa, 1st	4,474,977	1,558,351	1,273,466	106,658
Kyowa, 2nd	4,488,636	1,443,666	1,170,456	102,311
Kyowa, 3rd	4,485,711	1,562,872	1,272,120	107,627
Bumkwa, 1st	4,487,780	1,536,203	1,266,228	107,990
Bumkwa, 2nd	4,487,885	1,546,915	1,277,485	107,771
Average	4,493,038	1,536,752	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 34·2 per cent.

Bumkwa, 3rd	4,482,740	1,519,075	1,250,456	107,447
Bumkwa, 4th	4,453,870	1,425,102	1,163,522	107,211
Bumkwa, 5th	4,459,079	1,391,881	1,851,226	96,261
Bumkwa, 6th	4,457,080	1,501,989	1,230,897	108,436
Bumkwa, 7th	4,455,394	1,527,031	1,256,777	99,994
Bumkwa, 8th	4,478,873	1,532,910	1,241,483	108,476
Bumkwa, 9th	4,134,556	1,520,969	1,240,486	102,732
Bumkwa, 10th	4,437,458	1,501,877	1,221,763	103,459
Bumkwa, 11th	4,442,669	1,535,799	1,249,917	105,053
Bumkwa, 12th	4,423,929	1,501,023	1,214,791	105,240
Average	4,452,564	1,495,765	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 33.59 per cent.

THE SHOGUNATE'S ANNUAL REVENUE FROM TAXES—*Continued.*

Year.	Annual Output.	Total Revenue actually received.	Received in Rice.	Received in Money.
	Koku.	Koku.	Koku.	Ryo.
Bumkwa, 13th ..	4,423,274	1,483,067	1,196,505	105,215
Bumkwa, 14th ..	4,412,452	1,518,991	1,231,283	105,629
Bunsei, 1st ..	4,334,570	1,519,374	1,233,374	104,982
Bunsei, 2nd ..	4,352,548	1,537,207	1,250,568	105,133
Bunsei, 3rd ..	4,333,634	1,490,752	1,265,297	104,672
Bunsei, 4th ..	4,326,489	1,433,690	1,140,678	104,968
Bunsei, 5th ..	4,320,482	1,496,240	1,208,342	105,244
Bunsei, 6th ..	4,333,886	1,403,384	1,117,660	105,592
Bunsei, 7th ..	4,223,923	1,427,619	1,158,677	98,889
Bunsei, 8th ..	4,223,068	1,317,840	1,065,745	94,194
Average.. ..	4,328,432	1,462,816	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 33·79 per cent.

Bunsei, 9th ..	4,229,389	1,428,537	1,163,502	97,406
Bunsei, 10th ..	4,218,089	1,434,498	1,166,669	98,523
Bunsei, 11th ..	4,194,554	1,339,578	1,077,787	96,223
Bunsei, 12th ..	4,201,033	1,399,289	1,133,201	97,797
Tempo, 1st ..	4,182,691	1,378,578	1,113,204	97,715
Tempo, 2nd ..	4,201,301	1,429,328	1,162,448	97,980
Tempo, 3rd ..	4,204,038	1,396,390	1,120,504	101,292
Tempo, 4th ..	4,205,910	1,258,230	1,005,367	96,022
Tempo, 5th ..	4,202,806	1,427,193	1,150,709	101,648
Tempo, 6th ..	4,205,570	1,304,313	1,036,653	98,054
Average.. ..	4,204,538	1,379,593	—	—

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the total output during the above ten years was 32·81 per cent.

Tempo, 7th ..	4,202,493	1,039,970	807,068	93,161
Tempo, 8th ..	4,229,581	1,392,915	1,122,234	100,023
Tempo, 9th ..	4,194,210	1,305,746	1,046,104	97,412
Tempo, 10th ..	4,192,837	1,407,218	1,140,499	99,311
Tempo, 11th ..	4,166,475	1,382,698	1,138,359	97,735
Tempo, 12th ..	4,167,613	1,434,342	1,168,412	97,737

The average annual output during the ten years from the 3rd year to the 12th year of Tempo was 4,197,153 koku; the average annual revenue actually received was 1,334,901 koku.

The percentage of the revenue in rice actually received against the output during the ten years from the 3rd year to the 12th of Tempo was 36,774 per cent.

The average annual output during the 126 years from the 1st year of Kyoho to the 12th year of Tempo was 4,175,246 koku; the average annual revenue actually received was 1,536,907 koku.

The average annual output during the six years from the 7th year to the 12th year of Tempo was 4,192,201 koku; the average revenue actually received a year 1,327,148 koku, and its percentage against the annual average revenue 31·65 per cent.

rice. The tax rice was paid to the Shogunate in a bale, and it was regulated by a decree in the second year of Tenwa that each bale should contain 3 to and 5 sho of hulled rice. In addition, the people paid to the Shogunate an additional tax of 3 sho more per bale, namely 2 sho of novemai and 1 sho of kuchimai. With this additional tax the Shogunate used to pay the expenses of its local officials. But the above system was in force only in the territories called "tenryo," directly owned by the Tokugawa family, and not universally adopted in each and every part of the country. The systems adopted in the domains owned by the different lords, temples, shrines, nobles, or others were various and ever more complicated in many cases. For instance, different methods were adopted in different territories for the measuring of the area of the arable lands, and different rates of taxes, such as a division between the official and the people of 70 per cent. to 30 per cent., 60 per cent. to 40 per cent., 50 per cent. to 50 per cent., 40 per cent. to 60 per cent, or 30 per cent. to 70 per cent. Even the amount of the hulled rice supposed to be contained in 1 sho of the unhulled rice was different, 6 go, 5 go 6 shaku, or even 5 go. There were scores of different kinds of additional taxes, and their rates, too, varied in different territories, being over 1 to of rice in one place, 3 or 4 sho in another, 1 or 2 sho in another, 7 or 8 go in a fourth. In some territories the additional taxes were paid in money instead of in rice, at different rates of from 3 or 4 mon to 20 or 30 mon. One bale contained 4 to in one domain, 3 to to 5 sho in another, 3 to in a third. Different methods were adopted for deciding on the taxable amount of production from the arable lands; there were different ways of inspecting the condition of rice plants for the purpose of reducing taxes on the occasion of bad crops, and the rate of reduction was one-third in one territory, one-fifth in another, and two-thirds in another. In some places the inspection and measuring of arable lands for taxation purposes were severe and strict, though the rate of tax was rather low, while elsewhere the measuring was done rather leniently, but the rate was high. There were such inconsistencies as a big area of good arable land being exempted from taxation, while some barren lands, where nothing would grow, were subject to a heavy rate of tax. So many different methods and rates were in force in different territories, and certainly the system of the Tokugawa Shogunate in its own territories was not pursued universally throughout the country.

THE ACTUAL ANNUAL REVENUE OF THE TOKUGAWA FAMILY.—There were then so many different rates of tax in different territories, but speaking of arable lands supposed to be of equal value, it may be stated that the rates were 35 koku per 100 koku of the total output; that is, between 35 per cent. and 38 per cent. of the total output went to the official and the rest was taken by the farmer. The rate of fifty to fifty, namely one-half of the total output to the Government and the other half to the farmer, was adopted in 1716 or 1720 by Shogun Yoshimune, with a view of increasing the revenue of the Shogunate; but even in 1716 the Shogunate in levying taxes in different districts had to observe the different customs as well as rules prevailing in those districts, and the annual tax revenue of the Shogunate thus collected each year from its own territories scattered in different parts of the country was as shown in tables on pp. 306–10.

In these tables the quantities of rice are given in the unhulled rice, instead of the hulled rice, as was the custom during the Tokugawa period; therefore the actually received revenue, less 50 per cent., represents the actual amount of the hulled rice received by the Shogunate.

The average of these percentages of the different decades under review is 34 per cent., which means that the Shogunate received on an average a tax of about 35 koku out of every 100 koku of output. The average percentage of the revenue actually received against the output of a year during these 127 years under review is 36·774 per cent., which is a little higher than the average percentage of the different decades given above, and also means that the Shogunate received as a tax over 36 koku out of every 100 koku of output.

The tables also show the annual revenue the Shogunate received in the form of land tax. The rice thus received each year was kept in storage at seven different places, namely, in the Nijo Castle in Kyoto, the Osaka Castle in Osaka, at Shizuoka, Shimizu Port, Kofu, Otsu, and Nagasaki; and certain documents show us that the distribution and use of it were based more on a military than an economic standpoint.

CHAPTER L

THE REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES OF THE SHOGUNATE.—I

Revenues from the Official Business, Monopoly, Land, and Sources other than Taxation.—Besides the arable land producing over 4,000,000 koku of rice annually, there were other sources which the Shogunate relied on for its annual revenue. They were of many kinds, but there was no system and they were revised or discontinued frequently. Nevertheless, they increased year after year both in amount and description, until there were eleven such taxes being levied in the latter years of the Tokugawa period. Below are given the different revenue taxes that the Shogunate levied during the period from Genroku down to Kyoho or Gembun :—

I. ANNUAL REVENUE UNDER ORDINARY HEADING.

(1) Za (Monopolized Trade) Tax.

Silver Coin Za, Bronze Coin Za, Gold Coin Za, Gold and Silver Leaf Za, Cinnabar Za, Ginseng Za, Copper Za, Employment Za, Iron Za, Brass Za, Bronze Za, Camphor Za, Scale Za, and Measurement Za.

(2) Tax on Navigation by River-Boats.

The annual revenue on this tax which came from small boats operating in the rivers was 5,500 kwamme, paid in bronze coin.

The rate varied with the size of the boat, and the tax was first collected by the officials controlling the boats engaged in river transportation, but, in the 5th year of Kyoho, Tsuru Takezaemon was appointed to collect it, and the Tsuru family continued the business for four generations successively, apparently under contract with the Shogunate. In the 6th year of Temmei, Toshima Sahei, Director of the Board of Works in the Shogunate, was named the Director of River Navigation *ad interim*, and thereafter he collected the tax.

(3) Tax from Nagasaki Trade.

Beginning with the 12th year of Horeki, Nagasaki paid annually 15,000 ryo into the Shogunate's treasury in Osaka. At that period about 1,700,000 kin of copper was collected from different parts of the country annually and sent up to the copper mint, and of this quantity about 1,000,000 kin was disposed of in the form of bullion, but the rest was forwarded from Nagasaki to Osaka and Edo, where it was disbursed for the tax. If there was any silver in the copper mint, the tax was paid in silver instead of in copper, in which case the copper was kept in stock, and when the output of the metal was short, this stock was used at the prevailing price for settling with the Chinese and Dutch traders visiting Nagasaki, and money was paid for the same. When the Shogunate wanted copper, it drew on this stock. It was regulated that when the Nagasaki tax was paid in copper 473,680 kin of copper should go for 15,000 ryo, but that if the supply of copper was short, it could be paid in gold and silver partly, at the rate of silver 190 momme against 100 kin of copper, payment to be made at the Shogunate's godown in Osaka. This was the gist of a petition from Nagasaki regarding the tax, which was accepted by the Shogunate in the 5th year of Meiwa.

(4) Tax from the Stock Farms.

At Sakura, Kogane, and other places, under the care of the Lord of Sakura.

At Sakura, Uchino, Koya, and Yanagisawa, in Shimoosa Province, under the care of Watanuki Uyemon.

At Komako, Katori, Aburada, and Hassaku, in Shimoosa Province, under the care of the Lord of Sakura.

Those under the care of local officials of the Shogunate.

At Nakano, in Shimoosa Province.

The money from the sale of the horses, bred in these farms, was all collected by the local officials of the Shogunate.

The stock-farm at Mineoka, Awa, was in the charge of Sanyemon, who himself disposed of the horses bred there, and received the price on behalf of the Shogunate.

The Shogunate paid for the provender the wages and salaries of grooms, veterinary surgeons, and others employed on the farms, while the rations in rice, which were issued to these men in addition to the cash payment, came out of the tax rice collected at the office of the local official of the Shogunate.

(5) House-land Tax and Household Tax.

House-land Tax.—In June 1634 three places, namely, the suburban districts of Kyoto, Sakai, and Nara, were exempted from the tax. In July 1696 it was imposed in the city of Edo, at the rate of 3 bu in gold per 1 ken (1 ken is 6 feet) frontage, and pretermitted in 1703 owing to the suffering from the conflagrations.

Public Service Tax.—In 1721 a public service tax was imposed upon the people of Edo, according to the frontage of their house-lands. This was meant to be an imposition upon young men, who were exempt from the duty of doing service to the public. Regarding this tax, a decree was issued in February 1729 whereby it was regulated that the tax should be collected three times a year by the eldermen of each street. According to the statistics taken in April 1843, the public-service tax in Edo was imposed in accordance with the class of the house-lands, which were classified into three—first, second, and third—at the rate of one person per 5 ken of frontage in the case of the first-class house-land, per 7 ken of frontage in the case of the second-class, and per 10 ken of frontage in the case of the third. On house-lands given by the Shogunate the tax was levied at the same rate as on the second-class house-lands. In the lowest class of land the tax was imposed at the rate of one person per 20 ken of frontage, and one person was liable for 2 momme of silver, less one-fifth, to be collected fifteen times a year.

The number of streets in Edo, registered from the time gone by, were 728 altogether, which, however, gradually increased, and in 1710 there were

790 streets liable for the public-service tax. The Shogunate netted 3,474 ryo annually from this source of revenue, which increased to 6,347 ryo in 1818, but again decreased to 5,799 ryo in 1847, or 483 ryo per month. Owing to fires and other adversities some people could not pay the tax, and according to an investigation made in August 1847 arrears were about 200,000 ryo.

According to the documents prepared in 1814 the house-land tax collected in the city of Osaka during that year was 37,266.88 momme in silver. Rent collected from the leased official lands in Osaka was 650.2 ryo in gold and 57,290.48 momme of silver. Exchanging silver into gold we get a total of 939.2 ryo in gold and 4.87 of silver.

In Osaka, moreover, a part of the house-lands of the samurai and other unemployed lands were rented, and a sort of tax was collected from these lands, the revenue from which amounted to 64.23 ryo in gold and 1.75 momme of silver annually. Altogether the Shogunate's revenue from the three sources in Osaka amounted to 1625.11 ryo in gold and 0.823 momme in silver.

(6) Miscellaneous Taxes.

Dealing in Old Clothes.—A licence for dealing in second-hand clothing cost 1 ryo a year; a licence for a tea merchant the same. A barber paid 2 ryo, and an assistant barber 1 ryo a year.

Tax on Dyers.—The Shogunate imposed a tax of 1 to of rice per every dye-pot, and Tsuchiya Goroyemon, a dyer, was entrusted with the collection of the tax. Later the tax was paid in money, 200 mon in bronze coin, instead of rice.

Business Tax on Dealers in Old Clothes.—In 1701 a man called Hikozaimon, who was the headman of Tomizawa Street, Edo, was called to the office of the Shogunate as representative of the merchants dealing in old clothes in the city of Edo, when an order was handed to him that a pedlar dealing in old clothes should pay as a business tax 5 bu of silver per month, and one selling old clothes at his own store 9 bu of silver per month, the tax to be paid through the old-clothes merchants gathering-place each month; afterwards this business tax as well as one on dealers in gold leaf was rescinded.

Oil Tax.—In July, in 1770, a limit was put to the number of merchants dealing in oil in Osaka, and at the same time the fee of a permit was fixed at 50 pieces of silver a year.

Commercial and Industrial Business Tax.—In 1770 a regulation was issued that each house or store engaged in commercial or industrial business should pay a business tax at the rate of 2.5 momme of silver per month, the tax to be collected in February each year.

Fishery Tax.—In 1792 the fisherman's guild, called Fukagawa-Gumi, was saddled with a tax of 66 kwan 700 mon a year. This guild of fishermen in Edo had been used to contribute a certain quantity of fish to the Shogun's kitchen every year since 1625, and it had not been a tax, but the contribution was now enforced as a tax, and paid in money instead of in fish.

Tax on the Ten Guilds of Wholesalers.—In 1809 the formation in Edo of ten guilds of wholesale merchants engaged in ten different lines of trade was permitted. At the same time it was regulated that these guilds should pay to the elderman's office a tax of 8,150 ryo every year, but that one-half of the amount, namely, 4,075 ryo, be kept by the guilds themselves for their working capital, to be paid to the Government in every fourth year, and since this was not exactly a loan to the guilds, the Shogunate did not charge any interest on this money. There were similar ten guilds in Osaka, and the amount of tax paid by these guilds in 1814 was 5,364.13 ryo in gold and 1.78 momme of silver, but when the guilds were dissolved in December 1841, by the order of the Shogunate the imposition, too, was discontinued.

Carpenter's Tax.—In 1843 there were 3,600 carpenters in Edo, those employed by the state and by individuals included, who paid a tax of 107 ryo in gold and 0.35 momme in silver a year.

Plasterers' Tax.—Statistics taken in the same year give a total number of 280 plasterers in the city of Edo, who paid a tax of 12.3 ryo in gold and 7.5 momme of silver.

Saké Tax.—A decree on the saké brewing tax was issued in 1698. It was paid direct to the Shogunate in Edo and the Shogunate's own territories, but to the Jito (local governor) in the territories of local lords. The tax was imposed on the manufacturers alone, but not on the dealers. This tax, however, was discontinued in 1709.

In 1717 the Shogunate issued an order that a levy should be made upon the manufacturers of saké, and at the same time that the amount of saké to be brewed should be one-half of the quantity usually made annually in the past. Thereafter the brewer of saké was to turn over to the Shogunate a quantity of rice equal to one-tenth of that to be consumed in making saké, which rice was kept in stock and taken in lieu of the tax in money, which subsequently was discontinued in 1803.

(7) Shipping Taxes.

Kwasho Ship Tax.—In 1603 Kawamura Yosayemon and one more person were appointed by the Shogunate to be in charge of the administration of the river boats, popularly called Kwasho boats. On these boats engaged in navigation service on the rivers in Osaka, Amagasaki, Yodo, Fushimi, etc., was imposed a tax of 200 pieces of silver a year. In 1811 the amount of this tax was 470,000 ryo in gold.

In 1689 an order was issued to the owners of the boats working in the rivers, both in the urban and suburban districts of Edo, to pay a shipping tax.

The river boats in the eight provinces of Kwanto used to be inspected by the official in charge, but in January, in the 6th year of Kyoho, Tsuru Takezayemon was appointed to take charge of inspecting and collecting taxes on these river boats.

In 1722 a tax was collected at Uraga from the sea-boats passing there in accordance with the quantity of food carried, for the expense of the watch-fires there. The rate was 3 mon per 10 koku, 30 mon per 100 koku, 300 mon per 1,000 koku, and so forth. Those passing through Edo had to pay a tax at the rate of 6 mon per 10 koku at Edo on each voyage, but on their first voyage 18 mon each.

In 1766 at Nagasaki a tax was levied at the rate of 3 mon per koku on boats coming there from the different parts of the country, and one roll of sail-cloth on each boat from the neighbouring ports or villages of Nagasaki, the money thus raised to be spent for drainage work in the port of Nagasaki. Afterwards this tax was discontinued.

Wagon Tax.—In 1700 a regulation was issued that thereafter a tax should be levied on each wagon at the rate of 1 momme of silver per month.

Palanquin Tax.—In 1700 an order was issued that palanquins should pay 3 bu of silver a month. These last two taxes, however, were discontinued in 1703 owing to the conflagration in Edo.

Whaling Tax.—In 1712 a tax was levied on the whaling business at varying rates, such as one one-twentieth of the price of a whale, etc.

(8) Tax on the Hatamoto.

The hatamoto samurai, who were the direct retainers of the Tokugawa Shogunate, had the duties not only of serving on the battle-field, but also of doing civil engineering work for the Shogunate. With the changes in social conditions the hatamoto did not engage in such engineering work, but paid a sort of tax instead to cover the expenditure on the Shogunate's civil engineering works, which were now carried out by the regular contractors. The tax was paid in accordance with the rules issued in December 1689 at the following rates :—

1. Those with a salary of less than 20 bales of rice need not pay.
2. Those who get between 20 bales and 50 bales of rice, 2 bu in gold.
3. Those who get between 50 bales and 100 bales, 1 ryo in gold.
4. Those who get between 100 bales and 500 bales, 1 ryo 2 bu in gold per 100 bales.
5. Those who get more than 500 bales, 2 ryo in gold per 100 bales.

In 1714, 3,184 hatamoto samurai paid this tax, to the total amount of 175.45 ryo in gold and 8,386.6 mon of silver.

(9) Taxes in the Shogunate's Own Territories.

Taxes were imposed on people in the directly owned territories of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1724, to cover the annual expenses of the godown for the storage of rice, about 6,000 ryo in gold, collected at the rate of 1 bu in gold per 100 koku.

To cover the pay of the palanquin bearers, a tax was collected at the rate of 2 to of rice per 100 koku, or about 4,000 ryo in gold a year.

To cover the rice to be spent in connection with official travelling through the towns and villages along the highways to Edo, a tax of 6 sho of rice was levied per 100 koku, or about 1,900 ryo a year.

(10) Revenue from the Business Enterprises under the Direct Management of the Shogunate.

The mines throughout the country, with a few exceptions, were all under the direct management of the Shogunate, but their annual outputs fluctuated.

(11) Different Taxes Raised in the City of Edo (according to an Investigation in 1842).

1. Tax paid by the Hishigaki Shipping Corporation and others engaged in loading and forwarding business. This tax was raised from 1806 to 1841 to the annual amount of 10,200 ryo.

2. Contributions from dealers in dried salted fish, started in 1840 and discontinued next year, amounted to 100 ryo a year.

3. Contributions collected in the streets on the navigable rivers and canals, commenced in the 7th year of Bunkwa and discontinued in the 13th year of Tempo, raised 6,346.2 ryo in gold and 12.73 momme of silver a year.

4. Contributions by the fishmongers, who sold live tai to the Shogun's palace. In order to encourage their business the Shogunate made a donation of 2,300 ryo to these fishmongers in December 1820, and their sureties in return paid to the Mayor's office 69 ryo of gold each year.

With a view of helping in the business of the dealers, who sold fish to the Shogun's palace, the Shogunate made a donation of 3,000 ryo of gold, of which 2,300 ryo was given to the seven guilds of fishmongers, and 700 ryo to those who sold tai; and these two categories of fishmongers paid the magistrate's office 50 ryo of gold a year in return.

5. Contributions collected from the brokers in timber, wood fuel, and charcoal, both in Fukagawa and Honjo, to the amount of 298.2 ryo of gold and 10 momme of silver a year.

6. Contributions collected from the timber brokers on the river-side in Fukagawa to the amount of about 25 ryo a year.

7. Contributions made from the three dredging men in Fukagawa, 120 ryo or 40 ryo from each place a year.

8. Contributions from the newly opened area in the Itchujima in Fukagawa, 10 ryo a year.

The above were the sources of revenue for the Shogunate. Of these the contributions in the city of Edo were started and enforced without much consideration in the latter year of the Tokugawa period, when the Shogunate was in a difficult position financially and was eagerly seeking for new sources of revenue. When they were proved bad taxes, or business became depressed, they were discontinued, only soon to be started again when the Shogunate was badly in need of revenue, which shows clearly that the Tokugawa Shogunate had no guiding principle in its financial policies. Of the taxes raised in Osaka, Edo, and Nagasaki, such taxes as were paid by the wholesale merchants' guilds, by the hatamoto samurai, etc., went to the central coffers of the Shogunate, and were what we call state taxes; but the other taxes were spent more for the administrative expenses of the city or town, where they were raised, than taken into the state treasury. They were, therefore, more of a local tax than a state one. So were the taxes raised in the districts under the direct administration of the Shogunate. The taxes, as mentioned above, were of a temporary nature, as their names indicate, and their amounts were rather irregular.

II. EXTRAORDINARY REVENUES.

Gifts from Feudal Lords.

The presents that the lords made to the Shogunate were nothing but gifts at first, as the word indicates, but after the Third Shogun, Iyemitsu, fixed certain rules regarding them, they took the nature of a sort of tax. These presents, some in goods and some in money, did not amount to much in value, but certainly were a source of revenue to the Shogunate. They were of two kinds, one was regular and the other extraordinary. The presents that the lords made to the Shogunate in each of the four seasons were called the season presents, and differed in kind according to the season in which they were made, and the size and location of the domains. For instance, the present might be a basket of sea-bream, a few packages of cotton, or a certain amount of silver money in lieu of a pair of fowls, etc. On the occasion of various celebrations at the Shogunate, so many presents in the form of gold or silver money, swords, clothing, furniture, utensils, etc., were made from the lords and Hatamoto that the Shogunate counted on these presents for its expenditures to no small extent. Presents were made on such occasions as follows :—

A. Celebration of the arriving at manhood, etc.

- Celebration of the appointment of the heir to the Shogun.
- Celebration of the Shogun's heir dressing his hair for the first time ; tying his top-knot.
- Celebration of the Shogun's heir putting on his hakama for the first time.

B. Wedding celebrations.

- Celebration of the wedding of the Shogun's heir.
- Celebration of the Shogun's heir putting on ironaoshi (a sort of ceremonial garment).
- Celebration of the birth of the heir to the Shogun.
- Ceremonies of the wife of the heir to the Shogun putting on a swathing band five months after she had become pregnant.
- Celebration of the 7th day after the heir of the Shogun was born.
- On the occasion of celebration of the public announcement of the name of the heir to the Shogun.
- On the occasion of celebrating the wife of the Shogun's heir giving birth to a child.
- On the occasion of celebrating the recovery of the Shogun's heir from smallpox.
- Celebrating the first visit of the Shogun's heir to the shrine.

C. Presents on the occasions of funeral ceremonies.

- On the death of the Shogun.
- On the death of the real mother of the Shogun.
- On the death of the wife of the Shogun.
- Regulations regarding the sympathetic calls during the period of mourning.

D. Presents on the occasions of festivals.

- When stone lanterns are presented to the ancestral shrines.
- Memorial festivals for the deceased real mother of the Shogun.
- Memorial festivals for the deceased wife of the Shogun.
- Celebrations upon the Shogun's safe return to Edo from his visit to the ancestral shrine in Nikko.

E. Presents on the occasion of appointment of officials, etc.

- When a person celebrates his appointment to a Government office.
- When a person announces his samurai name or is given an official title.
- When the official recognized wife of a person's father is given a Court rank.
- When a person's wife is given a Court rank.
- When a Shogunate official is transferred or appointed to another office *ad interim*.
- When a person was promoted in his Court rank.

F. Presents on the occasion of succeeding to office, etc.

When a person succeeded to his father.
When a person retired from public life.

G. Presents on miscellaneous occasions.

When foreign merchants from Nagasaki are granted audience by the Shogun.
When the lords are received in audience by the Shogun.
When the heir to the Shogun moves house.
When the lords call on the palace on the days of the three great national festivals.
On the occasion of the Emperor's ascent to the throne.
When the Shogun moves house.
On the occasion of celebrations when an unlucky year is past.
On the occasion of celebrations on the Shogun's safe return to Edo from his visit to Kyoto.

CHAPTER LI

THE REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES OF THE SHOGUNATE.—II

CLASSIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE.—The sources to which the Tokugawa Shogunate resorted for its annual revenues were such as were covered in the foregoing chapter. We have now to look into the ways in which the revenues thus acquired in rice and money were spent. In those days the Shogunate had no guiding principle nor any definite policies in finance. As a matter of fact, no budget was ever prepared, but each of the different departments spent as much as it found necessary at any time. Even what was spent was not recorded. Rice and money were taken into the treasury as they came, so to speak, and were spent likewise. It was about 1718 that the Shogunate, for the first time, began controlling at one specific office the revenues and expenditures of its different departments and put them definitely on record. But even at that time there was no annual budget. In 1750 Hotta Masasuke, lord of Sagami, who had been stationed at Osaka Castle representing the Shogunate, was transferred to Edo, and was named a Cabinet Minister. Later he was made the senior member of the Cabinet, when, for the first time, he ordered budgets to be prepared which were to be strictly adhered to. Even for civil engineering works, the repair of ships, and such kinds of work, it was ordered that not only specifications, but estimates should be presented before the work was started. This means that 150 years after its beginning, the Tokugawa Shogunate for the first time had definite regulations for its financial affairs. But even in those days the items of expenditure, called "Regular Expenditures," once decided on, were repeated annually without change until forced into it by changed circumstances. There were many items of what may be called extraordinary expenditure which were very elastic and often the cause of misdemeanours or corruption among the Shogunate officials. It may be said, indeed, that the financial condition of the Tokugawa Shogunate always depended largely upon the expenditures under the heading of "Extraordinary."

The annual expenditure was classified into two parts. One was the allowances and salaries of the hatamoto, etc., paid in rice, and the other was for the most part the regular business expenses of the central offices of the Shogunate, paid in gold or silver. Principal items of expenditure were :—

The regular business expenditures of the Central Government.

The allowances and salaries paid to the hatamoto.

The allowance for the Imperial Household.

Expenditure for the construction or repair of bridges.

Annual allowances to the Court nobles in Kyoto.

The salaries of the officials at the gold and silver mint.

Salaries to physicians.

The expenditure in the Shogun's palace.

The business expenditures of the detached offices of the Shogunate at different places where the representatives of the Shogun were stationed.

Allowances to officers attached to the Imperial Palace in Kyoto.

Allowance to the officers attached to the Shogun's daughters and like persons.

Expenditures for the present to be made to China through the King of Loochoo.

(1) The Regular Expenditures of the Central Government.—Though there were changes made from time to time in the regular items of the expenditures of the Shogunate, the principal items were :—

2,000 ryo of gold.	For the offices of the Magistrate of Edo.
400 ryo of gold.	For the navy in Yedo.
200 ryo of gold.	For the navy in Osaka.
265 kwan and 800 momme of silver.	For the Imperial Household in Kyoto.
40 kwan and 100 momme of silver.	For the repair of the Imperial Palace, the Nijo Castle noble's residences, etc.
75.9 koku of rice.	For the repair of the Imperial Palace, the Nijo Castle, etc.
750 ryo of gold.	For the repair of Osaka Castle.
350 ryo of gold.	For the repair of Shidzuoka Castle.
100 ryo of gold.	For the repair of Kofu Castle.
50 ryo of gold.	For the repair of bridges in Kyoto.
50 ryo of gold.	For the repair of bridges in Osaka.
700 ryo of gold.	For the Shinto or Buddhist implements or ceremonial trappings of these rites.
15,000 ryo of gold.	For clothing.
10,000 ryo of gold.	For the culinary expenses of the Shogun's residence.
5,000 ryo of gold.	For the culinary expenses of the residence of the heir to the Shogun.
6,000 ryo of gold.	For construction expenditures. Of the above amount, 5,206.2 ryo was regular expenditure and 793.2 ryo extraordinary expenditure.
2,000 ryo of gold.	For mats. The above amount includes both regular and extraordinary expenditures.
8,386 ryo of gold.	Expenditure for civil engineering and such kinds of work. Besides, an allowance of 30 ryo was given to be distributed among the most diligent. The total amount of this item, therefore, was 8,416 ryo.
750 ryo of gold.	For timber.
2,500 ryo of gold.	For handiwork.

750 ryo of gold. For the expenditure on the godowns at Asakusa.
1,500 ryo of gold. For the purchase of copper and tiles.
10,000 ryo of gold. For the handling of timber taken from the forests in the province of Hida.
1,000 ryo of gold. Expenditure of the building office.
5,400 ryo of gold. For the purchase of necessary articles.
4,000 ryo of gold. Expenditure for river administration.
150 ryo of gold. Expenses of the office of the Governor of Fushimi.
50 kwan of silver. Expenses of the office of the Governor of Osaka.
45 kwan and 600 momme of silver. Expenses of the office of the Governor of Kyoto.
1 kwan and 600 momme of silver. Placed in charge of Lord Sakai for expense in connection with the collecting of silver.
300 ryo of gold. Expenditure for prison administration.
100 ryo of gold. Expenditure for the horticultural office.

Total, 92,560 ryo of gold, 430 kwan and 400 momme of silver, and 75 koku 9 to of rice.

The regular annual expenditures of the Shogunate were as quoted above, when the official outlays were most strictly economized, and about 28 per cent. less than items in the period of Horeki. But these official expenditures of the Shogunate increased again and became as great as those in the period of Horeki. Therefore it may be safely said that the regular annual expenditures of the Tokugawa Shogunate were mostly the amounts given above plus 20 or 30 per cent.

(2) THE KIRI-MAI, FUCHI-MAI, AND YOKU-RYO.—Of the hatamoto samurai, those who did not possess their own land each received a certain quantity of rice out of the rice the Shogunate received from its own territories and kept in stock at its godowns in Asakusa. This rice allowance was called the Kiri-mai (divided rice), because it was given out three times a year, and each time one-third or one-half of the allowance was given in money instead of in rice, according to the price officially fixed. This official price was decided on by the Shogunate in accordance with the general economic conditions, and was publicly announced. In the period of Horeki the rice allowance amounted to 1,427,450 bales of uncleaned rice, which, each bale containing 3 to 5 sho, meant 499,600 koku. Rations called Fuchi-mai were also given to some samurai. There were two kinds of Fuchi-mai. One was the regular ration, and the other was given for official services. These rations amounted to 73,200 koku annually. Each person received 1 to 5 sho in a long month and 1 to 4 sho 5 go in a short one.

(3) YOKU-RYO.—Not all the hatamoto samurai could be given official positions. Some were appointed officials of the Shogunate, but others were not, and the former, besides the Kiri-mai, received a regular official salary, called the Official Yoku-mai (salary rice), which

amounted to 78,000 bales (each bale containing 2 to 6 sho, or 20,600 koku a year).

The above three payments, when put together, amounted to 600,400 koku a year.

(4) THE EXPENDITURES OF THE IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD AND ALLOWANCES TO THE COURT NOBLES.—The annual expenditures of the Imperial Household, then in Kyoto, were decided on in 1792 as follows :—

Regular culinary expenses of the Emperor's palace, 745 kwamme of silver.
Addition to the above, 350 or 360 kwamme of silver.
Miscellaneous expenditures for the Emperor's palace, 800 ryo of gold.
Regular culinary expenses for the retired Emperor's palace, 515 kwamme of silver.
Miscellaneous expenditures for retired Emperor's palace, 700 ryo of gold.
Regular culinary expenses for the palace of the Empress Dowager (there were two Empress Dowagers then), 192 kwamme of silver.
Miscellaneous expenditures for the Empress-Dowager's palace, 40 ryo of gold.

The above sums were contributed to the treasury of the Imperial Court each year. If there was any surplus in the budget for the Emperor's palaces, it was to be put in charge of the two denso (senior chamberlains), who were to notify it to the chief Court lady. Surpluses, if any, in the budget for the two other palaces were to be treated in a similar way. Unspecified expenditures, if there were any, were to be paid with the surplus money. If an unspecified expenditure was of a very important nature, the Shogunate was to be notified of it before it was decided on.

So meagre were the annual appropriations from the Shogunate to the Imperial Court in Kyoto, and so far from covering the necessary expenditure, that the Court asked for supplementary amounts almost every year. These the Shogunate lent, to be returned when the Court could pay. These loans, borrowed from the time of Kyoho, were outstanding to the amount of 513,311 ryo of gold in 1792, in which year the Shogunate notified the Imperial Court that the debts were altogether cancelled.

In December of the same year, with regard to the expenditures of the three palaces of the Imperial Court in Kyoto, the following regulations were issued :—

THE ANNUAL EXPENDITURES OF THE IMPERIAL COURT.

Miscellaneous expenditures on the Emperor's palace, culinary department, 800 ryo of gold and 745 kwamme of silver.
Miscellaneous expenditures of the Dowager-Empress s palace, culinary department, 700 ryo of gold and 192 kwamme of silver.
Additional contribution, 300 kwamme of silver.

Total amount, 1,900 ryo of gold and 1,455 kwamme of silver.

In 1865 the Shogunate examined and approved the annual expenditure of the Imperial Court of that year. The items were :—

Paid out of the godowns in the Imperial palace, 9,213 koku.
Paid out of the godowns in the palace of Empress, 687 koku.
Paid out of the godowns in the Nijo Castle, 13,021 koku.
Expenditures both regular and special of the accountant office, culinary department, the repair office, of the culinary department of the palace, of the sons and daughters of the Emperor and that of the Empress, 23,429 ryo [1] of gold, 225 mon of Yeisen coin, and 8,485 kwamme of silver.
Amount paid in gold and silver instead of in rice, of appropriations, 104,411 ryo 2 bu 1 sho of gold and 2,936 kwamme of silver.
Amount paid in gold and silver instead of rice, of special contributions, 104,411 ryo 2 bu 1 sho of gold and 94,896.25 kwamme of silver.

Total amount, 22,923 koku, 432,637 ryo 1 bu of gold, 37 mon 5 bu of Yeisen coin and 11,515 kwamme of silver.

Besides, there were other expenditures, as follows :—

Paid out of the tax raised in the territory attached to the Imperial sanctuary, 20,226 koku.
Paid out of the tax collected in the territories attached to the state shrines, 606.6 koku.
Expenditure for extraordinary construction or repair work and contributions to the Princes of the Blood, 71,413 ryo 1 bu of gold, 62·5 mon of Yeisen coin, and 1,058 kwan of silver.
Rice put aside out of the godowns in the Nijo Castle, and placed in charge of the Governor of Kyoto, to be used when there was a deficit in the amount of tax raised in the territories attached to the Imperial Court, 1,475 koku of rice.
Silver put in charge of the governor of Kyoto for the same purpose as mentioned above, 678 kwamme of silver.

Total, 2,102.00 koku of rice, 71,413 ryo 1 bu of gold, 62·5 mon of Yeisen coin, and 1,737 kwamme of silver.
Grand total of the above two groups, 25,025 koku of rice, 504,050 ryo 2 bu of gold, 100 mon of Yeisen coin, and 13,253 kwamme of silver.

In 1867 it was decreed that all the private territories in the province of Yamashiro (except those owned by Court nobles, temples and shrines) be discontinued and made the territories of the Imperial Household.

The territory attached to the Emperor's palace, in the province of Yamashiro, had an output of 20,000 koku of rice a year, and a territory worth 5,000 koku of rice, in the province of Tamba, was attached to the palace of the newly retired Emperor.

A territory with an annual output of 5,000 koku of rice was attached to the palace of the first living retired Emperor, and a 50 per cent. tax was raised annually. This tax-rice of 2,500 koku, together with 900 koku, was paid each year as an annual allowance to the Princes of the Blood and to people of high rank.

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[1] 23,429 ryo may be 234,290 ryo, otherwise the figures do not comply with the total.

The amount of gold and silver money paid to the palace of the Emperor each year was 800 ryo of gold and 745 momme of silver, both of which were regular outlays. Besides, there was an additional 100 kwamme of silver in contribution. When the amount of tax raised in the territory attached to the palace decreased, the said contribution was increased by 260 kwamme of silver. In case of a further deficit in the revenue, it was covered with interest money, collected on the loans made by the governor of Kyoto to the people.

The amount of gold and silver money paid to the palace of the Empress was 400 ryo of gold and 192 kwamme of silver. In addition, there was a contribution of 100 kwamme of silver. Out of the above, 261 kwamme of silver was spent each year for the repair of the buildings, etc., of the palace.

The total expenses of the Court were :—

In rice, 25,025 koku.
In gold, 504,050 ryo 2 bu.
In silver, 13,253 kwamme and 557 momme.
In copper, 100 momme.

Besides, there were allowances to Court nobles, noble priests, and Court ladies, in all 97,085 koku of rice.

(5) The Expenditures for the Shinto Shrines and the Buddhist Temples.—Some temples received more than 1,000 koku in rice, and the total amount of allowances for temples and shrines made by the Shogun was 82,514 koku in rice, 139 ryo in gold.

(6) The upkeep of bridges in Edo, which was borne by the office of the Governor of Edo. It was 950 ryo a year in 1777.

(7) Allowances to the Court nobles from Kyoto visiting Edo each year were 1,632 ryo of gold.

(8) Allowances to the people employed at the gold and silver mints in Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka were 2,212 ryo of gold in 1794.

(9) The number of the official physicians in Edo was 196 altogether, and their allowance totalled 53,438 koku, and the rations given to them were for 944 persons.

(10) The regular expenditure on building and repairs was 7,000 ryo of gold.

(11) The total regular annual expenditure of the Shogun's palace in 1867 was 170,000 ryo of gold.

(12) The regular expenditure of the offices of the daikwan (officials

who, on behalf of the Shogun, administered in different local districts) was 21,803 ryo of gold.

(13) The salaries of the Zaiban and Koban officials. The Nijo Castle in Kyoto, the city of Osaka and the city of Shizuoka were regarded by the Tokugawa Shogunate as the most important places from strategic, administrative and commercial standpoints. The samurai on guard in each of these cities were called the Zaiban and those who performed the duty of guard *ad interim* were called the Koban.

The following were the allowance for Zaiban and Koban at Osaka and Nijo :—

Yakutaka salary, 27,000 koku.
Yakutaka salary, 18,000 koku.
Yakutaka salary, 10,000 koku.
Yakutaka salary, 10,000 koku.

THE ZAIBAN AND KOBAN AT SUMPU.—The Koban received rations for 400 persons per 10,000 koku of his principal salary or allowance.

(14) MISCELLANEOUS ALLOWANCES.—Tanehime (daughter of the Shogun) received 500 bales of rice and 3,000 ryo in gold annually.

The goriki allowance to the Lady Renko was 4,000 ryo in gold, 50 kwamme of silver, and 500 bales of rice annually, also rations for ten persons.

The ategai allowance of Lady Ansho-in was 3,520 ryo of gold and 950 bales of rice.

(15) Presents made by the Loochoo Islands to China. These presents were 900 kwamme in silver.

The other items of expenditure were :—

Subsidy to road expenses in connection with the visit of the envoy of the Emperor of Korea.

Donations to the musicians.

Donations to sumo (wrestling matches).

Donations to the people.

Donations in connection with celebrations on the proclamation of the Shogun.

Donations in connection with celebrations on the transfer of official appointments.

Donations in connection with celebrations on the seventh night after the birth of the heir to the Shogun.

Donations in connection with the offerings to be made by the Shogun's daughter on her visit to the shrine.

Donations in connection with the recovering from illness of the Shogun and other high personages.

Donations on the occasion of mourning.

Donations on the occasion of Buddhist memorial services.

Contributions for the maintenance of the mausoleums.
Donations toward the expenses of the Shinto ceremonies.
Alms to the priests for reading the Buddhist Scriptures.
Contributions for the construction and repairs of the Imperial shrines.
Contributions toward construction and repairs of the temples and shrines.
Donations to the temples where the Court peers stopped while travelling.
Expenditure of the abbots of the Monzeki temples travelling to Edo.
Contributions to the Imperial Court.
Presents to the Court nobles.
Expenditure for the reception of the Emperor's messenger on the occasion of his visit to Edo.
Expenditure for the construction and repairs of the Imperial palace building.
Public prizes.
Rewards to delators.
Prizes in connection with the studies in the ancient rites and ceremonies.
Donations for the relief of the poor.
Donations for the relief of the sufferers from calamities.
Gifts and loans to the hatamoto samurai.
Contributions toward the construction of Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.
Loans to the local communities or associations, etc

The revenues and expenditures of the Tokugawa Shogunate were such as are given above, and if it tried, the Shogunate could well meet its necessary expenditures with its revenues, and would not have been in financial trouble, as it often was. But in addition to its regular expenditures, as given above, the Shogunate had what is called extraordinary items of expenditures, which were of a very large amount. These extraordinary expenditures were often made use of by Government officials, either for political purposes or for the purpose if profiting themselves, and they increased year after year, until finally they exceeded the regular expenditure. In order to meet its increasing extraordinary expenditures the Shogunate had to find new sources of revenue, and for this purpose it imposed taxes on the lords, who, however, passed the burden on to the people under them. Here lay the cause of all the financial disorder from which the Tokugawa Shogunate suffered. To show what these extraordinary expenditures were, a few of them are given below. How difficult it was to get an idea of these special items of expenditures of the Shogunate can be seen from the fact that some items were given as spent for "certain purposes," but how much the sum was is not mentioned. Some were paid out of the regular revenue, and were to be covered by special revenue later, which, however, was not done. Yet some had the nature of a "continued appropriation." In truth, there were not a few items which it is difficult to discuss from a standpoint of the modern theory of finances. Of these items of the Shogunate's expenditures, to be listed under " extraordinary expenses," the principal were :—

Allowances to the Shogun's daughters.
Allowances to the Shogun's relatives.
Expenditure for the encouragement of culture.
Expenditures for the medical school.
Donations towards the repair of the schools.
Donations towards the libraries.
Donations towards the construction of schools.
Prizes for the encouragement of literary works.
Expenditures for the guarding of the forts.
Expenditures for the manufacturing of cannons.
Prizes for the manufacturing of cannons for forts.
Donations for messenger expenses.
Division of money left after death of Shogun.
Donation for the expenses of the retainers' moving.
Donations for the relief of those lords who suffered from calamities.
Donations in connection with the visit to Edo of the envoy of the King of the Loochoo Islands.

The above items of expenditures were picked out of different records and periods, therefore the total cannot be taken for a total of the Shogunate's " extraordinary expenditures " during any particular year. They are given here to show what some of the " extraordinary expenditures " of the Shogunate were in those days.

CHAPTER LII

THE REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES OF THE SHOGUNATE.—III

THE existing records of the revenues of the Tokugawa Shogunate differ from one another in many respects, but from the most reliable of them the following had been prepared on the annual revenues and expenditures of the Tokugawa Shogunate both in gold and rice during one hundred and fifty years :—

THE REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE, BOTH IN GOLD AND RICE, DURING THE 115 YEARS FROM 1722 (THE 7TH YEAR OF KYOHO) TILL 1836 (THE 7TH YEAR OF TEMPO).

Year.	Rice.		Gold.	
	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Revenue.	Expenditure.
	Koku.	Koku.	Ryo.	Ryo.
1722	529,919	550,705	841,789	956,950
1723	720,959	699,991	1,023,715	797,713
1724	603,910	647,153	1,032,793	710,401
1725	760,580	665,612	805,725	702,769
1726	654,614	616,655	879,831	647,945
1727	688,575	652,554	903,039	698,045
1728	653,559	627,341	860,461	673,638
1729	621,347	648,916	778,314	727,569
1730	854,240	592,998	798,752	731,167
1731	540,897	480,142	770,267	772,899
Average of the above ten years	653,860	618,206	869,468	741,911
Balance ..	(surplus)	35,654	(surplus)	127,557
1732	611,017	676,259	925,909	897,271
1733	829,474	776,985	863,474	899,017
1734	710,326	683,491	1,090,265	759,118
1735	771,158	593,449	974,204	935,067
1736	979,116	898,186	1,890,121	1,483,030
1737	635,279	644,032	1,773,762	1,394,257
1738	831,572	768,438	2,119,550	1,720,868
1739	697,666	661,668	2,293,810	1,391,901
1740	862,594	788,267	1,838,996	1,236,575
1741	706,697	658,367	2,028,044	1,353,844
Average of the above ten years	763,489	714,914	1,559,813	1,205,294
Balance ..	(surplus)	48,575	(surplus)	374,519

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN GOLD AND RICE—*Continued.*

Year.	Rice.		Gold.	
	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Revenue.	Expenditure.
	Koku.	Koku.	Ryo.	Ryo.
1742	809,662	761,792	1,869,386	1,391,109
1743	719,491	716,501	1,674,518	1,572,767
1744	801,263	715,866	1,370,692	1,236,632
1745	979,661	866,035	1,522,522	1,117,949
1746	783,264	679,925	1,610,317	1,257,594
1747	871,440	735,676	1,450,224	969,050
1748	710,985	598,919	1,495,370	1,123,103
1749	710,824	620,664	1,579,538	1,124,477
1750	817,744	754,762	1,724,807	1,039,657
1751	823,105	821,058	1,763,670	1,073,083
Average of the above ten years	802,713	727,119	1,606,104	1,190,542
Balance ..	(surplus)	75,594	(surplus)	415,562
1752	767,136	738,957	1,834,995	1,030,674
1753	838,673	720,066	1,788,672	996,125
1754	677,640	715,567	1,765,631	1,093,393
1755	842,742	822,747	1,809,358	993,063
1756	821,546	815,576	2,282,393	1,175,620
1757	781,630	791,505	2,225,829	1,099,129
1758	693,070	724,495	2,326,334	1,105,392
1759	773,919	799,665	2,459,883	1,310,505
1760	783,993	716,321	2,254,486	1,127,419
1761	692,834	645,875	1,996,775	1,209,490
Average of the above ten years	767,318	749,037	2,074,435	1,114,081
Balance ..	(surplus)	18,281	(surplus)	960,354
1762	658,161	736,667	1,657,487	1,193,360
1763	820,027	870,193	1,443,105	1,231,471
1764	828,808	870,912	1,641,810	1,693,517
1765	755,026	800,927	1,644,877	1,722,552
1766	666,079	705,666	1,746,589	1,768,242
1767	683,843	557,114	1,798,856	1,847,088
1768	718,474	756,877	1,819,959	1,865,933
1769	614,786	669,663	1,958,145	1,986,958
1770	697,259	747,176	2,109,319	2,089,240
1771	594,252	534,162	1,044,092	1,034,634
Average of the above ten years	703,171	724,935	1,686,423	1,643,299
Balance ..	(deficit)	21,764	(surplus)	43,124

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN GOLD AND RICE—*Continued.*

Year.	Rice.		Gold.	
	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Revenue.	Expenditure.
	Koku.	Koku.	Ryo.	Ryo.
1772	598,823	612,253	1,833,470	1,342,716
1773	653,412	684,001	1,689,046	1,295,164
1774	552,304	577,925	1,541,597	1,294,695
1775	613,913	646,199	1,694,577	1,375,829
1776	621,516	703,503	1,819,414	1,107,743
1777	644,491	727,344	1,804,161	1,426,733
1778	732,536	726,011	1,958,469	1,697,583
1779	646,901	638,382	2,042,374	1,969,619
1780	628,384	655,185	1,973,101	1,957,589
1781	615,914	660,392	1,849,839	1,947,503
Average of the above ten years	629,819	658,775	1,826,602	1,571,517
Balance ..	(deficit)	28,956	(surplus)	249,085
1782	627,745	684,999	1,779,056	1,892,258
1783	634,016	699,492	2,124,848	2,424,897
1784	614,117	653,230	2,044,075	2,261,220
1785	626,095	605,481	1,712,217	1,780,586
1786	634,912	627,310	2,242,660	2,199,611
1787	492,320	448,437	2,452,935	2,401,891
1788	634,755	510,846	1,912,239	1,588,145
1789	654,431	475,529	1,903,566	1,633,166
1890	705,676	482,241	1,914,375	1,438,203
1891	506,287	563,268	1,242,485	1,227,721
Average of the above ten years	613,035	575,083	1,933,045	1,893,769
Balance ..	(surplus)	37,952	(surplus)	39,276
1792	654,913	643,593	1,386,277	1,396,218
1793	497,162	476,035	1,082,181	1,124,157
1794	637,396	485,159	1,081,650	1,173,060
1795	496,713	524,779	977,284	959,682
1796	683,493	632,960	1,262,443	1,025,662
1797	646,960	636,370	1,319,770	1,347,153
1798	635,551	625,939	1,225,243	1,238,628
1799	648,801	610,954	1,085,485	1,331,273
1800	634,245	686,828	1,247,118	1,428,248
1801	644,774	675,632	1,584,633	1,440,847
Average of the above ten years	617,000	600,634	1,235,208	1,246,492
Balance ..	(surplus)	16,366	(deficit)	11,284

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN GOLD AND RICE—*Continued.*

Year.	Rice.		Gold.	
	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Revenue.	Expenditure.
	Koku.	Koku.	Ryo.	Ryo.
1802	658,020	624,529	1,335,835	1,895,503
1803	576,719	642,015	1,344,740	1,215,634
1804	743,418	603,386	1,103,643	1,265,656
1805	562,082	654,597	1,243,672	1,270,827
1806	567,623	583,161	1,386,520	1,442,106
1807	593,045	548,877	1,506,520	1,491,993
1808	526,785	598,679	1,450,068	1,677,594
1809	566,658	630,258	1,538,088	1,518,967
1810	773,913	526,810	1,633,226	1,698,712
1811	688,825	638,334	1,499,653	1,469,336
Average of the above ten years	617,710	605,064	1,403,977	1,444,632
Balance ..	(surplus)	12,636	(deficit)	40,655
1812	536,036	599,495	1,332,585	1,249,553
1813	626,719	575,137	2,265,821	1,981,801
1814	508,984	552,269	1,391,281	1,254,153
1815	526,486	539,686	1,364,573	1,688,483
1816	543,805	549,625	1,382,262	1,579,530
1817	588,429	570,136	1,489,238	1,577,495
1818	613,630	545,127	1,916,082	2,137,343
1819	563,071	589,205	2,244,739	2,428,254
1820	577,091	593,410	3,416,194	3,505,958
1821	576,087	622,669	4,729,156	4,873,513
Average of the above ten years	566,033	573,677	2,153,193	2,227,608
Balance ..	(deficit)	7,644	(deficit)	74,415
1822	532,455	559,175	1,973,107	1,933,878
1823	555,087	530,656	2,070,386	2,187,837
1824	527,276	567,319	4,704,858	4,761,446
1825	517,302	523,276	4,635,493	4,265,040
1826	486,881	529,648	3,771,830	3,439,419
1827	533,602	549,310	3,296,021	3,281,741
1828	521,064	527,024	2,351,218	2,561,206
1829	479,957	544,506	3,247,703	3,200,673
1830	554,609	533,044	2,552,685	2,515,228
1831	504,735	521,414	1,969,073	2,139,544
Average of the above ten years	521,296	538,537	3,057,237	3,029,301
Balance ..	(deficit)	12,241	(surplus)	27,936

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN GOLD AND RICE—*Continued.*

Year.	Rice.		Gold.	
	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Revenue.	Expenditure.
	Koku.	Koku.	Ryo.	Ryo.
1832	550,899	568,291	2,288,190	2,269,184
1833	554,132	540,274	2,296,938	2,354,338
1834	569,403	560,528	2,262,161	2,237,257
1835	646,571	583,790	3,074,018	3,240,783
1836	532,692	566,754	3,192,494	2,961,749
Average of the five years from 1832-6	570,739	563,927	2,618,760	2,612,662
Balance ..	(surplus)	6,812	(surplus)	6,098

The annual revenues, both in gold and rice, given in the foregoing tables are more or less from the figures quoted under the heading, " The Revenues from Land-Tax during the 126 years from the 1st year of Kyoho till the 12th year of Tempo," in Chapter I, and which figures are correct cannot be said. But it may be that in the figures given in Chapter I are not included such extra revenues as from the special tax of 100 koku per 10,000 koku imposed in the different fiefs and some other sources. There must be good reason for the difference between the two tables of figures, and it is certainly a matter of regret that we cannot discover it.

As the foregoing table shows, for about thirty-five years after 1722, thanks to the financial readjustment in the era of Kyoho, the Shogunate's annual revenues exceeded its annual expenditures. But from 1762 the expenditures in rice exceeded the revenues in rice each year, and ten years later the balance of deficit in rice amounted to 21,764 koku. During the same decade the revenues in gold left a surplus, which, however, was not more than 43,000 ryo in total, which far from covered the deficit in the revenues of rice. During the ten years following 1772 a deficit of 28,956 koku in rice was left. In order to overcome this the Shogunate not only readjusted its finances, but enforced a strict retrenchment in its expenditures, but the once reduced outlays often quickly increased, and the Shogunate began again to suffer from want of revenue. In 1765, therefore, the Government issued the five-momme silver to help its finances, yet eight years later, or in 1772, the Shogunate issued the 2 shu silver as auxiliary currency. The God of mines seems to have forsaken the Shogunate, for most of the gold and silver mines ceased to turn out gold and silver, and copper alone was produced. Even the output of copper decreased on account of the official mismanagement, and silver was produced only in small quantities. In 1831 the revenues in rice were not sufficient to cover the expenditure in rice, though the revenue in gold seems to have exceeded the expenditure. Both the Shogunate and people began to pay by that time serious attention to the coast defence, with a consequent increase in the Government's expenditure for the purpose. Contribution after contribution was raised both from the lords and people, but was not enough to cover the increasing outlay. No manipulations could save the Shogunate out of its financial distress. On the contrary, the situation became even more serious when the Russians appeared on the coast of the Ezo Island in 1793, for the visit of the Russians was followed by continuous reports of the presence of foreign ships on the coasts of Japan. In these circumstances, the officials were at a loss what to do for money, and again resorted to their favourite but undesirable policy of re-coining, whereby the Shogunate profited by increasing the quantity of currency, as it did before. Thus such gold and silver coins were made as 1 shu gold, 2 shu gold, soji 2 bu gold, new 2 shu silver, 1 bu silver, etc. The profit to the Shogunate from its various re-coinages amounted to 30,000,000 ryo altogether. After the time of Bunsei, as shown in the foregoing table of statistics, the Government was only attempting to cover the deficit in its revenues out of the profit it made through re-coining, but even that manipulation did not succeed well, and the Shogunate still suffered from poverty. As for its ordinary revenues, they were far short of meeting its necessary expenditures. In 1832, for instance, the Shogunate made an extraordinary profit of 394,300 ryo of gold as a result of re-coining, and spent it all in covering a deficit in its ordinary revenues. Had it not gained this extra revenue, there would have been a serious deficit. After the Shogunate had once, though only just, overcome its financial difficulties by re-making the current coins, it repeated the same manipulation so often that it was regarded by the successive financiers as the only way to save the Government out of its troubles. But even this profit-taking policy—so it was commonly called—could not save the Shogunate, and the finances had to be completely readjusted. Be that as it may, the profit-taking policy played formed an important part in the finances of the Tokugawa Shogunate in those days, and the table given on page 336 tells us how important it was.

As the table indicates, the profit that the Shogunate realized as a result of its policy on the re-making of the current gold and silver coins during the said eleven years amounted to 6,577,043 ryo. But for the said extra revenue, the Tokugawa Shogunate would

THE ANNUAL REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES IN GOLD OF THE SHOGUNATE DURING THE ELEVEN YEARS FROM 1832 TILL 1842, AND THE AMOUNT OF PROFIT MADE BY THE SHOGUNATE BY RE-MAKING CURRENT GOLD AND SILVER COINS DURING THE SAME PERIOD.

Year.	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Balance.	Profit made out of Re-making Coins.
	Ryo.	Ryo.	Ryo.	Ryo.
1832	1,612,211	1,593,909	18,304	394,200
1833	1,763,241	1,646,832	116,409	540,000
1834	1,644,503	1,790,051	145,547	470,596[1]
1835	1,631,786	1,760,288	128,502	620,000[1]
1836	2,151,372	2,963,750	187,621	499,844
1837	2,531,080	2,467,902	63,178	629,263
1838	3,178,386	1,512,666	765,720	1,075,950
1839	2,401,197	2,180,922	220,275	694,745
1840	2,419,487	2,001,958	417,529	997,000
1841	2,245,590	1,962,684	282,906	1,155,000
1842	1,761,147	1,936,911	202,764	501,445[1]

[1] Deficit.

have become bankrupt financially. Even with that extra revenue, the finances still showed a deficit in the three years, namely, 1834, 1835, and 1842. But still more surprising is the fact that even so recently as in 1842, which is 74 years ago, there was not any complete record made of the annual revenues and expenditures of the Central Government of Japan; in fact, the several records now available on the finances of the Shogunate in those days differ greatly from one another. In the latter part of the era of Tempo, Lord Togawa and other financiers realized the necessity of readjusting the Shogunate's finances, and prepared an official table of figures on the revenues and expenditures and also indicated how much and in what way the expenditures should be economized. The tables of figures prepared by them, which are the annual budget of the Shogunate, are given below, as they speak of the revenues and expenditures of the Tokugawa Shogunate in those days :—

THE ANNUAL BUDGET OF THE SHOGUNATE FOR THE 13TH YEAR OF TEMPO (1842).

ANNUAL REVENUES.

Regular Revenues.	*Ryo.*
Land-tax (based on the amount raised during the previous year)	360,391
Local contributions	75,046
River navigation tax	1,500

Tax paid by the hatamoto samurai in lieu of their labour services to the state	34,633
Contributions received by the accountant's office of the Nishimaru palace	15,957
Amount paid in lieu of rice by Otsu	19,175
Amount received by the offices of the Machibugyo (magistrate of city)	13,629
Amount out of the tax raised in Osaka	29,047
Amount paid in goods	58,012
Total	607,390
Special Revenues.	
Contributions raised for river administration	24,758
The Shogunate's advances to the lords, returned	111,118
The Shogunate's loans to local communities, etc., paid back, also interest thereon	35,960
Reserve money	35,960
Total	198,838
Extraordinary Revenues.	
Profit raised by re-coining of current coins	557,323
Contributions from the lords in connection with the repair of the Nishimaru Palace	29,727
Contributions in connection with the repair of the Bunkyo In's mausoleum	40,000
Contributions in connection with the construction of an addition to the mausoleum of the Shogun's wife	21,800
Allowance to the Lord of Mito, returned	10,000
Out of the contributions to the treasury of the Shogun's palace	10,000
Gold and silver brought down from the Treasury in Osaka	86,666
Contribution from the silver mint	5,800
Total	761,316
Grand total	1,566,743

As the following table tells us, the Shogunate's regular annual expenditures for the 13th year of Tempo were 1,066,770 ryo against its regular annual revenues of 607,390 ryo, which means that the finances had no solid ground. In order to cover the deficit in its regular revenues, the Shogunate naturally depended on the extraordinary revenues, which in the 13th year of Tempo amounted to 761,316 ryo, besides 198,800 ryo of special revenues. This dependence on such irregular revenues is a very dangerous financial policy. The financiers of the Shogunate in those days, however, did not realize it, and in their attempts to readjust the finances endeavoured to curtail mostly the regular expenditures even by one-half in some cases. Furthermore,

ANNUAL EXPENDITURES

NOTE.—It may be stated that these expenditures were compiled with a view of curtailing the Shogunate's outlays, which had been increasing in the foregoing years.

REGULAR EXPENDITURES.

Item of Expenditure.	Amount of Expenditure.	Amount to be Curtailed.	Comparison with the Foregoing Year.[1]
Kiri-mai Yakuryo payment	399,104 ryo NOTE.—Based on an average official price of rice, 39 ryo per 100 bales.	79,104 ryo NOTE.—Based on a price of rice, 32 ryo per 100 bales. The curtailment was made after comparison with the same item of expenditure in the Kwansei era.	201,632 ryo, an average of the five years from the 13th till the 17th year of Kyoho, based on the price of rice, 25 ryo per 100 bales. About 60 per cent. paid in rice and about 39 per cent. in gold. 297,568 ryo, an average of the five years from the 9th till the 13th year of Horeki, based on the price of rice, 34 ryo per 100 bales. 56 per cent. paid in rice and 44 per cent. in gold. 321,452 ryo, an average of the five years from the 1st till the 5th year of Kwansei, based on the price of rice, 35 ryo per 100 bales. 55 per cent. paid in rice and 45 per cent. in gold. 345,962 ryo, an average of the five years from the 10th till the 14th year of Bunkwa, based on the price of rice, 34 ryo per 100 bales. About 60 per cent. paid in rice and about 39 per cent. in gold.

Expenses in the Okumuki (Shogun's palace), such as Goriki Kiri-mai allowances, wages of male and female servants, and other employees, etc	75,371 ryo	25,123 ryo NOTE.—To be curtailed to 50,247 ryo or to two-thirds. The curtailment of this item was made after comparison with the same item of expenditure in Bunkwa era instead of Kwansei, because in Kwansei era the Nishimaru Palace had not been open.	63,275 ryo, an average of the five years in Kyoho, as mentioned previously. 32,052 ryo, an average of the five years of Horeki, as stated previously. 26,202 ryo, an average of the five years of Kwansei, as mentioned before. 49,994 ryo, the amount spent during the 11th year of Bunkwa.
Expenses at the eight offices, namely, the clothing office of the Shogun's palace, that of the Nishimaru palace, the construction office (Sakujikata), the engineering office (Kofushinkata), the kitchen, the craftsmen's office, the matting office, and the timber office, as explained below.	277,077 ryo	138,538 ryo NOTE.—To be curtailed to 138,538 ryo or to one-half. The curtailment was made after comparison with the same item of expenditure in the 5th year of Kwansei.	133,777 ryo, an average of the five years of Kyoho, as stated before. 157,031 ryo, an average of the five years of Horeki, as stated before. 117,438 ryo, an average of the five years of Kwansei, as mentioned previously. 143,688 ryo in the 5th year of Kwansei.

NOTE.—The expenses of the clothing officers of the Shogun's palace and of the Nishimaru (palace of the heir to the Shogun) are for clothes for use in each palace, clothes for gifts, ceremonial clothes, clothing on the occasion of births, etc.

The expenses of the Sakujikata (or construction office) cover the regular payments to the officials and men employed in the office, regular repair works, etc.

The expenses of the Kofushinkata (or engineering office) are for regular repair works, overhead payments, etc.

The expenses of the kitchen are for cooking, both at the Nishimaru and the On-Hiroshiki, fish, vegetables, Sakura charcoal, cake-making, mochigome (glutinous) rice, Soya-beans, regular gifts, and overhead expenses of the office, etc.

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[1] The comparison was made with the average expenditure of the same item of the four periods since the time of Kyoho.

ANNUAL EXPENDITURES (REGULAR)—*Continued.*

The expenses of the craftsmen's office are for the cords of the letter-cases, different implements, official coats, etc.

The expenses of the matting office are for the Bingo-omote and other mattings and overhead expenses of the office.

The expenses of the timber office are for timber and such building materials for use at the Shogun's Court and overhead expenses of the office.

Item of Expenditure.	Amount of Expenditure.	Amount to be Curtailed.	Comparison with the Foregoing Year.[1]
Expenditures of the different offices of the Shogunate.	72,793 ryo	36,396 ryo Or to be curtailed to 36,396 ryo or by one-half.	48,663 ryo in the 5th year of Kwansei.
		NOTE.—The expenditures of the different offices were curtailed by one-half.	60,428 ryo in the 11th year of Bunkwa.

NOTE.—The offices or expenses to which the above item of expenditure is to be applied are: (1) The Machi-Bugyo office in charge of swords, etc. (2) The rifle office. (3) The office in charge of ball-drugs. (4) The office in charge of the chests of drawers. (5) The office in charge of shooting arms. (6) The office in charge of armour. (7) The Court of Justice for thieves and such criminals. (8) The office of scholars. (9) The fire brigade. (10) The office in charge of eagle-hunting. (11) The office in charge of horses. (12) The office in charge of archery. (13) The office in charge of the Nishimaru and the On-Hiroshiki. (14) The office in charge of tea ceremonies. (15) The salaries of the officials employed at the accountant's office. (16) Small purchases, such as paper and other stationery, etc., by the purchasing office. (17) The expenses of the places for drinking hot water for police-guards. (18) The office in charge of the repairs of the temples and shrines. (19) The Medical School at Momijiyama. (20) The expenses for the making of drugs. (21) Allowances to the bald-headed male servants. (22) Aviary caretakers. (23) The astronomical office. (24) Registration office. (25) The office in charge of the rice godowns. (26) The office in charge of the gold coins godowns. (27) The forestry office. (28) The Hama detached palace. (29) The office in charge of the sacred treasures. (30) The office in charge of the medical-herb gardens. (31) The office of the Mayor of Fukiage. (32) The expenses in connection with the retirement of the boatmen employed by the Shogunate (33) Allowance to Asakusa Sanyemon, Sarugaku dances. (34) Allowance to the kitchen copper-ware beating. (35) Other small payments.

Expenditures outside Edo	27,213 ryo	13,606 ryo Or to be curtailed to 13,606 ryo or by one-half. The curtailment was made after comparison with Bunkwa era.	17,376 ryo in the 5th year of Kwansei. 16,326 ryo in the 11th year of Bunkwa.

Note.—The above item of expenditure was for: (1) The office in charge of the shrines and temples at Nikko. (2) The office of the Mayor of Uraga. (3) The office of the governor of Sado Island. (4) The office of the Mayor of Nagasaki. (5) The office at Sumpu. (6) The repairs both inside and outside the castle at Kofu. (7) The office at Kuno. (8) The Government medical-plant gardens. (9) The offices in charge of criminal examination. (10) The local offices in charge of engineering and such works. (11) The watchlight at Shinshu. (12) The purchases of silver at Handa, in the Woshu district. (13) Gunpowder. (14) The purchase of mochigome (glutinous) rice. (15) The purchase of Soya-beans. (16) The purchase of wax. (17) The purchase of paraffin plants. (18) The purchase of rape seeds. (19) The expenses of the eagle-hunting fields. (20) The expenses for the purchases of articles to be applied to guard-houses in various localities. (21) The payments to the officials at the On-Atsukari Dokoro.

Allowance to the sanke and sankyo (six branches of the Tokugawa family) and others.	32,262 ryo	16,081 ryo Or to be curtailed to 16,081 ryo or by one-half. Note.—The permanent allowance to the Lord of Mito, 10,000 ryo, was paid out of the interest on 106,000 ryo loaned in Kyoto, Nara, and Bakurocho in Edo. It is included in the curtailed amount (?).	15,815 ryo in the 5th year of Kwansei. 47,537 ryo in the 11th year of Bunkwa.

Note.—The allowances paid under the above item were: (1) The permanent allowance to the Lord of Mito. (2) Special allowances. (3) Allowance to the Lord Minbu-kyo for payment of the extra employees in his service. (4) Allowance to the Lord Tayasu. (5) Allowance to the Lord Kyoshu-In. (6) Allowance to Lord Hitotsuhashi. (7) Allowance to the Nikko Shrine. (8) Contributions to the Chion-in temple.

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[1] The comparison was made with the average expenditure of the same item of the four periods since the time of Kyoho.

ANNUAL EXPENDITURES (REGULAR)—*Continued.*

Item of Expenditure.	Amount of Expenditure.	Amount to be Curtailed.	Comparison with the Foregoing Year.[1]
Allowance to Lord So, of Tsushima.	8,655 ryo	The amount decided on under this item was 12,000 ryo, of which, however, 3,345 ryo was offset with an equal amount of loan, to be paid back to the Shogunate by the Lord of Tsushima. Therefore for the year under review 8,655 ryo was paid, but in the 4th year of Anyei, and after, 12,000 ryo was paid regularly, which means an increase by 3,345 ryo.	
Expenses of the offices of the Daikwan local governors of the Shogunate.	21,803 ryo	7,267 ryo Or to be curtailed to 14,535 ryo or to two-thirds. NOTE.—It may be stated that the curtailment was not made against the appropriation under the same item in the era of Kyoho, or that the expenses of these offices were cut down, but that, due to the decrease in the Shogunate's own territories, the business of these offices decreased, and their expenses too. Hence the above curtailment.	28,860 ryo, an average of the five years from the 13th till the 17th year of Kyoho. 29,901 ryo, an average of the five years from the 9th till the 13th year of Horeki. 26,958 ryo, an average of the five years from the 1st till the 5th year of Kwansei.

For the purchase of timber	63,645 ryo	53,645 ryo Or to be curtailed to 10,000 ryo. NOTE.—In case of extraordinary work, the necessary outlay be paid under an individual item. Therefore 10,000 ryo is estimated as sufficient for the regular expenses under this item.	5,473 ryo in the 5th year of Kwansei. 12,575 ryo in the 11th year of Bunkwa.

NOTE.—The above item covers (1) the expenses for the felling and transportation of timber in the province of Hida, (2) similar expenses at Mt. Hyakusho, and the amount paid for the timber purchased from the Lord of Owari and Lord Matsudaira of Tosa.

Expenditure for the transportation of rice.	34,163 ryo	11,387 ryo Or one-third or to 22,775 ryo to two-thirds. NOTE.—Of this item, the amount of freight for the transportation of rice by sea to Edo from the different parts of the country depended on how much such rice was brought to Edo each year. But a law has been issued whereby the amount of rice to be delivered at the Government godowns has been decreased, and also a part of the rice formerly brought to Edo is now to be disposed of in its respective places ; and, as a result, the transportation expenses in this respect will decrease.	22,285 ryo, an average of the five years from the 13th till the 17th year of Kyoho. 20,400 ryo, an average of the five years from the 9th till the 13th year of Horeki. 26,945 ryo, an average of the five years from the 1st till the 5th year of Kwansei.

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[1] The comparison was made with the average expenditure of the same item of the four periods since the time of Kyoho.

ANNUAL EXPENDITURES (REGULAR)—*Continued.*

Item of Expenditure.	Amount of Expenditure.	Amount to be Curtailed.	Comparison with the Foregoing Year.[1]
Expenditures for repair works, both in Edo and other districts, and other miscellaneous expenses.	54,791 ryo	44,791 ryo Or to be curtailed to 10,000 ryo. NOTE.—Though it is difficult to decide definitely on the amount to be spent under this item, all plans should be made so that the whole expenditures under this item will not exceed the amount fixed above, and if any excess over it, should be postponed to the next year.	28,089 ryo of the 5th year of Kwansei. 62,189 ryo of the 11th year of Bunkwa.
Total of the regular expenditures.	—	1,066,777 ryo The amount actually paid in the 13th year of Tempo.	To be curtailed by 422,593 ryo or to 644,178 ryo.

NOTE.—The expenditures under this item are: (1) For the repair works on the twenty-six places in Edo. (2) Repair works on the shrine at Kuno. (3) Repair works on the Nitta shrine. (4) Repair works on the Shinkomyoji temple. (5) Expenses for the visit of the Shogun to the shrine at Uyeno. (6) Expenses of the Consort and Court ladies. (7) Travelling expenses from Kyoto to Edo. (8) Allowance to Lord Matsudaira, of Osumi. (9) Travelling expenses of the Loochoonians. (10) Other miscellaneous expenses.

SPECIAL EXPENDITURES.

Expenditure of river administration, such as: (1) Regular expenditure for works against the overflow of rivers; (2) expenditure for similar works in Kwanto and other districts; (3) advances to different territories covering extraordinary expenses of local river administration.	33,329 ryo	7,329 ryo Or to be curtailed to 26,000 ryo, which is about the amount raised from public contributions (?) for river administration. The total expenditure under this item was 26,000 ryo annually on an average during the era of Tempo. The same amount was decided upon as an estimate for this item of expenditure, as it can be covered with public contributions for the purpose.	27,773 ryo in the 5th year of Kwansei.
		The amount was divided into two, one, 6,000 ryo, for regular expenditure of the river administration, and the other 19,900 ryo, including amount to be covered with public contributions (?); also extraordinary expenditure, the regular expenditure, 6,000 ryo, is to be made a special item, but will by and by be included in the amount to be covered with public contributions (?). No further advances shall be made to the different districts for the expenses of extraordinary river works until 213,600 ryo already advanced for the purpose is collected.	15,727 ryo in the 11th year of Bunkwa.

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[1] The comparison was made with the average expenditure of the same item of the four periods since the time of Kyoho.

ANNUAL EXPENDITURES (SPECIAL)—*Continued.*

Item of Expenditure.	Amount of Expenditure.	Amount to be Curtailed.	Comparison with the Foregoing Year.[1]
Expenditures to be paid out of interest on the Shogunate's advances, such as: (1) payments to the Sanke and Sankyo (six branch families of the Tokugawa); (2) to the retainers of the lords and the hatamoto; and (3) to the villages attached to the temples or shrines.	116,738 ryo	46,738 ryo Or to be curtailed to 70,000 ryo.	30,314 ryo in the 5th year of Kwansei. 76,961 ryo in the 11th year of Bunkwa. Advances since the time of Kyoho were, according to an investigation in the 12th year of Tempo, a total of 1,515,000 ryo in principal, and the amount raised out of the same annually was 122,000 ryo. From 1,000,000 ryo of principal left, an amount sufficiently covering 70,000 ryo, to be spent under this item, can be raised permanently. The rest of the principal, 515,000 ryo, will bring about 52,000 ryo annually, which will be used for some other purpose after the 15th year of Tempo. The aforesaid curtailment of this item of expenditure was made in accordance with the above calculation.
Expenditures to be paid out of interest on the Shogunate's advances, such as: (1) allowance to the office of Goto Sanyemon; (2)	8,163 ryo	—	Difference between the amount of interest paid in and the amount of expenditures actually paid under this item during the 13th year of Tempo was 18,837 ryo, which was a surplus

allowance to the Toyasu; and (3) payments to the loan office at Bakurocho.			of revenue. Of the above surplus, 10,000 ryo was paid to the Lord of Mito for his allowance, and the rest taken into the revenue under extraordinary heading.
Expenditures to be paid out of the Reserve Fund, such as: (1) travelling expenses; (2) for the manipulation of the price of rice; (3) the refunding of contributions once raised; (4) expenses at the godowns at Kosuge; (5) allowances for working on the uncultivated lands; (6) bridge expenditure; (7) amount to be paid at the Sekisho (barrier); and (8) permanent allowance to the silver mint.	25,535 ryo	—	Since these expenditures were to be paid out of the reserve fund provided for the purpose, they can be covered sufficiently.
Total	183,766 ryo actually paid		

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[1] The comparison was made with the average expenditure of the same item of the four periods since the time of Kyoho.

EXTRAORDINARY EXPENDITURES

Item of Expenditure.	Amount of Expenditure.	Amount to be Curtailed.	Comparison with the Foregoing Year.[1]
Expenditures under this heading were such as: (1) for repairs on the shrines, etc., at Nikko; (2) the Shogun's visit to the shrines at Nikko; (3) repairs on the temple and shrine at Uyeno; (4) repairs on the mausoleum of the Shogun's wife; (5) the making of gold, silver, and copper coins; (6) the club-house at Saruya-cho; and (7) expenditures to be paid out of the principal of advance loans.	172,713 ryo	—	The expenditures under this heading are expected to be covered with extraordinary revenue, contributions from the lords, etc.
Grand total of Regular, Special, & Extraordinary Expenditures	1,423,256 ryo		

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[1] The comparison was made with the average expenditure of the same item of the four periods since the time of Kyoho.

their curtailment was planned upon the basis of the figures at a time when the administrative expenses of the Shogunate were rather small. As already stated, the danger of the finances was in the extraordinary expenditures, which had been increasing year after year, and which was even the cause of corruption among the officials. Unless these extraordinary expenditures had been adjusted and curtailed, there was no way out of the morass. This, however, was not done, and the extraordinary expenditures, forming a greater part of the finances, remained unadjusted, and the Shogunate was still suffering from financial distress when the Restoration Agitation occurred and the Tokugawa regime was brought to an end. But it may be said that before it fell politically the Tokugawa Shogunate had become bankrupt or invalid financially. In other words, the Tokugawa Shogunate lost its real strength in the eras of Bunkwa and Tempo, when it was in such financial distress, and the agitators for the restoration of Imperial rule completed the overthrow of a Shogunate which only nominally existed in 1868. Hence the battles of Fushimi and Toba might be said to have been the burial ceremony of the Shogunate corpse.

CHAPTER LIII

PEACEFUL PROGRESS IN THE TIME OF YOSHIMUNE

Industrial Progress in the Time of Yoshimune.—Although Yoshimune was nothing but a mere soldier, honest and sincere but small-minded, it cannot be denied that Japan made great progress under his rule, though he was not personally responsible for it. He was not statesman enough to seize the opportunities presented or Japan might have advanced much more. At the same time he was no tyrant, and did nothing to hinder the progress of his country, stimulated by favourable circumstances. Japan's advance in his time was most reflected in the foreign trade at Nagasaki, which remarkably increased, for which there were two reasons. One was the considerable growth in the import of raw silk, cotton fabrics, medicial drugs, sugar, etc. The other is the fact that the Nagasaki trade offered much more opportunity for a daring merchant than the internal commerce, which was only on a small scale, and the cream of the merchant class were attracted to the city to engage in foreign trade. As a result exports as well as imports greatly increased at Nagasaki.

After the civil war of the eras of Keicho and Genwa the condition of industry and commerce in Japan became normal again, and attention was turned to the production of raw silk, partly to give the farmer a side-line and partly to reduce the price of clothing and textiles, the home-raised silk being much cheaper than the imported. Thus encouraged, in the era of Genroku, Japan was producing raw silk sufficient for her domestic use. The import of foreign raw silk quickly decreased and finally almost ceased, and only Chinese ships, coming from ports near the raw-silk producing districts in China, brought to Nagasaki from 500 kin up to 1,500 kin or so annually. Even this had to be disposed of at a low price, and the Chinese could not reap such profits as before.

Cotton Yarn taking the Place of Raw Silk.—The Dutch merchants abandoned the import of raw silk, and brought cotton yarn, which the Japanese had begun using. In the list of goods brought to Nagasaki by the Dutch ships in 1745 there is no raw silk at all, and cotton yarns and cotton fabrics make up the bulk. In fact Japan's industries had advanced so much that she had no need to import raw materials from foreign countries. It was only imported manufactured articles that could compete, as is indicated by the manifest of a Dutch ship.

MANIFEST.

Sugar-birds	3
Buncho (Java sparrow)	9
Special species of pigeons	6
Canaries	2
Musk deer	1
Monkey	1
Chinese pigeon	1

MANUFACTURED GOODS.

Special cotton of Bengal	240 kin
Coloured woollen cloth woven of thick yarns	32 rolls
Coloured woollen cloth woven of thin yarns	68 rolls
Coloured velvet	119 rolls
European cotton	100 rolls
Bengal cloth	380 rolls
New Bengal cloth	100 rolls
Silk cloth	500 rolls
Striped patterns of silk	500 rolls
Striped cloth of Aresha	400 rolls
Special striped cloth	100 rolls
Gigan	400 rolls
Special kinds of Gigan	860 rolls
Special kinds of Gigan	800 rolls
Gigan	400 rolls
White calico	80 rolls
Bengal calico	80 rolls
White cotton cloth	40 rolls
Printed cotton	200 rolls
Cotton mosquito nets	1,600 kin
Clove trees	1,600 kin
Seeds of the clove tree	799 kin
Medicine	800 kin
Wax	1,920 kin
White sugar	455,000 kin
Siamese dyestuffs	160,000 kin
Pepper	20,000 kin
Shark	1,500 pieces
Red Persian leather	1,200 pieces
Bengal leather	4,466 pieces

The Industrial Progress of the Country.—Piece-goods with a striped design had been imported into Japan both by the Portuguese and Dutch traders, and were called shima, because the goods came from foreign islands, the Japanese words "shima-mono" meaning "island goods" in English. But by the time of Yoshimune the shima-mono were produced in Japan, and were called striped goods instead of "island goods," though both combinations of words are pronounced shima-mono in Japanese. In a town called Ome, about thirty miles from Tokyo, a kind of striped piece-goods was manufactured in imitation of a product of San Thomé, and was marketed under the name of Santomé. A certain Shima-ya Sotan, of Hakata, introduced the haji tree (the wax tree), which quickly spread all over the island of Kyushu, and as a result candles were turned out in Japan in plenty. The textile fabric industry in Sakai and Kyoto, started by Toyotomi Hideyoshi with workers from China, had greatly advanced, and by the time of Yoshimune there were produced in these cities all kinds of silk cloth, and even velvet, which had been so difficult to manufacture without Western help. Sugar, too, was grown in the province of Satsuma and the island of Loochoo. In 1720 the sugar-cane was planted at Daishi-gawara, near Tokyo, and even loaf sugar was produced. This cultivation of sugar-cane in the neighbourhood of Tokyo, so far from the Tropics, was nothing but an experiment, undertaken by the officials of the Shogunate and rich merchants out of curiosity, and had no economic value; but it shows how enthusiastic both the Government and people were in encouraging home industries with a view of checking imports. Seeing that a large amount of money was leaving the country every year for Korean Ginseng, the plant was cultivated, and in 1733 Japanese Ginseng was marketed as well as Korean. The cotton seeds, which had been brought as well as Roman Catholic Christianity by the Portuguese, were planted, and by 1775 the production of raw cotton so increased, and trade in the same became so big and profitable, that the Shogunate appointed ten merchants in Edo and thirty more outside the capital city as brokers, giving them the privilege of monopolizing the trade.

The Origin of Jaga-imo and Satsuma-imo.—During the time of Yoshimune, not only did Japan's agricultural and other industries advance and the output of native products thereby increase, but many foreign products, which when first brought here by the Portuguese traders had been looked upon as objects of curiosity, became important factors in the economic life of the Japanese people. A kind of potato, which was brought to Japan from Jakatara, the capital of the Dutch East Indies, was first called Jakatara-imo (Jagatara potato), later abbreviated to Jaga-imo, and is now one of the most important agricultural products in Japan. The squash, first imported from Cambodia in Cochin-China and called cabocha, is now indispensable to the Japanese farmers. The sweet potato, one of the chief crops of the Japanese farmer, is also a foreign plant, but since its first importation the Japanese have so liked it that its use quickly increased, and in 1735 the Shogun Yoshimune cultivated the plant himself in the garden of his palace in Edo. The sweet potato has a very interesting history. A Spaniard from South America brought it to the Philippine Islands, but he suffered so much from the introduction, which cost him immense trouble, that he prohibited its being taken out of the Islands. But in 1594 a Chinese got hold of some of the tubers by bribing a native, and planted them in his own country, where the plant came to be widely raised. A Loochonian called Nogun visited Fukien, China, in 1605, and brought the potato to the Loochoo Islands, where its cultivation quickly spread. In 1665 a man called Riyemon, of Satsuma, was travelling in the Loochoo Islands, and he brought the plant back with him to Satsuma. From Satsuma it soon spread through the different parts of Japan, as it is now. It is called Satsuma-imo for that reason.

DOMESTIC COMMERCE INCREASED AND FOREIGN TRADE AT NAGASAKI DECREASED.—As a result of the progress of agricultural and other industries in the country, imported goods fell off both in kind and volume. At the same time the standard of the people's living considerably advanced, and their purchases increased correspondingly, which swelled the volume of domestic commerce and increased the profit. Formerly the foreign trade at Nagasaki had been regarded as the only business in which big profits could be made. But conditions had changed, and now beside the lords, who were the big land-owners, appeared what may be called the middle class, the big merchants in Edo, Osaka, Kyoto, and other large cities. In these big cities there grew up the down-town or commercial town, where business transactions were carried on with plenty of opportunities for ambitious merchants with capital. Those going to Nagasaki to do foreign trade naturally decreased, and the condition of foreign trade at Nagasaki so much changed that the city could not continue paying to the Shogunate the trade tax of 50,000 ryo annually. In 1733, therefore, the tax was reduced to 35,000 ryo for the time being, and at the same time 40,000 ryo of arrears were remitted. With the decrease in imports from foreign countries, exports from Japan decreased as well. Had the Japanese traders in those days been given the freedom of trading outside the country, they would have gone out and marketed Japanese products in foreign lands. But such could not be hoped, because our foreign trade in those days was entirely monopolized by the Chinese and Dutch traders, and the Japanese merchants, however ambitious they were, were prohibited from trading outside their own country.

THE GROWTH OF SMUGGLING.—Beyond the development of domestic industries and commerce there was another cause for the decrease in the foreign trade at Nagasaki, and that was the increase in smuggling. It may be said that the foreign trade at Nagasaki in those days had developed in an unnatural way for three reasons. First, because the Japanese merchants were prohibited from trading outside their own country. Second, because the number of foreign merchantmen visiting Nagasaki for trade in a year was limited. Third, on account of the fact that only Chinese merchant ships specifically licensed by the Japanese Government were permitted to enter the port of Nagasaki. Among the Chinese merchants, those who were not fortunate enough to get the licence were none the less eager to trade with Japan, and there was no way open to them but illicit trading. At first they used the ports in the islands of Eki or Tsushima, but afterwards extended their operations to the coasts of Kyushu and Chugoku, and later came in bands and looted and carried off women, emulating the exploits of the Japanese pirates 150 years before. This piracy was soon snuffed out, but smuggling continued to be practised as before. Among those arrested for the offence was a Japanese called Kinyemon, who always wore Chinese clothes and spoke Chinese. He lived at Shanghai, and travelled widely in the coast provinces of Fukien, Kiangsu, and Chenkiang, doing an extensive trade and controlling many Chinese merchants engaged in smuggling. He was a gallant man with some learning, universally popular, and called "Mr. Teacher" by the Chinese merchants at Nagasaki. The Governor and other Shogunate officials in Nagasaki had their eye on him, but had had no chance of arresting him because the merchants of Nagasaki, having more respect for Kinyemon than the Governor himself, would never give him away to the officials. One day it chanced that smugglers were arrested who would ordinarily have been beheaded, but they were released on condition that they should assist the officials in arresting Kinyemon, and through the treachery of these men he was apprehended. He in his turn was set free to assist the Government in their fight against smuggling. This principle of setting a thief to catch a thief, copied by the Shogunate from China, failed in Japan, as it had in the country of its origin, for most of the merchants of Nagasaki who made money after the era of Kyoho (1716–35) did it by illicit trading.

Thus the wealth of Japan considerably increased during the period of Kyoho, but it cannot be said to have been distributed in a safe way from the social standpoint in those days. The most desired way of distributing wealth, then, was that the Shogun should own most of it, and the lords and other samurai a part of it, and the farmers, merchants, and others the rest. But the fact was just opposite, and the greatest part of the nation's wealth was in the hands of the merchants, on whom the samurai class always looked down. A struggle naturally set in between the two classes, in which the samurai class, with all its political and military power, got the worst of it. The history of Japan after 1700 is full of records of the military class surrendering to the power of money.

Tiles instead of Thatch in Edo.—Yoshimune not only liked hunting himself, but urged its practice upon others, to foster the bravery of the samurai class and check the tendency to luxury and elegance prevailing among the people. To this end he issued regulation after regulation, and adopted different means for his purpose. Strange to say, however, the results were just opposite to what he expected. During his time the standard of living advanced more and more, and degeneracy prevailed to a greater extent. We often hear of the degeneracy of the samurai in the era of Genroku, but at that time the class with its military power was still struggling against the power of money and holding its own against the merchants. But as the standard of living advanced luxurious habits prevailed. The samurai, who were no exception to the general rule, wanted money, and naturally bowed before the merchant who had it. Therefore, as far as the samurai are concerned, they were more degenerate in the eras of Kyoho and Kwanpo than in the time of Genroku. How the standard of living advanced in those days is indicated by the fact that most of the roofs of the houses in the city of Edo were changed from thatch to tiles during the era of Kyoho (1716–35). In spite of the tradition that luxurious habits prevailed in the era of Genroku, they were limited to a small portion of society, and most of the buildings in Edo still had thatched roofs. But conflagration after conflagration convinced the people of their danger, and they adopted shell roofs instead of thatch. The new method of roofing was first to lay shingles and then put the oyster shells on the first layers. Another method was called the tsukiyaku. In this case the first layers were cut lumber, six feet long and about half an inch think ; on these were laid boards, and finally oyster shells on the surface. At first the Shogunate encouraged the shell roof as well as the mud roof as a precaution against fire, but then issued an order that when a samurai's house was destroyed by fire the new building should be tiled, and the Government would lend, if necessary, to cover the increased expense for the roof. The roofs of all the houses of the samurai in Edo soon changed to tiles, and then the Shogunate issued another decree bidding the common people roof their houses with tiles, without caring how the houses of their samurai neighbours were roofed. This change in roofing was quickly made by the people at large, as they had money enough, and had refrained simply because they were afraid that if they tiled the roofs their houses might look better than those of their samurai neighbours. The appearance of the buildings in the city of Edo thus became better. If it can be counted as one of Augustus Cæsar's merits that in his time the buildings in Rome changed from brick to marble, likewise the change from thatch or shells to tiles in Edo can be laid to the credit of Yoshimune.

THE RETAINERS OF THE SAMURAI BECAME CONTRACTED EMPLOYEES.—What had been regarded as luxurious in the time of Genroku were mere common practices among the people in the era of Kyoho. Thus the wives and concubines of the lords wore costly silk clothes embroidered with gold, and used the precious Chinese gold brocade for covering bed-clothes, bedding, kaioke (a lacquered pail for the carrying of shells for use in a game), hasamibako (a lacquered travelling trunk), etc. Even the hatamoto samurai used satin, damask silk, and figured satin for the covering of their bed-clothes, kaioke, hasamibako, etc., and it was quite common for their hasamibako to be lacquered with gold designs. As the common people were forbidden to ride in a palanquin through the streets the operation of public palanquins was prohibited by order, but the most luxurious palanquins made, with regular doors, thresholds, kamoi (the upper sliding grooves), etc., like a real house, could be found almost at every big street corner in Edo. Decree after decree was issued, prohibiting this practice, but to no purpose, and it increased so much that in December 1726 the Government was compelled to give a licence to 300 of these public palanquins to be operated in the streets of Edo. In the early days the retainers of a lord or samurai family continued generation after generation in the service of the same family. This system tended to make the relations between the retainers and their master closer and more harmonious, and the Tokugawa Shogunate wished to maintain it permanently, and from the era of Kwanyei till the time of Genroku several decrees were issued prohibiting the samurai from employing men on contract of wages for a certain limited period of time. These decrees, however, ceased to be enforced, and in 1730 the Shogunate licensed 202 special employment houses in Edo, whose recognized business it was to supply the samurai houses with their men, just as ordinary employment houses supply male and female servants to citizens. From the time of Genroku till towards the middle of Kyoho a retainer on wages used to get 3 ryo a year, an errand-boy 2 ryo a year, and a sewing-maid 1 ryo and 2 bu, while a maid who could cut out and sew silk clothes received 2 ryo a year. From the latter years of Kyoho and in the era of Horeki (1751–63) both the male-servant and the errand-boy got 2 ryo and 2 bu, and a sewing-maid between 2 and 3 ryo a year. Besides, there appeared a new calling, that of the watariyonin (one who was employed for wages for a certain period and changed his master from one to another), employed in a samurai family. Besides his ordinary clothes and swords he possessed a set of ceremonial clothes and an extra pair of swords for his own use, and used to get between 6 ryo in gold and ration rice for two men and 7 ryo in gold and ration rice for three men a year. Thus, even the retainers of the samurai families now became a sort of contracted employee, and although they wore a pair of swords as a samurai did, they were mere employees serving their masters for wages, and had no stomach to fight for their masters at the danger of their lives. Such were the retainers of most of the hatamoto samurai, on whom the Tokugawa Shogunate mainly relied in the time of war.

SOCIAL CORRUPTION AND THE SOCIETY OF THE DIPLOMATIC AGENTS OF THE LORDS.—The moral corruption or impurity of the people was far greater in the time of Kyoho than in the era of Genroku. Unlicensed prostitution was practised almost everywhere in the city of Edo, and the most notorious quarters of such bad women was in the precincts of the Gokokuji Temple in Koishikawa. There were girl dancers whose ostensible profession was to dance at public places for money, but they were simply private prostitutes and found in every part of Edo. In such quarters as Shiba, Kanda, and Asakusa there were prostitutes in the disguise of Buddhist nuns. As a result of the fact that Buddhism prospered and the fighting men had so much social influence in those days, the vice of sodomy was rampant throughout Edo, and there had never been a time before when this form of unnatural vice was practised so extensively. At Yoshicho, Kobiki-cho, Yushumatenjin, Kojimachi-tenjin, Nuri-Busshi, Daichi, Kanda Hanabusacho, Shiba, Shimmei-cho, etc., there were special quarters where thousands of handsome young boys were kept to serve the guests, who were Buddhist priests or samurai. So corrupt and impure were the morals of the people at large, and the high-class samurai were no exception to the rule. When the feudal lords were residing in their own territories they had their diplomatic agents to the Shogunate stationed in Edo, the seat of the Central Government, and when these men returned home they introduced the impure moral practices into their own districts, and social corruption became thus universal throughout the country. These lords' ambassadors formed a sort of society among themselves in Edo as the foreign diplomats do in London or Paris in the present time, and had peculiar political influence, so that the lords could not dismiss their diplomatic agents easily, however immoral they were. Not only that; neither the lords nor the Shogunate could overlook this peculiar clique of diplomats, because valuable information on political changes, Court intrigues, family troubles among the lords, etc., was often learned of among them. In 1743 the Shogunate issued a decree prohibiting the lords' agents from frequently gathering at restaurants, or spreading unfounded political rumours, etc., but to no effect; and at last this society of the lords' agents became an important factor in politics. From the facts detailed it may easily be seen that the people's standard of living had quickly advanced, with an inevitable increase in the cost, and a natural outcome therefrom was the surrender of the fighting class to the commercial men, holding the power of capital.

THE SAMURAI SURRENDERED TO THE POWER OF MONEY.—Struggles between the two classes, samurai and commercial, originated early in the era of Genroku, but in those early years the fighting class still exercised power over the commercial, and Yodoya and many other rich merchants in Osaka came down in ruin. But in the forty years after Genroku the samurai class completely lost their military spirit and power, and could not stand against the wealth of merchants. In the early years of Genroku a merchant's position against a samurai was such that, if any of his samurai debtors refused to pay his debt when due, the creditor had no way of pressing for payment. The merchant creditor would not now remain idle in such a case, but demand payment, shouting in front of the house of his samurai debtor. Even the privilege of the samurai class of killing commoners without breaking the law did not run before the shouting creditor. As a matter of fact the retainers of the lords took all sorts of pains in order to borrow money from the rich merchants. Those who were either stationed in or visited Osaka for their lords enthusiastically studied the singing of utai, and the tea ceremony, with a view of acquainting themselves with the rich merchants in Osaka and borrowing money from them for their lords. There was no need for them to give thought to the promotion of the happiness of the people in their lords' territories, nor was it necessary for them to practise the art of fighting. Their one care was to seize every possible chance to borrow money from the merchants for their lords, because almost every feudatory was suffering from financial distress, and the Osaka merchants were the only source whence they could get cash. But the merchants in Osaka and Kyoto had had bitter experiences in lending money to the Lord of Satsuma, the Lord of Higo, and other lords, who often refused to repay it, and they were not inclined to part with their money easily. Seeing that the merchants would not come to terms if they negotiated with them on an equal standing, the retainers of the lords lowered themselves and often entertained the merchants at restaurants, for which purpose they practised the light accomplishments already referred to. In such a small territory as that of the Lord of Fukuyama, where the lord was so poor that he could not afford his retainers any amusements, the singing of utai songs was most extensively practised, and the art most developed, as the result of his followers' intercourse with wealthy merchants in Osaka. The same was the case with many other feudal territories. A steward of Lord So of Tsushima, knowing that trade in Korean Ginseng was lucrative, wanted to get capital to embark on the business. He put into a few boxes a number of potatoes produced in Tsushima and resembling Korean Ginseng in shape, and on the security of this Ginseng he borrowed a large sum of money from the house of Konoike in Osaka. He started trading in Korean Ginseng with the money borrowed in that way, and made a big profit, thereby making Lord So rich, as referred to in another chapter. The lords thus flattered and even swindled the merchants in order to borrow their money.

The Ability of the Rich.—In 1695 the Governor of Osaka, irritated by the influence and luxury of Yodoya, a wealthy merchant in that city, punished him, and the merchant was ruined in consequence. But in the forty years following the incident the ability of the rich class quickly grew, and the Shogunate's officials and lords lost their power to deal with them. In 1740 Lord Inagaki Tenenobu of Awaji, then Governor of Osaka, was bribed in connection with a family trouble of Tomita-ya, a wealthy merchant in Osaka, and taking sides with one of the contending parties, attempted to suppress the other. His disgraceful action, however, was brought to light, and for punishment he was deprived of half of his territory and imprisoned in his own castle, while his chief retainer was ordered to commit hara-kiri. When such an important official of the Shogunate as the Governor of Osaka behaved so, it can easily be surmised what position the small lords and minor samurai held towards the rich, whose ability and influence quickly increased in those days. The conservative and honest elements in officialdom were much disturbed by this tendency, and Yamashita Konai, in a personal letter to Shogun Yoshimune, said :—

> In these years the circulation of gold and silver currency is not satisfactory and the Shogunate does not listen to appeals in connection with money affairs. Economic distress is now universal all over the country. There never has been a time when the lords, big and small, were so pressed for money as they are at present. Their distress is, indeed, beyond description, and they cannot fulfil their duties towards the Government satisfactorily. That the lords are in such a destitute condition means a loss to the Shogunate indirectly. For instance, the guards at the different gates in Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto are all temporarily employed for wages, but not the permanent retainers of the hatamoto or other lords in charge, and they cannot be relied upon in time of emergency, though they may do well enough in time of peace. But since we do not know when an emergency may occur, we must always be fully prepared in the time of peace to meet it. In these circumstances the social standing of the samurai has been greatly lowered of late years, and it is often difficult to distinguish a samurai from a certain class of merchants. Much of the samurai's authority over the commercial has been lost, and some samurai think that they can only live with the aid of the rich merchants, while many merchants declare that the samurai can do nothing without their favours. Nothing is to be more regretted. All this is due to the people's too great consideration of money, and the financial distress from which the samurai class is suffering.

Such were the true conditions in the writer's time, about which such a conservative samurai as Konai was indignant. Most samurai, however, had not the sense of honour of their progenitors, but did anything for the money which they coveted so much. On the other hand, merchants were rather more honest and upright than some samurai. A certain samurai in Osaka, through frugality, saved about 400 ryo, which he treasured as he did his own life, and thinking that the safest way was to deposit it with the Mitsui, he obtained an introduction and left his money with that house. In July and December every year he went for interest on the deposit, and each time the Mitsui showed him the bag containing his gold with the original seal, meaning that they had not utilized the deposit. Yet they used to pay him interest all the same. Their business was to make a profit from lending money to others, and they paid interest on a deposit from a petty samurai, which they never employed for any lucrative purposes, and he could not but feel grateful for what they did for him. The action of the Mitsui is praiseworthy when we see even the Shogunate in those days attempting to make profit for itself either by borrowing a portion of the hatamoto rice allowance, or by fixing as low as possible the official price of rice, at which the allowances to the Government officials and other employees were to be paid.

The Wealthiest Men in the Era of Meiwa.—In 1760 the wealthiest men in Japan, as recorded, were as follows :—

VISITORS TO THE SHRINE AT NIKKO IN APRIL, IN THE 9TH YEAR OF MEIWA.

Maru Gozayemon, of the province of Bingo, possessed 40 big ships, 6 small ships, arable land worth 10,000 koku of rice a year, and 7 islands.

Kanzayemon Murakami, of the province of Sanuki, owned 100 kettles made of gold or silver, 100 sets of Chinese implements, etc., and 300 pairs of folding gold screens.

Kayashima Hachiro, of the province of Kii, owned 16 big ships, 30 middle-size ships, 11 godowns, and arable land worth 80,000 koku of rice a year.

Hashizume Shichiyemon, of the same province, possessed 68 big ships, 11 godowns, and arable land worth 10,000 koku of rice a year.

Nawake Kakuzayemon, of the same province, owned 988 whaling boats and 11 godowns.

Shoku Zenyemon, of the province of Izumi, possessed 88 big ships, arable land worth 1,900 koku of rice a year, and 3 godowns.

Honke Sataro, of the same province, possessed 23 big ships, arable land worth 10,000 koku of rice a year, and 120 godowns.

Kono Genzayemon, of the same province, owned 8 big ships, 13 godowns, 3 godowns for the storage of gold and silver, and arable land worth 30,000 koku of rice a year.

Yogami Tamiyemon, of the provinces of Akita, possessed 20 big ships, arable land worth 18,000 koku of rice a year, and 2 godowns for the storage of gold and silver.

Hiroseya Hachiroyemon, of the province of Shimotsuke, owned arable land worth 29,000 koku of rice a year.

Tomino Shinnojo, of the same province, possessed arable land worth 21,200 koku of rice a year.

Gonnoshin, of the same province, owned 180 big ships.

Jiroyemon, of the same province, owned 480 saké barrels, 6 feet in diameter, and other unlisted property.

Awaya Iyemon, of the province of Awa, paid to the Government 1,000 ryo gold of tax a month, and a donation of 1,000 ryo gold in a year.

Yorozuya Shichiroyemon, of the province of Totomi, owned 98 big ships and arable land worth 8,000 koku of rice a year.

Yorozuya Heishichi, of the same province, owned 80 big ships and arable land worth 20,000 koku of rice a year.

Tsuboya-Sanshiro, of the province of Suruga, owned 28 big ships, 8 godowns for the storage of gold and silver, and rented 42 houses.

Tetsuya Shoyemon, of the same city, owned 15 big ships, and 10 godowns for the storage of gold and silver.

Yoshino-ya Sukejiro, of Awa Province, owned 160 big ships, and arable land worth 12,000 koku of rice a year.

Harushima Sukejiro, of Kyushu, owned bamboo forests worth 29,000 koku of rice a year.

Yamada Hikozayemon, of the province of Ise, owned 120 store-houses in Kyoto, Osaka, and Edo.

Nishitsuya Fujikuro, of the same province, owned 38 godowns and arable land worth 10,000 koku of rice a year.

Konoike Zenyemon, of Osaka, ran principal offices at 13 places and branch offices at 121 places.

Tatsumiya Kyuyemon, of the same city, owned 21 big ships, store-houses in Osaka, and 6 godowns.

Shibori Sokuro, of Yechizen Province, owned 120 big ships, arable land worth 8,000 koku of rice a year, and 7 godowns.

Seaizawa Zennojo, of Oshu Province, owned arable land worth 88,000 koku of rice a year.

Tsuruawa Zennosho, of the same province, owned arable land worth 48,000 koku of rice a year, 40 ships, chartered to the Government, and 300,000 ryo of gold.

Ishii Bunpei, of Soshu Province, owned 2·5 square miles of bamboo forests, worth 30,000 koku of rice a year, and had loaned 300,000 ryo of gold to the Government.

Wataya Choyemon, of Izumo Province, owned arable land worth 10,000 koku of rice a year, 11 godowns, and was permitted by the Shogunate to carry hasamibako when travelling.

The Miharaya, of the province of Bungo, owned 30 big ships, 28 small boats, 11 godowns for the storage of gold and silver, and 47 godowns for the storage of bronze coins.

So Tan, of Kyushu, owned arable land worth 5,000 koku of rice a year, 33 godowns, 20 residential houses, and 33 store-houses.

The Yechigo-ya (present Mitsui & Co.), of Edo, owned arable land worth 40,000 koku of rice a year, employed 7 banto (managers), 163 bookkeepers, 210 clerks (temawashi-tedai), 25 messenger boys, and 370 sales boys, making a total of 792. (According to another record, the Yechigo-ya, besides arable land worth 40,000 koku of rice a year, employed 7 banto, 163 bookkeepers, 200 clerks, 23 extra clerks, 4 cooks, 25 messenger boys, and 370 sales boys, making a total of 792.)

The Merchant pasted a Piece of Paper on the Gate of the Samurai.—These were the wealthiest men in Japan in the eras of Meiwa and Kwansei, that is, about forty years after the time of Yoshimune, and we can see the growth in those days of a new class of big land-owners and other wealthy men, with an influence strong enough to stand against the feudal lords. Besides those listed above there must have been no doubt many middle-sized land-owners and other wealthy men throughout the country who combined their influence with that of the wealthiest against the lords of the fighting class. In a word, it may be stated that, generally speaking, the commoners became much richer than the samurai. After the latter years of Genroku many samurai in Edo rented to merchants the residences given them by the Tokugawa Shogunate and they themselves lived in smaller houses. Many a time the Shogunate issued decrees prohibiting the practice, but to no purpose. The decree published in 1729 ran :—

> In the case of a samurai, who has failed in paying back his debts or paying for purchases made, on the due day, some merchants dun him for payment either by posting a paper flag in front of his gate or pasting a piece of paper on the gate itself. Such a practice is most outrageous, and cannot be countenanced in the future. If anyone does so, the offender shall be fined, and others related to him be regarded as having done a wrong thing.

This indicates the samurai class quickly losing their influence before the power of wealth, yet struggling with their falling strength as a candle leaps up before it dies.

No Suit over a Loan Accepted.—Yoshimune concentrated his efforts on readjusting the price of rice, which question he solved by re-coining the currency, thereby increasing its volume. The price of rice went up, as he desired, and both the Shogunate and the lords, who were big land-owners, were saved out of their financial distress, and the pressing trouble of the time was solved. But the solution was temporary. At the time when the price of rice was low, an account of the advanced standard of living, the improved art of craftmanship, increase in general market demand, and the increased price of labour, etc., the prices of manufactured articles went up. Now, as a result of Yoshimune's policy, the volume of currency increased and its quality became worse. Yet the face value of the new coins was just the same as that of the old ones, and, of course, the prices of other commodities went up in sympathy with the price of rice. The result was that the people at large rather suffered from Yoshimune's policy, and even the lords, though saved from their financial trouble for the time being, soon had to face greater and more serious distress arising as a consequence of the Shogun's policy. In 1742, in view of the high price of oil in Edo, the Shogunate issued a decree to the oil-dealers that the price should be lowered. Similar decrees had been issued for other commodities, but all to no purpose, and the prices of commodities continued to go up. A decree issued in August 1742 says :—

> Many decrees have already been issued that the price of commodities should not be raised, yet the prices are still high. This is a wrong act on the part of merchants. In the future, rice and other commodities should be sold for lower prices. If anyone demand a higher price, he shall be punished, etc.

How high the prices of commodities were in those days can be seen from the fact that in its letter of instructions to the Governor of Nagasaki in 1742 the Shogunate stated that the price of copper had doubled since the time of Kyoho. In November of the 4th year of Kyoho the Shogunate issued a decree saying :—

> Recently lawsuits over loans have so increased that the judges at the courts are so much occupied with these suits that they have hardly time to attend to other civil cases, which it should be their principal business to handle. Troubles over loans are such as should be settled between the persons concerned themselves, and no suits on such troubles should be accepted at the three law courts in the future.

Lawsuits over loans were thus prohibited, but seeing that the prohibition interrupted the circulation of currency, in December, in the 14th year of Kyoho (1729), the Shogunate withdrew the said decree and instructed the judges to accept lawsuits over loans as before. Nevertheless, seven years later the Shogunate issued the following surprising decree :—

MEMORANDUM DATED MAY 18TH, THE 1ST YEAR OF GEMBUN (1736).

> With regard to the settlement of loans, outstanding accounts, etc., after the re-coined currency is in circulation, the new coins should be accepted at the same value as the old ones without making any discrimination between the two. Lawsuits over loans, etc., should not be accepted at the courts, but be decided between the persons concerned.

In the 1st year of Enkyo (1744), however, as a consequence of the good crop of rice in the previous year, the price suddenly fell. The Shogunate, which always regarded a fall in the price of rice as a fatal blow to the samurai class, issued another decree in September of the same year with a view of causing a rise in the price, saying :—

> Not only in the rice market in Edo, but from rice-dealers all over the country, the Shogunate will undertake the purchase of rice. Besides, those

> who borrowed money from the rice-brokers handling the hatamoto's rice allowance need not pay back the debt at present or until the price of rice has gone up again, when the brokers have disposed of the rice put in their charge. The rice-dealers in the rice market in Edo, on behalf of the debtors, will hand the creditors sealed memoranda on the debts, which the creditors should keep secret, and not disclose even to any of their close relations. If they do, they shall be punished for the offence.

First the Shogunate instructed its judges not to accept any lawsuits over loans, and now it publicly notified that the lords or other samurai, when the price of rice went down, need not pay back money which they borrowed on the security of their rice allowance. No action of a Government could be more outrageous than this. The people thought that the same policy as in the time of the Ashikaga Shogunate might be repeated, and did not care to pay back their debts, if they had any. Capitalists felt anxious about any future loans they might make, and would not lend money any more. The result was that the movement of money suddenly stopped, and the economic condition of the country became chaotic. In Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto merchants who had been refused by the lords or other samurai repayment of their loans dunned their creditors for their debts, gathering with their families in front of the residences of their debtors, or stopping their palanquins or horses, or adopting other similar means.

YOSHIMUNE'S ONLY POLICY TO INCREASE THE REVENUE OF THE SHOGUNATE.—In October of the same year the Shogunate issued another decree to the effect that since it has ordered the rice merchants to keep a certain stock of rice, they may have to borrow money for the purpose, and that although, according to the regulations, lawsuits over loans, etc., are to be handled twice a year—namely in April and November—suits over loans in connection with deals in rice should be handled specially, even at other times.

In a word, it may be said that throughout his administration Yoshimune always concentrated his energy on the adjustment of the price of rice, and for this purpose he repeatedly adopted mistaken, sometimes stupid, measures. Some of his measures seemed to have succeeded to a certain extent, but the success was more a natural outcome of the circumstances than because the measures were good and appropriate. His real object in attempting to adjust the price of rice was no other than to increase the income of the Shogunate. With the same object in view, he imposed on the lords a tax of 100 koku of rice per every 10,000 koku of rice worth of territory. This impost, however, the lords passed on to the people in their respective territories, who thus had to bear the entire burden created by Yoshimune. For many years after the beginning of the Tokugawa Shogunate the people used to take

60 or 70 per cent. of the output of their land, and paid 30 or 40 per cent. to the Government, but they had now to pay 50 per cent., and for many years after they suffered from this policy of Yoshimune's. Not only did he cause this suffering, but Yoshimune cut the rice allowances given to the hatamoto by 8 to per every 100 bales, though apparently it was only that the Shogunate borrowed so much from the hatamoto. Besides, the rice allowance to the hatamoto was often paid in gold or silver instead of in rice, and in such a case the payment was made at the officially fixed price of rice. The price of rice officially fixed by the Shogunate under Yoshimune was always lower than the price then prevailing in the market, and Yoshimune squeezed the hatamoto in this way too. Therefore both the people and the samurai suffered under his measures to increase the revenue, which were more actuated by his greed than by political motives.

YAMASHITA KONAI IN A STRONG LETTER DISAPPROVED YOSHIMUNE'S POLICIES.—Yoshimune's policies were disapproved by many, and Yamashita Konai, a ronin living at Edo, in a strong letter addressed to Yoshimune, severely commented upon his policy, and made it clear that Yoshimune was ruling the Empire of Japan just as he had governed his own territory of Kishu, which is only a very small part of Japan, before he became the ruler of the whole country.

His letter says :—

> The cause of the present financial distress in Japan is the Shogunate's refusal to accept suits over loans, which has recently been decided on. But no official of the Shogunate has dared yet to tell you of this cause of the present distress, and the people think it is because you do not like to listen to the advice of true-minded men. The men around you simply tell you that as a result of your policy the Shogunate had been saved from its financial distress. If you think that is true, you are greatly mistaken. On the contrary, if the Shogunate hoards money itself, the people will suffer much in consequence. Even if wholesale dealers in a certain line stop disposing of their stock for a while, the prices in that particular line go up at once, and the people at large have to suffer from it. Far-reaching is the suffering of the people from the Shogunate's hoarding money in its coffers. If the crops of rice and other cereals are bad, or fire or such calamity happen, money is of no use, however much the Shogunate may have, but rice is always valuable on any occasion. It appears that you regard money as more important than rice, and I cannot understand it. It seems to me that you are ruling the whole Empire in the same way as you governed the territory of Kishu. The lord of a province or county attaches more importance to money than to rice, because if rice crops are bad in his own territory, he can import rice from his neighbours, should he have the money to do so. Even so, that is not what a shrewd ruler should do. As the ruler of the whole empire, you have to consider that though money has permanent life and should circulate permanently, the case of rice is different. If rice crops are continuously bad, there is no way of getting rice from other countries, while the people cannot live without it.

This is an important consideration, and I cannot understand the mind of the men around you who do not bring it to your attention. It is said that Hideyoshi entirely cleared the coffers of the Government twice a year, and gave the money to the people, saying that the keeping of money in the Government's coffers is like keeping good, able men in prison. In his time, the Government had such extra expenditures as for his expedition to Korea, etc., yet Hideyoshi pursued this policy. Money all over the Empire belongs to the Shogun, as it were, and I have never heard that any Shogun yet suffered from the want of money to cover state expenditure. In case of any emergency, the Government can raise any amount of money to meet necessary expenditures. Even during the revolt of Yui Shosetsu and Marubashi Chuya the Shogunate did not spend much money. At present, when the country is at peace, I cannot understand why you pursue such a policy and cause the people to suffer from it. You cannot appreciate how much the lords are suffering from your policy. Gold and silver coins have permanent life, as it were, but whether they circulate freely or are kept idle has great effect on the happiness of the people at large, and I hope you will take the matter into serious consideration.

YOSHIMUNE HONEST BUT SMALL-MINDED.—As Yamashita Konai says, Yoshimune was a petty-minded person, always thinking of affairs of minor importance, but without such broad views and mind as to make him a good ruler of a country. He had not, however, any serious personal faults. When he received Yamashita's letter, he was not angry, but rather praised him for writing such an admirable letter. Once Yoshimune instructed his Court officials to pick out the most beautiful of all the Court ladies, when over fifty were selected. Some thought that he intended to make them his concubines, like Shogun Tsunayoshi, who had many, but he dismissed the fifty ladies from the Court. He may have had some concubines, but not so many as to be particularly criticized in this respect, and, as we have seen, he employed his gardeners as detectives to get information on the secret doings of the lords. He was always interested in farming, and as a territorial lord Yoshimune was indeed ideal. As he attempted to encourage healthy thoughts and minds among the people, he kept his home comparatively pure, and was a good father and husband, compared with many other rulers. But he could not see how things were moving. During his long reign of twenty-eight years, he never had a good Prime Minister, to whom he could entrust the administration of the country. He himself was obliged to do the Prime Minister's business, and he administered through the men around him, who naturally gained political influence and began to interfere with the doings of the Shogunate, though they did not understand politics or state affairs, and were mere sycophants. In no country can the ruler always be a great man, and even if he be, the country he rules will not necessarily be happy, unless he has a suitable Prime Minister to assist him. Should a ruler be neither stupid nor a tyrant, but simply an ordinary man, his people may be satisfied, but neither can such a ruler rule well without a proper Prime Minister. It is not so much the wisdom or knowledge he possesses, but whether he can entirely trust his servants, and they assist him sincerely, that makes a man a good ruler. Yoshimune was honest and sincere, and attempted to manage the affairs of the Government himself without finding any good, able person to assist him. Besides, when he retired, he recommended his stupid son, instead of some wiser man from the Tokugawa family, to succeed him in the office of Shogun. These two faults of Yoshimune's as a ruler were such as to offset all his strong points and good acts during his administration.

THE DISCOVERY OF THE BONIN ISLANDS.—Yoshimune's time in Japan will be remembered as much by the discovery of the Bonin Islands as by the change from thatch to tile in Edo. In 1727 a ronin called Ogasawara Kunai applied to the Shogunate for the opening of a group of small islands off the coast of Izu, which he claimed had been given by Shogun Iyeyasu to his forefather, Ogasawara Sodayori. The Shogunate gave the permit. In November an expedition in a boat of 350 koku, equipped with sails of fourteen or fifteen rolls of cloth and five oars, was sent to the Islands, and upon their return the explorers reported, it is said, that the Islands had already been named Ogasawara after the name of the discoverer, with the permission of Shogun Iyeyasu. The Islands are still called by that name in Japan.

CHAPTER LIV

FOREIGN TRADE AND THE MOVEMENT OF GOLD AND SILVER

Hakuseki's Views on the Foreign Trade at Nagasaki.—In those days our foreign trade was confined to Nagasaki and Hirado. Foreign merchants who were permitted to trade at these ports were limited to the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and Chinese. What effect the trade at these places had upon the financial and economic doings of Japan is an important question in our economic history. Nevertheless, very little has been said on this important subject in our past histories, and reliable historical material in this respect, too, is very scanty. The only material relied upon by historians on the subject is the views of Arai Hakuseki, according to whom our foreign trade at these two places was entirely a failure, and the cause of the financial distress from which Japan suffered for many years in the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate. His views, as embodied in his book, *Oritaku-Shiba-no-ki* (*Fireside Talks*), may be outlined as follows :—

> There is no means of ascertaining the events from the era of Keicho (1596–1614) up to the 5th year of Seiho (1648). In the sixty-one years from the 5th year of Shoho till the 5th year of Hoyei (1708), 2,397,600 ryo of gold and 374,229 kwamme of silver flowed out of Japan through Nagasaki ; and in the forty-four years from the 3rd year of Kwammon (1664) till the 4th year of Hoyei (1707), 114,498,700 kin of copper was exported from Nagasaki to foreign countries. If we add what left the country at other ports or through other channels, the total would be twice or three times as much as all the currency in circulation now (20,000,000 ryo), and at least one-third of the old gold coins flowed out of Japan. The amount of silver circulating in this country at present is 400,000 kwamme, and twice as much has been exported to foreign countries.

Since Hakuseki himself was principally connected with the readjustment of the Shogunate finances in the middle part of the Tokugawa period, and he is as famous as a writer as he is as a statesman, many people believe in his views, which, in consequence, are sometimes exaggerated. It is generally held that a huge amount of gold flowed out of the country on account of our foreign trade, with the consequent result of long-standing financial distress, but that was not necessarily a historical fact.

Hakuseki's Mistake about the Quantity of Gold.—Before we discuss whether Hakuseki's views are right or not, we have to see how much gold went to 1 ryo. Goto, the gold mint-master and author of *Kin-Gin-Zukai* (*Explanatory Diagrams of Gold and Silver Coins*), speaking of the comparison of gold and silver coins, says :—

> "Ten ryo" impressed on the big gold coin does not mean that it is of the value of ten small gold coins, but it means 10 ryo worth of gold. In the olden time 1 ryo of gold meant one silver coin, therefore 10 ryo meant ten silver coins. One big gold coin was exchanged for 420 momme of silver, and all the other prices were brokers' prices in the market.

A calculation made in accordance with *Tamon-In Nikki* and other records indicates that one big gold coin weighed 42.8 momme; therefore 1 ryo of gold was about 4.2 momme or 4.3 momme. If the Shogunate had amassed 20,000,000 ryo of gold coins, as Hakuseki states, that means about 84,000,000 momme of gold, which exchanged into the currency of our own time means about 420,000,000 yen, which is indeed a big amount. We have next to consider what the gold and silver output was in those days. After the middle of the Ashikaga period Japan suffered from internal dissensions, and during those troubled years each of the feudal lords made special endeavours to open up natural resources and increase the wealth of his own domains. The output of gold, silver, copper, and iron grew, further increased in the periods of Genki and Tensho, and with the restoration of peace by Tokugawa Iyeyasu swelled very largely. Rightly or wrongly, historians count this as one of Iyeyasu's merits. In the Tokugawa period mines of gold, silver, copper, etc., were all placed under the direct management of the Central Government for the first time, for, though he distributed territories among his lords, Iyeyasu kept all these mining resources under his own control. Until 1603 (8th year of Keicho) the mines in the various parts of Japan were operated by different lords on a small scale, and for that reason we cannot believe that there was 420,000,000 yen worth of gold and silver in Japan in those days, as Hakuseki says. Elsewhere Hakuseki says that during the ninety-three years from 1602 (7th year of Keicho) till 1695 (8th year of Genroku) there were made "about 70,000,000 ryo of gold and 800,000 kwamme of silver" altogether. On what his statement is based it is not known, but 70,000,000 ryo of gold means about 294,000 kwamme of gold, which, if exchanged into the currency of our own time, is nearly 1,470,000,000 yen, an incredibly big amount. Before deciding whether his statement is correct or not, we have to see how much gold and silver were produced in Japan about the time when the Tokugawa Shogunate was established.

Gold Output from 1613 till 1649.—In a certain history it is recorded that: "Iyeyasu put Okubo Choan in charge of the mines of the two provinces, Iwami and Sado. Choan worked at his furnaces very hard, whereby the output of gold and silver increased; and in one year Iwami produced 25,000 kin or 4,000 kwamme, and Sado 62,500 kin or 11,000 kwamme. The output further increased thereafter. The mines in Izu Province, too, were placed under Choan's management, and after three years' working these mines began to produce as much as those in Sado. All this is placed to the credit of Iyeyasu." According to the above statement, it appears as if the output of these metals greatly increased, but the increase, if averaged for several years, was not necessarily big. For instance, the output of the mines in Sado during the thirty-two years from 1613 till 1648, from which year Hakuseki's discussion on the subject begins, was :—

Suji-Kin (gold refined in the cupel)	173,496 momme
Placer gold	30,617 momme
Koban (small gold coin)	158,704 ryo
Silver	55,735,513 momme

All this comes to about 212,700 ryo. Of the above-stated period, for the eleven years from 1624 till 1634, there are no available statistics, as all the records were destroyed in a conflagration in Edo, and during those years the output in Sado reached its highest point. Supposing that about 99 kwamme were produced annually, the total output in the ten years is 999 kwamme or 250,000 ryo, which, added to the figures given above, makes a total of about 460,000 ryo.

Gold Output from 1649 till 1710.—The output of gold and silver in Sado from 1649 till 1710 was :—

FROM 1649 TILL 1708.

Silver refined in the cupels	66,259 kwan 622.8 momme
Koban (small gold coin)	25,000 ryo
Gold refined in the cupels	101 kwan 612.8 momme
Gold separated from other metals, such as silver, copper, etc., in the furnaces	299 kwan 933.6 momme
Gold beaten out	131,468 ryo
Chogin silver coin	67 kwan 146 momme

In the neighbourhood of Doi village, in the province of Izu, gold began to be produced from about 1577, and at this and other places gold was turned out at one time as much as in Sado, but the output soon decreased, and the mines were given up after being operated for about fifty years. The mines in Izu, Sado, and other provinces, during a period from the 1st till the 7th year of Hoyei (1704–11), produced, it is said, 192, kwamme of gold annually, in average, the annual output in each province being as follows :—

	Kwamme.		*Kwamme.*
Sado	99.129	Satsuma	78.820
Izu	12.004	Buzen	0.749
Bungo	0.395	Suruga	0.999
Tajima	0.210		

Hakuseki's Views are Groundless.—From the figures quoted above, it can be said that even in the time when gold was most produced in Japan, the total output all over the country was about 48,000 ryo. In those days of internecine strife each lord tried to enrich his own territory as against his neighbour, so that if any gold or silver mine was discovered, it was worked at once by any means, even though the operation did not pay after all. It is probable therefore that, in addition to the mines above mentioned, there were many gold and silver mines operated on a smaller scale in different provinces by the respective feudal lords. Nevertheless, from the above figures we can get an idea of the general condition of gold output in Japan in those days, and, judging from these figures, we cannot believe that 20,000,000 ryo of gold coins were made from the beginning of the Tokugawa Shogunate. If the gold output was such as quoted above during the ninety-four years after the establishment of the Tokugawa regime, it cannot be easily believed that there was 70,000,000 ryo of gold and 800,000 kwamme of silver existing in Japan from days earlier than the Tokugawa period. For these reasons it can be stated that though a certain amount of gold and silver flowed out of the country as a result of our foreign trade at Nagasaki in those days, yet the amount must have been rather small ; and Hakuseki's statement that 70,000,000 ryo altogether flowed out is an exaggeration caused by his surprise over the state of trade at Nagasaki.

Gold Currency prior to the Tokugawa Period.—When gold and silver metals were made currency for the first time in Japan is not known exactly, but it was some time in the latter years of the Ashikaga period. During the era of Tensho (1573–92) Oda Nobunaga made the Oban (big plate) and Koban (small plate) gold coins. In the earlier days gold was alluvial in most cases, and was put into a bag and used as money by weight. This gold-dust was washed out of river-sand in a most primitive manner, and it may be safely asserted that it was of very small quantity. Later, metallurgy was introduced from China, and for the first time gold was extracted from ores, but the method was applied to a very small extent. Not many years elapsed from the introduction of the Chinese method till the days of Tokugawa Iyeyasu, and once more we cannot believe that there had been 70,000,000 ryo worth of gold in Japan before his time.

Iyeyasu's Desire for Gold.—Tokugawa Iyeyasu had a strong desire for gold—so strong that neither Oda Nobunaga nor Toyotomi Hideyoshi could be compared with him in this respect. The importance he attached to the precious metal can be seen from the circumstances attending his nomination of Okubo Choan as his Minister of Finance. The story of this man is curious. After Iyeyasu had begun to reside in the castle of Edo, parties of Sangaku dancers of four different schools in Kyoto came to Edo, and during their stay Iyeyasu called them to his castle every evening, and took pleasure in talking with them and learning their ideas on things in general. One evening, while conversing with these dancers and his Court officials, Iyeyasu said that of all the lords he and Mori Terumoto were the biggest owners of territories, but that big territories did not mean much without enough gold and silver. More revenue must be got somehow, which could only be done by reducing the number of samurai, rendering oneself defenceless against rivals. Here was a dilemma which he propounded to his hearers—some way to keep many samurai and yet amass money. The next day one of the dancers came forward with his plan, namely, mining and the improvement of mining. Iyeyasu was delighted, took him into his employ, made him lord of Iwami, and gave him the name of Okubo Choan. He gathered many adventurers and operated the mines on a large scale, and, it is said, among his staff were some Portuguese and Chinese engineers. The above story reveals the eagerness of Iyeyasu to gather gold.

The Appointment of Goto Shozaburo.—There were fifty-three rules for mining, which were observed, it is said, at each mine in the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and are said to have been made by Iyeyasu himself during the era of Tensho. According to these rules, a mine could be operated even under a castle ground, and a mining engineer was permitted through any barrier all over Japan if he could pass an examination on ores at each barrier. A mine was to be regarded as a state, where there was perfect freedom. Every possible protection was accorded to the mining industry, and there was entire freedom within a mining zone, for the reason that the people working there were always exposed to danger, and did not know when a calamity might come on them. All this shows that the administration of mining resources was closely watched by the Shogunate in those days. The appointment of Goto Shozaburo to a responsible position, under which he was given privileges at the Shogunate gold mint, indicates Iyeyasu's knowledge of the finances of his Government. Goto was a rich merchant in Kyoto, doing business with the Government, and with a good knowledge of foreign trade, for which reason the Shogunate officials often asked his advice regarding it. In 1617 the Governor of Goa sent a mission to Japan, with one letter to the Shogun, another to Honda Kotsuke-no-suke (then Premier), and another to Goto Shozaburo. In reply, Goto assumed the attitude of a person representing the Government of Japan, and spoke of Japan's policy towards India, proving how important were his connections in commerce and trade in his time. When a cinnabar dealer in Kobe, called Takanari, went to Mexico in 1611, it was Goto Shozaburo who introduced Takanari to the Shogun and obtained the latter's permit. He was connected not only with the foreign affairs, but the domestic affairs of the Shogunate also; and he controlled the ships coming to or going out of the port of Nagasaki. Goto's relations with Iyeyasu were very close, for Iyeyasu gave him one of his concubines, and the son that this woman bore was really Iyeyasu's. In course of years Goto was appointed to a responsible position in connection with the gold mint, and regulated the currency. Thus the finances of the Government in the early days of the Tokugawa Shogunate were regulated by Goto Shozaburo and Okubo Choan.

NOBUNAGA COLLECTED GOLD.—Oda Nobunaga was the first military leader who converted political power to money. Whenever he gave any territory or people to a samurai under him, he expected a certain amount of money in return. Thirty pieces of gold were usually presented when a lord was received in audience by Nobunaga. When Shibata Katsuiye was given the province of Echizen in the 9th year of Tensho, he presented to Nobunaga one pair of swords made by the distinguished smith Kunimitsu, 300 ryo of gold, 1,000 ryo in silver in lieu of a horse, 1,000 candles, 1,000 reams of Hosho paper, 1,000 bundles of raw cotton, and 1,000 rolls of silk. Not only when they were given territories, but also at New Year and on other ceremonial occasions, Nobunaga's retainers made presents to him in money. On New Year's Day in 1582 the lords, big and small, presented him with 1,000 bronze coins each. The fact that they presented bronze coins instead of gold or silver shows that the latter did not yet circulate widely. In 1574, when Iyeyasu joined him on a campaign in Totomi, Nobunaga gave him two leather bags of gold, which was publicly exhibited as a great curiosity. Judging from the fact that the gold was in bags, it must have been gold-dust. And that the samurai in Iyeyasu's army were astonished at the gift shows how strange a thing gold was to the people at large in those days, which means that the amount in gold in Japan was very small. How can we believe that there was 70,000,000 ryo worth of gold in Japan already in those days, as Arai Hakuseki says ?

Gold Coin circulated in Nobunaga's Time.—In 1578 gold coins were in circulation in Japan. In his campaign with Araki Murashige in Settsu, Nobunaga rewarded Nakagawa Seibei with thirty gold coins, and gave three of his retainers each six. When Takayama Ukon surrendered to him without resistance, Nobunaga gave him twenty gold coins, and his two senior retainers four each. That gold was given in such circumstances indicates that it was appreciated by the people more out of curiosity than for its purchasing power as currency, but in 1581, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi was campaigning in the Chugoku districts, the novelty was lost and gold indispensable appears to have become for the expense of a military campaign. On the death of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi hurried east to crush Mitsuhide, and distributed all the gold and silver in his castle of Himeji —namely, 1,000 gold coins and 750 kwamme of silver—among his retainers, with the remark that as he was about to enter on a desperate struggle it was no more use to him. There was still 460 gold coins and 10 kwamme of silver left out of the war-chest he had made for use in the campaign against Mori Teramoto, and this he ordered to be taken along, as, though he would not need it himself, it would come in useful for envoys who might be sent to him by other feudal lords. The amount Hideyoshi gave to his household at Himeji, and the amount left out of his fund for the war with Mori, totalled 14,600 ryo of gold and 780 kwamme of silver. (Note.—A Tensho Oban, or big gold coin of Tensho, weighed 44 momme.) Seeing that in those days gold and silver were not the only means of settling matters, but that Hideyoshi used so much money, we can easily realize that the precious metals played an important rôle both in political and military affairs in his time. But, in spite of this, the amount of gold and silver possessed by Hideyoshi's troops was rather small, considering the leading position of their general and also the fact that Nobunaga's policy had been to concentrate as much gold and silver as possible in the hands of the Central Government—another proof that the amount of gold and silver circulating in the country in those days was small.

Hideyoshi distributed Gold and Silver among the Lords.—When he defeated Mitsuhide, Hideyoshi opened the godown where Nobunaga had stored gold and silver, which Mitsuhide had seized, and distributed it among his mother and other relatives. In this connection details are given in *Sofu Monogatari* (*Grandfather's Tales*) as follows :—

> Lord Hideyoshi went to Sakamoto and took the burnt gold out of the destroyed castle, formerly occupied by Mitsuhide, and sent it to Kyoto, where

it was refined and coins were made out of it by Goto, who was in charge of the work there. The coins were then forwarded to Himeji, where Lord Hideyoshi distributed it among his family and relatives. His mother was given 200 pieces ; his mother-in-law, Asahi, 20 pieces ; Asahi's brother, Kinoshita Magobei, 20 pieces. This Magobei is Lord Hideyoshi's father. He was in charge of the castle at Himeji, and, while governing the whole province of Banshu, he owned a private estate worth 26,000 koku in Takamatsu. Asano Matayemon's widow was given 50 pieces and Kinoshita Koichiro (Hideyoshi's younger brother) 500 pieces. Magoshichi was given 200 pieces ; this man was called Prince Hidetsugu later and made Lord Regent. The general of Mino, a brother of Prince Hidetsugu, was given 200 pieces. The Chuganon of Yamato, third younger brother of Magoshichi, was given 200 pieces ; and Ukita Hachiro, a relation by marriage, was given 500 pieces. An elder sister of Hideyoshi's wife, Fukushima Ichimatsu, and Kato Toranosuke were given 20 pieces each ; Lord Aoki of Kii was given 50 pieces, and Sugiwara Shichirozayemon was given 10 pieces.

The total amount of gold coins that Hideyoshi distributed among his relatives, as stated above, was 2,310 pieces. By 1505 gold and silver in the treasury of his Government had again considerably increased, and Hideyoshi once more distributed it among the lords, as is told in the life of Hideyoshi by Kose Hoan :—

> Hideyoshi himself owned territories worth 2,000,000 koku of rice annually, and so much gold, silver, bronze coins, and rice came into his treasury every year that they accumulated considerably. Should the treasure so increased be left to pile up the result would be bad luck, men say, and Hideyoshi asked the advice of an elderly man named Yuki Hogan, who suggested a distribution of it. Accordingly, in the early part of autumn, in the 13th year of Tensho, Hideyoshi distributed 5,000 pieces of gold and 30,000 pieces of silver among the lords and his Government officers. These gold and silver coins were put on big tables in the southern corner of the main gate of his palace Shurakutei, in Kyoto, and a whole day passed in distributing them among the recipients. Later he again made similar presents to the lords and his Government officers. The citizens of Kyoto who actually witnessed the distribution were greatly impressed by this action of Hideyoshi, whom they declared as unsurpassed by any great persons in the past.

According to the record, Hideyoshi gave out on these two occasions 7,310 pieces of gold and 30,000 pieces of silver in all, and, although it was not the entire amount of metals possessed by Hideyoshi's Government, yet as Nobunaga and Hideyoshi concentrated their political power in their Central Government, the financial power of the country, too, must have been centred in Osaka, the seat of the Government in Hideyoshi's time, and from the figures given above, it is not difficult for us to get a general idea of the amount of gold and silver circulating in Japan in those days. In other words, we cannot easily believe that 70,000,000 ryo worth of gold and silver were circulating in Japan, and that 20,000,000 ryo of it was under the control of the Central Government, as Hakuseki says. In discussing foreign trade in the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Hakuseki bases his arguments on the belief that there had existed such a big amount of gold and silver in Japan ; in other words, his argument was mistaken from its start.

GOLD AND SILVER LOST BY JAPAN IN HER TRADE WITH PORTUGAL. What was, then, the result of our trade with the Portuguese in those days ? Some historians say that, as a result of her trade with the Portuguese during eighty years, Japan lost more than 600,000,000 yen altogether, but this is entirely imagination, and not based on solid fact. According to a record by a Portuguese, written in 1621 (Dunbar's *Portuguese Influence in India*), the amount of a 10 per cent. duty imposed at Goa, which was the headquarters of Portuguese trade activities in the Far East in those days, upon the Portuguese ships engaged in trade with Japan, was 300,000 seraphino annually, from which the total value of Japanese goods imported there from Japan was 3,000,000 seraphino a year. Supposing that the value of goods imported into Japan by the Portuguese was one-half of the value of exports, it was 1,500,000 seraphino, which, if exchanged into our present currency, is 1,100,000 yen or thereabout. Even suppose that Japan's trade with the Portuguese in those days was import only, and no export in all the said eighty years, Japan's total loss is 80,000,000 yen, and it cannot be imagined that during those eighty years Japan's specie flowed out so much that the country suffered from the want of gold in consequence. And the fact was, that Japan's foreign trade during those eighty years was not one-sided at all, but Japanese goods were exported to Europe and India. An Englishman called Ralph Fitch, who was at Malacca in 1588 when Hideyoshi was in his glory, and the Emperor honoured him by personally visiting his residence in Kyoto, speaking in later years of the trade between Japan and Portugal, said :—

> When the Portuguese merchants sailed from Macao and China to Japan, they took with them a large quantity of raw silk, gold, china-wares, and musk, and on their return they brought back nothing but silver. They owned a big ship, which navigated once a year in those waters and took 600,000 crusadoes of silver out of Japan and 200,000 crusadoes of silver from India annually, which silver they utilized profitably in China, purchasing there gold, raw silk, musk, china-ware, and other precious articles, etc.

Crusado is the name of a Portuguese coin in those days, worth about 1 yen 40 sen of our present currency. Supposing that in those years Japan bought from Portugal, but sold her nothing, she had 600,000 crusadoes of silver taken away by the Portuguese in a year. But though Fitch says that the Portuguese took from Japan nothing but silver, yet there is no doubt that in later years Japan exported her goods through the Portuguese traders. Besides, among the goods imported into Japan by the Portuguese was a large quantity of gold. All this contradicts Hakuseki's views.

HIDEYOSHI'S POLICY ON THE IMPORTATION OF GOLD.—The importation of gold as well as raw silk by the Portuguese merchants was due to Hideyoshi's policy, under which they were requested to bring gold as well as other merchandise. In 1518 the captain of a Portuguese merchant ship, in a letter addressed to Hideyoshi, says :—

> Arriving at Nagasaki on July 1st, we expected the same freedom of trade as last year, but the local authorities did not allow it to us, disregarding the permit we have been enjoying.
>
> The local authorities, making search for gold in the ship, which, if found, they are instructed, as we are told, to purchase, have delayed the landing of our goods, which is intolerable to us, and we respectfully ask you to instruct them to permit us to land our goods at once.
>
> When we arrived at Nagasaki, we were very happy, because we thought we could land and rest ourselves after so many days of voyage on the sea, but since our arrival our ship has been placed under a strict guard, and we cannot even take meals regularly, nor is a single one of us permitted to land.
>
> In the past forty years, during which we have been trading with Japan, we have never been treated like this.
>
> If your Government wants to purchase any special goods direct from us in the future, we hope an official who understands trade will be named to deal with us for the purpose. In other words, we wish to be accorded the same freedom of trade as before, and that our ship be allowed to come to this country without any objection.
>
> The above I bring to your attention, as we cannot land our goods as expected.
>
> I respectfully present to you gold cups, gold stands, gold chains, etc., though in small quantity, which I hope you will accept.
>
> *July 15th, the 17th year of Tensho.*

So early, then, as Hideyoshi's time the Japanese Government was already attempting to import gold as much as possible, and how can we believe that gold had been allowed to flow out of the country so recklessly as Hakuseki fancied.

JAPAN'S TRADE WITH THE DUTCH.—How was then our trade with the Dutch ? One difficulty we are confronted with in discussing our trade at Nagasaki in those days is the absence of exact statistics. The results of an investigation made by Nohod, a German, into the records of the Dutch East India Company are the most reliable of all the materials in this respect, though even they are not complete.

According to investigations made in various ways, the exports and imports of Japan to and from China and Holland during the seventy-one years from the 1st year of Keian, were as follows :—

THE RETURNS OF TRADE WITH CHINA AND HOLLAND

CHINESE MERCHANTMEN.

Year.	No. of Ships.	Description.		Amount. (Silver is given in Weight, Kwamme.)
1648 (5th year of Seiho or 1st year of Keian)	20	Imports,	Merchandise	4,997.547
		Exports	Merchandise	2,204.553
			Silver coins and silver articles	1,794.556
		Excess of exports over imports		998.437
1649 (2nd year of Keian)	59	Imports,	Merchandise	12,062.476
		Exports	Merchandise	4,422.560
			Silver coins and silver articles	5,454.205
		Excess of exports over imports		2,185.611
1650 (3rd year of Keian)	70	Imports,	Merchandise	15,299.415
		Exports	Merchandise	5,293.531
			Silver coins and silver articles	6,827.710
		Excess of exports over imports		3,178.174
1651 (4th year of Keian)	40	Imports,	Merchandise	9,617.682
		Exports	Merchandise	3,208.119
			Silver coins and silver articles	4,749.429
		Excess of exports over imports		1,660.033
1652 (1st year of Shoo)	50	Imports,	Merchandise	13,950.526
		Exports	Merchandise	6,165.823
			Silver coins and silver articles	5,867.301
		Excess of exports over imports		1,917.402
1653 (2nd year of Shoo)	56	Imports,	Merchandise	15,103.305
		Exports	Merchandise	9,304.666
			Silver coins and silver articles	3,517.443
		Excess of exports over imports		2,281.198
1654 (3rd year of Shoo)	51	Imports,	Merchandise	19,080.589
		Exports	Merchandise	7,070.068
			Silver coins and silver articles	8,181.167
		Excess of exports over imports		3,829.353
1655 (1st year of Meireki)	45	Imports,	Merchandise	11,933.725
		Exports	Merchandise	6,651.176
			Silver coins and silver articles	4,655.050
		Excess of exports over imports		627.498
1656 (2nd year of Meireki)	57	Import,	Merchandise	14,216 928
		Exports	Merchandise	7,440.302
			Silver coins and silver articles	5,241.110
		Excess of exports over imports		1,535.515

FOR TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, FROM 1648 TILL 1672.

DUTCH MERCHANTMEN.

No. of Ships.	Description.	Amount. (Silver is given in Weight, Kwamme.)	Amount of Specie Blowed Out.
6	Imports, Merchandise	6,987.547	Silver coins and silver articles, 8,015.956 kwan
	Exports { Merchandise	556.765	
	Silver coins and silver articles	6,221.400	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	209.382	
7	Imports, Merchandise	7,076.169	Silver coins and silver articles, 10,794.605 kwan
	Exports { Merchandise	775.634	
	Silver coins and silver articles	5,340.300	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	960.235	
7	Imports, Merchandise	5,472.540	Silver coins and silver articles, 10,768.310 kwan
	Exports { Merchandise	1,025.085	
	Silver coins and silver articles	3,940.600	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	506.855	
8	Imports, Merchandise	6,656.157	Silver coins and silver articles, 9,645.029 kwan
	Exports { Merchandise	1,294.425	
	Silver coins and silver articles	4,895.600	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	466.132	
9	Imports, Merchandise	7,052.273	Silver coins and silver articles, 11,406.201 kwan
	Exports { Merchandise	1,062.021	
	Silver coins and silver articles	5,538.900	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	451.352	
5	Imports, Merchandise	7,423.915	Silver coins and silver articles, 9,707.643 kwan
	Exports { Merchandise	786.763	
	Silver coins and silver articles	6,190.200	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	446.961	
4	Imports, Merchandise	5,190.776	Silver coins and silver articles, 12,029.367 kwan
	Exports { Merchandise	900.324	
	Silver coins and silver articles	3,848.200	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	442.251	
4	Imports, Merchandise	5,102.594	Silver coins and silver articles, 8,666.550 kwan
	Exports { Merchandise	703.971	
	Silver coins and silver articles	4,011.500	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	387.123	
8	Imports, Merchandise	8,435.482	Silver coins and silver articles, 11,431.360 kwan
	Exports { Merchandise	1,668.747	
	Silver coins and silver articles	6,190.250	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	576.484	

THE RETURNS OF TRADE WITH CHINA

CHINESE MERCHANTMEN.

Year.	No. of Ships.	Description.		Amount. (Silver is given in Weight, Kwamme.)
1657 (3rd year of Meireki)	51	Imports,	Merchandise	10,366.301
		Exports	Merchandise	6,568.107
			Silver coins and silver articles	2,449.750
		Excess of exports over imports ..		1,348.444
1658 (1st year of Manji)	43	Imports,	Merchandise	16,429.184
		Exports	Merchandise	4,364.713
			Silver coins and silver articles	11,028.540
		Excess of exports over imports ..		1,035.931
1659 (2nd year of Manji)	60	Imports,	Merchandise	25,953.059
		Exports	Merchandise	5,621.416
			Silver coins and silver articles	19,400.898
		Excess of exports over imports ..		930.745
1660 (3rd year of Manji)	45	Imports,	Merchandise	23,806.846
		Exports	Merchandise	2,448.798
			Silver coins and silver articles	20,151.286
		Excess of exports over imports ..		1,206.762
1661 (1st year of Kwammon)	39	Imports,	Merchandise	29,313.729
		Exports	Merchandise	2,711.066
			Silver coins and silver articles	25,769.442
		Excess of exports over imports ..		833.220
1662 (2nd year of Kwammon)	42	Imports,	Merchandise	18,859.093
		Exports	Merchandise	3,335.039
			Silver coins and silver articles	12,942.654
		Excess of exports over imports ..		2,581.499
1663 (3rd year of Kwammon)	29	Imports,	Merchandise	11,089.768
		Exports	Merchandise	1,968.150
			Silver coins and silver articles	5,411.346
		Excess of exports over imports ..		3,710.272
1664[1] (4th year of Kwammon)	38	Imports,	Merchandise	20,870.675
		Exports	Merchandise	2,751.266
			Silver coins and silver articles	16,663.684
			Gold coins	470 ryo (29,920 kwan)
		Excess of exports over imports ..		1,425.803

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[1] In this year the Dutch

AND HOLLAND FOR TWENTY-FIVE YEARS—*Continued.*

DUTCH MERCHANTMEN.

No. of Ships.	Description.	Amount. (Silver is given in Weight, Kwamme.)	Amount of Specie Blowed Out.
8	Imports, Merchandise	5,873.300	Silver coins and silver articles, 5,893.987 kwan
	Exports Merchandise	2,017.373	
	Silver coins and silver articles	3,444.237	
	Excess of exports over imports	411.690	
9	Imports, Merchandise	7,961.833	Silver coins and silver articles, 16,669.087 kwan
	Exports Merchandise	1,811.937	
	Silver coins and silver articles	5,640.547	
	Excess of exports over imports	509.348	
8	Imports, Merchandise	8,066.364	Silver coins and silver articles, 25,361.293 kwan
	Exports Merchandise	1,422.050	
	Silver coins and silver articles	5,960.395	
	Excess of exports over imports	683.918	
5	Imports, Merchandise	6,545.258	Silver coins and silver articles, 24,419.691 kwan
	Exports Merchandise	1,715.557	
	Silver coins and silver articles	4,268.385	
	Excess of exports over imports	561.315	
11	Imports, Merchandise	9,128.698	Silver coins and silver articles, 31,313.032 kwan
	Exports Merchandise	2,958.166	
	Silver coins and silver articles	5,543.590	
	Excess of exports over imports	626.932	
8	Imports, Merchandise	9,204.090	Silver coins and silver articles, 18,902.664 kwan
	Exports Merchandise	2,068.044	
	Silver coins and silver articles	5,960.010	
	Excess of exports over imports	1,176.036	
6	Imports, Merchandise	6,410.993	Silver coins and silver articles, 9,082.756 kwan
	Exports Merchandise	2,259.850	
	Silver coins and silver articles	3,671.400	
	Excess of exports over imports	479.742	
9	Imports, Merchandise	11,014.226	Silver coins and silver articles, 22,266.157 kwan
	Exports Merchandise	4,138.785	
	Silver coins and silver articles	5,602.473	
	Excess of exports over imports	1,272.962	

were permitted to export gold.

THE RETURNS OF TRADE WITH CHINA

CHINESE MERCHANTMEN.

Year.	No. of Ships.	Description.	Amount. (Silver is given in Weight, Kwamme.)
1665 (5th year of Kwammon)	36	Imports, Merchandise	12,690.570
		Exports Merchandise	2,764.820
		Silver coins and silver articles	8,041.985
		Excess of exports over imports ..	1,883.764
1666 (6th year of Kwammon)	37	Imports, Merchandise	13,099.7044
		Exports Merchandise	3,866.4067
		Silver coins and silver articles	7,235.5149
		Gold coins	3,700 ryo (251.600 kwamme) at 68 momme
		Excess of exports over imports ..	1,736.1827
1667 (7th year of Kwammon)	30	Imports, Merchandise	10,154.663
		Exports Merchandise	2,937.085
		Silver coins and silver articles	4,547.012
		Gold coins and specie ..	12,160 ryo (826.880 kwan) in silver at 68 momme
		Excess of exports over imports ..	1,843.293
1668[1] (8th year of Kwammon)	43	Imports, Merchandise, 17,541.477 kwan. NOTE.—Of the above, 3,880.318 kwan brought in silver, and 231,801 ryo and 8 momme of silver in gold. Of the amount of gold, 56,690 ryo at 68 momme and 175,111.1 ryo at 58 momme.	
		Exports Merchandise, 4,246.2801 kwan. NOTE.—Of the above 73,506 ryo and 3 bu and 3.7 momme or 4,116.3817 kwan brought in gold.	
		Silver coins and silver articles, 3,415.0363 kwamme.	
		Gold coins and gold articles, 128,818 ryo and 2 momme of silver (7,894.090 kwan silver).	
		Excess of exports over imports, 335.3841 kwamme; 29,476 ryo 2 bu and 2 momme of silver (1,650.686 kwamme).	
1669 (9th year of Kwammon)	38	Imports, Merchandise, 293,746 ryo 3 bu and 2 momme of silver. NOTE.—Of the above, 273,012 ryo 1 bu at 56 momme and 20,734 ryo and 2 bu at 54 momme.	

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[1] In this year the Dutch

AND HOLLAND FOR TWENTY-FIVE YEARS—*Continued.*

DUTCH MERCHANTMEN.

No. of Ships.	Description.	Amount. (Silver is given in Weight, Kwamme.)	Amount of Specie Blowed Out.
12	Imports, Merchandise	10,620.537	Silver coins and silver articles, 15,087.585 kwan
	Exports: Merchandise	2,753.851	
	Exports: Silver coins and silver articles	7,045.600	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	1,001.086	
7	Imports, Merchandise	8,699.768	Silver coins and silver articles, 11,022.8149 kwan Gold coins, 33,700 ryo (2,651.600 kwamme in silver)
	Exports: Merchandise	1,995.610	
	Exports: Silver coins	3,787.300	
	Exports: Gold coins	30,000 ryo (2,040.000 kwan silver)	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	876.858	
8	Imports, Merchandise	10,430.334	Silver coins and silver articles, 8,120.752 kwan. Gold coins, big and small pieces, and specie, 62,235 ryo. (4,231.980 kwan in silver.)
	Exports: Merchandise	2,145.152	
	Exports: Silver coins and silver articles	2,573.740	
	Exports: Gold coins (big piece) ..	75 ryo (5.100 kwan in silver)	
	Gold coin (small piece) ..	50,000 ryo (3,400.000 kwan in silver at 68 momme)	
	Excess of exports over imports ..	1,306.341	
9	Imports, Merchandise, 203,927 ryo 3 bu and 8 momme of silver (11,419.9623 kwan at 58)		Silver coins and silver articles, 3,415.036 kwan Gold coins and gold articles, 287,573 ryo 1 bu and 2 momme of silver
	Exports: Merchandise, 33,556 ryo 3 bu and 9 momme of silver		
	Exports: Gold coins, 158,755 ryo 1 bu		
	Excess of exports over imports, 11,615 ryo 2 bu and 12 momme of silver		
5	Imports, Merchandise, 186,677 ryo 1 bu and 9 momme of silver (10,453.9355 kwamme)		Silver articles, 5,279 ryo 2 bu 10.2 momme of silver

were prohibited from exporting silver.

THE RETURNS OF TRADE WITH CHINA

CHINESE MERCHANTMEN.

Year.	No. of Ships.	Description.
1669 (9th year of Kwammon)	38	Exports: Merchandise, 69,594 ryo 3 bu and 6 momme of silver (3,897.312 kwamme). Exports: Silver articles (the export of silver coins has been prohibited since the previous year), 5,279 ryo 2 bu and 10.2 momme of silver (295.6622 kwamme). Exports: Gold coins and gold articles, 180,026 ryo 1 bu (10,040.001 kwamme). Excess of exports over imports, 38,846 ryo (2,175.385 kwamme).
1670 (10th year of Kwammon)	36	Imports, Merchandise, 263,483 ryo 3 bu and 10 momme of silver. NOTE.—Of the above, 15 ryo 1 bu at 56 momme and 263,468 ryo 2 bu at 58 momme (15,282.0375 kwamme). Exports: Merchandise, 54,958 ryo 1 bu and 1.8 momme (2,187.580 kwan), 6,805 ryo 2 bu and 13 momme of silver (394.7322 kwan). Exports: Gold coins and gold articles, 152,304 ryo 1 bu (8,833.616 kwan). Excess of exports over imports, 49,415 ryo 2 bu and 10 momme of silver (2,866.109 kwamme).
1671 (11th year of Kwammon)	38	Imports, Merchandise, 14,426.1157898 kwan. NOTE.—Of the above, 289,300 kwan transacted in silver, and 243,738 ryo and 2.7898 momme transacted in gold at 58 momme. Exports: Merchandise, 67,833 ryo 1 bu and 8.8299 momme of silver (3,934.336799 kwamme). Exports: Silver coins, 289,300 kwamme. Exports: Silver articles, 11,393 ryo 1 bu and 3.66 momme of silver (660.81216 kwamme). Exports: Gold coins and gold articles, 111,499 ryo 2 bu (6,930.971 kwamme). Excess of exports over imports, 45,011 ryo 3 bu and 14,338 momme of silver (2,610.6958308 kwamme).
1672 (12th year of Kwammon)	43	Imports, Merchandise, 15,082.17032 kwamme. Exports: Merchandise, 2,756.1608365 kwamme. Exports: Silver coins and silver articles, 8,964.24696 kwamme. Exports: Gold articles, 125 ryo (8,500 kwan in silver at 68). Excess of exports over imports, 3,353.262355 kwamme.

AND HOLLAND FOR TWENTY-FIVE YEARS—*Continued.*

DUTCH MERCHANTMEN.

No. of Ships.	Description.	Amount of Specie Blowed Out.
5	Exports: Merchandise, 36,525 ryo 2 bu and 12 momme of silver Exports: Gold specie, 144,464 ryo 1 bu (of the above, big gold piece were 4, each at 7 ryo 2 bu) Excess of exports over imports, 5,687 ryo 1 bu and 2 momme of silver	Gold coins and gold articles, 324,409 ryo 2 bu
6	Imports, Merchandise, 204,748 ryo 1 bu and 0.74 momme of silver (11,875.395 kwan at 58 momme) Exports: Merchandise, 60,308 ryo 1 bu and 0.12 momme of silver Exports: Gold specie, 132,684 ryo (of which included 22 big gold each at 7 ryo 2 bu) Excess of exports over imports, 11,756 ryo and 0.62 momme of silver	Silver articles, 6,805 ryo 2 bu and 13 momme of silver (394.7322 kwamme) Gold specie and gold articles, 284,988 ryo 1 bu
7	Imports, Merchandise, 181,543 ryo 2 bu and 8.53 momme Exports, Merchandise, 142,789 ryo and 8.53 momme Specie, 138,348 ryo (to Holland); 407 ryo 1 bu (to Java)	Silver coins and silver articles, 950.11216 kwamme Gold coins and gold articles, 250,254 ryo 3 bu
—	Imports, Merchandise, 149,426 ryo 1 bu and 0.72 momme of silver Exports, Merchandise, etc., 60,271 ryo and 0.72 momme of silver Special, 88,891 ryo 1 bu (to Holland); 164 ryo (to Java)	Silver coins and silver articles, 950.11216 kwamme Gold coins and gold articles, 250,254 ryo 3 bu

THE AMOUNT OF SPECIE FLOWING OUT OF JAPAN FROM 1648 (5TH YEAR OF SHOHO) TILL 1672 (12TH YEAR OF KWAMMON).

	China.	Holland.	Total.
Silver specie	193,949.97272 kwan or 2,852,190 ryo 3 bu and 4 momme of silver	100,674.627 kwan or 1,480,509 ryo 1 bu	294,624.59972 kwan or 4,333,700 ryo and 4 momme of silver
Gold specie	589,103 ryo and 2 momme of silver or 34,815.578 kwan	743,789 ryo or 50,577.652 kwan	1,332,892 ryo and 2 momme of silver or 85,393.230 kwan

THE RETURNS OF TRADE WITH HOLLAND (FROM THE 1ST YEAR OF EMPO TILL THE 3RD YEAR OF KYOHO).

Year.	No. of Ships.	Description.	Amount. (Silver given in Weight, Kwamme.)	Total.
1673 (1st year of Empo)	6	Imports, Merchandise ..	130,933 ryo 3 bu and 3.16 momme of silver	
		Exports { Merchandise ..	54,079 ryo and 3.16 momme of silver	
		Exports { Specie	86,480 ryo 2 bu (to Holland) 374 ryo 1 bu (to Java)	Specie— 86,854 ryo 3 bu
1674 (2nd year of Empo)	6	Imports, Merchandise ..	113,968 ryo	
		Exports { Merchandise ..	47,535 ryo 3 bu and 8,003 momme of silver	
		Exports { Specie	66,312 ryo 1 bu (to Holland) 120 ryo 2 bu (to Java)	Specie— 66,432 ryo 3 bu

1675 (3rd year of Empo)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	80,500 ryo and 14.16 momme of silver	
		Exports	Merchandise	31,981 ryo and 14.16 momme of silver	
			Specie	48,365 ryo 1 bu (to Holland)	Specie—
				153 ryo 3 bu (to Java)	48,519 ryo
1676 (4th year of Empo)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	71,138 ryo and 12,161 momme of silver	
		Exports	Merchandise	46,505 ryo and 1,161 momme of silver	
			Specie	23,341 ryo (to Holland)	Specie—
				292 ryo 2 bu (to Java)	23,633 ryo 2 bu
1677 (5th year of Empo)	3	Imports,	Merchandise	81,408 ryo and 13,797 momme of silver	
		Exports	Merchandise	36,298 ryo and 13,797 momme of silver	
			Specie	45,053 ryo (to Holland)	Specie—
				57 ryo 1 bu (to Java)	45,100 ryo 1 bu
1678 (6th year of Empo)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	68,650 ryo 2 bu and 9,176 momme of silver	
		Exports	Merchandise	36,103 ryo 2 bu and 9,176 momme of silver	
			Specie	32,447 ryo 1 bu (to Holland)	Specie—
				99 ryo 3 bu (to Java)	32,547 ryo
1679 (7th year of Empo)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	80,787 ryo and 9.41 momme of silver	
		Exports	Merchandise, etc.	50,792 ryo 2 bu and 9.41 momme of silver	
			Specie	29,799 ryo (to Holland)	Specie—
				195 ryo 2 bu (to Java)	29,994 ryo 2 bu
1680 (8th year of Empo)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	80,250 ryo 1 bu and 13,994 momme of silver	
		Exports	Merchandise, etc.	68,298 ryo 2 bu and 13,994 momme of silver	
			Specie	11,385 ryo 1 bu (to Holland)	Specie—
				566 ryo 2 bu (to Java)	11,951 ryo 3 bu

THE RETURNS OF TRADE WITH HOLLAND—*Continued.*

Year.	No. of Ships.	Description.	Amount. (Silver given in Weight, Kwamme.)	Total.
1681 (1st year of Tenwa)	4	Imports, Merchandise	100,922 ryo 1 bu and 13.61 momme of silver	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	63,963 ryo 1 bu and 13.61 momme of silver	
		Exports, Specie	35,386 ryo 3 bu (to Holland)	Specie—
			1,572 ryo 1 bu (to Java)	36,959 ryo
1682 (2nd year of Tenwa)	4	Imports, Merchandise	120,523 ryo 1 bu and 6.17 momme of silver	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	69,158 ryo and 6.17 momme of silver	
		Exports, Specie	51,094 ryo 1 bu (to Holland)	Specie—
			271 ryo (to Java)	51,365 ryo 1 bu
1683 (3rd year of Tenwa)	3	Imports, Merchandise	70,813 ryo and 13.11 momme of silver	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	42,732 ryo 2 bu and 13.11 momme of silver	
		Exports, Specie	27,944 ryo (to Holland)	Specie—
			136 ryo 2 bu (to Java)	28,080 ryo 2 bu
1684 (1st year of Teikyo)	5	Imports, Merchandise	122,156 ryo and 12.65 momme of silver	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	61,836 ryo 2 bu and 13.65 momme of silver	
		Exports, Specie	60,635 ryo (to Holland)	Specie—
			184 ryo 2 bu (to Java)	60,819 ryo 2 bu
1685[1] (2nd year of Teikyo)	4	Imports, Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	45,260 ryo	Specie—
		Exports, Specie	4,739 ryo 2 bu	4,739 ryo 2 bu

[1] In this year it was regulated that trade with the Dutch should not exceed 50,000 ryo a year.

1686 (3rd year of Teikyo)		Imports, Merchandise ..	6,053.5903462 kwamme or 100,893 ryo and 1.3462 momme of silver	
		NOTE.—Though the above amount exceeds of the same, 5,969.754862 kwamme (99,495 ryo 3 bu and 9.8462 momme of silver) is the amount of regular imports, and 83.8355 (1,397 ryo 1 bu and 0.5 momme of silver) is the price of goods purchased by the Government.		
		Exports { Merchandise ..	3,616.228665 kwamme (60,270 ryo 1 bu and 13.665 momme of silver)	
		Exports { Silver specie and silver articles	596.7551 kwamme (9,945 ryo 3 bu and 10.1 momme of silver)	
		NOTE.—Of the above silver, silver specie is 464.5745 kwamme and silver articles 132.1806 kwamme.		
		Excess of exports over imports	1,840.6065812 kwamme or 30,676 ryo 3 bu and 1.5812 momme of silver	
—	4	Imports, Merchandise ..	49,996 ryo 1 bu and 15.373 momme of silver	Amount of specie flowed out— 13,966 ryo and 10.1 momme of silver. Of the above, 601.1211 kwamme is silver articles, and 3,948 ryo 2 bu and 10 momme of silver, gold specie.
		Exports { Merchandise ..	37,677 ryo	
		Exports { Gold specie and silver articles	4,020 ryo 1 bu	
		NOTE.—Of the above silver, articles are 4.366 momme at 68 momme or 64 ryo and 14 momme of silver, and gold specie 3,956 ryo and 3 momme of silver.		
		Excess of exports over imports	8,289 ryo and 0.273 momme of silver	
1687 (4th year of Teikyo)	3	Imports, Merchandise ..	49,997 ryo 3 bu and 2.343 momme of silver	Specie— 16,534 ryo and 5 momme of silver.
		Exports { Merchandise, etc. ..	33,463 ryo 3 bu and 2.343 momme of silver	
		Exports { Specie	16,534 ryo and 5 momme of silver	

THE RETURNS OF TRADE WITH HOLLAND—*Continued.*

Year.	No. of Ships.	Description.		Amount. (Silver given in Weight, Kwamme.)	Total.
1688 (1st year of Genroku)	3	Imports,	Merchandise	49,981 ryo 1 bu and 11.28 momme of silver	Specie— 23,353 ryo
		Exports	Merchandise, etc.	26,628 ryo 1 bu and 11.28 momme of silver	
			Specie	23,353 ryo	
1689 (2nd year of Genroku)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	49,981 ryo 3 bu and 1.165 momme of silver	Specie— 10,570 ryo 1 bu
		Exports	Merchandise, etc.	39,411 ryo 2 by and 1.165 momme of silver	
			Specie	10,570 ryo 1 bu	
1690 (3rd year of Genroku)	2	Imports,	Merchandise	49,978 ryo and 7.493 momme of silver	Specie— 17,723 ryo 1 bu
		Exports	Merchandise	32,254 ryo 3 bu and 7.493 momme of silver	
			Specie	17,723 ryo 1 bu	
1691 (4th year of Genroku)	3	Imports,	Merchandise	49,925 ryo and 0.099 momme of silver	Specie— 27,943 ryo 3 bu
		Exports	Merchandise, etc.	21,981 ryo 1 bu and 0.099 momme of silver	
			Specie	27,943 ryo 3 bu	
1692 (5th year of Genroku)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	50,000 ryo	Specie— 13,118 ryo 2 bu
		Exports	Merchandise	36,881 ryo 2 bu	
			Specie	13,118 ryo 2 bu	
1693 (6th year of Genroku)	5	Imports,	Merchandise	50,000 ryo	Specie— 22,854 ryo 3 bu
		Exports	Merchandise, etc.	27,145 ryo 1 bu	
			Specie	22,854 ryo 3 bu	

1694 (7th year of Genroku)	4	Imports, Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	34,965 ryo 3 bu	
		Exports, Specie	15,034 ryo 1 bu	Specie— 15,034 ryo 1 bu
1695 (8th year of Genroku)	4	Imports, Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	37,385 ryo 2 bu	
		Exports, Specie	12,614 ryo 2 bu	Specie— 12,614 ryo 2 bu
1696 (9th year of Genroku)	4	Imports, Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	31,986 ryo 3 bu	
		Exports, Specie	18,013 ryo 1 bu	Specie— 18,013 ryo 1 bu
1697 (10th year of Genroku)	6	Imports, Merchandise	49,995 ryo and 12.326 momme of silver	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	44,111 ryo 2 bu and 12.326 momme of silver	
		Exports, Specie	883 ryo 1 bu	Specie— 883 ryo 1 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima	5,000 ryo	
1698 (11th year of Genroku)	6	Imports, Merchandise	49,997 ryo 2 bu and 14.68 momme of silver	
		Exports, Merchandise	43,716 ryo 3 bu and 14.68 momme of silver	
		Exports, Specie	3,880 ryo 3 bu	Specie— 3,880 ryo 3 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima	2,400 ryo	
1699 (12th year of Genroku)	5	Imports, Merchandise	49,206 ryo 3 bu and 0.615 momme of silver	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	44,416 ryo 3 bu and 0.615 momme of silver	
		Exports, Specie	2,290 ryo	Specie— 2,290 ryo
		Specie kept at Dejima	2,400 ryo	
1700 (13th year of Genroku)	5	Imports, Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports, Merchandise, etc.	23,745 ryo 3 bu	
		Exports, Specie	23,854 ryo 1 bu	Specie— 23,854 ryo 1 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima	2,400 ryo	

THE RETURNS OF TRADE WITH HOLLAND—*Continued.*

Year.	No. of Ships.	Description.		Amount. (Silver given in Weight, Kwamme.)	Total.
1701 (14th year of Genroku)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports	Merchandise, etc. ..	31,775 ryo 3 bu	Specie—
			Specie	15,824 ryo 1 bu	15,824 ryo
		Specie kept at Dejima.. ..		2,400 ryo	
1702 (15th year of Genroku)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports	Merchandise, etc. ..	28,916 ryo 2 bu	Specie—
			Specie	18,683 ryo 2 bu	18,683 ryo 2 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima.. ..		2,400 ryo	
1703 (16th year of Genroku)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports	Merchandise	31,389 ryo 2 bu	Specie—
			Specie	18,610 ryo 2 bu	18,610 ryo 2 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima.. ..		2,400 ryo	
1704 (1st year of Hoyei)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	49,051 ryo and 15.32 momme of silver	
		Exports	Merchandise, etc. ..	43,120 ryo 1 bu and 15.32 momme of silver	Specie—
			Specie	3,430 ryo 3 bu	3,430 ryo 3 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima.. ..		2,400 ryo	
1705 (2nd year of Hoyei)	4	Imports,	Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports	Merchandise, etc. ..	39,392 ryo 1 bu	Specie—
			Specie	8,207 ryo 3 bu	8,207 ryo 3 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima.. ..		2,400 ryo	

1706 (3rd year of Hoyei)	5	Imports, Merchandise . .	46,650 ryo	
		Exports { Merchandise . .	39,577 ryo 3 bu	Specie—
		Specie	4,672 ryo 1 bu	4,672 ryo 1 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima	4,672 ryo 1 bu	
1707 (4th year of Hoyei)	4	Imports, Merchandise . .	50,000 ryo	
		Exports { Merchandise, etc. . .	38,380 ryo 2 bu	Specie—
		Specie	17,300 ryo	17,300 ryo
		Specie kept at Dejima	4,319 ryo 2 bu	
1708 (5th year of Hoyei)	3	Imports, Merchandise . .	50,000 ryo	
		Exports { Merchandise, etc. . .	23,212 ryo 2 bu 2 shu	Specie—
		Specie	24,607 ryo 3 bu 2 shu	24,607 ryo 3 bu 2 shu
		Specie kept at Dejima	2,180 ryo	
1709 (6th year of Hoyei)	4	Imports, Merchandise . .	50,000 ryo	
		Exports { Merchandise, etc. . .	28,343 ryo	Specie—
		Specie	19,257 ryo	19,257 ryo
		Specie kept at Dejima	2,180 ryo	
1710 (7th year of Hoyei)	4	Imports, Merchandise . .	50,000 ryo	
		Exports { Merchandise, etc. . .	28,000 ryo	Specie—
		Specie	18,800 ryo	18,800 ryo
		Specie kept at Dejima	2,400 ryo	
1711 (1st year of Shotoku)	4	Imports, Merchandise . .	50,000 ryo	
		Exports { Merchandise, etc. . .	28,048 ryo 3 bu	Specie—
		Specie	1,951 ryo 1 bu	1,951 ryo 1 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima	20,000 ryo	

THE RETURNS OF TRADE WITH HOLLAND—*Continued.*

Year.	No. of Ships.	Description.	Amount. (Silver given in Weight, Kwamme.)	Total.
1712 (2nd year of Shotoku)	4	Imports, Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports Merchandise, etc.	22,740 ryo 2 bu	Specie—
		Specie	24,859 ryo 2 bu	24,859 ryo 2 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima	2,400 ryo	
1713 (3rd year of Shotoku)	3	Imports, Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports Merchandise, etc.	29,145 ryo	Specie—
		Specie	19,855 ryo	19,855 ryo
		Specie kept at Dejima	—	
1714 (4th year of Shotoku)	3	Imports, Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports Merchandise, etc.	38,103 ryo	Specie—
		Specie	18,897 ryo	18,897 ryo
		Specie kept at Dejima	3,000 ryo	
1715 (5th year of Shotoku)	3	Imports, Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports Merchandise, etc.	31,065 ryo 2 bu	Specie—
		Specie	15,934 ryo 2 bu	15,934 ryo 2 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima	3,000 ryo	
1716 (1st year of Kyoho)	2	Imports, Merchandise	50,000 ryo	
		Exports Merchandise, etc.	34,589 ryo and 2.26 momme of silver	Specie—
		Specie	13,621 ryo 2 bu	13,621 ryo 2 bu
		Specie kept at Dejima	1,789 ryo 1 bu and 12.74 momme of silver	

1717 (2nd year of Kyoho)	2	Imports, Merchandise ..	50,000 ryo	
		Exports { Merchandise, etc. ..	36,128 ryo 1 bu	Specie— 11,873 ryo 3 bu
		Exports { Specie	11,693 ryo 3 bu	
			180 ryo	
		Specie kept at Nagasaki ..	2,000 ryo	
1718 (3rd year of Kyoho)	2	Imports, Merchandise ..	50,000 ryo	
		Exports { Merchandise, etc. ..	35,742 ryo 2 bu	Specie— 12,585 ryo 1 bu
		Exports { Specie	12,585 ryo 1 bu	
		Specie kept at Nagasaki ..	1,672 ryo 1 bu	

THE AMOUNT OF SPECIE TAKEN OUT OF JAPAN BY THE DUTCH EAST INDIES COMPANY DURING SEVENTY-ONE YEARS, FROM THE 1ST YEAR OF KEIAN TILL THE 3RD YEAR OF KYOHO.

(*The Review of Trade and Navigation.*)

REMARKS.—The figures in brackets represent the exchanged amount from gold into silver, and vice versa.

Years.	Description.	In Silver.	In Gold.
For twenty-five years, from the 1st year of Keian till the 12th year of Kwammon	Chogin, Fukugin (both silver coins), and silver articles	100,674.627 kwamme	1,480,509 ryo 1 bu
	Oban, Koban (with gold coins), and gold articles	(50,577.652 kwamme)	743,789 ryo
	Total	151,252.279 kwamme	(2,224,298 ryo 1 bu)

AMOUNT OF SPECIE TAKEN OUT OF JAPAN BY THE DUTCH EAST INDIES COMPANY—*Continued.*

Years.	Description.	In Silver.	In Gold.
For twelve years, from the 1st year of Empo till the 1st year of Teikyo	Specie	(35,514.204 kwamme)	522,267 ryo 3 bu
For thirty-four years, from the 2nd year of Teikyo till the 3rd year of Kyoho	Specie	62.95 momme (33,070.77495 kwamme)	and 486,334 ryo
	Chogin coin and silver articles	14 momme (4,366 kwamme)	and 64 ryo
	TOTAL	33,075.14095 kwamme (8.95 momme	and 486,399 ryo)
For seventy-one years, from the 1st year of Keian till the 3rd year of Kyoho	Total amount of gold and silver reported	219,841.62395 kwamme (8.95 momme	— and 3,232,965 ryo)
	Of the above amounts :—		
	Silver specie	100,678.993 kwamme (14 momme	— and 1,480,573 ryo 1 bu)
	Gold specie	11.95 momme (119,162.63095 kwamme)	and 1,752,391 ryo 2 bu
In addition to the above, trade in goods done during 110 years is as follows :—			
For seventy-six years, from the 14th year of Keicho till the 1st year of Teikyo	—	38,000.000 kwamme	(558,820 ryo 2 bu)
For thirty-four years, from the 2nd year of Teikyo till the 3rd year of Kyoho	—	6,800.000 kwamme	(100,000 ryo)
	TOTAL	44,800.000 kwamme	(658,820 ryo 2 bu)
	GRAND TOTAL ..	264,641.62395 kwamme (8.95 momme	— and 3,891,785 ryo 2 bu)

ANOTHER RECORD ON THE AMOUNT OF SPECIE TAKEN OUT OF JAPAN BY THE DUTCH EAST INDIES COMPANY.

For twenty-one years, from the 1st year of Keian till the 7th year of Kwanmon (1648–67)	Gold and silver coins and articles	106,119.727 kwamme (15 momme	— and 1,560,584 ryo) .
For seventeen years, from the 8th year of Kwanmon till the 1st year of Teikyo (1668–84)	Gold and silver coins and articles	80,646.759 kwamme	(1,185,981 ryo 3 bu)
For thirty-four years, from the 2nd year of Teikyo till the 3rd year of Kyoho	Gold and silver coins and articles	33,075.14095 kwamme (8.95 momme	— and 486,399 ryo)
	TOTAL	219,841.62395 kwamme (8.95 momme	and 3,232,965 ryo)

NOTE.—The seventy-one years from 1648 till 1718 is divided into three periods, as given above, and the amount of gold and silver exported during each period and their total are given. Of the three periods, during the first one, from 1648 till 1667, silver flowed out more than any other metal. The second period, from 1668 (in which year the exportation of silver was prohibited), saw gold exported principally; while during the third period, from 1685 till 1718, the amount of trade was limited to 50,000 ryo annually.

The figures given in the above quoted book differ, it appears, from the original documents, and the itemized amounts and total amount, too, seem to be mistaken, but as there is no way of correcting them authentically, we can but trust in the figures given for each year in the above table.

Though we are told that in the second period gold alone was exported, trade results are given both in gold and silver.

Japan Lost more Gold by her Trade with China than with Holland.—Hakuseki emphatically expressed his regret over the specie taken by the Dutch merchants out of Japan, but he overlooked the fact that more specie was taken by the Chinese than by the Dutch in those days. His strong objection to our trade with the Dutch was only in accordance with the general sentiment of the Japanese in those days, who liked the Chinese but hated the Westerners. As the tables quoted above indicate, during the twenty-four years from 1648 till 1672, the Chinese took 193,949 kwamme of silver and 589,103 ryo of gold out of Japan, and the Dutch 100,674 kwamme of silver and 743,789 ryo of gold. The amount of specie flowing out of Japan on account of her trade with the Chinese and the Dutch during the same period aggregated 2,940.624 kwamme of silver and 1,332,892 ryo of gold.

The Japanese were trading with the Spanish and the Portuguese as early as in 1543, and though no authentic figures are available for our trade with them during about a century that followed or till 1648, yet no doubt trade was done on a very small scale in those years. The Spanish and Portuguese were not such good traders as the Dutch, and the amount of specie carried away by them in those early days was very small. According to Nohod's calculation, the amount of silver taken by the Dutch out of Japan during the fifteen years from 1621 till 1645 was only 62,864 kwamme. Of the fifteen years, owing to the Christian uprising at Shimabara, the exodus of silver amounted to 23,683 kwamme in those two years, and yet the annual average exodus of silver in the period was only 4,190 kwamme. The amount of silver, then, taken away by the Spanish and the Portuguese in those hundred and four years was rather small when compared with that carried off by the Dutch during the later seventy-one years. Nevertheless, Hakuseki calmly concluded that out of 20,000,000 ryo of gold which existed in Japan, as he says, one-third was taken away by the European traders, which shows how hysterical he was in discussing our early trade with the Dutch. The amount of gold exported to Holland out of Japan during the sixty-one years from 1648 till 1708 was 1,595,159 ryo, but Hakuseki put it at 2,397,600 ryo ; and comment is needless. But his miscalculation with regard to silver was still greater, as one can see from the tables quoted above. Thus not only was he mistaken in the premise that prior to the Tokugawa regime 70,000,000 ryo of gold had existed in Japan, and 20,000,000 ryo at the time when the Tokugawa Shogunate re-coined its currency, but he made equally gross mistakes in his calculation of the amounts of specie flowing out. His arguments will not hold water, and equally erroneous are all similar arguments based upon his.

Japan's Early Foreign Trade not a Failure.—From the tables quoted above, we can get an idea of our trade with the Dutch and Chinese from 1648 till 1672, but for the forty years from 1672 till 1711 we have figures for our trade with the Dutch alone, and the Chinese trade can only be estimated at about 8,000 kwamme of silver a year, as a decree of 1685 limited it to that amount. The records of the Dutch East India Company do not tally with those taken at Nagasaki, but both agree that a large amount of Japanese specie flowed out on account of foreign trade. Then was our foreign trade in those days a complete failure? Was the country seriously impoverished on account of it? No! It is a mistake to judge the whole consequences of our foreign trade by conditions at Nagasaki alone. We have to look at trade as a whole, which can be judged only by the activities of the whole nation. When two peoples enter into intercourse at any time, it is a rule that they supply each other's economic wants. At first they are astonished by the conditions and produce of the alien country, and for the first several years they import indiscriminately, with a subsequent exodus of specie out of the country. At the same time, however, the same feelings of curiosity prevail in the other country with a similar result, and, in time, exports balance imports. Such is a universal rule of history, to which the activities of all nations must submit. If we believe Japan lost millions of specie on account of her early trade with the Westerners, then we must believe that for scores of years the Japanese were continuously making purchases only, which is against all rule and quite incredible. Besides, when an uncivilized people open intercourse with a civilized one for the first time, usually the former exports more than they import, for an uncivilized country usually has plenty of raw materials to supply, but not much purchasing power. In the time under review, speaking economically, Japan was still uncivilized, and China, Holland and other European countries were civilized; and we cannot believe that, contrary to all laws of economy, our people purchased so much that their country continuously suffered from excess of imports over exports for so many years. Of course, it was not so. The purpose of the Dutch, the Portuguese and others engaged in Oriental trade was not only to sell to Japan merchandise from Europe, India, and China, but also to take to Europe the products of Japan, India, and China. According to Dunbar, a Portuguese who was in India in those years, until 1585 the Portuguese were satisfied with bringing Oriental products to Lisbon, but later on the Dutch traders succeeded to their business, and distributed the said products throughout Northern Europe. There can be no doubt that Western traders in those days not merely imported Chinese merchandise into Japan, but exported Japanese goods to China and Europe. It is an exaggeration, therefore, to say that our early trade with the Westerners was a complete failure and impoverished the country.

IYEYASU'S ATTEMPT TO GET GOLD FROM MEXICO.—When a people reach a certain stage of improvement, they possess common sense, which teaches them methods of self-support. Such common sense and methods of self-support are always the same in principle, though they may differ in form according to the varying circumstances of the times. For instance, early in Meiji our statesmen tried to import foreign specie, which the scholars of those days called the first attempt of the kind yet made in Japan. But such an attempt had been already made hundreds of years before by Tokugawa Iyeyasu, a soldier-statesman who is not supposed to have been an expert in social economics. The incident shows that the Japanese people had their economic common sense early developed. In 1610, two years before the Dutch came to Hirato to trade for the first time, Tokugawa Iyeyasu sent a letter to the Governor of Fukien, in South China, with a view of opening trade with that province, and dispatched to Mexico a man called Takanari, a Kyoto dealer in rice and cinnabar, to enter into trade relations with that country. Iyeyasu's idea, which was prompted by a Christian missionary, was to get gold and silver from Mexico, where, as he was told, it abounded. The Christian missionary in question was a Spaniard called Fray Jeronimo, who pressed upon Iyeyasu the advantage of entering into relations with such a powerful country as Spain, and as Iyeyasu looked with envious eyes on the wealth brought to Kyushu by foreign trade, he listened with complacence even to the preaching of Jeronimo. Of course, all he really wanted was tangible gains, and he requested the aid of the priest in the opening of trade between the Philippines and his provinces of the Kwanto and in the procuring of Spanish shipwrights and mining engineers. Jeronimo, hoping for future favours, did the best he could, and Manila consented that Spanish ships should come to east-coast ports, but declined to send the shipwrights, not caring to teach the Japanese the art of building big ships. That mining engineers came is probable, as in the records of the Sado mines there is mention of a special residential quarter for Portuguese, and there are said to have been Portuguese among the retainers of Okubo, lord of Sado. For want of Spanish shipwrights, the Japanese mission to Mexico had to sail in a small boat built in a combination of Japanese and Chinese methods.

GOLD IN EXCHANGE FOR SILVER AND COPPER.—Tokugawa Iyeyasu not only tried to get gold and silver through foreign trade, but he also attempted to collect gold by selling silver and copper. The *Todai-ki* (*The Annals of the Present Day*) says :—

> The Black Ships have not yet come this year. That may be because when the Chinese ship came last year the interpreter told her captain that so many "Black Ships" had come, and there was so much raw silk in Japan, that if the ships came again this year with raw silk, the price of the article would fall, or because the Grand Man (Shogun Iyeyasu) requested the said captain to bring 10,000 pieces of gold next time. Now one piece of gold weighs between 100 momme and 500 momme, and is worth about 1.4 kwamme of silver. The 10,000 pieces of gold would be equivalent to 14,000 kwamme of silver. The Chinese want pure silver, but the Grand Man wishes them to accept unrefined silver in exchange for their gold, which the Chinese do not like.
>
> *April 24th, the 12th year of Keicho* (1607).

It appears, then, that pure gold was brought to Japan and exchanged for silver which was not pure, at the rate of one against fourteen, Iyeyasu attempting to get hold of gold not only through foreign trade, but by taking advantage of the exchange rates.

In Morga's *History of the Philippine Islands* references are made to the trade done between the Philippines and Japan, and the author says :—

> Trading with Nueva Espana was done on a large scale and brought great profits, besides being easy to supervise. Therefore the Spanish merchants devoted themselves to their trade with Mexico and neglected all other lines of commerce. They did not, however, attempt to open the natural resources which were abundant in Mexico, and the native Mexicans, too, neglected their own industries. And silver continuously flowed out of Mexico and passed on to the heathen peoples.

From the above, therefore, it can be supposed that, in addition to what appears in the records of Nagasaki, there must have been a large amount of silver brought to Japan by the foreign merchants resident there.

The above supposition is approved by Dr. Lee's *History of the British Firms at Hirado*, in which Saris, an employee in one of the firms in those days, is quoted as saying :—

> A large amount of gold was imported into Japan by the Portuguese and Chinese merchants in those days.

In the same book it is also recorded :—

> Of the merchandise imported from England as much as five-eighths came from London, two years and two months being spent on the voyage. Other articles, such as pepper, gold, and cotton clothes, manufactured in India, were all brought from Bantam and Patan.

Thus we see that gold was brought to Japan by the British merchants as well.

Speaking of the Philippines' trade with Japan, Morga says :—

> The majority of the residents in the Philippine Islands were merchants and other business men, because, in addition to the products in the islands, a large quantity of merchandise was imported from such foreign countries as Japan, China, Malacca, Siam, Cambodia, Borneo, etc. The merchants invested their capital in these goods, which they then exported to Nueva Espana and sometimes to Japan. In their export to Japan they made most profit in raw silk.

What, then, did Japan export to the Philippines in those days? Let Morga speak :—

> Some Japanese and Portuguese merchants from Nagasaki, Japan, came to the Philippine Islands in the latter part of March and October every year, taking advantage of the northern wind, and dropped anchor in the port of Manila. Much of what they brought was good wheat flour and salted meat, which were consumed by the people of Manila. They also brought delicately woven silks of different colours and designs, gold folding screens, beautifully finished armour, spears, swords, and other arms, ink-cases, boxes, etc., made of wood and lacquered in strange designs, beautiful toys, cages for skylarks, whose song is so lovely, cases of salted tunny, which was fresh and tasty, and other goods. In this trade with them some purchases could be made in their ships without paying any public tax. Most of the goods brought by them were consumed in the islands, but some were exported to Nueva Espana, where they were generally paid for in Spanish liards, which, however, they did not like because Japan had silver. Usually, these merchants brought with them silver in plates, which sold at a pretty good price.

GOLD AND NAMBAN-YAKI EARTHENWARE MOST VALUED BY THE JAPANESE.—The Japanese did not like to take silver in payment of their goods, but liked to get gold instead. Referring to this, Morga says :—

> The merchant ships sailed back to Japan in the Vendavals season, when they took with them the goods they had purchased at Manila, such as Chinese raw silk, gold, deer-skins, wax for making dye-stuff, hemp-palm, Castilian wine, musk-deer, big tea-jars, glass, cloth, and other strange articles imported from Espana.

The tea-jars mentioned above are of earthenware called Namban-yaki in Japanese, and are regarded as very rare articles among the Japanese curio-lovers, only second to things made of solid gold, and carefully preserved in silken bags. Some jars of this kind are often sold for 2,000 taels, but the prices vary, of course, according to quality.

GOLD ABUNDANT IN MANILA.—On all exports from the Philippines to Mexico the Spanish paid a 20 per cent. export duty, and we must suppose that the Japanese paid the same rate on what they brought from Manila. Besides, Spain imposed a 20 per cent. tax on all gold produced in the Philippines, though for a certain special period it was 10 per cent. instead of 20 per cent. Gold that had been owned by the natives before the Spanish came to their islands was exempted from the 20 per cent. tax or any other similar taxes. The tax brought in 10,000 pesos every year, which was rather small, not because gold was scarce in the islands, but chiefly because the natives concealed it in order to evade taxation. In those days a story prevailed among the Chinese that there was abundance of gold in the Philippines, and in 1602 the Chinese Government dispatched three of its high officials to the Philippines to lay hands on the gold and silver in the island of Cabid. The expedition failed, as the gold existed only in the Chinese imagination, and, besides, they were resisted by the Spanish. Nevertheless, the Philippines possessed so much gold and silver in those days as to create a widespread belief among the Chinese that they were an Eldorado.

MERCHANTS PRIVILEGED TO DISPATCH TRADE SHIPS TO FOREIGN WATERS.—Trading by the Japanese was not limited to the Philippines alone, but done with Borneo, Singapore, Annam, Macao, and India, and the Japanese merchantmen very frequently visited these places, of which Annam was known as the richest in gold. Much gold must have been brought to Japan from the South Sea countries in those days, for the Japanese merchantmen called Goshuin-bune were seen almost everywhere along the Asiatic coasts or among the South Sea Islands. Trading in foreign lands was limited to certain privileged merchants, and during the twelve years from 1604 till 1616 eighty merchants were given by the Shogunate the privilege of dispatching ships to foreign waters.

Of the figures from 1616 till 1634, when foreign navigation by Japanese merchantships was prohibited, there are no available data, but there is no doubt that they increased in number above the earlier period. Neither must we overlook the smuggling by traders and pirates. Through all these channels foreign gold and silver was brought to Japan in large quantities, enough to compensate for what was taken out by the Chinese and Western traders, though, to our regret, we have not exact figures to prove it.

THE CHINESE MERCHANTS BROUGHT GOLD TO JAPAN.—Not only did the Japanese merchants import gold and silver, but the Chinese traders, too, brought gold to Japan from other countries, for in China in those days, as in the present time, copper and silver were the standard of currency, but not gold, which was not needed for currency purpose. If gold was wanted at all, it was to be made into ornamental articles, and the quantity of the metal employed for such a purpose was not very big. If they had any gold, either produced in their own country or brought from the other countries through trading, the

Chinese brought it to Japan, where they exchanged it for copper or silver, both of which were the most useful of metals in their country.

The *Zenseki Heisei*, a book written by a Chinese in the time of the Ming Dynasty, contains comments on the Japanese commercial system, and gives the relations between the Japanese Government and the Chinese from the latter part of the Ashikaga period till the early part of the Tokugawa regime. According to this, many wealthy Chinese merchants resident in Japan in those days built great ships, employing the best Japanese carpenters, and spending a large amount of money for the purpose. The reason why they built in Japan instead of in their own country is, it appears, because their lives and properties were safer in Japan than in their own country. In starting trade with the South Sea countries, such a Chinese trader, if he had 10,000 ryo to invest, for instance, spent about 2,000 ryo on ships. Now, the Japanese officials in those days knew how to impose taxes on capital but not on commerce. When any trader, Japanese or foreign, went to a foreign country with capital, says the book, the Japanese officials impose a tax amounting to 1,000 ryo on every 10,000 ryo of capital to be taken on the trip, and they were so strict in the imposition that they made thorough search in every outgoing ship. Until the owner paid the tax, his ship was not permitted to leave harbour. But when these ships returned to Japan with foreign goods, the traders were permitted to trade quite freely without any interference from the Japanese Government. The said book also states that one obstacle that the merchantmen met with in the Japanese waters was the pirate ships, which were small boats, but formed a fleet. When they crossed the ocean, the merchantmen took on board hundreds of brave armed men to fight against the pirate ships. In case of a fight, if the pirates were defeated, they would not make off, but sailed along ahead of the merchant ship to keep off other attackers, for which they demanded presents, a kind of blackmail which they usually obtained.

From the above we can see how dangerous the navigation was in the Japanese waters in the latter part of the Ashikaga regime, and also that in those days many Chinese merchants were residing in Japan, engaged in trade, paying a tax to the Japanese Government, and taking copper out of Japan and bringing in gold. Wang Yu-Yang, a Chinese poet, in his memoirs says :—

> As foreign copper has not come in recently, the officials have stopped minting copper coins, and the price of copper specie has gone up, while that of silver specie had speedily gone down. The Government officials have frequently conferred on this question, but have found yet no way of adjusting it. That 1 ryo of silver should be exchanged for 1,000 pieces of copper has

been repeatedly decreed, but to no purpose. Both the Government and the people are suffering from the situation.

The "foreign copper" is the copper the Chinese used to import from Japan, which indicates that Japanese copper was as important to the Chinese in those days as gold was to the Japanese.

THE PRICE PROPORTION OF GOLD AND SILVER IN CHINA.—Silver having been the standard of currency in China since the old time, gold has been little used in that country, but the value of gold has always been recognized by the Chinese. In the 13th century, when China, under the rule of Yuan Dynasty, had paper-money for the first time, 1 ryo of silver was exchanged for 1 bu of pure gold, which means the price proportion of gold and silver was one against ten. In 1299 1 ryo of gold was exchanged for 875 mon of copper and 1 ryo of silver for 125 mon, or a proportion of one against 7·28. In the time of the Ming Dynasty the price of gold went down, and that of silver was rather high. In 1385, with 1 ryo of gold 10 koku of rice could be bought, and with 1 ryo of silver 2 koku, which means a proportion of one against five. Over twenty years later, or in 1413, however, 1 ryo of gold was worth 7 ryo 5 bu of silver, and in the 17th century it was one against thirteen in Kiannan. These were the prices prevailing in China when she had very little relation with the West economically, but after that the influence of the Western countries was felt on the economic conditions in the East, and in the 18th century 1 ryo of silver was exchanged for 1 bu of gold, the proportion being one against ten. In the same period the proportion was one against 12·5 in Flanders, one against fourteen in Spain, and one against ten and twelve or thirteen in trade ports in Japan. These prices of gold and silver in China were the market prices of the metals as bullion, but not as specie. As stated below, copper and silver were the standard of currency in China, and these metals, in which Japan was rich, were much needed in China, while Japan needed the gold which the Chinese brought to Japan to exchange it for silver and copper. Thus Japan and China have been bound together economically since those old days.

THE GOLD BROUGHT BY THE CHINESE.—The merchants of each country well understood what was wanted in the other, and the Chinese merchants brought to Japan as much gold as possible, and took away in return copper and silver, which their country needed. In their turn, the Japanese merchants, too, made every possible effort to get as much gold as possible out of China. How actively the traders of the two countries did their business, which was mostly along the southern coasts of the Asiatic continent, we can easily imagine. Since this kind of trade was done without the knowledge of the Japanese officials at Nagasaki and Hirado, it is needless to point out that much more silver was taken out of Japan, and much more gold brought in about the time of Tokugawa Iyeyasu, than the amount shown on the official records. In addition, the Japanese Government itself purchased gold. The amount of gold imported at Nagasaki alone, as a result of this policy of the Government, during the fifty-two years from 1763 till 1815, was 1,014,418 kwamme of Chinese gold; 23,389 kwamme of Annam gold; 18,899 kwamme of Tibetan gold; making a total of about 1,057 kwamme. Taking 4 momme of gold at 1 ryo as it was in those days, the total amount is 2,640,000 ryo. The most significant fact in connection with the importation of gold in those days is the purchasing price, which was lower than that prevailing in Europe. Twenty-four momme of silver was paid against 1 momme of Chinese soku seki-kin gold, the same quantity of silver against 1 momme of Batei soku seki-kin, 19.5 momme of silver against 1 momme of seki-kin gold, 18.5 momme of silver against 1 momme of the Yuan-pao soku seki-kin gold, 15.28 momme of silver against 1 momme of Annam plate gold and 21.5 momme of silver against 1 momme of Tibetan gold.

THE QUALITY OF GOLD COINS IN THE ERA OF HOREKI (1751–63). The gold coins which were circulating in the era of Horeki were called the Genbun Koban, and weighed 3.474 momme, made up of 653.2/1000 of gold, 345.3/1000 of silver, and 1.5/1000 of other metal—that is to say, 2.269 momme of pure gold.

The Kyoho Koban gold coin which had been circulating in the era of Kyoho, previous to Horeki, consisted of 867/1000 of gold, 132.5/1000 of silver, and 0.5/1000 of other metal, and weighed 4.7 momme—that is, 3.875 momme of pure gold.

The Genbun silver (chogin and Mameita silver) circulating in the era of Horeki was of inferior quality, and consisted of 46 per cent. silver and 54 per cent. copper, while the Kyoho silver coins consisted of 80 per cent. silver and 20 per cent. copper.

The prices at which the foreign golds were purchased originally with the Genbun silver would become different had they been paid for with the other silvers. One momme of the Soku seki-kin would be exchanged at 13.8 momme of the Kyoho silver; 1 momme of the Batei soku seki-kin at 19.5 momme of the Meiwa silver and at 11.21 momme of the Kyoho silver; and 1 momme of the Hattei kin at 11.21 momme of the Kyoho silver. In other words, the price proportion of gold and silver, as calculated above, was one of gold against about 11.21 of silver.

JAPANESE GOLD NOT CHEAP IN PRICE.—The above facts are a light that will dispel the wrong belief of many historians that Japanese gold specie was taken away in huge quantities in those days. These historians, simply looking at the price proportions of gold and silver prevailing in Europe in those days, as quoted in history, concluded that the price of gold was high and that of silver low in Europe, while the price of gold was comparatively low in Japan, and that of silver more or less high, and that Japanese in those days did not know of this, and did not regard gold as of much importance; and the Portuguese and Dutch traders, availing themselves of this ignorance, took away a large quantity of gold from Japan. As stated above, the price proportion at which Japan exchanged her silver with gold from China and the South Sea Islands was one of gold against about 11.21 of silver. Had the price proportion of gold and silver in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries been one against fourteen or fifteen, as so often stated in history, how is it that gold from China and the South Sea Islands did not find its way to Europe but into Japan? Should the price of gold have been low, and that of silver high, in Japan, and the condition been just opposite in Europe, gold from China and the South Sea Islands would have flowed into Europe instead of into Japan. Why did gold come to Japan from these countries? The truth is that the price of gold was not so high in Europe, and not so low in Japan, as has been believed. Dr. Lees, in his *History of the British Firms at Hirado*, quoting a report made by Saris and the British clerks at Hirado, about 1610, says:—

> Both gold and silver are abundant, but gold is dear; therefore, transactions in gold are not very profitable. According to a calculation by the Dutch, the prices of gold and silver at present are in the proportion of one to thirteen. That was the price at which a Chinese merchant brought eight pieces of Oban (big gold coin) from a British firm at Hirado in 1614. But at the time when Saris sailed from Europe the proportion of gold and silver in price was one against twelve.

This is a statement by one who actually dealt in gold and silver in those days, and the truth of it cannot be doubted. The prices of gold and silver, then, were in the proportion of one against thirteen or thereabouts in the 17th century in Japan, and the price of gold did not much differ from, or was even higher than, that in Europe. It is now clear why gold from China and the South Sea Islands found its way into Japan instead of into Europe, and we can also see it was not because the price of gold was low that Japanese gold was exported to Europe in those days.

WHY DID THE CHINESE SELL GOLD TO JAPAN?—A doubtful point in this connection, however, is that if the prices of gold and silver were in the proportion of one against thirteen in Japan in 1610 or thereabouts, as Saris reports, how did the Chinese sell their gold to Japan at such a low price as one against 11.21 in 1760 or thereabouts? Besides, if the price of gold was even a little higher in Europe than in Japan, why did the Chinese not sell their gold to Europe? It is difficult to understand. But perhaps it may be that since copper and silver, which China wanted most, could be secured from Japan alone, the Chinese brought gold to Japan to exchange it for copper and silver, though their profit was smaller than from selling their gold in Europe. Of course, the Chinese merchants were not all such altruists as to sacrifice their profit for the benefit of the state, and a true explanation may be that if they took home copper and silver from Japan, they could make out of it more profit than they could gain by exporting their gold into Europe. Japanese copper and silver were quickly taken to China, so that some feared that all Japan had might be exported to China. But in China they were afraid that all their gold might find its way into Japan, for, as a result of her trade with Japan and Europe, China saw most of her gold flow out of the country in the 18th and 19th centuries.

GOLD WAS NOT WHAT THE FOREIGN TRADERS WANTED.—In his *History of the Philippines* Morga says:—

> The Spanish shipped their goods at Manila and sent them to Nueva Espana, whence they brought to the Philippine Islands silver coin and silver bullion to the amount of 1,500,000 annually. There the silver was exchanged with gold at the rate of 1 luble of gold against 4 luble of silver. But this business was not done on a large scale, for Peru and Chili had abundant gold in their own countries. The Spanish rather preferred ordinary trade with the Chinese, for their profit was ten times as much as the cost of their goods, etc.

His statement endorses what I have set forth above. The Europeans profited more from trading than in the difference of exchange in gold and silver, as Morga says. In their trade with Japan they took the same attitude. In 1686 the Chinese, who came by ship from Cambodia, told the Shogunate officials that what they desired was not to sell their goods for gold and silver, but to exchange their merchandise for Japanese articles. In other words, the Chinese saw more profit in taking Japanese goods to Cambodia than in selling their goods in Japan, and taking gold and silver with them. Of course, the smart Dutch merchants did not lose any chance for making profit, and no doubt more or less gold specie must have been taken away by them from Japan.

According to a record of trade regulations between Great Britain and Siam in the early part of the 17th century, the British merchants believed that there was abundant silver in Japan, and that if they traded there they could get silver, not only sufficient to meet the demand in India, but even to export to Great Britain as well. In reality, however, it is said that gold and silver were imported to Hirado from Siam and Ayuchu instead of being exported out of Japan.

The Movements of Gold and Silver harmonized by Trade.—Boulger, in his *History of China*, says that some Japanese merchants, working in co-operation with some Chinese, secretly landed the goods they brought on a certain island, and then sailed away. When the Government officials were not on guard in the neighbourhood of the island, the Chinese secretly came to the island and removed and distributed the goods. He further says that the value of the goods that could be loaded on such a small boat as could escape the eyes of watchers was £4,000, and these smugglers must have been making a big profit out of their business. This is what occurred at the period when the Japanese pirates infested Chinese waters and the seas were dangerous to traders, and even in such a troubled time so much gold was imported into Japan. The same thing must have, no doubt, continued even after the Japanese pirates had disappeared from Chinese waters, and the Chinese merchantmen could come to Japan for trade. In those days the island of Formosa was an important place for trade between Japan and China, and the merchants of both countries met and exchanged their goods in that island. In later years, however, the Chinese traders came over to Japan, where they set up permanently and engaged in business under the safe protection of the Japanese Government, and even made the place their headquarters for trading in foreign countries. It was in 1718 that Hakuseki wrote his book on the currency condition of the country, in which he declared that so much gold had been taken out of Japan that the country's future would be seriously affected. Forty-four years later, or in 1762, however, much gold and silver were imported into Japan, as stated above. What had made Hakuseki most afraid was that in the sixty-one years from the 1st year of Keian till the 5th year of Hoyei, 1,595,000 ryo of gold had been taken away from Japan through the port of Nagasaki, but forty years after his death the condition changed, and in fifty-two years, beginning with 1763, Japan imported 2,640,000 ryo of gold. It must be remembered that the above 2,640,000 ryo is only what appeared in the official reports of the Government, and we must also take into consideration the movements of gold and silver from the time of Tokugawa Iyeyasu till the time of Arai Hakuseki before we form a definite opinion of the ultimate effects of our foreign trade in those early days. The most detailed records on the gold and silver brought to Japan in those days are those in the *Records on Gold and Silver Imported from China and*

Holland, which contains complete records of the gold and silver brought by each foreign ship to Japan every year, beginning with that brought by a Chinese captain called Wang Li-kai in the 12th year of Horeki. It is the work of Lord Iwatani of Bungo, who was then Governor of Nagasaki. Some historians believe that the importation of foreign gold began in the 12th year of Horeki, but that is not necessarily so, though in that year official records began to be kept of the imported gold and silver, due to the then Governor's policy of encouraging the importation of it. Even prior to that year there had been, it may be said, imports and exports of gold and silver, and in those early years the Japanese merchants, without knowing the price of gold and silver in foreign countries, doubtless suffered losses or gained profits from time to time, but Hakuseki exaggerates too much when he says that gold flowed out of Japan like an ebb-tide. In the first place he was mistaken in his belief that 70,000,000 ryo of gold was circulating in Japan from the latter years of the Ashikaga Shogunate to the beginning of the Tokugawa regime; in the second place, he simply looked at the outflow of gold and silver, but did not count how much were brought to Japan; in the third place, he made a mistake in exaggerating the amount of gold and silver taken out of the country. His views were, therefore, incorrect. But he cannot necessarily be blamed for it, because even in the era of Meiji, when Japan held a position among the Powers, many of our leading men, looking merely at the Customs House reports on exports and imports, were seriously concerned about the future of their country when they saw any excess of imports. They did not realize that an unfavourable balance in trade is often remedied by favourable rates of exchange, what foreign tourists spend, etc. Besides, in the documents kept at Nagasaki the exported articles are simply mentioned in bales or under the heading of miscellaneous goods, but no doubt there must have been a quantity of goods exported by individuals, but not kept in the official records. For instance, Cocks, a British merchant, who came to Japan in the time of Iyeyasu, in his diary says that he exported Japanese pig-iron from Tomonotsu in the province of Bingo more than once, but nothing is said in the official records at Hirado or Nagasaki as to the shipments of pig-iron from the port of Tomonotsu. In those days the Dutch merchants exported into Japan goods not only from China, India, and the South Sea Islands, but also from Turkey, Annam, Siam, Bengal, Ceylon, Malacca, Persia, and Europe.

THE JAPANESE GOODS EXPORTED.—Let us now look into what Japan exported in those days. The records available are very brief, and do not give any complete list of the Japanese exports. To China we exported the Yamato Senkyu, Yamashiro parsley, Uda herbaceous

peony, nut grass, China root, stalactile, marbles, crystal, camphor, Nambu amber, Kaga koren (yellow lotus), Japanese pepper, Hange, alum, sea-slugs, dried sea-slugs, sea-ear, fur-seal, dried cuttle-fish, dried tai, herring-roe, dried bonito, dried turnips, radishes, dried calabash, Osaka saraki, mushrooms, dolls, coloured paintings, Nagasaki plaster, Karatsu earthenware, copper, lead, wax, etc. To Annam, Luzon, and Canton we exported copper, iron, tea-kettles, wheat-flour, articles of raised lacquerwork, Japanese fans, paper umbrellas, bronze coins, bowls, mirrors, camphor, folding-screens, mattings, mosquito-nets, oil-paper, etc. The principal Japanese goods exported were copper, camphor, and sea products, of which copper was the chief, just as it was during the era of Meiji. It may not be too much to say that it was copper which saved Japan during the Toyotomi and Tokugawa regimes.

THE JAPANESE EXPORTS UNDER BAN.—In spite of the fact that exports from Japan in these days were so few, the Tokugawa Shogunate put some exports under ban, and anyone who offended against the law was liable to severe punishments. The articles put under ban were the following :—

JAPANESE GOODS, THE EXPORT OF WHICH TO HOLLAND WAS PROHIBITED.

1. Imperial or Shogun's family crests or any articles bearing either crest.
2. Armour, arms, and weapons of war.
3. Paintings of fighting men.
4. Books containing pictures of Court life.
5. Models or pictures of Japanese ships.
6. Maps, charts, etc., of Japan.
7. Fighting dolls.
8. Carpenters' planes.
9. Hino silk.
10. Kaga silk.
11. Pongee.
12. Gunnai silk, etc.
13. Clothes of different descriptions.
14. Cotton fabrics of various descriptions.
15. All fabrics of Japanese manufacture.
16. Silk yarns.
17. Floss silk.
18. Silver.
19. Oil (except for use in the ships).
20. Saké (liquors) (except that for use in the ships, the quantity permitted being 1 to or 3.9703 gallons *per capita*. After 1697 the quantity limit was removed, but it was decreed that the quantity bought in excess of that originally permitted *per capita* should be reported to the Government office from time to time).

21. Japanese swords.
22. Dutch swords.
23. Salt (but each ship is permitted to take as much as 50 kin or about 50 pounds).
24. All kinds of oil (though each ship is permitted to take 5 sho or 2·4 standard gallons of sesame seed oil).
25. Green beans (though as much as 1 to or 15·88 quarts of the same is permitted).
26. All kinds of cereals (but rice is permitted up to 3 to or 47·64 quarts, and wheat-flour and buckwheat flour to any quantity).
27. Sake and wines (for use as medicine).
28. Distilled spirits (shochu) (but anyone who wished was permitted to take with him as much as 1 to 2 go or about 4 gallons, according to the original regulation, which after 1689 was made unlimited).
29. Silk fabrics.
30. Habutai.
31. Cotton clothes.
32. Cotton yarns.
33. Clothes of all kinds.
34. Hemp.
35. Hemp cloth.
36. The new Kwanyei bronze coin.
37. Lacquer.
38. Manuals.

NOTE.—Morga and some other writers state that wheat and bacon were exported from Japan to the Philippines, but it cannot be ascertained whether pig-farming was practised at Nagasaki in those days or how they got bacon in Japan for export.

Among the articles listed above, silk, oil, Hino silk, habutai, clothes of different kinds, floss silk, cotton yarn, hemp, hemp yarn, and cotton plants were permitted to be exported, if the Chinese desired, according to the law issued in 1715 controlling the business of the Chinese firms. It appears that the officials of the Shogunate in those days did not realize that the Chinese who bought these articles with a permit in Nagasaki might sell them to the Dutch traders on the sea or out of Japan. Some of the reasons set forth for the prohibition are ridiculous indeed. The export of the Tokugawa family crest was forbidden for fear of hurting the dignity of the Shogun, and pictures of Court life were put under the ban on the ground that they might disclose the secrets of the Imperial Court in the days gone by. It is stated that the export of the fighting dolls was prohibited for the reason that these dolls, if exported, might disclose to the foreigners the secrets of the Japanese art of fighting, and the manuals were not permitted to be exported for fear that a list of names of provinces in Japan contained in these books might give foreigners some knowledge of the geography of Japan. As a matter of fact the ban was ignored, except in the case of the Shogun's crest, the manuals, etc., which were not important articles at all from a commercial viewpoint.

THE PROFIT OF THE DUTCH TRADERS IN THEIR TRADE WITH JAPAN. What profit did the foreign merchants gain from their trade with Japan in those days ? As far as the Chinese part of it is concerned, there is no available record, but the Dutch merchants made, it is said, a profit from 90 per cent. to 100 per cent. on their invested capital. According to Dr. Lees, the Dutch East India Company declared a dividend of 95 per cent. for 1601 and 1603. How did they make such big profits ? They purchased their merchandise for low prices in foreign lands, and disposed of it elsewhere for tremendously high ones. For instance, in Bantam they bought pepper for 2 taels 3 mars per picul, and sold it at 6 taels 5 mars in Osaka, and yet they complained that the price in Osaka was too cheap. Some Indian garments they sold at from twice to five times the original prices. The Dutch, too, often attacked the Spanish or Chinese merchantmen in the waters between Macao and Manila, Batan and other ports, and plundered from them raw silk, which they brought to, and sold at, cheap prices in Japan. But it must be remembered that their profit as quoted above does not represent what they gained in selling foreign goods in Japan alone, but also includes the profits they made in exporting Japanese goods to the European market. From the fact that their double profits combined left a net profit of 90 per cent. or more, we can imagine how big were their expenses, in which was included the profit of the Japanese interested in their business. According to Dr. Lees, the capital of the British firm at Hirado was 23,310 taels (£7,000), of which 500 taels were invested by Lord Matsuura of the island, and 221 taels by Lord Matsuura of Hizen, which means that the Matsuuras were shareholders of the British firm in the island of Hirado. From the viewpoint of capital invested in trade or business in those days, the British merchants were richer than the Dutch, so much so that the then Dutch Governor-General of Formosa once declared that the Dutch should not only combine their fighting forces against the Spanish and the Portuguese, but utilize English capital in their trade. The fact that there was Japanese capital in the British trading firm would lead one to believe that it was invested in Dutch and Portuguese business as well. The old bonds of debt given by the Portuguese merchants, which are found scattered in various parts of Kyushu, give some light in this connection. The famous Suyetsugu made his riches, it is said, not only out of his shipping business, but also by lending money both to the Japanese and foreign merchants at such high rates as from 45 per cent. to 80 per cent., and among his foreign clients were the Chinese, Portuguese, and perhaps the Dutch too. There are many more instances of the kind. It can be said, therefore, that by our trade with Holland, not only the Dutch, but the Japanese too profited—though, to our regret, we have no record available to ascertain what the Japanese investment was and their profit from it.

Imports decreased as Home Industries progressed.—In spite of the official band and opposition by the scholars our trade with Holland and China had quickly increased in the early years. But soon Japan began to produce herself most of the goods which she used to import from these two countries and consequently her imports greatly decreased, to the delight of the Government officials and the scholars, who had looked with prejudiced eyes at our early foreign trade. Of the articles that we bought from the Chinese, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish in those days, raw silk was the principal, and it was this raw silk which took our gold and silver out of the country. But with the Tokugawa era the wars that had been going on among the feudal lords ceased; perfect peace prevailed, and each feudal lord encouraged the industries of his people more than the art of fighting. Sericulture was started some time early in the Monarchical age and in 1740 Japan was producing so much raw silk that she needed no more of the foreign article. In the matter of foreign raw silk it may be stated that at first we imported the white raw silk produced in the south-eastern provinces of China, but later, in 1650 or so, the yellow-coloured raw silk, from Shan-si and Shen-si, and our early silk products too, were of the two different colours. Though we discontinued importing foreign raw silk, silk fabrics came in more than before. In our early days we used sand-iron in our foundries, which was comparatively high in price and took much labour, proving a handicap to the industry. After we began to import pig-iron from China the foundries quickly advanced, so that Japan soon began to export her own iron manufactures. The pig-iron was called the Namban iron (Namban being the common name given to the Spanish and Portuguese), though in reality it was a product of China, but imported into Japan by the Portuguese and Spanish. At first the pig-iron was used by our smiths because it was cheap, but later more because it was imported than on account of its low price. In the Nagasaki Memorandum quoted above, after giving a list of imports in those days, it is stated that among these imports earthen amber, Dutch skin, Heitala baser, tortoise-shell, kekkatsu, Dutch steel, cotton aresha, Ito seirasu striped cloth, striped calico, and cotton sankuzushi, being cheap in Japan, the merchants have not brought them, etc. This indicates that our industries, encouraged by the early imported articles, advanced, and Japan did not need to import such articles any more. It is true that she lost a great deal of her gold and silver on account of her early trade with the Chinese, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish, but the Japanese got much specie, too, from their trading with these foreign merchants. In addition we got the knowledge of raw silk, the cotton plants, and iron, and later came to produce along these three lines, which worked quite a revolution in our industries and trade, and at the same time what is called a middle class, consisting of industrial and commercial capitalists, came into existence between the ruling samurai and the lowest. These capitalists soon got influence, and began fighting with the samurai class, and a gradual revolutionary change was worked in the social system in Japan, upon which the Tokugawa Shogunate was established, producing an entirely new situation. That was towards the end of the 18th century.

CHAPTER LV

THE DOUBLE STANDARDS OF CURRENCY OF THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD

GOLD STANDARD IN EDO AND SILVER STANDARD IN OSAKA.—In connection with the economic life of the people in the Tokugawa period, the most noticeable phenomenon is the fact that there were two standards for payment, one gold and the other silver, and business transactions were made in accordance with either standard in different parts of the country.

The kimme, as it was called, mostly prevailed in Edo, under which system payment was made by weight in gold, while the other method of payment, adopted mostly in Osaka, was called the gimme, or silver payment.

It must be stated, however, that the kimme and gimme do not necessarily mean that payment was always made in gold and silver money, but that both gold and silver payments were made by weight. The kimme then does not mean what we call nowadays the gold standard system of currency in the strict sense of these words. However, the kimme and gimme later developed into the double-standard system of currency, gold and silver. In many books it is stated that in Edo payment was made in gold, and in Osaka in silver in those days. In Chikamatsu's play, *Kuruwa Bunsho*, dealing with the licensed quarters in Osaka in Genroku, a debt is assessed at 700 kwamme of silver, that is, by weight. In *Koi Hakke Hashira Goyomi*, or *Lover's Calendar*, mention is made of a house being mortgaged for 30 kwamme of silver, and again in *Kasaneizutsu* a loan in the shape of 400 momme of silver coin passes from one hand to another. All this tends to show that the gimme system prevailed in Osaka then. In *The Historical Explanations of Three Kinds of Coins* it is stated: " Therefore in Kwanto districts, in business transactions both the gold and bronze coins are used, but silver rarely.

" But in the districts west of Kyoto silver is more respected and all business transactions are made in silver, and the prices of commodities are all fixed in accordance with the price of silver," etc. In his memoirs, Morisada says: " Gold coins are mostly used in Edo. For instance, rice is quoted in Edo at so much for 1 ryo of gold, while in Osaka and Kyoto the price goes in accordance with the weight of silver." Thus the kimme system prevailed in Edo as the gimme system in Osaka.

THE DOUBLE STANDARDS OF CURRENCY ESTABLISHED.—From the latter years of the Ashikaga period until those of Tokugawa business transactions in Japan were made under the two systems of kimme and gimme. But in 1767 a great reform was worked on our currency system because the Tokugawa Shogunate established the double standard of gold and silver for the national currency. From the last phase of 16th century up to 1767 gold, silver, and copper coins had been in circulation with no distinction among the three ; if there was any difference with regard to their real functions, it was that gold coins were used in big transactions, silver and copper coins together in small transactions, while copper coins were mostly used in the purchase of daily necessities. The law now limited the difference of the three kinds of coins in regard to circulation to that just stated. But it cannot be said that the three kinds of coins were regarded as standards of payment equally. Gold was regarded as the standard of payment, and even in districts where gold was not made the standard for payment in actual transactions, it was regarded as the standard when any legal doubt arose concerning it. The other kinds of coins were measured according to their value, to correspond to the value of each kind of the gold coins, as regulated by law. It was regulated, for instance, that so much weight of silver or copper should correspond to 1 ryo value of gold money. The proportion of prices among the three kinds of coins was so regulated by law. At first the price proportion between gold and silver was 1 ryo of gold against 50 momme of silver, but later against 60 momme of silver. Though gold was regarded as the standard of payment, yet that does not mean that gold was made the standard money, and the other coins the subsidiary, for in that case the maximum amount that would be paid in subsidiary coins must be limited, but there was no such limit enforced on payment in silver and copper in those days, and these two kinds of coin could be used for a payment of any amount. As far as the amount of the payment was concerned, each of the three might be regarded as the standard money. From the point of relative quality, too, one kind of coin was as good as another. For instance, the gold coin, commonly called Keicho Koban, of 1 ryo, weighed 4.73 momme, of which 86 per cent. was pure gold, 13 per cent. silver, and 6 per cent. copper. Therefore, 1 ryo of that gold piece contained 36,678 momme of pure gold, and since 1 ryo of that gold coin was exchanged for 50 momme or 60 momme of silver coins (note—as the chogin and mameita silver coins of Keicho era contained 80 per cent. of pure silver and 20 per cent. of copper, 50 momme of the silver coin contained 40 momme of pure silver, and 60 momme 48 momme of pure silver), the price proportion of gold and silver was one of gold against ten of silver in case of 50 momme of silver coins, and one of gold against twelve of silver in case of 60 momme of silver coins. The market prices of gold and silver were in the same proportion as the prices of those metals contained in each gold coin and silver coin. Therefore the relative quality of a silver coin in those days was by no means inferior to that of the standard coins, as a subsidiary silver coin of to-day is as against the standard gold coins.

From the point of view of quality the silver coins in those days had the character of a standard currency. Thus both on the point of the amount of payment, which was unlimited, and that of their quality, the three different kinds of coins each had the character of a standard currency. Yet the gold coins were made by law the standard of payment all over the country. In practice, too, the gold coins were regarded as the standard of payment, and such system was called the kimme and was in operation in many districts. In some other districts, however, the gimme system, in which silver coins were made the standard of payment, prevailed. Each system of payment had been in practice for many years, and the prices of commodities in the districts where the kimme system prevailed naturally differed from those where the gimme system was in practice; but in 1767 the Tokugawa Shogunate proclaimed that thereafter not only the gold coins alone, but the silver coin, too, should be regarded as standards of currency, though the proclamation of the said decree was actuated by the necessity of adjusting the Government's financial difficulties in those years, and by no means from any firm principle of economy. To tell the truth, the Shogunate was obsessed by the idea that it was easier to get silver than to get gold, and that if both gold and silver were made the standards of currency the price of silver would go up, and the Shogunate's treasury would be enriched thereby.

LAW ON THE DOUBLE-STANDARD SYSTEM OF GOLD AND SILVER.—On December 21, 1767, the Shogunate, through Lord Matsudaira, issued a decree which established definitely the double-standard system of gold and silver for currency. The decree runs:—

> That a new silver coin, of the same quality as that of the Moji-gin silver coin and weighing 5 momme, was to be made and to circulate together with the chogin, and the kodame-gin silver, then already in circulation, was publicly announced last year. One ryo of gold should exchange always with 60 momme of the said 5 momme of silver coin, regardless of any fluctuations in the market price of silver, which means 3 pieces of the silver against 1 bu of gold, and 12 pieces against 1 ryo of gold. The above shall apply to all business transactions, and the new silver coin shall circulate as the other silver coins already in circulation. This announcement shall be made known to all parts of the country.

The decree is one of the most important documents in the economic history of the Tokugawa period, and perhaps the most noticeable point in connection with it is the exchange rates of 1 bu of gold against 3 pieces of silver, and 1 ryo of gold against 12 pieces of silver. Until the Gomomme silver of Meiwa appeared all the other silver coins, including the chogin and mameita silvers of the era of Genbun, were commonly called Moji-gin, and the value of these silver coins against that of the gold coins had been decided upon in accordance with the proportional prices of gold and silver bullion in the market. When the quality of the silver coins was lowered, therefore, their proportional price became lower against that of the gold coins (assuming that the quality of the gold coins was not lowered in the same proportion; in which case, the weight of the silver was increased in proportion). But as a result of this decree the weight of the silver coins need not be increased in any case, but a certain fixed number of the silver pieces was always paid per 1 ryo of gold.

THE NANRYO SILVER COIN.—That the silver coins be exchanged with the gold coin according to the number of pieces, instead of by weight, became the definite policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate, by the decree issued in connection with the issuance of the Nanryo-gin silver coin in 1712. On September 10th of the year the Shogunate, through Lord Mizuno, issued a decree, saying :—

> The new silver coin, which is now coined for circulation, is called the Nanryo 2 shu gin, and is of a good quality. Eight pieces of this new silver are to be exchanged for 1 ryo of gold.

Like the decree on currency issued in 1767, the above decree regulates that the silver coins be exchanged with the gold coins by number. On the back of each Nanryo 2 shu silver it is distinctly stated that " eight pieces of the Nanryo are equal to 1 ryo of gold," meaning equal in value.

THE ACTUAL VALUE OF SILVER IN THE DOUBLE-STANDARD SYSTEM.—Though, according to regulations, both the Nanryo-gin silver and the 5 bu silver of Meiwa were to be exchanged with gold, according to the number of pieces, as stated above, these silver coins did not always so circulate in actual transactions. Despite the strict enforcement of the decrees, silver coins were paid according to their weight in many cases. As a result of this decree the price of the gold coins went up considerably from the time of Meiwa till the 1st year of Anyei, in June 2nd of Anyei, 1773, a decree was issued to the effect :—

> Silver coins shall circulate in the same way as gold ones throughout the country. In the matter of exchange commissions it has been fixed that it shall be paid by the exchange shop in case they paid out the Nishu silver, but shall be accepted if it received the silver coin. But it is learned that the regulation is not followed by some people, etc.

On October 16th, the same year, another decree was issued, as follows:—

> As it has been regulated since the beginning that the silver coins should circulate in the same way as the gold ones, the sense of the regulation shall be followed. If Koban gold be exchanged, it shall be exchanged with the Nishu silver as well as the Kotsubo silver, no matter whether the amount be large or small. The exchange commission on the silver coins shall be paid the same as in the case of the gold. The above shall always be borne in mind, so that the silver coins shall circulate in the same way as the gold, etc.

Yet on January 1, 1779, another decree was issued, saying:—

> Since the circulation of the Nishu silver has increased, the Government caused the making of the said silver coin. Since the year of the Dragon (1772), it has been regulated that the Nishu silver shall be exchanged with and circulated in the same way as the gold coin. At first the Nishu silver coin was made in large quantities; that coin alone was sent out for exchange, and the Koban gold and the Kotsubo silver naturally remained immovable. But that was contrary to the principle on which the Nishu silver coin was first made in the hope that both gold and silver coins shall circulate equally, or without any discrimination between the two. It shall always be borne in mind that both the Nishu silver and the gold coins shall circulate side by side without any discrimination, etc.

Many other decrees were issued to a similar effect, but the above few will suffice.

THE ORIGIN OF THE KIMME AND GIMME SYSTEMS.—When these two systems of payment were first adopted in Japan cannot exactly be ascertained, but it is certain that they were in operation as far back as the 13th century. In 1293 Prince Hisaaki, with the support of the Hojo family, was proclaimed the Shogun of the Kamakura Shogunate, when, in the records kept of his proclamation ceremonies, it is stated that 9 ryo of sand gold equal 2,855 hiki, and 42 ryo of silver, 4,200 hiki, etc. For the above, it can be seen that towards the middle part of the Kamakura period, the price proportion of gold and silver was 1 against 3.106. In the 15th century, when Shogun Yoshimasa of the Ashikaga Shogunate was in his glory and living luxuriously at Higashiyama, Kyoto, the two systems of payment, "kimme and gimme," were in operation in Kyoto, for in the 16th year of Bummei (1484), Lord Ouchi of Magato issued the following public announcement to the people of his territory:—

> The two systems of payment, *kimme* and *gimme*, are regulated by the law of the Shogunate in Kyoto, and, according to the same, in both cases, of gold and silver, 1 ryo is equal to 4½ momme of silver, and 2 ryo to 9 momme of silver. There is no reason why 1 ryo of gold should be exchanged for 5 momme of silver. The rule should be followed, especially in the territories given by the Shogunate. The prices of commodities should be fixed by the

parties concerned in each individual case, but in regard to the two systems of payment, the law of the Shogunate should be followed. In case anyone offends, his case will be brought to the court, and he will be punished. If anyone is accused of offending the said law, he will be put on trial, and, if found guilty, he will be severely punished.

By Order,
Mikawano Kami,
Shigeyuki.

Dated May, the 16th year of Bummei.

From the above it looks as if the double-standard system was already in operation in Kyoto in those early days, but that was merely a temporary phenomenon. As a matter of fact, the system did not develop at all into the double-standard system in the strict sense of the term, but ended in the two systems of payment—" kimme " and " gimme."

The Price of Gold goes up.—In later years the price of gold went up, and the proportional value of gold and silver one against one could no longer continue, and in 1570 the proportion was one of gold against about ten of silver. In this connection the following facts, drawn from documents, dating from the era of Tensho, are interesting :—

> The price of silver is extremely high.
> Gold is bought at a low price.
> Eight to of rice can be bought for 1 kwamme of copper coins.
> The price of gold is 50 kwamme of copper coins
> The price of 10 ryo of gold is 420 momme.of silver.

According to the document 10 ryo of gold was equal to 420 momme of silver ; that is, 1 ryo of the gold was equal to 42 momme of silver. Such were the circumstances under which the kimme and the gimme system of payment were definitely established after the era of Keicho, and the gimme system exclusively prevailed in Osaka as well as in all cities in western Japan depending on the Osaka market.

Arguments on Currency.—As stated above, until the middle of the Tokugawa period, in the currency history of Japan, the three kinds of coins, gold, silver, and copper, possessed the nature of a standard currency from the two points of the amount of payment and quality. What idea, then, had people about coins and the nature of currency, for their interpretation of the nature of currency in any period decides the meaning of the currency, and consequently the currency itself in that period ? Among the books or treatises on currency in the Edo or Tokugawa period, the most distinguished are Kumazawa Banzan's *Daigaku Wakumon*, Miura Baiyen's *Origin of Price*, Arai Hakusek's *Oritaku Shiba-no-ki*, Ogiu Sorai's *Political Discussion*, and Dazai Shundai's *Economic Dissertation*. Of these writers, Baiyen, who followed Gresham in his ideas on the effect of bad coins on good ones, was the most advanced, and his opinions were so modern that they comply with our ideas of currency in many points. Naturally he is so far ahead of the general ideas of his time that his opinions cannot be taken as representing popular views on currency in his day. Banzan belongs to the Metallist School in that he regards coins as the medium of exchange, and believes that coins should possess the same value as the merchandise, whose value is measured by them. His, therefore, can be said to be the most representative opinion of the time on currency. That different kinds of coins were each of the nature of a standard currency is a phenomenon, which is visible in the early period of currency history not only in Japan, but in the European countries as well. For instance, Europe passed through the same stage from the Middle Ages till the 18th century, the reason being that coins did not yet hold an independent position as currency in the business transactions of the people. In other words, though the coins seemed to act as a medium in the business transactions, yet in reality they were not a medium in the true sense of the word, but the coins themselves were being dealt in—that is to say the coins, like merchandise, were negotiable goods, and to sell or buy merchandise in the market was nothing but to exchange a negotiable goods called merchandise with another negotiable goods called coins, and vice versa. As business transactions were made thus, the coins were to be negotiable things, or priced goods at least, and when one form of priced goods is to be exchanged with another, the prices of the two must be equal. Therefore in commercial transactions the value of coins has to be equal to the value of the goods which are to be sold or purchased, from which we may infer that the coins were not employed in business transactions as if they were coins, but were used because they were priced goods, like the ordinary merchandise with which the coins were exchanged.

In other words, the Koban gold piece passed for 1 ryo, not because it was a coin, but because it contained a certain amount of gold worth 1 ryo. In his *Daigaku Wakumon*, Kumazawa Banzan proposed that rice should be employed as coins instead of precious metals, and was not prepared to admit that paper-money could have a purchasing power. This is partly because of his mediaeval idea that such money could be used for the food of the troops any time, and be more convenient from a military point of view, as he himself said, but more because he held that any thing which itself had not a price had no purchasing power and could not be made a currency.

SUDDEN CHANGE IN THE PRICE PROPORTION BETWEEN THE GOLD AND SILVER COINS.—The coins could not, of course, exist regardless of the market prices of gold or silver contained in each of them. Since each of the three kinds of coins, gold, silver, and copper, was of the nature of a standard money, both in the amount of payment and quality, the proportion between the market prices of the three coins should comply with the proportion between the metals contained in each of the three kinds of coins. For instance, suppose that the prices of gold and silver are in the proportion of one against twelve, as in the early part of the Tokugawa period. If the price of silver doubled, the quantity of gold contained in the gold coin would have to be increased in proportion, otherwise the ratio of 1 ryo of gold to 60 momme of silver could not be maintained. This fact had obstructed the currency system of Japan after the era of Genroku, and had disturbed the economic world of the country till the gold coins of Kyoho appeared. When the finances of the Shogunate were in such a parlous condition in the 8th year of Genroku (1695), at the suggestion of Hagiwara Shigehide, the chief treasurer, the Shogunate recoined the Keicho gold coins, which contained 86 per cent. of pure gold, into one containing 55·7 per cent. of pure gold, decreasing the quantity of pure gold by 30·3 per cent. In the same year the silver coin, too, was recoined, and the new silver coin contained between 61 per cent. and 64 per cent. of pure silver against between 80 per cent. and 83 per cent. in the old Keicho silver, a difference of 16 per cent. Apart from the rise in the prices of commodities, the value of the gold coin had decreased by 14·7 per cent. against the value of the silver coin, unless the market prices of gold and silver changed in proportion. When there are two kinds of coins, gold and silver, the value of both of which is decided by the quantity of pure principal metal contained in each, there are two ways of changing the price proportion of the coins. One is recoinage, by which the quality of each kind may be changed, and the other is change in the market price of the metals, which will affect the value of each coin, even though the original quality remains unchanged. After the recoinage of the coins in the era of Genroku, therefore, the value of the gold coin decreased for the reason already stated. When the Shogunate carried out the recoinage, they did not expect it to have any effect upon the prices of commodities, nor upon the proportionate prices of the gold and silver coins; but in the result it did, and unless the change in the proportionate values of the new gold coins and silver ones be prevented by some means, the new gold coin could not keep its value in the market, and the finances of the Shogunate and the hatamoto samurai, both of which were based upon gold, could not but be affected thereby. The sudden rise in the prices of commodities took the Government quite by surprise, and they subsequently issued decree after decree with a view of maintaining the prices at normal, and the proportionate prices of the gold and silver coins, apparently believing they could prevent these changes by paper decrees.

Erroneous Views on the Rise in the Prices.—The Shogunate officials could not see that the rise in the prices of commodities was caused by their recoinage policy, but concluded that the people's luxurious habits were responsible, and that if luxury could be checked, the prices of commodities would soon fall. Many a time official warning was issued against the luxurious practices of the people on the one hand, while on the other they endeavoured to maintain the values of the gold and silver coins at their original proportion.

Mainly in order to prevent the rise of the value of the new Genroku silver coin against that of the new gold coin, a decree appeared in November, the 13th year of Genroku (1700), saying :—

> The exchange rate of the silver coin should not be higher than 58 momme for 1 ryo of gold, etc.

In December, the same year, another decree said :—

> The silver coins in circulation being scarce should not be taken out of the Shogunate dominions.

In August, the 14th year of Genroku (1701), yet another decree was issued, saying :—

> The price of the silver coin is high, and if there is any in store it should be used in the market. If anyone attempts to hoard it he shall be punished.

Further, a decree was issued in December, the same year, to the effect :—

> The exchange rate of silver shall not be more than 58 momme and that of copper more than 3,900 kwamme per 1 ryo of the gold.

In the same December the Shogunate issued another decree, saying :—

> In the western districts of the country the gold coin is not freely circulating, but hereafter the gold as well as the silver coins shall be freely circulated all over the country.

During the era of Hoyei, which followed the era of Genroku, decrees were issued seven times for the same purpose, namely, twice in 2nd year, 1705 ; four times in the 4th year, 1707 ; and once in the 5th year, 1708. In Edo, the then capital of Japan, gold was the standard of payment, and unless the exchange rate of the copper coins fluctuated, speculation was not attempted between silver and gold, but in Kyoto, Osaka, and other cities in the western part of Japan, silver was the standard of payment, and the exchange rate of gold was always changing ; the proportion between the prices of the gold and silver coins was much more complicated, and there was much speculation. In Osaka, prior to 1660, there was an exchange-house, where there were regular transactions in the Koban gold, though it was forbidden by the Government. In Osaka, silver was the standard of payment, and the daily prices of gold were fixed in accordance with the silver standard. In order to abolish the silver standard the Shogunate issued a decree in December 1700 saying :—

> Though silver has been hitherto regarded as the standard of payment in Kyoto, yet in the future, as in Edo, both gold and silver shall be standards of payment equally, and if a man pays in silver in the place of gold, at the rate of from 58 to 60 momme of silver against 1 ryo of gold, the recipient shall raise no objection, but accept it.

Permission was given also for the people to pay their taxes either in gold or silver. In December 1701 the Shogunate issued a decree to the following effect :—

> In the western and middle provinces silver was regarded as the standard of payment, and gold did not circulate as freely as silver, but that is against the law.

The decree also denounced those who refused to accept gold instead of silver, on the pretext that they had no silver in their possession, and stated that gold should be accepted just as silver was, exchange not to be lower than 1 ryo of gold against 58 momme of silver.

BAIYEN'S VIEWS.—How did the kimme and gimme systems come to be adopted ? When a currency system is still undeveloped, and the different kinds of coins, gold, silver, and copper, change hands according to the value of the metal in each kind of coin, and the legal proportional prices of the gold and silver coins (copper coins as well) do not always comply with the market prices of these metals, it is natural, as Miura Baiyen said, for good coins to disappear, and bad coins to remain in the market, creating naturally a difference in the proportional prices of the gold and silver currency. With the increased circulation of gold and silver coins, the merchants instinctively grasped the above principle of economics, though the sciences were unfamiliar to them, and as early as in the 16th century, taking into consideration the proportionate prices of gold and silver, gradually established the two systems of kimme and gimme. But Miura Baiyen was, however, the first really learned Japanese who grasped the above principle. He was born in the province of Bungo, and studied political economy, in which he became deeply versed, so much so that his feudal lord paid him high respect, and often sought his advice in regard to the administration of his territory. In his famous treatise called *Kagen*, or *Origin of Prices*, Baiyen discusses the principle of coins, and says that gold and silver coins are nothing but the medium for the exchange of merchandise, and that their function in business transactions is similar to that of ships and carts. He also says that the more coins there are circulating in the market, the higher will be the prices of commodities, and vice versa, and that lower prices of commodities mean higher prices of gold and silver, and vice versa. He speaks of the same principle as that of Gresham's law, and says that the more bad coins circulate in the market, the more good coins are driven out. Sir Thomas Gresham was born in 1519, and died in 1579, and Miura Baiyen lived from 1723 till 1789. It was in 1772 that he published the *Origin of Prices*, or over 200 years after Gresham. But since there was no means of communicating ideas between the Orient and the Occident in those early days, it may be said that Baiyen's ideas grew out of the general common sense of the Japanese people, which had gradually advanced so much by his time. The principle set forth by Baiyen was also shared by many of those connected with the finances of the Shogunate in the later years, and among them Goto Sanyemon espoused the principle most warmly. In 1831 Goto submitted to Lord Torii of Kai a memorandum recommending a revision of the currency system of the Shogunate. He says :—

> According to the regulations, that have been in force since the era of Keicho, the gold coins were to go by value, and the silver ones by weight. But nowadays the regulations are not observed, and the silver coins go by value, or by ryo, bu, or shu, like the gold ones, instead of by momme, in which sense the silver coins may be called quasi-gold. In the circumstances, however genuine the gold money may be made, the value of the gold specie too will be lowered on account of the changes in the value of the silver coins, and thus the prices of gold and silver will be out of proportion in consequence. In Kyoto and other western cities silver came first in estimation, and in the eastern part of the country gold has been regarded as more important, while at present the silver circulating in the west is very scarce, and, besides, the Ichibu silver coin, whose quality is inferior, is taking the place of the better quality of silver coin, with a possible consequence of disturbing the prices of commodities in the three big cities, Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka. People particularly dislike the Ichibu silver coin, and at present this alone is circulating in the market, and such good coins as the Koban and the Ichibu-ban have all disappeared. In other words, the value of the gold coin has increased, and the people try to hoard it as much as possible, but they do not like the silver money and get rid of it first, whenever they have to pay, etc.

Lord Torii approved of Goto's suggestions, and presented a letter to the Shogun, in which he says :—

> In order to reduce the prices of commodities various taxes and contributions have been remitted, and trade associations have been broken up, and that policy has had a good effect in so far as the cunning merchants cannot manipulate the price of commodities to their own desire, by co-operation among themselves as they used to do. But what I fear is that if prices are forced down to an unnatural level, they are bound to rise again.

Generally speaking, the prices of commodities vary with the status of the gold and silver money circulating. When the value of coins is low, the prices of commodities are high everywhere in the world, as it is hardly necessary to repeat.

When the coins were recoined in the era of Genroku, both gold and silver coins were made of an inferior quality, but the inferiority of the new gold coins was even greater than that of the new silver ones. Consequently the silver coins were regarded as better than the gold, and the natural consequence must be either that the silver coins would disappear out of the market and the gold coins alone continue circulating in the market, or that if the silver coins continue circulating, their prices must go up against the prices of the gold coins. In these circumstances, however, the Shogunate attempted to keep a good proportion between the gold and silver coins, and establish the double-standard system by issuing decree after decree. They failed, and it is quite natural that the two systems of payment kimme and gimme were gradually established.

It may be said, therefore, that though originally these two systems came into existence because, the monetary system being still in a primitive state, the coins could not circulate as mere tokens, but only by dint of the value of the metal contained in them, yet the systems continued in practice for a long time, on account of the sudden changes wrought in the proportionate prices of gold and silver, caused by the Tokugawa Shogunate's recoinage policy, by which baser coins were made and put into circulation in the place of the better ones.

Reasons for the use of Gold in the Eastern Provinces.—How was it that the gold system prevailed in the eastern provinces and the silver system in the west? The first reason is because gold was more produced in the east and silver in the west. For instance, the province of Kai produced the Kokin gold, the island of Sado, when belonging to Uyesugi Kenshin, was full of gold mines, which were already being operated in those days, while the provinces of Izu, Suruga, and Owari, too, produced gold, the Izu mines having been started before the Tokugawa period, and the mines in the latter two provinces first operated under Oda Nobunaga.

Most of the gold coins appearing in the currency history of Japan were made in the eastern provinces, and among those minted from the latter years of the Ashikaga period till the early part of the Tokugawa period many may be counted. There were the Musashi Koban, Tensho Koban, Imagawa Koban, Yedoza Koban, and Suraga-za Ichibu-ban. Of the Koshu gold, there were the Kokin Taiban and 133 other different coins, all known as Koshu gold, made in the province of Kai. In Owari was the Nagoya Koban and the Tsushima Koban;

in Suruga the Imagawa Yeishikwan Koban; in Sagami the Oiso Koban of 5 momme, the Hishi Koban of 3 momme and 3 bu; in Musashi the Benjo Koban, which it is said was made by Konwo at Shibuya, in the suburbs of Tokyo; in Kazusa was the Togane Koban; in Shimoosa the Jumyo Koban, bearing the figures of the sun and moon; in Shimotsuke the Ashikaga Koban; in Mutsu, were the Hidehira Koban and the Matsushima Koban; in Dewa were the Shuzen Koban and Sekisei Koban; in Kaga was a Koban made of the gold turned out of the Sawamura mine; in Echigo were the Takata Koban, the Kenshin Koban; in Kaga the Gyuzetsu Koban, the Taihei Koban, and the Seimon Koban. Many different gold coins were thus made and circulated in the eastern provinces. On the other hand, silver was more produced in the western parts of Japan. In the 16th century Lord Ouchi dug silver in the provinces of Iwami, and made silver coins, which were used in Kyoto. The famous Ikuno Silver Mine in the province of Tajima had been worked when Lord Yamana owned it in the latter part of the Ashikaga period, and its output was the greatest about the era of Tensho (1573–91). The Tada Silver Mine in the province of Settsu was operated, it is said, as early as in the time of Tada Mutsunaka, the founder of the Genji family in the latter part of the 10th century. At first the mine produced silver only, but afterwards copper also. After the wars of Hogen and Heiji (1156–9) the mine was under the control of the Hojo family, who as regents of the Genji Shogun ruled the country. The Hyotan Pit in the mine produced most silver in the time of the Ashikaga Shogunate, and both the Hyotan Pit and the Daidokoro Pit turned out silver in the days of Hideyoshi. In the Tokugawa period, in the era of Kwanmon (1661–72), the mine produced between 1,500–1,600 kwamme of silver, and 700,000 kwamme of copper a year, and paid a tax of 660 kwamme of silver. How famous the silver mine at Tada was even among the common people in those days can be seen from a story in the *Honcho Yeitaigura*, a book of popular stories.

A father bought a folding screen for his daughter as a wedding present, and wanted to have some picture painted on it. If the noted sights of Kyoto be painted, thought he, my daughter might wish to visit them, and hearing stories from such books as the *Genji Monogatari* or the *Ise Monogatari*, she might be tempted to bad conduct; therefore, finally, he had pictures of the working of the Tada Silver Mine painted on the screen. Among the silver coins circulating in Western Japan in those days were the Yamashiro Koban, in Yamashiro; the Koban of Sakai, Izumi; the Kogin of Tada; the Tsuda Koban of Echizen; the Nigiku Koban and the Ichibu-gin of Mimasaka; the Hagiban of Nagato; the Kiri-gin of Tamba; the Ichiryoban, Dotsu-gin, the Kodama-gin, and the Nanryo-gin of Tajima; the Jinbei Gokuin-Kiri gin of Inaba; the Jozein Kodama-gin of Hoki; the Kiuri-ban Kiri-gin of Izumo; the Cho-gin and the Kiri-gin of Iwami; the Yogokuin Kiri-gin of Yamaguchi; and the Gokoyo-gin of Hakata, Chikuzen. It goes without saying that there were some silver coins circulating in the eastern provinces, and some gold coins in the western provinces, but generally speaking more gold coins were circulated in the east and more silver coins in the west.

State Currency.—The state currency principle was not in practice in the western provinces. In the Tokugawa period decree after decree was issued with a view of maintaining the values of the gold and silver coins in proper proportion, and these decrees were faithfully followed in Edo, the seat of the Government, and the provinces near Edo; but in the distant western provinces they were not in full force, and the value of coins was decided according to the intrinsic value of the principal metals contained in them, and the silver system came into existence in these provinces.

In the later years, even in Edo, silver was used in business transactions in many cases, and in business bonds it was often stated that payment be made in silver; but the gold standard was always enforced for payment to the Government. If the amount of money was stated in silver in any Government document, the silver amount exchanged into gold was to be given in red ink at the same time.

Two Empires in Economics.—From the economic view-point, the eastern provinces, with Edo as the centre of their activities, were behind the western provinces, where Osaka was the business centre, and the standard of living was very low in the former compared with that of the latter.

In the latter part of the Ashikaga sway, when Osaka was the centre of the country's political activities therefore, the silver mines in the west were busily worked, and the silver taken to Osaka or Kyoto and made into different kinds of coin. These silver coins, with copper or bronze coins, circulated in the western provinces, silver being used in big business transactions and copper or bronze money in smaller transactions, such as the purchase of daily necessities, etc. Such was the condition in the western provinces in the latter part of the Ashikaga period and the Oda and Toyotomi periods. In the western provinces the bronze coins were the only money circulating in the market, and the silver was so precious that it was used to make gifts to the big samurai, or hoarded as the personal treasure of big merchants. The people's social life was so poor, and their economic life so primitive, that they did not feel much inconvenience, even when so hampered.

The condition, however, suddenly changed with the establishment of the Tokugawa regime in 1601, as a result of which the centre of Japan's political activities moved to Edo from Osaka, and gold began to be produced at different places, particularly in the east. The gold thus produced was all brought to the mint in Edo, where it was made into coins, which were subsequently put into circulation and quickly replaced the bronze coins in the east. Naturally the Shogunate made gold the standard of payment, whereby the gold system was established in Edo and other eastern cities; but with all its political power, the Shogunate could not destroy the silver system in Osaka, which was still the centre of the country's commercial activities. In these circumstances, the gold and silver systems prevailed in two different parts of the country at the same time. In other words, commercially the country was divided into two parts, and in one gold was the standard of currency, and in the other silver. The gold system represented the rising power of the Tokugawa family, and the silver the declining influence of the Toyotomi, represented by the conservative elements in those days. Though the fact was overlooked by many historians, yet commercially the western provinces were independent of the eastern provinces and each was an empire independent of the other, and their currency systems differed as much as the present currency system of Japan differs from that of China. The Mitsui and other big merchants in the western provinces made most of their riches by dealing in exchange, just as the banks of the present day are making profits by the fluctuations in foreign exchange rates. It is said that the Mitsui have a complete record of the daily rates of exchange between gold and silver, both in Edo and Osaka, for 300 years from the beginning of the Tokugawa rule.

The two systems, kimme and gimme, developed later into a double-standard system of currency, which was forced into operation by the Shogunate; but the smart exchange houses in Osaka, though apparently observing the Government's regulations, continued in reality practising the two old systems.

The double-standard system was soon destroyed and the kimme and gimme systems revived once more. All the circumstances attending the change are covered in the chapter "Exchange-Houses."

CHAPTER LVI

THE GOLD AND SILVER RECOINAGE IN GENBUN ERA

The Shotoku (1711–15) Reform denounced.—The reform of the currency system in the era of Shotoku was carried out under Arai Hakuseki's direction, and the circumstances attending it are recorded by Hakuseki alone, whose books have been widely read. Besides, the currency system was in such disorder in the era of Genroku, that the reform of Shotoku was regarded as a great success by almost everybody, and it was, in so far as the former system was restored by making coins of better quality to take the place of the debased money which had been circulating since Genroku. But it cannot be said that the reform was carried out in accordance with the then existing economic circumstances of the country. It was not so much practical as idealistic, and eighteen years later it was severely criticized, and the gold and silver coins had once more to be recoined in 1736 (1st year of Genbun). It may be stated that the Genroku silver recoinage was made in 1695 (8th year of Genroku), and eighteen years later, in 1713, came the Shotoku reform, which was completed in 1718 (3rd year of Kyoho).

Eeficiency of Coins.—Shogun Yoshimune's policies were all reactionary, and planned apparently with a view of undoing what Iyenobu had done, for Yoshimune disliked the reforms that Arai Hakuseki had made under Iyenobu in modelling the institutions, customs, etc., in Edo after those of the Imperial Court in Kyoto. He considered the Kyoto customs too effeminate, and even feared that they might destroy the brave spirit of the eastern samurai. Perhaps he was right, but since not only did he attempt to undo what Iyenobu had done, but recalled to office men whom his predecessor had dismissed for corruption or inefficiency, every measure taken by his Government was of a reactionary character. His recoinage in the era of Genbun was no exception to the rule, but the good points and effects of his revision should not be ignored. The basic reason for the recoinage was to increase the volume of currency circulating, by making more gold and silver coins of inferior quality, because at that time there was not enough currency to meet the then increasing business demands.

The Shotoku Reform against the Interests of the Samurai Class.—In those days, while on one hand the output of gold considerably decreased, on the other a large amount of gold specie flowed out of the country. In 1685 the country's foreign trade was limited to a certain amount a year by the Shogunate, and then, on Hakuseki's recommendation, the Government limited the number of the Chinese and Dutch merchantmen coming to Nagasaki, and also the amount of their trade each year. By these measures, to a certain extent, Japanese gold was prevented from flowing out of the country, but the Shogunate could not do anything to improve the declining output of gold. On the other side, tranquillity had prevailed since the era of Kwanyei (1624–43), and the economic system developed in those years, when, as a result of the recoinage policy of Genroku, the volume of currency circulating considerably increased. The people began to realize the convenience of currency in their business transactions, which, together with the increase of population and the development in the general economic conditions, tended to increase the demand for more currency. Suddenly the Shogunate carried out the recoinage policy of Shotoku, improving the quality but reducing the volume. How the people suffered from this decrease is proved by the fact that when in 1723 the Shogunate announced the new Shotoku gold and silver coins as the standard currency, there were still old Genroku gold and silver coins circulating, which means that the Shogunate had not been able to exchange the old coins with the new ones, as it expected. Besides restoring the quality of the gold and silver coins to the standard prior to Genroku, the Shogunate, in its Shotoku recoinage policy, had another object, namely to bring about a decline in the price of commodities and reduce the cost of living. That, however, could not be accomplished merely by changing the name of the coins. There are two classes of people who will be differently affected by changes in the prices of commodities. One is those who receive their income in money, and the other those whose income is paid in goods. Now, in these days, the revenues of both the Shogunate and the samurai class were, generally speaking, in rice, and rice, like other commodities, had advanced in price. The Shogunate's attempt to save itself and the samurai class out of their difficulties by bringing down the prices of commodities, therefore, had a contrary result. The people's suffering in those days was caused more by their luxurious habits, prevailing since the era of Genroku, than by the rise in the price of commodities. In May 1713 the Shogunate issued a decree prohibiting the use of costly materials for clothing, and in 1716 another decree was issued for the same purpose. Despite these decrees, the luxurious habits of the people did not cease, and with the advance in the standard of living the demand increased for manufactured articles. The cause of the samurai's troubles lay in the fact that they had to dispose of their rice at lower prices, and buy manufactured articles at the higher prices, just as the farmers of the present time have to do. In these circumstances the samurai were in no way benefited by the Shotoku recoinage, as the price of rice, in which they received their income, went down in proportion to the decline in the prices of other commodities. When a new financial policy is adopted, it acts more quickly on some commodities than on others. The effect of the Shotoku currency revision was not felt so quickly on other commodities as on rice, which was most widely dealt in, so that while the price of rice went down, the price of some other commodities did not follow. The Shotoku currency revision, therefore, benefited the common people, but rather increased suffering among the samurai class, and in 1718 the Shogunate had to issue the following decree :—

> When the price of rice was high, the prices of other commodities, too, were high. But at present, while the price of rice has gone down, the price of other commodities and labour is still as high as before. The reason is that, whereas commodities should be sold by each individual merchant at the price he decides, the merchants in different groups agree upon certain fixed prices for their wares, and no one can dispose of his goods at a lower price. Such is a violation of the Shogunate's decree, and indeed outrageous.

THE VALUE OF SMALL COINS INCREASED.—Another result of the Shotoku currency revision was a shortage of small coins and a subsequent increase in their value. A new coin was to be exchanged for 2 ryo of the old coin, but goods that used to be sold for 1 ryo of the old coin could not be purchased at 2 bu of the new coin, and consequently smaller gold coins and silver coins, and copper and bronze coins were more used than before, and their value also could not but increase. In 1718 the Shogunate issued a decree saying :—

> As intimated some time ago, it appears that some are concealing silver coins, and business transactions are not done smoothly in consequence, etc.

Then another decree was issued :—

> The merchants should not hoard the money they receive from their sales, but dispose of it at the exchange-houses near to them, etc.

Despite these decrees, the same condition continued, and in 1724 the Shogunate issued the following decree :—

> Recently the value of bronze coins has quickly gone up, as some people have been purchasing them in order to make profit out of the purchases. This cannot be allowed. If a money-house (zeniya) knows of any other money-houses, merchants or others, committing such an act, it should report to the Government office at once. Everyone involved shall be punished. In case anyone, knowing of another man committing such an act, fails to report to the Government, he shall be punished. The present high values of the bronze coins have been manipulated, it appears, by an agreement reached among the money-houses, who therefore will be punished for it.

> The exchange rate, too, has gone up recently, without reason, but due to a manipulation on the part of some profiteers. That, too, should not be allowed, and if any exchange-house or others do it again, they shall be punished for it. If anyone is refused small coins at an exchange-house or money-house, and told that there will be no small money for some time, etc., he should report it to the nearest Government office at once, and the exchange-house or money-house shall be punished immediately.

In 1725 again a decree was issued for the same purpose. The high prices of the silver and bronze coins dealt a blow to the samurai class particularly, for they disposed of their rice mostly in Osaka, where it was paid for in silver, and their payments were made in gold in Edo, and when the price of silver was high, the price of rice was low. Besides, payments being made in gold in Edo, the exchange was against them, and yet when they purchased daily necessities they had to exchange this gold again for silver or bronze. Of these years, the price of silver was the highest in 1717, when it was 45 momme, or 46 momme per 1 ryo of gold, and then continuously fell to 50 momme or so, though in 1720 it was once quoted at 41 momme. Compared with the gold standard, it means a considerable fall in the price of silver, but it means a marked rise, when compared with the standard price of 60 momme silver against 1 ryo of gold. The rise in the price of the bronze coins was yet more remarkable. Against 1 kwamme of bronze coins, silver was 9 momme in 1717, 10 momme in 1720, 11 momme in 1721, and 12 momme in 1729; and the fact that the Shogunate permitted the different feudal lords to issue their own paper money in 1730 was for the purpose of adjusting the difficulties created by the high prices of silver and bronze. But most of this paper money was in silver notes, and they served to cause a further rise in the price of silver, because the western provinces were full of these silver notes, whose circulation was limited to the territory of issuance, and did not run in any other territory. People did not like to dispose of their rice in the country market, when payment was made in silver notes, but rather forwarded it to Osaka, where they disposed of it for gold or silver specie. Thus rice was brought abundantly to Osaka, with the result of a fall in the price of rice and the scarcity of gold and silver there.

OGIU SORAI'S VIEW.—In his *Sei-Dan*, or *Political Talks*, Ogiu Sorai attributed the suffering of the samurai and other classes in those days to two causes. One, that the lords and other samurai resided mostly in towns, where they had to purchase all their daily necessities with money, and in most cases the merchants sold goods of an inferior quality, and made unreasonable profits. Such a tendency was further increased as the people moved to cities from their country towns or villages. The other that no rules of distinction existed. In towns the lower class of people could buy anything they liked, if they could afford it, and naturally they indulged in luxury, with the result that the merchandise became scarce and prices went up, and the samurai and other classes of people equally suffered from it. Besides these two principal causes, Sorai found three others for the people's suffering in those days. One, the rise in the prices of commodities; another, the decrease in the volume of gold and silver coins circulating; and a third, the fact that loans were made with difficulty and the circulation of currency was not smooth.

The appreciated prices of commodities Sorai attributes to five causes. One is the brokers, who on behalf of the land-owners levied taxes from the people, and manipulated the prices of commodities. Another is the expense of living in the cities and towns, which was taken into account when the merchants decided the prices of their commodities. Sorai tells a story that eighty years previous to his time his grandfather had bought a residence in the commercial part of Edo for 50 ryo, which was priced at 2,000 ryo in his father's time, or thirty years previous to his own time, and he suggested that some measure should be taken against such an unusual rise in the prices of commodities. Speaking of this condition, he says :—

> Those people who have moved to Edo, while in their villages used to live a simple life, eat wheat and millet, etc., and drink unrefined sake. They did not use miso (bean paste). They used to wear hemp or cotton clothes, and sleep on straw mats. But as soon as they moved to Edo, their style of living entirely changed. They now live on rice and miso, and use such fuel as wood and charcoal to warm their rooms. They purchase clothes of good quality, and drink refined saké, which they never tasted while in the country towns or villages. Their houses are now furnished with sliding paper screens, their rooms painted, the floors covered with fine mats, and they use mosquito-nets, none of which things they had in their country villages. Such is the style of living of a low class of town people, while rich merchants, without any restriction of class distinction, are living in the same luxurious way as the lords. Thus the demand for commodities has increased with a resulting rise in prices. Not only the people in Edo, but the rich people in the country towns and villages too, live in luxurious ways after the style of Edo folk.

By this improvement in the people's economic life the samurai class received a direct blow, as they were living with false dignity or show. In order to save the samurai class from their difficulties, Sorai urged that class distinctions should be restored as before, and that the people who had moved to Edo should return to their country homes, thus give up their residence in Edo, which was so expensive. Another cause responsible for the high prices of commodities, in Sorai's opinion, was the transportation charges and the profits of middle men, who squeezed all they possibly could out of every transaction.

> Some merchants in co-operation do wholesale business, and attempt to get profit, without efforts on their own part. The consequence is the increase in the cost of merchandise, which causes a rise in the prices of goods. The manipulation is so well planned that the Government officials in charge cannot discover it. In former years, when some merchants cornered the market, they kept the merchandise they had bought in their godown, and it was easy for the Government officials to detect their manipulation. But to-day they advance money to the manufacturers and contract for their products in advance, and it is entirely within the power of these merchants whether they sell their goods at high prices or low, as they are under their control. Until they begin to sell the merchandise at high prices, the people think that they contracted for it in advance, simply in order to buy at the cheapest possible prices. It also happens that when they transport the grapes from the province of Koshu, where they are produced, to Edo, they throw away three or five horse-loads, so that grapes become scarce and the price goes up in the market in Edo. This kind of manipulation is very difficult for ordinary people to detect.

In those days, as in our own time, the wholesale merchants sometimes controlled the producing plants by advancing money to the manufacturers or producers, and when there was over production they even threw away a part of the product in order to maintain the price. Concluding his argument, Sorai declares that the best way of bringing down the prices of commodities is for the samurai to return to their respective districts, and for their salaries to be paid in rice, which they would not sell. In that case, he continues, the merchants would become anxious to get rice, and the citizens of Edo will have to take to other cereals as well as rice, and thus most of the people's suffering would be removed.

SORAI'S VIEWS ON THE VOLUME OF CURRENCY CIRCULATING.—Then, in Sorai's opinion, the way of saving the Government out of its financial difficulties, and of adjusting the economic troubles in his time, was to increase the volume of both silver and bronze coins circulating. He declares that, despite the arguments of the exchange merchants, the quality of coins, gold or silver, is not an important matter at all, but that any coins that the Government officially recognized should circulate without regard to their quality. In that respect he belonged to the same school as Hagiwara Shigehide, a Shogunate financier, who failed in his financial policy during the era of Genroku. Sorai's financial views, as given in his own work, *Political Talks*, which he wrote for the Shogun's reference, are as follows :—

> The only way of restoring the present conditions to normal again is to make more bronze coins. It is foolish to discuss the quality of gold and silver coins, though the exchange merchants and some others do so. The truth is that in the era of Genroku, when the quality of gold and silver coins was made worse, the price of the bronze coins did not change much, and it

> may be said that the value of the gold practically did not change much against that of the good Keicho gold. Then the bad Genroku gold and silver were recoined, and new coins of a better quality were made out of them; but the price of the bronze coins remained just the same, which means that the value of the new coins did not differ from that of the Genroku gold and silver. One ryo of the new coins is exchangeable for 1 ryo of the old coins, not for 2 ryo or more. The bettering of the quality of the new coins was useless. The result of the recoinage was simply as if the Genroku gold and silver, without there being any change in quality, had decreased by one-half in volume. Naturally the whole nation is suffering from the effects of the policy. Should the volume of the bronze coins be increased so much that 1 ryo of gold is exchanged for 7 or 8 kwamme of the bronze, the value of gold and silver will be doubled, and the result wiil be the same as if we had the same volume and quality of gold and silver coins circulating as in the era of Genroku. The true value of the gold and silver coins changes according to the price of the bronze coins. If the price of the bronze coins is high, the value of the gold and silver coins will be low, and vice versa, and the quality of the coins has nothing to do with the true value, etc.

In Sorai's opinion, the currency reform of Shogun Iyenobu and Arai Hakuseki was useless, for though after the reform the quality of the gold and silver coins was made better than before, yet the volume of currency considerably decreased. Besides, in spite of the better quality of the recoined gold and silver, the price of the bronze coins against gold and silver did not come down, but remained the same as in the era of Genroku, when the gold and silver coins were of an inferior quality. As a matter of fact, the Shotoku currency reform did in effect nothing but decrease the volume of currency circulatings, and that was the cause of the financial troubles in those days, and the only remedy Sorai suggested was to increase the volume of the bronze coins circulating so much that their price, which was about 2 kwamme per 1 ryo of gold and silver, should come down even to 7 kwamme or 8 kwamme per 1 ryo of gold or silver, whereby the value of both gold and silver could be increased in proportion against the bronze coins.

THE CIRCULATING SPEED OF GOLD AND SILVER CURRENCY.—The scarcity of bronze coins in the market in those days was also due, in Sorai's opinion, to the slow circulation of these small coins. He says:—

> Since the era of Genroku different kinds of coins have circulated widely in the country districts, especially through the hands of travelling merchants. Now, gold and silver coins are easy to carry, and if they are taken into the country, they soon come back to the central market, but the heavy bronze coins are a different matter. Besides, the people in the country districts are now accustomed to using money in daily business transactions, and if they be once taken into the country districts, these bronze coins do not come back to the central market easily. That is a cause of the present scarcity of the bronze coins in Edo, and the more widely merchants travel about the country, the more will that scarcity be felt.

Another cause of the difficulties Sorai attributes to the stoppage of loan transactions, and, like Yamashita Konai, he denounced the Shogunate's policy of refusing suits on loan troubles. The only difference in the opinions of the two men was that while Konai attributed the cause of the difficulties to Yoshimune's "thrift policy," and denounced the Shogunate for keeping money in its coffers without using it, Sorai urged the encouragement of loan transactions, on the ground that thereby money would circulate more quickly. Sorai discussed the value of currency not from the standpoint of its quantity, but from that of its circulating speed, which was, it may be stated, an advanced view in his time. He says :—

> Even a rich man cannot be expected always to possess a big sum of money. Most of his riches are bonds, certificates, etc., or goods. Gold and silver coins do not stay long in one place, but travel about, and it often happens that 100 ryo of gold appears far more than 100,000 ryo in paper, and vice versa. The volume of gold and silver circulating has already decreased, and if loan transactions are stopped, the circulation of gold and silver will lessen, and the people will suffer from it, etc.

As a remedy, Sorai urged the Shogunate to encourage lotteries, which he suggested be promoted in proper ways.

Dazai Shundai's Views.—His views were the same as Sorai's on general points, except that he approved the currency reform in Shotoku and Kyoho, which Sorai had denounced. Speaking of the reform, Shundai says :—

> When the Kyoho decree on currency reform was issued, the volume of currency circulating was expected to decrease by one-half. But in the several years following the reform the new coins have circulated well, and it has been proved that the decrease in the volume of currency has not caused much suffering among the people.

It may be that as he lived in a different time, Shundai differed in his views from Sorai on the Shotoku reform; but he agreed with Sorai in advocating the increase in the volume of the bronze coins circulating. Sorai proposed to increase their volume in order to lower the price of the bronze coins and remedy the shortage of both gold and silver coins, but Shundai advocated the same policy in the interest of the samurai class. Let him speak for himself :—

> The samurai class is discontented if the price of the bronze coins is high, but with the people it is just the opposite. The high price of bronze coins means the low price of gold and silver coins, and vice versa. Merchants are pleased if the price of the bronze money is high, but they never omit to make a profit even when the price is low. But the samurai class suffer if the price of gold is low and that of bronze high, because they sell their rice for gold, change the gold to bronze, and use this bronze to make their daily

purchases. Therefore the best way to adjust the present situation is to increase the volume of bronze coins circulating and thereby lower the price of these small coins.

The effect of the high price of the bronze coins was more felt in the eastern than in the western provinces, for in the eastern provinces gold and bronze were used side by side, and transactions were made in gold for 1 bu and upward, but in bronze for less amounts. But in the west, where the gimme system prevailed, transactions were made in silver for 5 rin and upward, and in bronze for less amounts. (One momme of silver was exchanged for from 40 mon to 80 mon of bronze, but 5 rin of silver for between 2 mon and 4 mon.) Even if there was fluctuation in the price of bronze, it would not affect payment at all, because where transactions were made in silver, payments in bronze were made according to the prevailing relative price of silver and bronze in the market. If the same system of payment was adopted in the eastern as in the western provinces, the question of the price of bronze could be solved at once, said Shundai. He deemed it impossible to circulate silver in the eastern provinces, owing to the scarcity of the metal, but thought it not difficult to make silver the standard for prices, which would bring about the same result as silver circulating.

In Shundai's opinion, gold is too high to be the standard for prices, and if it be made so, naturally bronze will be the standard in most transactions, and such transactions will be affected by fluctuations in the prices of bronze. But as it was difficult to carry out his idea and enforce the gimme system in the eastern provinces against the customs of the people there, Shundai suggested, as the best remedy, that the kimme system of payment should be maintained, and silver be made the standard for prices of certain amounts below bu. But that suggestion, too, was rather impracticable.

FALL IN THE PRICE OF RICE DUE TO GOOD CROPS.—In those days the samurai class suffered more from the low price of rice than the price of silver and bronze or anything else. In 1717, at the Dojima rice-market, 1 koku of Higo rice (the best in Japan) was quoted at 70 momme, and the price fell to 33 momme the next year. In 1721, owing to the inundations and bad crops in the previous year, the quotation went up to between 70 momme and 80 momme. There was much damage done to rice plants by insects in 1732, and the price of rice went up to 81 momme, and even to 100 momme between September and December, and the Shogunate gave rice out of its own godowns to save the people from starvation. Except in those years, however, rice crops were generally good, and, thanks to the Shogunate's encouragement (such as teaching methods of killing noxious insects, etc.), the farming industry progressed and the crop of rice increased. Naturally, the price of rice went down so much that it was quoted at 23 and 24 momme, and at 30 momme at the highest, and in 1730 it fell so low that from 3·5 to 4 sho of hulled rice could be bought for 100 mon of bronze coins. All that was due to Yoshimune's policy, and he was well called "Rice Shogun" by his people. In those days the samurai, like the Shogunate, were land-owners, and lived on the income that they obtained by disposing of their rice. The decline in the price of rice cut their revenues almost by one-half. To save itself as well as the samurai land-owners out of their difficulties, therefore, the Shogunate attempted several times to cause a rise in the price of rice. In January 1730 the Government purchased 13,000 koku out of the stock of rice held by the dealers in Edo. In March the next year it made another big purchase in Edo, and appointed some Osaka merchants to purchase rice on behalf of the Government in the same year, and establish the rice-exchange market at Dojima, Osaka, in 1730, while in 1731 a limit was put on the amount of rice to be moved to Hyogo, Edo, and Osaka. All these measures were taken for the purpose of raising the price of rice. In 1731 the Shogunate permitted each of the feudal lords to issue paper-money, in the hope that money might become abundant in the provincial markets, and the people would not hastily dispose of their rice in the central markets, as they had done in the past. But even with these successive measures the Shogunate could not stop rice from going down, and the issue of paper-money by each feudal lord only caused a rise in the price of silver. In 1735, therefore, the Shogunate regulated the market price of rice, so that in Edo it should be 1 koku 4 to or more for 1 ryo of gold, and in Osaka 42 momme of silver or more per koku, and if anyone purchased rice at a lower price, he had to pay the Government a tax of 10 momme of silver per koku. Regarding the inferior kind of rice, it was regulated that it should be dealt in at a price in proportion to that of the better grade, and another decree was soon issued ordering that the best grade of rice be transacted at 42 momme of silver per koku and the low grade at 39 momme of silver per koku, and the middle grade at a proper price between the said two grades. The Shogunate attempted to enforce these public prices of rice till the spring of next year, and, contrary to the expectation of the officials, the decree interfered rather with transactions on rice, but failed to cause any rise in the market price, for the merchants refrained from purchasing rice, in the expectation that the price would come down further, when the official prices, too, would be lowered.

The Motive of the Genbun Currency Reform.—In these circumstances the Shogunate did not know what to do in the matter. In 1734 the Government called a meeting of the rice-dealers and exchange merchants at the rice exchange at Dojima, Osaka, and asked them to express their views as to how to make the price of rice rise. Various answers were sent in. Some declared that there was so much paper-money in each feudal district that the land-owners did not like to dispose of their rice there, but wished to sell in the central market, where the price was low in consequence. Some urged that the official price of rice be fixed at 30 momme of silver per koku, and the dealers should be lent 600 kwamme of silver, enough to purchase 200,000 koku and thereby corner the market. Another proposal was that the Shogunate's rice should be sold to merchants freely, instead of selling to the dealers alone, for hitherto the sale of the Shogunate rice had been thus limited, and the prices were low in consequence. Yet another proposed the abolition of the deposit system, whereby a deposit had to be made with the Government office at the rate of 200 momme of silver per 100 koku in cases of purchases of rice, on the ground that, because of the deposit, the merchants were afraid of making a loss and tendered at a low price. The opinion set forth by one exchange merchant was that the quality of the gold and silver currency circulating in those days was too good compared with the price of rice, against which the quality of Genroku or Hoyei gold and silver had been just right. The value of the Shotoku silver was ten times that of the Hoyei silver, and 30 momme of the Shotoku silver per koku might be said to be equal to 60 momme of the Hoyei silver. His argument was a double-edged one; the quality of the coins circulating was too good, but owing to the scarcity of currency, the price of rice was low. This opinion of an exchange merchant was an eye-opener, and in 1736 the Shogunate carried out a reform of the currency system, increasing the volume of currency circulating by re-making gold and silver coins of an inferior quality out of the better Shotoku coins. In the same year the name of the era was changed from Kyoho to Genbun, after which name the reform is called.

THE RECOINAGE DECREE OF GENBUN.—In May 1736 the Shogunate issued a decree in connection with the currency reform. That the reform was for the purpose of increasing the volume of currency is indicated by the first clause of the decree saying that the recoinage was undertaken on account of the scarcity of gold and silver currency, etc. The decree runs :—

> On account of the scarcity of both gold and silver coins, the circulation of currency is not good and the people are suffering. Hence the Government has decided to re-make new gold and silver coins out of those now circulating.
>
> One hundred ryo of the new gold shall be paid for 100 ryo of the Keicho gold, and 10 kwamme of the new silver for 10 kwamme of the Keicho silver, and there shall be no difference between the two kinds of coins as far as paying capacity is concerned; and the exchange-houses should make no difference

between them in their making or receiving payments, so that the new coins will circulate without obstacle. The same shall apply to the payment of Government taxes with the new coins.

When the existing gold and silver coins are to be exchanged for the new coins at the Government mints, a premium shall be given at the rate of 65 ryo per 100 ryo in case of gold and 5 kwamme per 10 kwamme in case of silver.

The existing coins, gold and silver, are to be exchanged for the new ones through merchants and samurai, and others possessing the old coins shall get them exchanged for the new coins through the hands of merchants at their convenience.

The number of the existing coins to be exchanged for the new ones is known, and those possessing these coins should not hoard them, but get them exchanged, and in case anyone fails to do so, and keeps his stock unexchanged, he shall be punished for it.

PROVISO.—Coins, gold or silver, that have not been exchanged for the new coins within the fixed time-limit shall be regarded as broken metal, but not pass for money.

THE QUANTITY OF GOLD OR SILVER CONTAINED IN THE GENBUN COINS.—The meaning of the above decree is, in brief, that as far as the prices of commodities, loans, etc., are concerned, the coins new and old pass at the same value, or 1 ryo of the new gold against 1 ryo of the old gold, but that when the old gold or silver coins were exchanged for the new ones a premium was given.

The quality of the new coins made in the era of Genbun, in accordance with the above decree, and the comparison with that of the old coins are as follows :—

	Total Weight of 1 Ryo.	Quantity of Gold.	Percentage of Alloy.
	Momme	Momme	Fine
Old gold	4.73	4·05–7	0·867–0·856
Genbun gold	3.47	2·27	0·653

That is to say, compared with the old gold coin, the new one contained only 55·8 per cent. of gold, in other words out of 100 ryo of the old gold coin, 179 ryo of the Genbun gold coin could be made. The proportion of the Genbun silver coin against the old silver in quality was :—

Old silver coin	800 per cent.
Genbun silver	460 per cent.

That is, 17.6 kwamme of the Genbun silver could be made out of 10 kwamme of the old silver.

THE TRUE AIM OF THE GENBUN CURRENCY REFORM.—Following on the above quoted decree, the Shogunate issued another on June 19th in the same year in connection with the currency reform, in which it is stated that the prices of commodities in the market should be decided by the new coins, but where the new coins were scarce, the new and old coins should be permitted to be used in their proportional values for the time being. Besides, the Shogunate confessed the true aim of the reform in the second decree.

The purport of the said decree was that the prices of commodities should be decided on and paid in the new coins, but where there were no new coins, the old ones could be used in their proportional values ; loans and so forth could be paid in the new coins at the same price as the old ones. In other words, a loan of 100 ryo borrowed in the old gold could be redeemed by the same amount in the new coins. Now the prices of these coins in the market at that time were 100 ryo of the old gold to 160 ryo of the new gold, and if a loan originally borrowed in the old coin was paid back in the new coin, the advantage was all on the side of the debtors. The samurai class were mostly debtors in those days, therefore it may be said that the object of the currency reform of Genbun was to save the samurai class out of their difficulties, first by raising the prices of rice, and then by affording them a huge advantage in settling their debts. Most of the debts of the samurai were thus settled in the new coins, except in the territory of Lord Maeda of Kaga, where the old loans were all settled in the money in which they had been originally borrowed, and Lord Maeda was praised for it.

The Exchange of the Old and New Coins closed.—The exchange was commenced in September 1736 (the 1st year of Genbun), the old coins having been collected in the hands of the exchange merchants, and exchanged for the new coins at the Government mints. With a view of covering necessary expenses in connection with the exchange, charges were made at the rates of 1 momme of the Bun-gin silver per 10 ryo of the Bun-gin gold ; 1 momme 5 bu of the Bun-gin silver per 1 kwamme of the Bun-gin silver in Osaka, and 1 bu of silver against 1 ryo of gold and 1·5 of silver against 100 momme of silver in Edo. Beginning with October, the same year, rice quotations were made in the new silver. But as the people had detested exchanging old coins with new ones in Genroku, they were equally reluctant in Genbun and the exchange did not proceed as quickly as desired, and in March 1737 the Shogunate had to issue the following decree in this connection:—

> On account of the slowness with which the old coins were being exchanged for the new ones, the old coins had been permitted for use in their proportional value for the time being, but since plenty of the new silver is now being made, the circulation of the old gold and silver shall be entirely forbidden from the 1st of January next, and payments, exchange, etc., shall be made thereafter in the new coins at the already published rates of 100 ryo of the Moji-

> kin gold against 100 ryo of the Keicho and the new gold, and against 200 ryo of the Ken-kin gold, and of 10 kwamme of the Bun-gin silver against 10 kwamme of the Keicho and the new silver. In case anyone uses the old coins in their proportional value, he shall be punished for it.
>
> Premium in connection with the exchange of the old coins with the new ones shall be paid at the rates already notified till the end of December, but from the 1st of January it will be 30 ryo of gold per 100 ryo of the gold exchanged, and 2 kwamme of silver against 10 kwamme of the silver exchanged. Therefore as much as possible the old coins should be presented for exchange with the new ones within the time limit.

In December 1737 the Shogunate announced that the exchange would be closed at the end of March 1738, but to no purpose, and, in June 1744, another decree allowed the use of the old coins in any kinds of transaction. The exchange in connection with the Genbun reform thus almost ended.

THE SUCCESS OF THE GENBUN CURRENCY REFORM.—The currency reforms of Genbun and of Genroku were alike in making the quality worse, but the Genbun reform was carried out comparatively smoothly and without any immediate economic troubles, while the Genroku reform invited strong public criticism and created immediately serious economic consternation. Three reasons may be stated for the difference: first, the motive that actuated the Shogunate in the reform of Genroku was entirely a selfish one of profiting the Shogunate itself by the reform, but the reform in Genbun was undertaken in answer to the public cry for an increase in the volume of currency, but not for the mere selfish purposes of the Shogunate, though it is a fact, as stated before, that the true purport was more to save the samurai class than the people at large; second, the exchange transactions of the eastern provinces created considerable difficulties in many ways in western provinces, because of the shortage of currency, and it was universally agreed in those days that these difficulties could be removed only by increasing the volume of currency, and the Genbun reform was just what people desired; third, at the time of the Genroku reform the way in which the old coins were exchanged for the new ones was not just and fair, but the attitude taken by the Genbun Shogunate in this respect was very fair, and the way of exchange and the rates of premium to be paid were previously announced to the public. Therefore, the merchants in Osaka, for instance, accepted the Genbun reform as a proper measure for the time, and did not much object to it, though they complained of some inconvenience that they had to face for the time being.

THE PRICE OF RICE APPRECIATED, AND THE SAMURAI CLASS STILL SUFFERING.—What was the effect of the Genbun currency reform on the economic market? The price of rice, no doubt, went up. In 1734 Hiroshima rice was 30 momme of silver per koku; in 1735 it was

35 momme of silver; and in 1736 Kaga rice was 24 momme, or 25 momme per 9 to, but in December 1736 it was quoted at about 50 momme of silver per koku, and later it was always over 40 momme of silver; while in the latter part of 1738 and 1740 it went up even as high as 80 momme. Whether the prices of other commodities, too, went up in equal proportions we have not material for discussing now. It appears that they did not go up so quickly as the price of rice, but there is no doubt that the prices of other commodities did rise generally. In 1744, nine years after the Genbun reform, the Shogunate officials in Osaka, in their instructions to their subordinates in connection with the purchase of rice, said:—

> Whereas the prices of other commodities are all high, the price of rice is not good, and the samurai class are in difficulty. Rice began to fall in price in March and April, and was particularly low in July and August. If things continue moving in the same direction, the difficulties of the samurai will become greater, and they will not be able to pay off their debts to the merchants. The result will be sluggishness in business, and the general financial condition will become difficult, etc.

From the above it appears that though the price of rice was double that before Genbun, yet the prices of other commodities too went up so much that the samurai class were still in financial difficulties, proving that the reform of currency alone could not save it, and that the Shogunate's manipulations in raising the price of rice were to no purpose.

The Prices of Gold and Silver after the Reform.—As already stated before, at the time of the reform 1 ryo of gold was equal to 52 or 53 momme of silver, but later 1 ryo of gold went to 60 momme of silver or even more. At first the price of silver was rather high, because usually the silver coins were recoined later than the gold coins. The fall in silver in 1746 was due to demand for gold in the province of Kaga, and that in 1770, when 1 ryo of gold was equal to 66 momme of silver or even more, was on account of the demand for gold in connection with the construction of the Imperial palace in Kyoto, to the expenses of which the lords were called upon to contribute. In 1772 there was a big conflagration in Edo, and 1 ryo of gold went up to 70 momme of silver. In the later years in general gold continued going up and silver falling. One secondary cause of the continuous fall in silver was due to silver flowing out to Holland and China in large quantities after the era of Horeki (1751–63).

The Price of the Bronze Coins.—The price of the bronze coins had been going up even before Genbun, and it went up further after the reform. Neither was it a nominal rise, due to the inferior quality of the gold and silver coins after the Genbun reform, for in 1735 1 kwamme of the bronze coins was equal to 12 momme 1 bu of silver.

and the figure should have been 18 momme or so of silver after the reform, but was actually over 20 momme.

The circumstances attending the continuous rise in the price of the bronze coins in those days were given in the *Sankwa Zuyei* as follows :—

> But in 1737 the price of the bronze coins further went up, and 1 kwamme of the bronze coins was equal to 19 momme 5 bu of silver and 25 momme or 26 momme in private transactions in November and December in the same year. In Edo it was 2 kwan 700 momme of bronze coins against 1 ryo of gold. Decrees were issued several times, therefore, that the price of bronze coins should not be raised further, and the exchange merchants disobeying the decree were punished. Consequently the bronze coins did not accumulate in Osaka, whereas the merchants, who brought cotton and other merchandise from the western and northern provinces, took back home a large amount of bronze coins from the city, where the scarcity of the coins was seriously felt in consequence, and the taking of the bronze coins out of Osaka was prohibited. In 1738 the price of the bronze coins was between 25 momme and 28 momme of silver against 1 kwamme of bronze, and between 28 momme and 30 momme of silver in secret transactions for shipping the bronze out into other provinces. Not a few of the people were found guilty of and punished for such secret transactions. The merchants were warned several times that they should not do anything that might tend to the further rise in the price of the bronze, but to no purpose, and many were punished severely. A decree was issued that goods, which used to be sold for silver, should not be sold for bronze, and that if anyone broke the law by selling for bronze he should be punished. It was strictly regulated that bronze be not taken to other provinces, and that payments to the other provinces that used to be made in bronze should be made in silver, and that anyone offending the rules should be fined or punished. As a matter of fact, many were punished for disobeying these decrees, and there was much unrest in the city. It was all due to the fact that, in addition to the scarcity of the bronze coins in the market, the quality of the gold and silver coins was made worse after the Genbun currency reform, and the people did not obey the Shogunate's instructions in connection with the price of bronze. Besides, the new Bun-kin and Bun-gin coins were not yet well circulating in the country provinces, and the people there were doubtful about the new gold and silver coins, and they instructed their agents or representatives in the central market to get payments in bronze for their goods. In addition, small silver coins were scarce in the market, and where transactions were once made in these small silver coins, they were now made in bronze instead. Thus the price of bronze continued to rise, and the Shogunate, realizing the fact, gradually made small silver coins to make good the shortage. In November 1738 the price of bronze coins was 21 momme of silver per kwamme in Edo and 22 momme or so in Osaka and Kyoto. It was regulated that if anyone coming from another province wanted to purchase bronze, it could be sold at a price up to 30 momme of silver, but not higher, but if any such men from another province were found purchasing bronze at a price of 30 momme of silver at different places for the purpose of taking the same out into their own province, report should be made to the court at once. No excessive amount of bronze should be permitted to be taken

out of Edo, nor should further rise be caused in the price of bronze. In April 1739 against 1 ryo of gold were 2 kwan 860 momme of bronze and 57 momme 2 bu of silver, and against 1 kwamme of bronze were 20 momme of silver in Edo, and 21 momme 7 bu 2 rin in Kyoto, and 21 momme 4 bu in Osaka. In the era of Kyoho the average price of bronze was about 12 momme of the old silver, and if it had increased by 50 per cent. against the new Genbun silver of inferior quality, it ought to have been about 18 momme of silver, but, in fact, the price of bronze was from 21 momme to 30 momme of silver, which is unusually high.

New Copper Mints established.—Since the quality of both gold and silver coins was made worse after the reform, it was natural that the price of the copper and bronze coins went up as a result, and the only way to save the people out of the difficulties arising from this was to increase the volume of these coins circulating. In May 1736 the Shogunate issued a decree announcing that more copper coins should be made for the purpose. But the Shogunate's idea was to have private mints established to make copper coins under contract with the Government, and in its public announcement, issued in July, the same year, it says :—

> Those who wish to apply to the Shogunate for an official permit for the establishment of copper mints in Edo shall present themselves at the office of Lord Ooka of Echizen or Lord Hosoda of Tamba by the 5th of next month. They must bring full specifications, etc., and the names of their bondsmen.

Particulars regarding the terms of contract under which individual merchants made copper coins for the Shogunate cannot be known, but a mint, with specifications approved by the Government, was established with official permission at various places. The copper and bronze coins made at each mint were sold at the prices decided upon by the Shogunate, and a certain contribution or tax was paid to the Shogunate by each mint.

Thus in June 1736 a mint was established at Fukagawa, Edo, and 100,000 kwamme of copper coins were made there annually. The new coins were sold ten times a month at a price 500 momme cheaper per 1 ryo of gold than the prevailing market price. And this was a sample of many.

Profit of Copper Coin-making Business.—What profit copper coin-making business brought to the investors we do know. But from the fact that in the era of Genroku, the Nagasaki-ya in Kyoto in return for an official permit for the manufacture of the big copper coin contributed to the Shogunate 200,000 ryo of gold, we can easily imagine how lucrative a business it was ; which is confirmed by another fact, namely that when the Shogunate itself made copper coins at Ashio in

1743, 40,000 kwan of Ashiji Zeni was made out of 30,000 kwamme of copper. When an application was made to the Shogunate for a copper mint, it was to be accompanied with sample coins for approval, and seeing how lucrative the business was, many people made private coins, called them "samples," and used them, so that the Shogunate had to issue a decree prohibiting the practice.

Iron Coins.—Thus, under the Shogunate's encouragement, copper coins were made at different mints, but the work was not carried on satisfactorily on account of the shortage of copper. For instance, the mint at Wakayama, where coins used to be made out of the Kumano copper, was soon given up because of the shortage of material. In order to remedy it, coins were made out of pig-iron instead of copper. The first iron coin made was the Hiroshima Zeni, made at Fushimi in 1736, but later iron coins were made in large quantities at many other mints as well on account of the shortage and high price of copper. At such mints as those at Wakayama, Edo, etc., either iron coins only or iron and copper coins together were made. In the circumstances iron coins circulated in as large amounts as copper coins.

The Prices of Copper and Iron Coins.—The price of iron being lower than that of copper, the price of the iron coins was lower than that of the copper coins. When the iron coin was sold at the Honjo mint, Edo, in 1739, the price was 4 kwan 200 momme for 1 ryo of gold while the copper coin was 4 kwamme. The Kashima coin, too, was sold at a price lower by 80 momme for 1 ryo than the copper coin. According to the Sankwa Zuyei, in January 1739, in Osaka, 1 kwamme of the iron coin was equal to 21 momme 7 bu or so of silver. When the iron coin first appeared in the market, more or less objection was made to it, but this soon abated. The iron coin circulated as well as the copper coin, it appears, because it did not differ much from the latter, and there was then a deficiency of coppers. Then the price of these small coins went down, and from the era of Horeki till that of Meiwa 1 kwamme of the big copper coin was equal to about 15 momme of silver. The *Seikwa Jiroku*, or *History of Specie*, says :—

> In March 1743, after the Moji-kin coin appeared in the market, copper coin was 2 kwamme 400 momme for 1 ryo of gold, but nowadays it is over 4 kwamme for 1 ryo, etc.

Since silver was 60 momme for 1 ryo of gold in those days, 4 kwamme of the copper coin for 1 ryo of gold may indeed be called an ideal market price to the minds of the people in those days.

CHAPTER LVII

ECONOMIC FEUDALISM

THE ZA SYSTEM DEVELOPS INTO THE KABU SYSTEM. — Oda Nobunaga aimed at freedom of trade and tried to remove anything that obstructed it. He abolished the Seki-sho or barriers at various places and prohibited the za-men from controlling the Seki-sho in Kyoto and Omi, where they were collecting a tax from those passing through, and finally put an end to the za itself, which may be compared with the European guild. By doing so Nobunaga destroyed entirely the commercial system of the Ashikaga period. Toyotomi Hideyoshi was also a free trader, and he, too, suppressed the activities of the za. In Hakata, for instance, Hideyoshi put up a public notice saying that the za merchants would not be allowed to enter that city. No country can ignore the environment, history, and traits of its people. If it does, we see only a temporary phenomenon, which, divorced from environment, will not last long. Nobunaga's free trade policy was no exception to the rule. He had seen that since the beginning of their rule the Ashikaga had been practically under the thumb of their lords, and he realized the necessity of restraining this. He also had been aware that the powerful monasteries in Kyoto and Omi backed some lords against his rule directly or indirectly, and he wanted to suppress such actions of certain groups of Buddhist priests in Kyoto and Omi. All the trade systems and the influence of the merchants belonging to these systems, maintained by the influence of the lords and temples, were marked out for destruction. In a word, Nobunaga was placed in circumstances which drove him to sweep away all the influences of the old social and commercial systems even by revolutionary means. His destruction of the za system, like his punishment of the temples, was nothing but a part of his general policy, to which he was driven by necessity. Hideyoshi was not so drastic as Nobunaga in his general policy, but he followed on the whole the line set by his predecessor. Tokugawa Iyeyasu, who succeeded Hideyoshi, however, changed everything, and adopted a policy which was reactionary to the policies of both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi in every respect. In ruling the country both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi relied upon their lords and generals, but Iyeyasu adopted an entirely different system. He drew a distinct line between the private retainers of the Tokugawa family and the lords whom he had subjugated, and relied upon the former for the maintenance of the sway of the Tokugawa Shogunate. The private retainers developed, so to speak, out of the semi-slaves of the olden times who had served their masters generation after generation. Iyeyasu made his generals and lords out of the retainers of the Tokugawa family, and these generals and lords, too, picked their retainers from those related to them personally. The hatamoto, as the direct retainers of the Tokugawa family were called, were men who had served the Tokugawa family from the time of their forefathers or from their boyhood at least. Thus Iyeyasu formed a group of generals and men who had the same history as the Tokugawa family and relied upon their loyalty for the maintenance of his ruling power over the country. In his system, family relation was an essential factor, and unbroken relations between master and retainers for generations ranked next. In appointing his generals and lords, Iyeyasu first made inquiries into their family history and their relationship with the Tokugawa family, and then their character, ability, influence, etc., which were secondary things in his estimation. He believed the system to be the safest for his Shogunate, for the lords and generals related to the Tokugawa family had an interest in supporting it The appointment of a capable new man, with no family traditions, to important positions in the Government, as had been done by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, carried with it, in Iyeyasu's opinion, the seed of future danger. Under Iyeyasu's system, therefore, the greatest feudatory could not become a Minister in the Tokugawa Shogunate unless he was connected with the ruling family. Contrariwise, the most incapable Tokugawa scion could get an important position in the Shogunate and control over other lords. In such circumstances, the free trade policy pursued by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi was discontinued, and the influence of the za system and merchants belonging to it, which Nobunaga and Hideyoshi had attempted to destroy, quickly revived. In those days, as the conditions changed, the name of za was applied to such official lines of trade as gold mint, silver mint, scales trade, etc., but the true za system was to be found among the wholesale dealers, kabu (commercial charter) and kumiai (guilds). Since both in wholesale business and in the kumiai system commercial charter known as kabu was the essential, the kabu system of the Tokugawa period was the same as the za system in the Ashikaga period. The kabu system operated in the same way as Iyeyasu's political system, and commercial privilege, known as kabu, was given only in accordance with family relations and history, and no competition was permitted to crawl in.

Transactions in Samuraihood.—After the Tokugawa rule was established, the samuraihood or right to succeed in title, etc., of the samurai, like commercial privileges, also became kabu, and was dealt in in the market. The kabu was indeed so essential a factor both in the political and commercial system in the Tokugawa period that before further discussing them we have to make inquiries into the origin of the kabu.

The Meaning of Kabu.—What is meant by it? When a farmer cuts down a tree and leaves the stump, out of this, even if burnt, young shoots grow in the next spring. This stump is called kabu. The same holds true of a samurai family or commercial house that has a certain privilege held by the same family in successive generations. This privilege or right to succeed to it was, therefore, called kabu, or stump. Such kabu came into existence by official systems, through official permit, agreement among men concerned, or custom and practice. The characteristic of the kabu system was limitation of the number of men engaged in a similar line of business or occupation, and though such a limitation was not legally enforced, it was actually in practice. The result was that a certain group of men were engaged in a certain line of business or occupation exclusively, and rights to succeed to such a privilege were called kabu or kabu-shiki, and made the objects of transactions in the market. Of kabu there were two kinds, one of which came into existence for social reasons and the other for economic reasons. Under the former category are such kabu as the retainership nanushi (town or village headship), iyenushi (house headship), etc., which are the fruit of the caste system or social customs. The kabu belonging to the economic category may be divided into two kinds. One is a line of business which, owing to its nature or scope, could not be permitted to many men, and this is again sub-divided into two, one created by official permit and the other by an agreement among the people concerned. The second economic kabu is the kabu springing from customs and usages, though without such limitations as those stated above. A firm engaged in a certain line of business for long years assumed a privilege in that line, admitted by the people. For instance, when the producers or owners of merchandise sell their merchandise to the wholesale merchants, who re-sell them to the brokers but not direct to the consumers, the business of the wholesale merchants becomes a kabu. From the legal standpoint, the kabu may be divided into two: one was formed with official permission and the other was in practice, though without a Government permit. The officially granted kabu falls again into two heads: one is such as is doing work for the Government, or specially placed under the control of the Government, and the business belonging to this kind of kabu was organized and operated by order of the Government and did not pay state taxes or contribution. The other kind consisted of those privileges which, upon applications from the merchants interested, were granted by the Government, and those holding these privileges had either to make a contribution of a lump sum or pay a tax each year.

Transactions in Kabu.—That the privileges of both commercial houses and samurai families in certain lines of business or in official titles, position, ranks, etc., became kabu and were bought and sold in the market was a characteristic of the social system of the Tokugawa period. As all the lines of trade were made hereditary, there were no sudden changes in the social or economic life of the people, which the Shogunate was most afraid of; while both the samurai and tradesmen had their interests well protected by this hereditary system, under which they could hold their privileges, commercial and otherwise, for generations successively. Thus the country enjoyed peace for a time under this system established by Iyeyasu. Where a hereditary system prevails there is no competition, no change, nothing but monotony, with resulting stagnation, decline, or asphyxiation. Thanks to the kabu system, however, some change came; for the privileges monopolized by a certain class or group of people became objects of transactions in the market, and competition arise in the purchase of them. It may not be very much to say that the fact that kabu could be sold and bought was the safety-valve of society under the hereditary system. If anyone possessed money, he could buy any kind of kabu he liked, and could raise himself to any official position or line of trade for which he thought he was fit, which otherwise was entirely impossible in a society where the hereditary system and strict class distinctions prevailed. Dealings in kabu were the first step in destroying these strict class distinctions, and capital became a kind of controlling power affecting various social as well as economic phenomena.

Social Kabu.—Under the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate the hatamoto were naturally in an enviable position. But soon after the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate we are surprised to find that the rights became kabu and were bought and sold in the market. The influence of capital, which was in the hands of commoners, ate into the hereditary military system, just as water seeps into the earth and will gradually split a stone. Slowly, it is true, but steadily, and in the end sharply. It was in the era of Genroku that the right of being a hatamoto was a marketable article, but a similar thing had been in practice as early as the era Kwanmon, about sixty years after the crowning battle of Sekigahara. In those early days it was not called kabu, and was managed in a somewhat different manner. Hatamoto samurai adopted into their families the sons of rich commoners, who brought with them a large anount of money, which means, in other words, that the right of becoming the heir to a hatamoto samurai was sold to a son of a rich commoner. How extensive the practice was can be seen from the fact that in the laws of the samurai, issued in August 1751, the Shogunate says :—

> Covetousness should be avoided when getting a wife for a son or adopting a son, etc.

Speaking of the political conditions in the era of Genroku, Ogio Sorai, in his *Political Talks*, says :—

> The positions of Okachi (foot-soldier) and Yoriki (policeman) were sold for money, and merchants, farmers, and such-like, are often appointed to these positions through the influence of the purse. Many sons of rich men were adopted into the families of the samurai for money. These merchants and other low-class men who were without any family distinction of their own, and bought the rights of families of distinction for money, are now found among the hatamoto samurai in great numbers.

In these circumstances, therefore, in the Law of the Samurai, issued in 1710, the Shogunate proclaimed as follows :—

> Recently in selecting a wife for his son a man considers more whether the girl is rich or what clothes and other belongings she may bring with her, etc., and it even happens that a family of high social distinction is united with a family of very low class by marriage. Such practices must cease in the future. In selecting a son for adoption, similar ideas have prevailed. This too should be discontinued.

In July 1713 the Shogunate issued a decree and warned the hatamoto samurai against such practices, saying that vacancies in such official positions as Yoriki, Doshin, Tedai, etc., were often filled with men who had secured them either by personal favour or by the influence of money. This was contrary to the wishes of the Shogunate that reliable men should be put into these positions, and if the same practice occurred again, the officials in charge would be punished, etc.

HATAMOTO KABU VALUED AT 60 RYO.—Similar decrees were issued almost every year thereafter against the marriages for dowries, but to no purpose, as the practice was too deeply rooted to be checked even by the power of the Government. A samurai Takahashi Kichitayo was punished in 1727 for adopting into his family a rich merchant's son who brought a fortune with him, in spite of his having a son of his own. But there were numerous similar instances of such a practice among the hatamoto samurai in those days which escaped official punishment. In later years, the right of becoming an adopted son in a hatamoto family was valued at from 60 ryo up to 300 ryo of gold, the prices differing according to the official income attached to the position. The contract quoted below explains how such a transaction was done in 1832.—

LETTER OF CONTRACT.

Since last summer you have performed your official duties, and after consultation with your relatives have agreed to adopt me into your family to be your heir, and though I have accordingly to look after you and your family hereafter, you prefer to receive in cash the sum of money necessary to cover your living expenses, which has been decided at 60 ryo. Of the amount, 16 ryo 2 bu you wish set aside for paying your debts, and the rest to go to your taxes to the Government. Besides, as in earnest in connection with this contract I will pay 5 ryo, making a total of 65 ryo, which I will hand you in the presence of your relatives and the responsible officials of the group to which you belong. In case your official salary is decreased, my dues to you will be also decreased by 5 ryo per koku, and if you are transferred to some other office and your salary be decreased to 7 koku, my dues to you will be decreased by 15 ryo. This contract having been entered upon, if I fail to carry it out and decline to become your heir, you are not bound to pay back the money you have received from me, but in case you refuse to carry out the terms of the agreement, you must repay me the said money. I have duly paid you 5 ryo as earnest money, and the agreement has been signed in the presence of the responsible officials of the group to which you belong.

OKANO HEISHICHIRO (Seal).
YAMSHITA JIHEI.
TANAKA YUYEMON (Seal).

December, 3rd year of Tempo (1832).

Addressed to :—

NISHIMURA KURANOJO.
IMAI KOHACHIRO.

The Witnessing Officials :—

SUGIURA KIJURO.
UCHIYAMA SHUZO.
TAKAHASHI KISHIBEI.
YOSHII KOJURO.

HATAMOTO KABU MORE THAN THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF THE HATAMOTO SAMURAI.—The offices openly bought and sold were the yoriki, kachi-doshin, shonin, nakama, kago, kurokuwa, makanaikata, etc., which were all held by the hatamoto samurai, direct retainers of the Shogunate and succeeded to by their sons, and thus held by their families hereditarily. The prices of these offices varied according to whether the names of the original holders were maintained or changed to the names of those who bought the kabu. For instance, if the name of an original holder was to be maintained, the purchaser had to look after his family and employees, and even bear social and other expenses of the original family. In a book called the *Tenkwan Shu-ki* there is a passage reading :—

> In the early part of Kwansei there was a report that the soldiers, a thousand in number, in the town of Hachioji, might be removed to the suburbs of Edo, when upon an investigation it was discovered that the thousand was only a nominal number, and actually there were not more than 450 in all. The fact is that there were many who held by purchase the kabu of five or even seven Doshin.

The above indicates that the number of the hatamoto samurai, upon whom the Tokugawa Shogunate relied, was far less than the number officially decided upon and supposed to be in existence. In fact, many kabu of the hatamoto samurai were bought and held by merchants who were not trained nor practised in the art of fighting, and who did not care a fig about tendering military service to the Shogunate at all, having bought the kabu of samurai just for social distinction and honour, and the rice allowance attached.

THE POWER OF THE SWORD SURRENDERED TO THE POWER OF WEALTH. Such, then, was the condition of the hatamoto, whom the Tokugawa Shogunate relied upon as the basic strength of its power, but there was nothing unnatural in it. For though the forefathers of the hatamoto fought gallantly for the Tokugawa family, and could really be relied on by the Shogunate, and as a reward for their services on the battlefield had been given special positions and privileges, their sons, who had no practical experience of war, were different, and though they were called the bodyguards of the Tokugawa family, their positions were merely honorary in time of peace. Besides, their salaries and allowances did not change even when the general standard of living advanced, and they could hardly live on them. They wanted money, and had no other way of getting it than selling their old swords and other weapons and their family kabu. They did this under necessity, and their family kabu thus passed into the hands of the rich merchants, who, in spite of their riches, had no social distinction and honour and were eager to get it. Not only the hatamoto samurai, but even some lords too, under financial stress, adopted into their families sons of rich merchants, and saved themselves out of their money difficulties, as happened in the eras of Bunkwa and Bunsei.

Thus the power of the sword surrendered to the power of the purse, which is an inevitable outcome of peaceful times. Some are inclined to regard this kabu system in a favourable light, and hold that, because of it, able commoners were given an opportunity of holding responsible positions in the Shogunate, and doing good service to the country, which otherwise they would not have had. But such men were very few indeed, and most of these commoners who acquired samuraihood by purchase were by no means good specimens of their kind.

When all is said and done, dealing in the kabu merely indicates the great influence which, thanks to the peaceful times, capital came to exercise even over the power of the sword, so that the family rights of the samurai, like ordinary merchandise, were made objects of barter in the market.

THE KABU OF THE STREET HEAD-MEN IN EDO.—The kabu of the street head-men and suchlike in Edo were also dealt in in the market like the kabu of the hatamoto samurai. The position of the head-men nanushi, as they were called, corresponded to that of the toshiyori or elders in Kyoto and Osaka in those days, except that the toshiyori were chosen from among the merchants and were engaged in certain lines of trade themselves, and their offices were not hereditary, while the nanushi in Edo did not engage in any other business at all, but devoted their entire life to their offices, which were hereditary. In this respect it may be said that Edo was feudalistic, and Osaka and Kyoto democratic. The toshiyori were one for every street, but one nanushi controlled three or even five streets. About the eras of Bunkwa and Bunsei there were 284 nanushi over 1,640 streets in Edo, and thirty of these nanushi had succeeded to their offices without a breach from the very beginning, when Edo was made the seat of the Tokugawa Shogunate. With these nanushi it was customary to collect a certain amount of money from every property owner in the streets they controlled for the expenses of their offices, and besides, they charged for endorsing applications to the judge's offices; and when they appeared in the law courts or judge's offices, they had the privilege of putting on the kataginu (a ceremonial garment), and wearing swords like a samurai. Hence their rights had market value, and they were bought and sold in the market.

THE KABU OF THE CHODAI IN OSAKA AND KYOTO.—At first Kyoto and Osaka had the toshiyori alone, but in later years they added the chodai, who, in the place of the toshiyori, were in charge of the affairs of a combination of a few streets. The influence of the chodai gradually grew and superseded that of the toshiyori. He received a certain salary from the streets under his control, and his rights were thus made marketable.

THE KABU SYSTEM DEVELOPED OUT OF THE ZA SYSTEM.—It may be said that the kabu system in the Tokugawa period developed out of the za system in the Ashikaga period, but in later years the commercial and industrial men began to form a kind of association called the kabunakama, which soon secured a position in business circles. It was followed by another kind of association called kumiai, with still greater influence. Some writers confuse these three bodies, but one system is entirely different from the other. The kabu is one system, and nakama is another, and the kumiai is a third. A kabu represented certain rights, a nakama was an association of men engaged in the same line of trade, while a kumiai was a combination of men, either engaged in one and the same line of business or different lines of business, gathered together by force of contract. These three were often confused because of the use of such words as kabu-nakama, nakama-kumiai, etc. The kabunakama was a group of men engaged in the same line of business possessing kabu by official permit, and the nakama-kumiai was an association of men of the same line, combined by agreement. The words nakama and kumiai were often used with the same meaning, because an association of men engaged in the same lines often formed a kumiai through agreement. That side of the old za system, by which men engaged in the same line of business formed an association, developed into the nakama and kumiai, and the other side of the za system, by which certain privileges were secured, remained in the kabu system.

The Economic Kabu.—In the Ashikaga period the different lines of commercial and industrial business were carried on under the za system, and there were such za as the rice, timber, fish, horse, and other lines of trade, and the members of each za secured the exclusive manufacturing and sales rights for each line by paying a kind of tax to the Shogunate. Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi destroyed the za system and established freedom of trade. In the Tokugawa period, too, the za system was strictly forbidden in general commerce and trade, though there were such za as the gold and silver for the manufacture of gold and silver coin, and also measures and scales for the unification of weights and measures, etc. The nakama and kumiai, both of which developed out of the za, were forbidden as well. But the fundamental policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate was to uphold as much as possible the old customs and usages as well as precedents, and those engaged in commerce and industry, knowing this, worked for the revival of the za system, which was soon realized. About the era of Keicho the Shogunate recognized the economic kabu system, and in the era of Kyoho the formation of the nakama and kumiai was universally permitted in Edo. But in those days no tax was levied as yet on those organizations, and the rights of the members of such an organization were not as yet so developed as those of the old za. Nevertheless, even in these early years the business rights of the members of such an organization were commonly recognized as a kabu in the market. In 1800 a sort of tax was imposed upon the kumiai, and the members of a kumiai organization were limited in number and an official licence issued to each member, but which the kabu of such an organization obtained privileges as under the old za system. This kumiai system had been in practice extensively in Osaka since 1760 to 1780. Edo simply copied it, and between 1804 and 1829 the system was of a most exclusive character, with many undesirable results, on account of which it was discontinued after the reform of Tempo (1830–43).

The different Kinds of Kabu in Edo.—Of the different kinds of kabu in Edo in those days, the principal ones were those of the various tonya organizations. Then there were such kabu as the fudasashi (rice-broker), public bath-houses, hairdressers, purveyors, headmen of carpenters, and other workers. Land-leasing, the regular cleaning of moats and rivers, the supplying of young pine-trees to be planted on the banks, the construction and repair of bridges, supported by the kumiai, the repairs of the conduit pipes of the two water systems, the repairs of the roads, the supplying of ferry boats, etc. Besides such kabu there were the direct retainership of the Shogunate, the priestship of temples, the nanushi and iyenushi (house-master), tutorship, the night-guards, etc. All these kabu were made the objects of transactions in the market, and similar kinds were dealt in at Kyoto and Osaka as well. The following are the origins of the principal different kinds of kabu in those days :—

1. *Hairdressing Kabu.*

An official notice put up in Edo in January 1609 says :—

Except those merchants already officially licensed men dismissed from official service, farmers, and suchlike, are not permitted to engage in hairdressing and such kinds of business. Those who have been engaged in these lines of business, according to the official regulations, should apply to Kambei and Gonyemon for their official licence.

In June 1639 another decree was issued of a similar tenor, by which it was regulated that a branded certificate should be issued and given to the hairdressers by the Shogunate. The hairdressers kabu was thus early established.

In 1793 it was regulated by a decree that no one should be permitted to engage in this line of business unless he joined the Hairdressers' Association.

2. *Public Bath-house Kabu.*

In 1651 the following public notification was issued :—

Transactions in the rights of running a public bath-house are forbidden, except for the transfer of the same from one man to his brothers and other relatives. If the transaction should be made between the seller and buyer in the presence of the owners of the building, the men of the association concerned, and reported to the eldermen of the respective streets, it will be permitted.

3. *Different Kabu of Travelling Salesmen.*

As early as 1595 an official certificate was issued to those engaged in peddling.

4. *Calendar Store Kabu.*

In the era of Genroku the number of those engaged in the business of making, selling, etc., calendars was limited to 81 in all.

5. *Exchange-House Kabu.*

In 1718 the number of exchange men were limited to 600 in all, and the opening of any new house was prohibited. In an official notification to the exchange men issued in 1784, it was stated that the number of the exchange men kabu " had been decided at 643," etc. This was the first time that the word " kabu " was used in any official decree of the Shogunate.

6. *Fudasashi Kabu.*

By a decree issued in 1724 the number of the fudasashi or rice-brokers attached to the Shogunate godowns at Asakusa was fixed at 109 in all.

7. *Water Fowl and other Bird Dealers' Kabu.*

In 1725 it was regulated by decree that the number of dealers in water-fowls be 6, and that of those in land-birds 8 in all.

8. *Druggists' Kabu.*

In addition to the 25 wholesale druggists already recognized, the 19 druggists of Odenma-cho were permitted officially to deal directly in the drugs prepared at Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto.

9. *Wholesale Dealers in Rice from the West Kabu.*

In 1730 the number of the rice wholesale merchants was fixed at 8 in all, which number was increased to 9 in October 1736.

10. *Fuel Dealers' Kabu.*

In March 1744 the number of wholesale dealers in such fuels as bamboo, wood, and charcoal was fixed at 524 in all.

11. *Pawnbrokers' Kabu.*

In 1760 the number of the pawnbrokers was limited to 2,000 in all, but the limitation was removed several years later.

12. *Rice-brokers' Kabu.*

In 1804 a rice exchange was established at Isemchoi, when the number of rice-brokers was limited to 120, but the limitation was removed several years later.

THE TONYA AND KABU.—The above are such kabu, officially recognized or privileged, which the Shogunate either limited to a certain fixed number of persons or gave official licence to, as necessitated by the nature of the business, from economic, judicial, and police, or controlling standpoints. But besides these officially recognized privileges there were different kinds of what were called the tonya or wholesale merchants. On account of the peculiar position they held between the producers and consumers, or their combined influences, these tonya merchants enjoyed special privileges, which as tonya-kabu were marketable articles from an early time. But a factor which particularly encouraged transactions in the tonya-kabu was the formation of the Tokumi Tonya, as they were called. The Tokumi Tonya was composed of the ten different associations of wholesale merchants in Edo and Osaka, each association dealing in different kinds of merchandise. The circumstances attending the progress of these wholesale businesses are given under the chapter "The Rise of the Tonya." The privileges enjoyed by the members of each association were made the object of transactions in the market as valuable kabu, and encouraged by the success of the Tokumi Tonya combination, other tonya merchants handling different kinds of merchandise also formed similar combinations, and the different tonya-kabu were bought and sold in the market to a large extent in those days.

THE DOGYO KUMIAI AND KABU.—Yet another factor which encouraged transactions in the tonya-kabu was the Dogyo Kumiai Kai, or Trade Association Decree, issued in 1721. Prior to that decree the Shogunate did not permit the formation of a nakama-kumiai, or association of merchants, unless such was necessary for the purpose of controlling these merchants, or for some other special reason. Therefore even the merchants engaged in the same line of business had not an opportunity to meet together for their mutual interests, except at the exchange-house. But after the decree had been issued officially recognizing the formation of trade associations the merchants in Edo, encouraged by it, formed one association after another among themselves, and registered with the Government offices the members of each association; hence the kabu of these trade associations, as well as other trade kabu, were briskly dealt in in the market. In 1729, under the necessity of controlling the prices of commodities, the Shogunate issued a decree whereby fifteen different articles were selected as daily necessities, and made subject to the Shogunate's control. The privileges of those handling these daily necessities were then officially recognized by the Government. In 1809 the Tokumi Tonya applied to the Shogunate for official licence, which was subsequently granted, and in 1813 the number of kabu was decided on the basis of the then number of members of this Tokumi Tonya Association, by which the kabu of the association obtained the officially recognized privileges. Another result was that no one could engage in any of these lines of business unless he bought the kabu or privilege for that line. In other words, these lines of business were absolutely monopolized by the members of the association, and their kabu, now endorsed by the official licence, went up in price and became an indispensable factor in the money market, the prices ranging from 20 ryo to even 1,000 ryo. Anyone buying a kabu had not only to pay such a high price, but also the debt connected with the kabu-shiki, which made the actual price tremendously high. In 1841, however, Mizuno Tadakuni, Prime Minister of the Shogunate, discontinued the kabu system in its entirety, and the merchants thereby lost an important source of profit and business became almost hopelessly depressed. The object of the tonya decree issued in the era of Kayei was to save the business circles in their financial difficulties by reviving the tonya association system and also the kabu system. But remembering that the tonya and kabu system had been of the most exclusive and monopolizing character in the eras of Bunkwa and Bunsei, in its decree of Kayei the Shogunate stated that the systems should be revived in the forms they took in the eras of Kyoho and Kwansei, and not those of Bunkwa and Bunsei. In other words, in the eras of Kyoho and Kwansei, as a result of the Shogunate's recognition of the formation of the tonya-kumiai, the kabu system naturally grew up, but was not officially recognized, and in those days both the tonya and kabu-shiki systems were of a moderate character. In Kayei the Shogunate wished the system revived in the moderate form of those early years. So the kabu of the tonya association was revived and existed as a matter of fact, but its monopolizing character was not officially recognized, and no limitation was put upon the membership of the Tokumi Tonya and other associations as before. Any merchant could join this association freely. In fact, after the reform of Tempo these tonya-kabu were not of such an exclusive and monopolizing character as they had been in the Bunkwa and Bunsei eras.

The Difference between the Kabu in Edo and in Osaka.—In those days Edo was more a political centre than a commercial one. Commerce and trade were often made subject to political interests, and it was inevitable they should develop under the protection or interference of the Shogunate. The position in Osaka was just the opposite, and commerce and trade developed there as freely as possible without interference from political interests. The kabu system developed as a whole along the line of the official regulations of the Shogunate in Edo, but it grew up in one trade after another according to the necessity of circumstances in Osaka, and was recognized by the Shogunate afterwards. So much did the economic developments of Edo differ from that of Osaka. This was because many of the forefathers of the Osaka people had come or had been moved there by Toyotomi Hideyoshi from Sakai and Kyoto, and introduced into Osaka the commercial system which prevailed in these two cities. The trade association system had long existed, and no doubt the kabu system, too, must have been in operation for many years. Of the nakama, or "unions in business," whose kabu was officially recognized and dealt in in the market on those days, the oldest of all was the Osaka Pawnbrokers' Kabu (officially recognized in 1642), the Mikuni Old Clothing Dealers' Union Kabu (officially recognized in 1645), the Old Copper and Old Furniture Dealers' Union Kabu (officially recognized in 1645), etc. In the eras of Meiwa and Anyei kabu were most numerous. Among those bought and sold were the Vegetable Brokers' Union (granted in the era of Meiwa), the Salted Fish Dealers' Unions, the Dried Bonito Dealers' Union (granted in the era of Anyei), the eight different unions of merchants dealing in foreign goods (granted in September 1779), the seven different unions of the merchants handling foreign goods (recognized in September 1781), etc. The combination of the twenty-four different wholesale unions that, in co-operation with the Tokumi Tonya of Edo, monopolized the shipping between Edo and Osaka, had their kabu officially recognized in August 1784.

The following is a further list of different kabu dealt in in the market in those days at Osaka:—

1. Tea stores.
2. Public bath-houses.
3. Inns.
4. Inns for pilgrims.
5. Restaurants.
6. Low-class inns.
7. Barbers' shops.
8. Pawnbrokers.
9. Old coins and second-hand furniture stores.
10. Old-clothing stores.
11. Ikanago tonya.
12. Ikanago broker.
13. Cotton merchants.
14. Cotton tonya (wholesale).
15. Cotton brokers and shippers.
16. Guarantors of rent.
17. Sugar wholesalers.
18. Sugar brokers.
19. Tin and other metal casters.
20. Stone tonya.
21. Cut-stone dealers
22. Bird dealers.
23. Bird brokers.
24. Scavengers.
25 Shipping interests engaged in the transportation of saké and other goods to Edo.
26. Village inns.
27. Mail carriers of Kyoto.
28. Mail carriers of Edo.
29. Dealers in grindstones.
30. Fishmongers in Ikeda village.
31. Sumo (wrestlers) in the near towns.
32. Brokers and sales agents in timber, etc.
33. Charcoal dealers.
34. Dealers in charcoal for use in the smith shops.
35. Ash dealers.
36. Clothing brokers.
37. Gardeners.
38. Raw-wax tonya.
39. Raw-wax makers.
40. Raw- and refined-wax brokers.
41. White-leather dealers.
42. Forwarding agents for the transportation of province of Kawachi.

43. Dealers in oars.
44. Makers of wooden bowls, cups, etc.
45. Painters of wooden bowls, other similar utensils, and furniture.
46. Matting tonya.
47. Money house unions.
48. Timber merchants' union.
49. Tile merchants.
50. Flour millers.
51. Face-powder makers.
52. Brass-foil makers.
53. Well-diggers.
54. Shibu (the juice of unripe persimmons).
55. Basket-weavers.
56. Fu-cake and to-fu cake drying business.
57. Water-wheels repair business.
58. Wood-fuel tonya.
59. Wood-fuel brokers.
60. Selling and forwarding agents of wood fuels.
61. Rice dealers.
62. The shipping of nails to Edo.
63. The shipping combination of the 24 unions engaged in shipping to Edo.
64. Boarding houses.
65. Ship carpenters' union.
66. Rods and matting dealers.
67 Straw ashes dealers.
68. Contractors for the clearance of night soil in 314 villages.
69. Rice cleaning and sales.
70. Paper merchants.
71. Saké brewers.
72. Cotton and other seeds tonya.
73. Rape-seed oil dealers.
74. Cotton-seed oil dealers.
75. Oil dealers.
76. Pedlars in oil.
77. Oil brokers.
78. Oil of Muko.
79. Foreign druggists.
80. Foreign drug brokers and druggists.
81. Chemists.
82. Foreign dry-goods wholesalers.
83. Foreign fancy-goods stores.
84. Regular tonya of Satsuma.
85. Smaller tonya of Satsuma.
86. Dealers in imported articles.
87. Sugar and sugared articles.
88. Dealers in tortoise-shell.
89. Ivory dealers.
90. Paint and dyestuff dealers.
91. Dealers in sugar, pepper, etc.
92. Rice-exchange brokers.
93. Bankers.
94. Temma market.
95. Greengrocers (wholesale) and brokers.
96. Fish market.
97. Salted fish market.
98. Sancho and gokumi tonya.
99. Small fish market.
100. Raw-fish market and raw-fish tonya.

THE TWO CLASSES OF KABU.—Of the 100 different kabu, some represented other lines of business or occupation than commerce and trade, and this fact indicates that the kabu system constituted the essential factor of the social organization in those days. And these kabu can be divided into two classes, one the Gomen-kabu and the other the Negai-kabu. Those belonging to the category of the Gomen-kabu, or kabu granted by the Government, were established either as a result of or by the Government's decrees, and among them were the foreign fancy-goods dealers, foreign drug stores, foreign drug brokers, exchange-houses, rice dealers, timber merchants, pawnbrokers, old copper and old tools and furniture, second-hand clothing dealers, dry goods tonya, oil merchants, saké brewers, sugar manufacturers, etc. Those engaged in any of the above-mentioned lines of business were limited in number and bound by contract among themselves. For instance, among the oil merchants, those engaged in shipping oils to Kyoto were limited to two in number, and those shipping to Edo to four ; the De Tonya to eight, and the oil brokers to 190, etc., and their number could not be increased. According to the rules the Kyoto shippers were permitted to make shipment of oils to Kyoto alone, and the Edo shippers to Edo alone. The business of the De Tonya was to collect by purchase what was produced in the two provinces of Settsu and Kawachi, while the business of the brokers was to purchase the goods from the De Tonya, but according to usage they had to make their purchases through the Kyo-guchi Tonya (shippers of oil to Kyoto). Such was the contract or agreement among the oil merchants, who were bound by the same, and no one was permitted to infringe on another's rights.

THE NEGAI-KABU.—The Negai-kabu were those that were recognized by the Government upon application from interested parties. In the first instance the organization was a private one. Upon application their organization was officially recognized by the Government, and accordingly they fixed upon their kabu, paid a tax to the Government, reported the names of the members of the association, and registered with the Government offices, after which their kabu could be bought and sold on the market and the association monopolized the line in which it was engaged. As stated before, the number of such favoured kabu considerably increased during the era of Meiwa, when the policies of the Shogunate were framed and carried out according to the favours of the Shogun and his ministers. After that the kinds of kabu and the number of the union merchants in Osaka changed according to the circumstances in the different ages, and cannot be exactly ascertained ; but according to an investigation made in about the era of Ansei there were over 99 different kinds. The largest, from the number of merchants engaged, were the old copper and old tools and furniture stores, including 4,641 merchants ; the second-hand clothing dealers, 3,425 ; the twenty-four-union tonya, 3,172 merchants ; and the pawnbrokers, 1,328 ; while the smallest of all was the straw ash dealer, 1 ; the Horiye greengrocers, 2 ; the bird-sellers, 3 ; the Arawa-fu brokers, 3 ; and the white-leather dealers, 3, etc. Besides, there were many other commercial associations, which, too, varied according to the circumstances of the times, and the rights of the members of each of these associations, too, were recognized in fact by the people as a sort of kabu in those days.

THE RULES OF THE KABU-NAKAMA.—The growth of the kabu-nakama in Osaka, or those trade associations whose kabu were officially recognized by the Shogunate, was such as outlined above. We have now to look into the organization of these associations or the rules by which they were formed and operated. Each association had its officer, who held office for a month or a year, and the mutual agreement and rules were signed by all the members of the association. In their agreement at the outset it is stated that the laws and regulations of the Shogunate should always be strictly observed. Then references are made as to how the association was organized, its aim and methods of business, the method of election of the executive, officers of the association, namely, directors of monthly or yearly tenure, treasurer and others, and the scope of their authority ; how the taxes and expenses of the association were to be borne by the members ; meetings ; the admission fee of members newly admitted, or those who inherited the kabu of deceased or retired members ; social expenses ; the rules for employing managers and other employees, punishments for breaking the rules, etc. Such an agreement was always signed by all the members of the association, and its terms may be outlined as follows :—

1. Regarding the methods of business, references are made principally to the suppliers, wholesale dealers, and members of the association, and also to the rates of discounts, commissions, etc.

2. Of the executive officers, one, whose tenure of office was one year, represented his association, and was the most responsible of all the executives. The way in which he was nominated differed according to circumstances. In case of a large association, he was elected, but where the association was small he was named from among its members in turn, and in some cases the position was held by the head of a noted firm, connected with the association hereditarily. He received an allowance.

3. The number of members of a kabu association was limited without regard to whether the association was officially recognized by the Government or not, and no one could be admitted to membership unless there was a vacancy. Naturally there was a price for the transfer of a kabu, which was as high as 1,000 ryo in some cases. In the case of an association whose kabu was definitely fixed in number, the existing members bore the entire tax paid by the association to the Government without regard to whether there was any vacancy or not among the kabu of the association. But where the number of members was limited, but not definitely fixed, no member paid more than the share stated for one member in agreement of the association. When a kabu was transferred from one man to another the buyer paid the price to the seller, but in most cases it was customary that the buyer, in addition to the price of the kabu, paid the debts of the seller, and besides paid an admission fee, congratulatory money, etc., to the members of the association. The same was the case with one who acquired a kabu by inheritance or established a branch firm with the permission of his master, who was a member of the association. The amount of investment by each member differed according to the circumstances or lines of trade. No woman was admitted into the membership of any kabu association, or to engage in any line of trade as listed above, and this was distinctly laid down in the agree-

ment of each association. In case a woman became the head of a member-firm of an association she had to be represented by a man in the association. Such representative was to be selected at a conference of her relatives from among her close relatives, friends, managers, or others, according to the circumstances, and his name to be submitted to the magistrate's office for official approval through the toshiyori and the so-toshiyori of the streets concerned. In the association the representative was accorded the same treatment as his master, given the same privileges, rights, honours, etc., but had no vote in the election of the executive officers.

4. No one, of course, could engage in any line of trade controlled by an association, unless he was a member of that association. Any offender was reported by the association to the magistrate, who would suspend the man's trade association in those days. In addition to the officially recognized trade associations, there were a number of private trade associations, and the latter, like the former, had their own agreement, binding the doings of their members, and established their own kabu, which had in reality the same value and effectiveness in the market as those of the officially recognized trade associations.

THE ECONOMIC FEUDAL SYSTEM.—For hundreds of years the common class of people had been oppressed by the samurai class, but when peace was restored by the help of the samurai a better time came for the commercial class of people. Slowly but steadily they established their influence, secured their position, and finally established their kabu system officially or privately, thereby united themselves for their common interests. The kabu-nakama and the nakama-kumiai thus came into existence, and by dint of the influence of the system, as well as of the power of the capital they controlled, the merchants connected with the trade associations formed under the system monopolized certain commercial and trade interests, and other merchants could not compete with them, even though they had capital and ambition. A commoner possessing trade kabu in those days might be compared with a feudal lord. His territory was the exclusive monopolizing trade interest he had acquired, while the daimyo levied taxes and contributions from the people in the domain he had acquired. In other words, in addition to the military feudal system, there existed a commercial feudal system in which the members of the trade associations, or kabu-nakama, as they were called, held a position comparable to that of the feudal lords. So deeply rooted was the idea of feudalism in those days. The commercial feudal system had both strong and weak points, like the military feudal system. Under the latter force was too much resorted to, the farmers were oppressed like slaves, and the samurai class were given too many privileges and rights, all of which tended to obstruct the progress of the people. With the peace of the Tokugawa regime each of the feudal lords settled down in his own territory, which together with its inhabitants was made his property, to which his descendants could succeed generation after generation. Thus established, each lord could devote his money and energy to the developments of his subjects, by encouraging industries and commerce, introducing good customs among his people, improving water utilities, constructing bridges, roads, etc. The kabu system had strong points and weak points in almost equal proportions. Among the strong points of the system were the following :—

1. The common class of people for the first time secured a solid position for themselves against the samurai class.

2. Merchants with common trade interests united themselves and established their business credit.

3. The system relieved the producers in the different districts from anxiety about the disposal of their products, and they could always work on a definite line because they could depend on the merchants connected with trade associations for the sales of their products.

4. Commercial rights in the form of a kabu having a value, to be measured in money, the system gave considerable financial facilities to the merchants.

But the kabu system had its weak points as well.

1. As the number of kabu in an association was limited, other merchants, however desirous of joining it, were excluded.

2. The members of an association monopolized their business, and there was neither freedom nor competition in the line, with a consequent loss of activity and the progress which come from stimulus.

3. Besides, the monopoly often caused an unreasonable rise in the prices of commodities or upheld the prices unnaturally. For instance, when a group of Osaka merchants proposed to form a trade association along a line of business in which they were engaged, they applied to the Shogunate for a permit, paid their tax, and definitely pledged themselves before the officials that they would not raise the prices unreasonably. But when the permit was granted and was once in their pockets, by an agreement among themselves they raised the prices of their merchandise sufficiently to cover the tax they paid the Shogunate for their kabu. If any member of the association did not raise his prices he was threatened with exclusion unless he did so. At last the Shogunate in a public notification warned the members of the different associations in Osaka against such unlawful practices, but, as this had no effect, in December 1787 the Government prohibited the following kabu or trade associations in Osaka :—

Rice refining and selling, wood-fuel wholesale, wood-fuel brokery, the forwarding and sales agents of wood-fuel producers, the removing of night soil in eighty villages in the provinces of Settsu and Kawachi, brokery on fertilizers for use in the rice-fields, charcoal wholesale, brokery and sale of charcoal for use in blacksmith shops, etc.

KABU THE ULTIMATE OBJECT OF MERCHANTS.—Kabu and nakama were so advantageous to those privileged to stand within the sacred ring that the ultimate ambition of a merchant, struggling hard in business, in those days was to secure a kabu privilege and become a tonya, or wholesale dealer. This was the pinnacle of a commercial man's ambition, just as it was the highest ambition of a samurai to win a lordship by his valour. The feudal system, therefore, had both strong and weak points, but it was a necessary stage in our political life. It may not be even too much to say that but for the feudal system in the past we could not have even imagined the present progressive system. The same can be said of our commercial or economic feudal system in which the common class of the people for the first time acquired their own position against the privileged military class. This tendency developed into the present social system, in which the people all enjoy equal rights.

ORGANIZATION, THE PHENOMENON OF THE TIME—When the old monarchical system had broken down and the feudal system was not established, the powerful land-owners in different districts struggled against each other, each attempting to secure controlling power over the neighbouring territory and people. But most of these men were nothing but bandit chiefs. Naturally the strongest and most able rose to the top and swallowed their rivals, and in each province there were two or three such men. It was under these men alone that civil administration, etc., began to grow, for in order to guard against invasion from neighbouring clans they began to take pains in the administration of their respective territories. Such were the circumstances attending the growth of the feudal system; thus established were organization and concentration. Under this system the followings of many small bandits were amalgamated and concentrated, or organized, by the big men, and the influences of the different lords were well arranged.

When the military feudal system was finally established no one, of course, attempted to explain that its essence was organization and concentration, but the smart folks in the Kwansai districts soon discovered the secret, and applied the same principles in their business organizations. Concentration of capital was, indeed, the order of the day after the early part of the Tokugawa period. In 1694 the ten wholesale associations representing ten different lines of business in co-operation formed a shipping league, Tokumi Tonya, to control the service between Osaka and Edo. This league, with funds supplied by the trade associations, constructed new ships and repaired old ones for these associations, and distributed cargoes equally among the ships that loss might be comparatively small when any shipwreck took place. All questions of loss, damage, etc., to the ships connected with the League were handled by the executive officers of the associations concerned. In 1807 the members of the Hishigaki shipping association established a chamber of commerce, the Mitsuhashi Kwaisho, as it was called, where they formed a fund which was employed for various shipping purposes or objects connected with shipping interests, such as the repair of ships owned by the members, supplying members with capital for this business, accumulating funds for the relief of seamen, lending money to the members of the association who needed it to pay their taxes to the Government, etc. All these facts are fully covered in the chapter on "The Rise of the Tonya." In June 1717 merchants connected with the rape-seed and cotton-seed wholesale associations in Osaka, with the Government's permission, established six branch houses in Hyogo for dealing in cotton seed, paying the Government a tax of ten silver coins a year. On the purchases of cotton seeds made at these six branch houses a commission of 2 momme of silver was collected on every 100 momme worth of purchase, and one-half of the commission was paid to the shipping houses in the port that acted between the sellers and the purchasers. The management of these branch houses was in charge of the senior executive officers of the association, one of whom went down to Hyogo in turn each month for the purpose while two of the members of the association always stayed in turn in Hyogo to handle the business of the branches. In case any executive officer or member of the association refused to stay in Hyogo to look after the business of the branch houses in his turn, he was fined 150 momme of silver, and, if a senior executive officer failed to be in Hyogo in his turn, the fine was 1 bu gold. To cover the expenses of the officers and members in charge of the business of the branch houses in Hyogo, each member of the association paid 1 bu gold a year. The salary of the senior executive officer was 200 momme of silver, which was distributed among those who were stationed in Hyogo, whereas the profit gained at the branch houses was distributed among the members of the association in the presence of the senior and other executive officers. Besides these trade associations the concentration of capital was also carried out in such individual concerns as the Mitsui-gumi, the Uyeda-gumi, and other, who made a family combine and enlarged their business accordingly. Of these individual concerns the Mitsui-gumi was organized as follows:—

> When he became rich, Hachiroyemon established branch houses not only in the three principal cities, Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka, but in almost all the big provincial capitals, where they handled other merchandise as well as dry goods. In the Mitsui there were six brothers or six families, who owned together the head office and branch houses, none of which belonged to any of the six individuals. The profit or loss of each of these stores was divided among or borne by the six families together, and no one of the six took more profit or bore more loss than the others, all six assuming equal responsibility for loss and taking an equal share of profit. The employees of the Mitsui were the employees of the whole family, and were not distinctly assigned to

any individual family or the six. In Edo there were six managers, who were in charge of the main store at Surugacho and at other places. These six men did not attend to the daily business at the stores, but held a conference six times a month, at which the policies, method of business, etc., were discussed. The six families lived in Kyoto, but the heads of these families, while young, went through the mill at the stores, together with their employees. Each family received a certain fixed annual income for living, etc., and not even the heads of the families were allowed to spend more than what they were given. Anyone failing to observe the family rules was forced to retire at once. Of the six families, Hachiroyemon is the head, and if he dies or retires, his heir will succeed to his name at once, and his family is always looked up to as the head family of the Mitsui, and assisted by the five branch families, just as the eldest of the brothers is assisted by the others. On account of such rules governing the Mitsui organization these six Mitsui families will prosper for ever and none of them will decline.

The concentration of capital means business on a larger scale than before, and the business organizations revealed in the above quoted examples resembled that of to-day. Our present company law was introduced in the Meiji era from Europe, but it may be stated that during the days of the Tokugawa period the germ of modern business organization existed. Besides the Mitsui there were the Uyeda-gumi, the Ono-gumi, and others, all of which were big individual organizations like the Mitsui, and each controlled vast business interests, holding some privileges in business-like trade associations, and exercising great influence in the business world in those days.

THE END OF THE KABU SYSTEM.—Such big individual concerns as the Mitsui, Uyeda, and others resembled the trade associations or combinations in that both concentrated their capital and did their business on a large scale, and made much profit thereby. The difference was as follows: The Mitsui-gumi, the Uyeda-gumi, and such individual concerns, with a big capital at their command, made purchases of merchandise at the best possible prices, and disposed of the same at the lowest prices they possibly could offer, looking for their profit to the quick turnover or to such transactions as could only be made by big capital. Although, however, they made good profits, they never attempted to monopolize or exclude others from their line of business. The trade associations acted entirely differently. From the beginning the object was, to put it precisely, to enable the members to make unreasonable profits by monopolizing the market for their lines of business under the protection of the Government in the form of the special privileges granted them. It was by the special privileges they enjoyed that the members of a trade association excluded competition from their line of business, and made profits, which were often unwarranted and unobtainable in any other way. The position of the merchants connected with the trade associations in those days could be compared to that of the hatamoto samurai, who as the direct retainers of the Tokugawa family enjoyed many special privileges against the samurai of the other feudal lords and the common class of people. Had both been able to hold on to their respective specially privileged positions, the Tokugawa Shogunate and the kabu or commercial feudal system would have lasted for ever. But the hatamoto samurai were spoiled by their special position, and so were the privileged merchants. Their methods of business and their social life were denounced by the officials of the Shogunate, and strongly criticized by the other merchants who were not connected with any trade association, and always at a disadvantage against trade association merchants. The condemnation of, and opposition to, the association merchants began some time in the era of Meireki (1655–7), and grew ever stronger, and at last, in 1841 (13th year of Tempo), Lord Mizuno Tadakuni, then Premier of the Shogunate, suddenly issued a decree prohibiting transactions in kabu and tonya operated on the kabu system, and ended the entire system itself throughout the country. Thus those merchants who had enjoyed the Shogunate's special favours and protection for many years previously were deprived of their privileges, and the commercial feudal system, as it existed with the kabu merchants, was completely destroyed. All the circumstances as to how the commercial feudal system came into existence, prospered and then fell, are given in the chapter on " The Rise of the Tonya." In 1851 (4th year of Kayei) the " tonya " system was revived, and, as a matter of fact, their " kabu " too revived, and was bought and sold as before, but as the kabu was not recognized by the Government officially, the tonya merchants had no rights on which to base a monopoly. But if the commercial feudal system, which was founded on the privileges of the kabu, had to fall for the sake of the happiness and interests of the majority of the people, the Tokugawa Shogunate and its lords, who were also rooted in privilege, had to fall for the same reason. It may be said, therefore, that Lord Mizuno's reform was a forerunner of the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which came about twenty-five years afterwards.

CHAPTER LVIII

THE ZA SYSTEM IN THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD

FROM THE ZA TO THE KABU.—We have already seen that the za system, as officially recognized in the Tokugawa period, was different in its organization, object, etc., from the system of the same name in the Middle Ages, and that the kumiai and the kabu system in the Tokugawa period in their organization, etc., were rather the same as the mediæval za system. The term kabu was applied to exclusive trade rights, which, with the Government's recognition, became hereditary to a certain individual or a group of people, and no other persons were permitted to compete with, or interfere with, these rights. It may be said that the present term kabu originated in the hereditary kabu in the Tokugawa period, though without the same exclusive and monopolizing meaning. Of the za system, as operated in the Tokugawa period, there were four different categories :—

1. Merchants who, while holding the monopoly privileges granted by the Shogunate and paying a tax for them, were under its direct control. They were the Masu-za (measure), the Hakari-za (scale), the Shu-za (cinnabar), the Ninjin-za (ginseng), the Haku-za (gold-foil), the Ryuno-za (refined Borneo camphor), and the To-wa Myoban Kaisho (Foreign and Domestic Alum Chamber of Commerce).
2. The mints where the Shogunate coined money : the Kin-za (gold mint), the Gin-za (silver mint), the Zeni-za (copper mint), etc.
3. The monopoly bureau, under the direct management of the Shogunate : the Do-za (copper), the Tetsu-za (iron), the Shinchu-za (brass), etc.
4. Those under the protection or guidance of the Shogunate : the Meshii-za (blind people), the Hiyatoi-za (day labourers), etc.

These za were mostly controlled by either individuals, or a group of individuals, related to the Tokugawa Shogunate, to whom the Shogunate granted the right of control, and these individuals, or groups of individuals, paid a tax or contribution either in a lump sum or every year.

Of the za of the first category the Masu-za and the Hakari-za were established with a view of unifying the measures, scales, and other means of measurements and weights under one control throughout the country. The Haku-za was formed by the Shogunate to control the foil made from gold and other precious metals, so that the people might not employ it luxuriously in decorating their articles of daily use. But the object of the Shogunate in permitting the establishment of the za for cinnabar, refined Borneo camphor, ginseng, alum, etc., was different. Like raw silk, sesame, drugs, etc., which were also handled by the merchants under a sort of monopoly, the above-mentioned goods all had connection with foreign trade in those days, or were partly imported and partly produced in Japan, and the domestic production much increased towards the middle part of the Tokugawa period. The Shogunate's object was, it may be stated, to protect the domestic production by giving a monopoly to the merchants dealing in the articles, and placing the import under the sole control of the same men, so that the prices of the imported goods could be adjusted in accordance with those of the domestic products. As a matter of fact, the prices of these special forms of merchandise were officially decided on. That the aim of the Shogunate in permitting the za system was to protect the domestic industries, and not merely to increase its own revenue, is confirmed by the fact that when ginseng was extensively cultivated throughout the country, the Ninjin-za was abolished; that with the discontinuation of the manufacture of Borneo camphor in Japan, the Ryuno-za was discontinued; and that imported goods, which had not to compete against home products, were not handled by a za. In the light of this explanation, the taxes that the different za paid to the Shogunate may be called a sort of import duty in an indirect sense. How these different za were organized we do not know exactly, but it appears that the Shogunate's permit of monopoly was given to an individual, who had under him one or more officers, taking charge of the business of the za, which was run on a collegial system.

THE KIN-ZA AND GIN-ZA.—The za under the second category were under the direct management of the Shogunate, and established for the purpose of unifying under one control all the different kinds of money to be made for circulation in the country. Both the Kin-za and Gin-za had senior officers, accountants, ordinary officers, and others, who were in charge of the management of each of these za. In addition to these officers, the Kin-za had an "Inspector of Gold Coins," who was, in fact, the Governor of the Gold Mint, and whose position was held successively by the descendants of Goto, who was the first holder of the position. The senior officers of the silver mint were ten in all, and when the mint was first established, Yuasa Sakubei was named the "Inspector" or Governor, and Daikoku Joze was the engineer in charge of the coinage work at the silver mint. Each mint, however, was managed on a collegial system, and the officers of each mint were paid by commission, varying according to the amount of coins made at their mint. Governor Goto of the gold mint received a special allowance, in addition to his regular commission. The organization of the Zeni-za, or mint for the making of copper or bronze money, was somewhat different from those of the Kin-za and Gin-za. The Zeni-za was not a permanent establishment like the Kin-za and Gin-za, but was set up now and then according to the necessity of the circumstances, and had not so many officers as the Kin-za or Gin-za. All the circumstances pertaining to the growth, organization, etc., of the Kin-za and Gin-za are given in the particular chapters dealing with the subjects.

THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY ZA.—The za given in the third category, such as the za for copper, for iron, etc., were simply monopolies run by the Tokugawa Shogunate directly. The Do-za (copper) was established with a view of balancing foreign trade at Nagasaki, while the Tetsu-za (iron) and Shinchu-za (brass) were both established in connection with coinage business. The business of these za was rather making purchases than sales, in which respect they differed from those belonging to the first category. The Do-za was under the control of the Shogunate Minister of Finance and the Governor of Nagasaki, and under them were three men from the Nagasaki Chartered Company, and three other officers and employees, who handled the business of the za, making purchases of copper for it. One accountant and some other officials were dispatched each year from the Shogunate in Edo to look after the management of the Do-za in Nagasaki, where these officers stayed one year and were then replaced and returned to Edo. The Do-za was, therefore, entirely under the direct control of the Shogunate. The organization of the Tetsu-za and Shinchu-za was a little different, and they were attached to the Gin-za. The office of the Tetsu-za was in Osaka, while the business of the Shinchu-za was handled at the offices of the silver mint in Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto.

THE MESHII-ZA AND HIYATOI-ZA.—Different from those za aforestated were the Meshii-za and the Hiyatoi-za, which belong to the fourth category. The Meshii-za was established for the purpose of protecting blind men and women, while the Hiyatoi-za was brought into existence with a view of controlling the wage-earners, who quickly increased in number in those days. Both these za were organs established by the Shogunate under administrative necessity. The business of the Meshii-za was under the management of ten selected Kengyo (senior blind shampooers), of whom one was named director and supervised the business of this za. Two men were named to take charge of the business of the Hiyatoi-za, with several subordinates under them. Dues were collected from the daily labourers, who were members, and a tax paid to the Shogunate. Besides, towards the middle of the Tokugawa period, there were some za connected with theatrical business, the most renowned of which were the Saruwaka-za and the Nakamura-za. The term za, as applied to the theatre and such show-places in our own time, must have originated then, when it meant theatrical business officially permitted by the Government. There were also some theatre promoters, who were not connected with any theatrical za, but promoted theatrical performances in cities and towns independent of the existing za, in the era of Genroku. These za all come under the same category as the Meshii-za and the Hiyatoi-za.

Other privileged Lines of Trade.—The za above mentioned represented the special privileges in trade, exclusively granted either to an individual or a group of individuals, and in them was significantly embodied the favour policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate. But even of these za one differed from another in its organization and object. In addition, there were some merchants who were granted the same kind of privileges in trade as the za, though they did not adopt the name Za for their business organizations. They were the raw-silk merchants, Chinese sesame merchants, dealers in foreign and Japanese drugs, rice cleaners, rice wholesalers, shell-ash dealers, lime merchants, cotton-seed merchants, and others. The za existed, of course, by dint of the special favours of the then existing Government, therefore the character and position of the za changed according to the opinion and interpretations of the existing Government. The za of the Tokugawa period was different from that of the Ashikaga Shogunate, and in the early and middle parts of the Tokugawa period the za were limited to the already mentioned four categories, and none existed based on the Ashikaga principle. But as the young plants grow under the snow, the idea of reviving the za system in the form, character, etc., in which it was operated in the Ashikaga period grew steadily underneath the restriction of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which limited the character and position of the za to the four kinds. The merchants formed a new system called the tonya-kumiai, or wholesale trade association, in which certain lines of trade, in the name of kabu, were made hereditary among the members of the association, and protected against encroachment. As stated before, therefore, in the Tokugawa period, the four kinds of za retained the name of za, and the tonya and kumiai reproduced the essence of the za system in the Ashikaga period; in other words, the successor to the old za system was the tonya-kumiai and kabu, but not the system called za in the Tokugawa period.

The old Za System survived in some Provinces.—The Tokugawa Shogunate then limited the za to the four kinds, but the limitation was enforced only in those territories owned by or under the direct control of the Shogunate; for though it exercised direct authority all over the country in military affairs and currency administration, ordinary civil administration was left in each territory to its local lord, except in domains directly owned or controlled by the Shogunate. In civil matters each territory was administered by its lord according to his own idea and judgment, and most of the feudal lords retained as many old systems as possible, because they generally found them more convenient. It often happened, therefore, that systems already discontinued in the territories under the Shogunate's direct control were still in force in other territories. Such was the case with the za system in its original character and form, as in the Ashikaga period, and it even happened that the system was newly adopted in some territories by their lords for the purpose of increasing the local revenue.

The following are instances :—

In Tanabe and Shingu of Kishu, za were set up in earthenware, salt, dry goods, dried sardines, lacquered articles, and tobacco.

In the province of Echizen, Lord Matsudaira established a seamen's za during the Kamakura period. Both at Tsuruga and Hikida, in the same province, there were the livery-stable za.

In the town of Odawara there was the fish za for fish dealers, with eighty members.

In the province of Etchu there existed the fu-za (wheat cake).

The above are only some of the many instances in those days, and it appears that such za in the original character and form existed mostly in districts or among clans that had direct connections with Kyoto, the seat of the Central Government during the Ashikaga regime.

The Masu-za.—Imperial control over the whole Empire was only exercised for a very short period in the Fujiwara era, for local barons soon set up their own rule, and the institutions, legislation, and political system of the Fujiwara period, good as they were, were in operation, as a matter of fact, only in limited districts, but not throughout the whole Empire as generally supposed. But as far as instruments for weights and measurements are concerned, the regulations and rules promulgated by the Imperial Government in the Fujiwara period were in full force, and observed throughout the whole Empire. Such instruments as the Masu (dry measure), Hakari (scale), and Shaku (linear measure) were made in accordance with one standard and the same rules throughout the whole country. Some instruments were perhaps a little different from others in measurement, but that was due to an error on the part of the makers in interpreting the rules or copying the standard, or for similar reasons, but not because they were made in accordance with any standard different from the one set by the Central Government. Sometimes, also, these instruments were made in different districts under the supervision of their respective local governments, but, nevertheless, they were all made in accordance with the standards set by the Kyoto Government. In those circumstances, in each clan the manufacture of these measuring instruments was granted to some tradesmen, who, with their local lord's permission, formed a za for their business, and received special protection from their respective Governments. In Eastern Japan, before Tokugawa Iyeyasu established his Shogunate in Edo, the Hojos had had the Masu-za in Odawara, while in the province of Kai the local lord granted the privilege to carpenter Kichikei. When he became Master of Edo, Tokugawa Iyeyasu established a Masu-za in Edo, and put Taruya Tozayemon in charge of it. Taruya had moved to Edo from Nara, and as there was a Masu-za already in operation there, it may be that Iyeyasu established the Masu-za in Edo at Taruya's suggestion, after the one at Nara. At the time, Fukui Sakuzayemon of Kyoto was running a Masu-za with exclusive rights, and the Shogunate divided the country into two and placed the Masu-za of thirty-three provinces in the western districts in charge of this man. At first the masu at Edo and the Kyoto masu were not identical, but feeling there should be but one standard for measurements throughout the country, the Shogunate made the Edo masu to tally with the Kyoto masu in February 1669. In 1670 the Shogunate issued an order to the lords that each of them should purchase the revised Masu measure at the rate of 50 per every 10,000 koku of territory. The Masu-za business, both in Edo and Kyoto, continued to be run by the same privileged houses till the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

THE HAKARI-ZA.—During the Ashikaga period there was a za system in Kyoto monopolizing the manufacturing and sale of scales. This system was soon introduced into the province of Kai, where there was a Hakari-za, in the era of Tenmon, which was under the control of a man called Yoshikawa. The manufacture of scale instruments developed, particularly in the province of Kai, because as it produced gold abundantly in those days, gold currency was in circulation, and more exact balances were necessary than in agricultural provinces. But when Tokugawa Iyeyasu moved the seat of his Government to Edo, a certain Morishita, who then controlled the Hakari-za in Kai, advised that the Hakari-za should be established in Edo, so that all the scaling instruments in use in the Kwanto districts should be placed under one control and unified in every respect. Iyeyasu was pleased with the idea, and gave him his official permission, and Morishita was given the exclusive rights over the trade, monopolizing to himself the business in scaling instruments in use in the eastern part of the country. Possibly he paid Iyeyasu something for the privilege.

In Kyoto the Hakari-za had been monopolized by a family called Jin since the Ashikaga period. In the Keicho era they applied to Iyeyasu for his confirmation of their trade rights, which they had held continuously for many years past. Hereupon, as in the case of the Masu-za, Iyeyasu divided the country into two territories, one covering the thirty-three provinces in the east, and the other an equal number of provinces in the west, giving the Morishita's the exclusive controlling power over the trade in the east, and the Jins similar rights in the west. The two families were strictly forbidden to infringe on one another's rights. Under the new system, the two families not only manufactured scaling instruments in accordance with their standards, but were also authorized to inspect those instruments already in use in their respective territory, and forbid the use of any that they found wrong. Consequently, the means of scaling greatly improved.

MORISHITA MONOPOLIZING THE WHOLE SCALE TRADE.—In 1630 Jin quarrelled with Morishita, and the matter was brought to Iyeyasu for judgment. After many intrigues on both sides, characteristic of those feudal days, the Jins were defeated in the suit, and consequently were deprived of their privileges entirely, while the Morishitas were given controlling power over all trades connected with scale instruments throughout the country. Thus all the scaling instruments were unified under one control, and the Morishita not merely manufactured according to the standard officially fixed, but were also empowered to inspect all the instruments then in use all over the country, and stop the use of any found wrong or defective, and supply their own make in their place, their scales bearing the maker's name as a guarantee. For this guarantee they were authorized to collect 1 bu of gold per instrument. Later, however, all the old instruments, different from Morishita's make, were ordered to be put out of use, and Morishita's alone to be used in any part of the country. Besides, whenever any instruments broke, they could not be repaired anywhere but in a Morishita shop, or by men authorized by Morishita. This monopoly must have brought the Morishitas a huge profit.

THE HAKARI-ZA PAID CONTRIBUTION TO THE CLAN GOVERNMENTS.—The Hakari-za, officially recognized and with all the authoritative power granted to it by the Central Government, had to pay contributions to each clan government for business done in its territory. An example in the Shonai clan in the era of Bunsei gives some figures, contributions, and other expenses.

MEMORANDUM.

100 ryo	Contribution paid to the Shonai clan government for the establishment of a Hakari-za office in the Shonai territory.
30 ryo	Paid in connection with inspection business among the clan.
10 ryo	Expense of the feast given for the purpose of introducing the local inspectors to the officials of the clan.
140 ryo	Total.

The Haku-za.—In April 1680 the Tokugawa Shogunate established for the first time the Haku-za for the purpose of controlling trades connected with gold- and silver-beating. All the recognized silver- or gold-beaters had to put up signboards bearing the name of the Haku-za. Those without such a signboard, recognized by the Haku-za, were forbidden to continue their trade. To carry on trade in gold- or silver-foil, gold- or silver-beating, gold- or silver-beating on nashiji (aventurine), lacquer-work, and gold or silver inlay, it was necessary to get a permit from the Haku-za by paying a certain fixed rate of tax. In establishing the Haku-za the Shogunate had a two-fold object: one, to restrict the luxury of the people by controlling the use of gold and silver foil, and the other to levy taxes on trade connected with gold- and silver-foil, which were articles of luxury. A branch office of the Haku-za was set up at Osaka and, after investigation, reported to the Shogunate the amount of gold- and silver-foil and metal used for silver-beaten works, etc., throughout the city of Osaka.

The Haku-za abolished but the System remained in Operation.—The Haku-za was abolished in the Genroku period, but it cannot be said that the system itself vanished. It remained in operation in some form or other, for trades connected with gold- and silver-beating were not done along entirely free lines, but were still under some restrictions, as revealed in the public notification issued in 1775:—

> Despite the regulation that silver-foil is to be made and put into the market by the artisans concerned in Kyoto, to whom the certificate of trade and material for the purpose are supplied at the silver mint, it is learned that in some other places silver-foil is made out of an inferior quality of material and sold in the market. Such a practice is strictly prohibited, and no one other than the recognized artisans in Kyoto should make silver-foil. Any offender against this rule shall be punished.

As the above notification indicates, though the Haku-za, as it prevailed in the era of Genroku, was discontinued, the manufacture of silver-foil was still limited to the officially certified artisans in Kyoto, as before. Similar limitations must have affected the manufacture of gold-foil as well, though we have no record to prove it.

At the same time it was officially regulated that selling silver fittings or broken silver-work to anyone other than the silver mint, or its agents, would constitute an offence against the state law. Goto Sanzayemon was appointed by the Shogunate to take sole charge of gold-foil and the necessary gold material, and at the same time the following notification was made in 1821 :—

> Goto Sanzayemon has been given the sole control over trading in gold-foil and the necessary gold material. In the future, therefore, waste gold and other gold material for the making of gold-foil should be all sold to the gold mint or its agents, and the gold artisans and gold-beaters should buy their necessary gold material at the gold mint, but nowhere else. It is strictly prohibited to trade with any persons other than those officially recognized, as stated above. After this public notification, if anyone is found trading in gold materials with other than Kin-za, or making gold-foil privately, he will be submitted to trial at the court of justice and punished, if found guilty.

THE SHU-ZA.—Cinnabar was an important material in industry, but at first it was not produced in Japan, but all imported from China. In the latter years of the Ashikaga period, the manufacture was started for the first time by the Japanese in the port of Sakai, through which Chinese cinnabar came; but even then most of the material used in Japan was imported from China. According to records a man called Odagiri Sukeshiro at Sakai had been engaged in the importation of Chinese cinnabar into Japan for many years, and it was he, who, for the first time, started the manufacture in the latter part of the Ashikaga period. It is said that he went to China, where he personally studied the way of making cinnabar for some years, and returned to Sakai to start the manufacture of the material himself. In 1609 Odagiri was given by Tokugawa Iyeyasu the right of establishing the Shu-za at Sakai. It is said that Odagiri was thus favoured not merely because he had been engaged in trade in cinnabar, but because he travelled about the country and reported to Iyeyasu all the information he picked up on the conditions in the different clans, just as Goto Shozaburo was given by Iyeyasu the controlling rights over the Kin-za for the same services. The Shu-za paid a tax of 1,700 silver pieces a year for the exclusive trade rights. These silver pieces were all large ones, each weighing between 40 and 45 momme, and 1,700 of them were equal to 170 gold pieces. Towards the middle of the Tokugawa period, however, they applied to the Shogunate for a reduction of the annual tax to 800 pieces on the ground that trade in cinnabar had fallen off, and their petition was granted.

THE CINNABAR BROKERS PRIVILEGED MERCHANTS.—The Shu-za, which at first controlled cinnabar material alone, later monopolized the manufacturing of, and trading in, cinnabar ink as well. Seeing that this manufacture was a lucrative business, other merchants secretly engaged in it, and the Shogunate issued decrees several times prohibiting the private manufacture of cinnabar powder. But seeing that competition among merchants could not be stopped after all, the Government established in August 1696 licensed cinnabar brokers, in addition to the Shu-za, in the five cities, Edo, Kyoto, Osaka, Nara, and Sakai, their business being to get cinnabar products from the Shu-za at wholesale prices and sell it to retail merchants.

THE NINJIN-ZA.—Ninjin was believed at first to be a special product that could be raised in Korea alone, but could not be produced in any other country. In the latter part of the Ashikaga period, with the restoration of intercourse between Japan and Korea, the importation of Korean ninjin began, and increased year after year until it became one of the principal imports into Japan in those days. People had a superstitious reverence for the medical virtues of ninjin, and the price was very high. Not only was the original price high in Korea, but it became several times higher when imported into Japan, because in 1685 the Shogunate established the Ninjin-za, and permitted the merchants associated with the Ninjin-za to monopolize the trade and raise the price of the article to an almost unreasonable figure. Ninjin was imported into Japan in three ways. Lord So of Tsushima imported it direct from Korea; the Chinese merchants brought it to Japan from Korea and South China; and the merchants at Nagasaki also imported. The ninjin imported by So and the Chinese was put on the market through the Ninjin-za, but there is no denying that a large quantity of ninjin was imported privately or smuggled. How lucrative the trade in ninjin was can be inferred from the mere fact that the finances of the So of Tsushima were entirely maintained with the profits of their trade in ninjin. In fact, merchants profiteered so much, and the Ninjin-za squeezed their monopoly so tight, that ninjin became so dear that the poor could not afford to buy it. In one of Chikamatsu's plays we read of a poor girl whose parents fell sick and wanted ninjin, but were so poor that they could not buy it. The girl, therefore, " sold " herself to a licensed house to get the money to buy the drug. There was a popular proverb among the poor people which ran: " If you take ninjin you will have to hang yourself." That is to say, that if a poor man wants ninjin, he will have to burden himself with debt and kill himself when he is unable to pay it back.

THE SYSTEM OF THE NINJIN-ZA CHANGED AS A RESULT OF HOME PRODUCTION.—From the eras of Teikyo and Genroku, the Shogunate adopted many measures for the encouragement of home industries, and some of these measures succeeded to a certain degree, among which was the cultivation of ninjin. Ninjin seeds, imported from Korea, were sowed in different districts with success, especially at Nikko, where the experiment was made under the direct management of the Shogunate. This Nikko ninjin was sold in the market through the druggists in Edo, and at first two merchants were named to handle it. These were Iseya Seiyemon and Osaka-ya Tashiro, as announced in the public notification issued on October 18, 1718, but although they were appointed to handle the home production of ninjin, they were not given the exclusive rights over the trade as in the za system. There was no za established for Japanese ninjin at that time. In 1735 Nagasaki-ya Genyemon, in Edo, was permitted to sell Chinese ginseng for the first time; and the *Buko Annals* says :—

> A Ninjin-za was established for the first time and had exclusive trade rights over the Chinese ginseng, and at the same time handled the Japanese ninjin independently of the Ninjin-za established in the era of Kyoho, controlling the trade in Korean ninjin.

By this time ninjin was produced extensively in the north-eastern districts of Japan, and merchants in Edo competed so keenly over the merchandise that it became impossible for the Shogunate to continue to permit a few privileged merchants to handle the trade exclusively. Therefore, in 1739, the Government changed the system of the za controlling the Korean and Japanese ninjin, and their function was limited to inspecting the quality of the ginseng on behalf of the Shogunate, and controlling the distribution of the merchandise. Sales of ninjin were made by the sales agents of the Ninjin-za, and these sales agents, limited in number, monopolized the trade among themselves as the Ninjin-za did before, a large portion of the profits going to them.

WHOLESALE DEALERS IN DRUGS PARTICIPATED IN THE MONOPOLY RIGHTS OF THE NINJIN TRADE.—The Tokugawa Shogunate in those years was as eager for money as a thirsty man for water. Knowing their financial troubles, the wholesale drug merchants approached the Shogunate for permission to participate in the exclusive sales rights of the ninjin in return for a certain amount of money, their contention being that the ninjin was a kind of medicine. Their application was accepted, and in October 1767 the Shogunate granted the wholesale drug merchants the sales rights of the ninjin, as well as the already named sales agents.

In 1767 the Shogunate granted two medical men, Tani Jihei and Imaizumi Soyemon of Edo, the exclusive sales rights of the Korean ninjin in the east, while in the same year Ogiya Saburoyemon, Osaka, and four Edo merchants were named the sales agents in the thirty-three provinces in the west. For trade in the latter provinces, the sales promotion centres were established in Kyoto and Osaka, and these two places distributed the ninjin forwarded by the Ninjin-za and collected for it. At the same time they were authorized to keep money that they collected from the ninjin retailers and lend it at interest, until the time when the cash had to be forwarded to the Ninjin-za. In other words, these sales-promotion places did banking business.

THE NINJIN MERCHANTS PRESSED THEIR CUSTOMERS TO PURCHASE. The principal personage connected with this ninjin sales-promotion campaign was Ogiya Saburoyemon of Osaka. The entire scheme was his, and his associates in Edo he took in more because of their intimacy with the leading officials of the Shogunate than for their business knowledge or experience. Their intimacy with the officials had been necessary to get the Shogunate's imprimatur on his plan. The ninjin monopolists naturally tried every possible method to make their sales turnover as big as possible, and at last adopted a sales method which was practically forcing their customers to make purchases of ninjin, and they were criticized for it. Every year they sent out inquiries to their customers, such as druggists, brokers, medical men, and others, requesting them to send advance orders for ninjin; and if any sent in an order smaller than they expected from him they would immediately threaten him, saying that he was not responding to the benevolent spirit of the late Shogun Yoshimune, who is commonly believed to have first encouraged the cultivation of the Korean ninjin plant in Japan. Such a threat was, of course, highly effective in its object in those days when the Shogun was the despotic ruler of the country. These circumstances made it necessary for the Shogunate to issue the following public notification in 1771 :—

> The salesmen of Heijuro's store, also the two medical men, Tani Jihei and Imaizumi Soyemon, who are handling the Korean ninjin of the Ninjin-za, while travelling on business in the country districts, acted against the trade regulations, and have been punished for what they did. In the future, therefore, while travelling on business in the country districts, the ninjin salesmen should always follow trade customs and usages and sell their ninjin just to those who want to buy it, and not attempt to press people to purchase of their merchandise. This should be strictly borne in mind by the salesmen, and if any of them offend trade regulations or attempt to force the sale of his wares, he should be detained where he is and reported to the Government offices immediately. The above should be made known to those concerned.

After such changes in the system of the Ninjin-za, the Tokugawa Shogunate began to realize the evils arising out of the monopoly of the ninjin trade, and in November 1787 abolished the Ninjin-za, establishing instead the ninjin laboratory at Edo. Thereafter, the Shogunate itself examined and distributed the ninjin, and entrusted the druggists with the sales end of the business entirely. At the same time the prices of the ninjin were considerably lowered, so that even the poor could buy it.

In view of the high price that ninjin had commanded, and the large profit in this line of trade, the people had eagerly invested in the business, and the output of ninjin so much increased that the business reached a stage where it did not need any more encouragement and protection from the Government. In 1790, therefore, the Government publicly announced that in the cultivation of the ninjin plant and sales business of the ninjin medicine, etc., the Shogunate would give no more encouragement or protection, but leave it entirely to private enterprise. At the same time, the ninjin laboratory was shut. But this policy did not please the medical men attached to the Government, nor the officials formerly employed in the late ninjin business, who, therefore, attempted to secure some privilege for themselves in the trade, and after persistent efforts they got what they wanted. In March 1803 the Shogunate publicly announced that the ninjin produced in the province of Shimotsuke would be bought by the Shogunate for its own use for the time being, and at the same time granted special privileges to those merchants handling the said ninjin for the Shogunate, the consequence being a rise in the price of the drug. This, too, was discontinued after Lord Mizuno Tadakuni's famous Reform in 1843. Since then the Government has ceased to interfere in the ninjin business in any way, and left it to private enterprise entirely.

THE ORIGIN OF THE DO-ZA.—Copper, which is one of Japan's principal exports at present, was not only a leading export, but constituted a greater portion of the total exports of Japan in the Tokugawa period. As a matter of fact, Japan's foreign trade then was balanced by the export of copper, and it can be safely stated that had Japan not had copper to export, and offset thereby the excess of imports, her financial condition would have been seriously affected. When Japan opened trade with China and European countries, her imports exceeded her exports, and the excess of imports was paid for in gold at first, and later in silver. But with the gradual increase in the excess of imports, the amount of gold and silver flowing out naturally increased in proportion, and an idea struck the statesmen of that day that the excess of imports could be offset by the export of copper. At the same time China, which produced little copper, wanted to buy copper from Japan to make copper coins and other copper articles. In these circumstances, copper and sea products constituted two leading exports of Japan during the Tokugawa period. The foreign trade at Nagasaki was free at first, but after the Tokugawa Shogunate, hating to see gold and silver flow out of the country as a result of foreign trade, attempted to offset the excess of imports with copper, foreign trade at Nagasaki was placed under Government control, and it became the business of the Shogunate to collect copper at Nagasaki. In 1701, for the first time, the Shogunate established the Nagasaki copper-handling office at Osaka, which was the prototype of the Do-za, or copper mint. It was attached to the Gin-za in Osaka. After that, all copper products from the copper-mines in the different parts of Japan were brought to Osaka, whence the necessary quantity was forwarded to Nagasaki by sea. Thus the Do-za was brought into existence, though the name was not yet applied to it. On the one hand was the Government, very eager to see the excess imports offset with copper as much as possible, and, on the other, were some smart merchants, who attempted to secure profitable exclusive rights for the handling of the copper in return for a monetary contribution to the Shogunate. These two causes combined in the establishment of the Do-za in Osaka, in June 1766, when the following decree was issued :—

> The production of copper at the different mines having been rather slow of late years, the Nagasaki copper-handling place in Osaka has been given the sole controlling power over all copper trades. At the same time the name of the place is changed to Do-za. In the future, therefore, all copper produced in the different parts of the country should be brought to Osaka, where it will be handled by the Do-za, dealing with the wholesalers, refiners, brokers, etc., of copper.

THE POWER OF THE DO-ZA.—Thus the name of the Nagasaki copper-handling place was changed to the Do-za, but the change was not in name alone ; the change in the system was far greater. In those days foreign trade at Nagasaki was under the control of the Nagasaki chartered company, composed of leading citizens and influential merchants, who had almost exclusive power of control over foreign trade ; and copper playing such an important rôle in the balance of trade, the Nagasaki company established a branch in Osaka for the purpose of handling the collection and distribution of copper, particularly copper to be forwarded from there to Nagasaki for the purpose already stated. Though the Nagasaki company was such a powerful organization at Nagasaki, the branch at Osaka was not so powerful, nor was the position of the Osaka organization officially recognized. But by the Government's decree of 1766 the organization was officially organized, and it was given greatly enlarged authority, or full controlling power over all the copper-mines in the different parts of the country. The organization was formerly attached to the Gin-za, but was now made an independent institute, standing in a position equal to that of the Gin-za, placed under the control of the Governor of Nagasaki, and the Shogunate's chief accountant or Minister of Finance. The functions of the Do-za, as officially regulated, were :—

1. All the copper, produced at different mines and unrefined, is controlled by the Do-za exclusively, and the handling of any of the same by other agents, as before, must be entirely discontinued.

2. Copper wholesalers, refiners, and brokers in Osaka, are all under the control of the Do-za.

3. The Do-za buys copper from the wholesalers and brokers at the price of 200 ryo of silver for 100 kin of copper, giving them besides a 2 bu commission per 100 kin. Then the material thus bought from the merchants, the Do-za delivers to the refiners, who, too, receive a certain rate of commission.

4. In case copper is to be sold to the Do-za in the shape of pale copper, it was at 150 momme per 100 kin.

With the Do-za thus exclusively controlling all the copper-mines in the different districts of the country, it can be easily imagined that the merchants connected with the institute made a big profit. But the men connected with the Nagasaki company, who established the organization in Osaka, did not monopolize the profit of the business in Osaka among themselves, and co-operated with some Osaka merchants, who invested in and took charge of the business of the Osaka organization. The Do-za not only controlled all the copper-mines in the different districts of the country, but bought copper at very low prices, almost at cost, from the mines under the direct management of the Shogunate. Therefore, the people in the mining districts concerned complained of the prices at which they had to sell their copper to the Do-za, and in some places there were uprisings against the Do-za. No doubt the merchants connected with the Do-za made tremendous profit in their trade, and the others were jealous of them.

THE TETSU-ZA.—The Tetsu-za was established for the first time in Fushimi and Osaka in August 1780, and given the sole right to purchase the iron produced in the province of Bingo. The Shinchu-za was established at the same time. Both the iron and brass institutes were attached to the Gin-za in Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka, and their function was to purchase iron and brass materials for the making of iron coins, which the Tokugawa Shogunate started in the era of Meiwa.

THE ABOLITION OF THE TETSU-ZA AND THE SHINCHU-ZA.—After these two za had been established they worked in defiance of the interests of the merchants and workmen concerned in Osaka. According to the *History of the City of Osaka*, the iron merchants and workmen in Osaka first appealed to the Shogunate for the discontinuation of the Tetsu-za, and getting no satisfaction they stopped business and work for a while, or, in other words, they struck against the Government to enforce, if possible, the stoppage of the Tetsu-za. These men were firmly determined, and forced any iron works or shops which kept open to close. What they objected to was that while the Tetsu-za, under the regulations, controlled all the iron products throughout the Empire, it did not publicly announce any prices at which it would purchase the iron produced in the different districts. The prices at which the brokers purchased iron products in the different districts, on behalf of the Tetsu-za, were different from the prices at which the Tetsu-za could buy, and the merchants and workmen concerned suspected that the brokers were pocketing a large and illicit profit. Their movement succeeded at last, for the application was accepted by the Shogunate.

As a matter of fact, neither the Tetsu-za nor the Shinchu-za were established out of any economic necessity of the times, but both were schemes of speculative merchants, who, availing themselves of the Shogunate's need of both iron and brass metal for coinage purposes, saw a chance of profit. Complaint after complaint was raised by those concerned against the doings of these za as well as their system, and the Shogunate discontinued both of them in 1787.

THE HIYATOI-ZA.—The first Hiyatoi-za in Japan was established in Edo in 1665. Even previous to its establishment the Tokugawa Shogunate had issued regulations, strictly governing employees, in order to control the vagabonds and prohibit the sale and purchase of persons, etc. But as the time went on, and progress was made in the economic life of the people, the number of labourers without permanent employment increased, as well as the apprentices. These labourers, as a result of the industrial and business circumstances of the day, did not need much training or experience, and they changed their work freely, their wages being generally higher than those of apprentice employees. They were what are now called free labourers, and the Tokugawa Shogunate felt it necessary to control them systematically. Hence the establishment of the Hiyatoi-za.

The decree issued in this connection was as follows :—

PUBLIC NOTIFICATION ISSUED ON THE 27TH OF MARCH, THE 5TH YEAR OF KWANBUN (1665).

Two citizens are authorized to form a za in connection with the employment of free labourers. From the 1st of April this year such labourers, both in the urban and suburban districts, as firemen, rice cleaners, palanquin-bearers, etc., shall present themselves at the said za, get a licence there, and act as they are told to do at these bureaux. The monthly fee payable for the licence to the za shall be 24 mon, applicable to all, with the exception of rice cleaners at the rice-cleaning houses, employed under a one year or six months' contract. Other workmen, who are employed under a one month

> contract, shall obtain a licence from the bureaux. All the nanushi and other employers in different streets, when engaging any workmen, shall be very careful to find out whether they have a licence or not, and shall consult with the Hiyatoi-za as to their wages, etc. If any such labourers apply for employment without a licence from the Hiyatoi-za they shall be punished.

Two men controlled the business of the Hiyatoi-za, and issued official licences to the day labourers who were placed under their control, and collected 24 mon of copper a month from each man. In later years the licence fee was increased from 24 mon to 30 mon, and after collection by the Hiyatoi-za subsequently surrendered to the Shogunate. How much the Hiyatoi-za paid to the Shogunate a month in the earlier days is not certain, but in the era of Anyei it was 100 ryo of gold per month, under the regulations, which amount was reduced to 75 ryo in later years. As the charge was collected from each labourer every month by collectors sent out for the purpose, the expens ewas very great, and the system was discontinued in 1789.

CHAPTER LIX

THE RISE OF THE TONYA (MIDDLEMAN)

THE ORIGIN OF THE TONYA.—The first introduction of this institution is rather remote, and during the middle of the Ashikaga period we find the tonya system in vogue under the name of Toimaru, who were engaged in the dual business of wholesale and commission merchants. With the Toyotomi period this organ of trade was found in general among the commercial cities of South-Western Japan, of which Osaka was the centre. When the Shogunate settled in Edo, commerce was encouraged by inviting the traders from Kyoto, Osaka, Omi, and Ise, who naturally brought with them the system of these provinces. During the Genwa era we find in Edo tonya of rice and produce, and two or three other lines. Taking advantage of the business ignorance of the Edo population, traders in similar lines combined, and manipulated the market at will by such devices as amalgamating capital, agreeing to increase prices and profiteering by limiting the supply, a method which they had practised in the south-western cities. In 1622, to meet this situation, the Shogunate enacted a law, as given below, which proclaimed freedom of trade:—

RE TRADE IN GENERAL.

Commercial transactions must be free, and no one shall act to the contrary or combine to manipulate prices. It is strictly forbidden for any person to contract with his fellow-traders for such purpose, and hereafter any person found violating the law must be reported to the authorities.

RE COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS.

A transaction, when not made in cash, must be accompanied by a promissory note duly signed by the respective parties involved, with full evidence, otherwise a just decision cannot be made if the case is brought to court for justice.

POLICING THE TONYA.—Fourteen years after the above law was passed in 1635, crop failures took place, so that rice middlemen and brokers hoarded cereals and resorted to various methods to prevent stocks from entering the capital, thus limiting the supply and bolstering prices. The keeper and accountants of the Shogunate godowns were mixed up in this game, as they did the same with their stock, forcing up prices, so that many died of starvation. On the accusation of a certain citizen, Yanagiemon, the Shogunate punished the corrupt officials and profiteers, over thirty in number, but the incident proves how much influence the tonya already had, sufficient to cause confusion in the whole market. With the growth in the prosperity and complexity of trade, it became necessary in 1648 to make a distinction between the tonya and consignor, and a law was passed in Osaka which sets forth the legal steps to be taken by both parties, and prohibiting combination among different trades, with the exception of the cinnabar and copper guilds. The reason why the Shogunate prohibited the formation of guilds other than the two above named, was the tendency of tonyas to combine and form a kind of kartel, thus monopolizing the market.

In January 1657 a great conflagration swept the capital of Edo, reducing one-half of the city to ashes, including the palace, and costing about 37,000 lives. There was naturally a sudden increase in prices, and this was artificially accentuated by the combined cornering of the tonya, which had greater effect than the natural cause. In July of the same year, therefore, came an order branding all merchants as criminals who co-operated in setting their own price levels. Not only did the consumers suffer from the tonya manipulations, but also the producers, who were so enraged that they refused to moor their boats by the tonya godowns. Another law was passed in September 1657 prohibiting all traders, wholesale and retail, from combining and manipulating the markets under penalty of punishment. The decree emphasized the fact that, owing to vessels refusing to moor in the usual places, travellers were inconvenienced, which was one of the reasons for issuing the law. The Shogunate, while enacting such regulations, at the same time postponed the rebuilding of the Edo palace for three years, and decided to utilize timber from the Shogun's private forests. The rebuilding of the residences of the feudal lords was also restricted, so that prices in Edo rapidly declined and checkmated the operations of the tonyas. The area of the district devastated in Edo proper by the great fire comprised about 400 cho, and outside the city limit over 100 cho, but by September and October of the same year, 60,000 houses were rebuilt, so that one may judge how small the houses were in this period.

CREDIT SALES PROHIBITED.—It was the custom then for shopkeepers to sell on credit to ordinary customers, and, as many attempted to evade payment, the Shogunate frequently passed laws enforcing the exchanging of legal papers in credit transactions, or the case would not be dealt with if brought into court. As these decrees did not have the effect expected, the Government enacted a law in August 1661 prohibiting all credit sales, with the exception of tonya transactions, and sums involved were not recoverable by law. In practice, however, it was impossible to do away with the system, and in 1663 it was regulated that the seals of both parties should be affixed to the signature in order to prevent misunderstanding when the accounts were brought up for settlement.

CORNERING BY TONYAS.—As the tonya prospered they tended to step beyond their justifiable spheres to corner the market, or resorted to similar exclusive means of commanding prices, and in 1666 a law was passed stopping such underhand methods of business. This decree called for a stocktaking of the actual quantity of staple commodities held by traders, such as rice, soya beans, wheat, barley, saké, salt, rape seed, sesame, and oils. The law required each trader, wholesale or retail, to submit a list of goods held in stock in their own or in other godowns. The sale was at the discretion of the holder, but evidence of the transaction had to be kept as a proof of the exact selling price. The same report was required for consignments on their way from the different provinces. Moreover, in January 1681 similar acts were issued, but in spite of the power of the Shogunate, and the weakness of individual rights, it was plain that the authorities could do nothing to readjust the prices, and the Shogunate authorities were the only ones who believed that their duty had been duly accomplished. In reality the only effect was oppression and suffering to the tonyas. The authorities of this time, with their patriarchal notions, believed that an order from on high was enough to command the respect of the people, and in May 1683 a new regulation appeared, which says :—

> All men engaged in any trade may, to a certain extent, reap a reasonable profit, but if anyone be found profiteering he is liable to be examined, and, if found guilty, punished.

The statute does not say what may be the extent of reasonable profit, which made it useless, and the officials only issued it to please themselves. In February 1684 another regulation was issued which, while prohibiting the fixing of prices by agreement, yet ordered that prices in business transactions must be occasionally regulated according to market levels, which is a clear contradiction. The statute was simply one of the whims of the officials during the days of feudalism, and need cause no surprise.

THE RISE OF THE ORANGE TONYA.—In the history of the orange tonya of Kishu, we have an example that will serve for all. Kishu had always produced oranges, and in the Toyotomi period they were shipped to Osaka and Fushimi. In the early days of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Tokugawa Yorinobu, the lord of Kii, encouraged agriculture and laid great stress on the improved cultivation of oranges. Larger production and increased exports were the result. In 1634 one Tobei, of Arita-gori, shipped 400 baskets of oranges to Edo on a regularly scheduled vessel, consigning the lot to a fruit-dealer, Nieyama Nizaemon, as tonya. This is supposed to be the first shipment of Kishu oranges to Edo, and so superior were they to the oranges from Izu, Suruga, Mikawa, and Kazusa that they immediately commanded the market and fetched 1 ryo for one basket and a half. Tobei's profits were the talk of his neighbourhood, and the farmers of the surrounding district asked him to market their goods for them. In the following year he was instrumental in shipping 2,000 baskets to Edo, and disposing of them at 2 bu per basket. Thenceforward, the export of Kishu oranges into Edo increased each year. In 1656 it amounted to 50,000 baskets, in 1687 to over 100,000 baskets, and in 1714 it had reached the 350,000 mark. While the production and export of oranges thus increased, there were many disputes between buyer and seller, so that, in order to protect themselves, the growers organized a crude form of what may be called to-day a sellers' association, which was composed of many groups representing different interests. Each group elected a to-tori (president) and kimoiri (assistants), who were made the consignors and looked after the shipment from the province. Those who managed the disposal of the oranges after arrival at Edo were known as uriko (salesmen). They negotiated with the tonya and collected amounts due and suchlike. In the association were ten perfectly organized groups who did business with the seven tonyas in Edo. However, in January 1657, the so-called conflagration of Meireki took place, burning many of the tonya and broker offices, and causing an arrears in payment amounting to 940 ryo. The salesmen remained in Edo until the summer in the hope of collecting the debt, but were unsuccessful. They then returned home, and after conferring with the consignors, decided to press for payment of the debt with the aid of the Lord of Kishu. For this purpose two representatives from Arita county were dispatched to Edo, and appealed to the Shogunate through the Edo office of the Lord of Kishu. As the petition came from the most powerful of the three branches of the Tokugawa house, the Shogunate immediately ordered its officials to investigate, and the tonyas were summoned and questioned to ascertain the validity of the claim. It was found that the tonya actually owed the amount, and they were forced to pay it. Not only in this way, but in other ways, did the daimyo help the orange-growers. It was through this medium that they obtained from the Shogunate the landing- and market-places at Edobashi, Kamakura-bashi, Ichikokubashi, and others.

Kumi-kabu and Tonya changes to Za.—Seeing the profit in oranges, many were led to take up the cultivation of the fruit, and the number of growers gradually increased. The number of associated interests (kumi-kabu) at first was limited to ten, but it increased to twenty; then to thirty, for the rise and fall of the various interests made it utterly impossible to keep new traders from coming on the field. This stopped the limitation of number, and the increase and decrease was left to take its natural course. With the changes wrought within the kumi-kabu the number of Edo tonyas, who received consignments for sale, increased also to fifteen, who had no contract or understanding among themselves, so that the competition was almost ruinous. The price of oranges naturally declined, and as the sales were rather forced than from actual demand, the settlement of accounts was very slow. For this reason the consignors, after due conference, decided in 1687 to dispatch a certain Jinbo Ichiyemon, the sole shipping agent of oranges, to Edo, in order to confer with the tonyas and brokers, proposing a limitation of the number of tonyas and brokers, and to set up an organized body to stabilize transactions. The Edo tonyas, to meet the acknowledged facts, made a counter-proposal, primarily to establish the status of all those engaged in the production and sale of oranges; secondly, to limit the kumi-kabu of orange-growers; and thirdly, to make the occupation of the Edo tonyas and brokers hereditary. An agreement was arrived at between producer and seller, and nine of the most reliable houses of the time were picked as tonyas, with a limited number of brokers attached to each, prohibiting any increase of the fixed number. While the Edo merchants were organizing, the Kishu producers were also limiting their number to a certain figure according to the districts, agreeing not to increase the number without first referring to the Edo tonyas. A standard price was arranged, and the growers invoiced a basket at 66 momme 5 bu to the tonyas. These conditions were put in writing and duly signed by the producers and tendered to the tonyas. The tonyas agreed with their dealers (nakagai) not to purchase in unreasonable quantities, accounts to be settled as soon as the crops of the year were disposed of, and, in case of the discovery of underhand methods, the nakagai-kabu (agency) and its assets should be surrendered. These stipulations were agreed to under a compact jointly signed by the brokers. The tonyas swore to the producers that, inasmuch as they had obtained the contract from the brokers under the foregoing conditions, and according to the articles agreed on by the producers, nothing should be neglected to uphold the terms; that the salesmen should be allowed to return home on the fifteenth day after all sales had been completed, and that, if any of the conditions were violated, it was agreed that the tonya interests should be confiscated. The above was made up in contract form and duly signed by the tonyas and their endorsers. To these arrangements was added a by-law between producer and seller, and thus what was at first a kind of sellers' association of the orange-growing interests, now, in combination with the Edo selling interests, grasped a monopoly, and became a kind of za. The orange-growers' representatives wrote to the Kishu office as follows :—

> After having successfully attained our purpose as detailed in our previous report on the negotiations, we took leave to return homeward. You have given us every facility as one of the members of the household, allowing our humble selves to arrive at our respective homes without any mishap, for which we extend our grateful thanks. We clearly see the extent to which the Lord of Kishu has used his influence in order to help his people to obtain their purpose.

THE CAUSE OF THE KISHU ORANGE-GROWERS' SUCCESS.—As above detailed, the Edo orange tonyas stabilized their position through contract, while the Kishu orange cultivators through the limitation of their numbers relieved the fear of over-production and fall of prices. They further received payment of the outstanding accounts of the Edo tonyas from the brokers and middlemen's association, thus benefiting both parties. Those that supplied oranges to Edo between the years 1687 and 1698 were nineteen groups (Kumi-kabu) from Arita-gori, and four from Ashi-gori. It is usually the custom in the relations between farmer-producers and sellers that the latter take the upper hand in their dealings, but in this case of the Kishu oranges the producers curbed the middlemen, and, for the first time, the tonya and brokers were made to bind themselves to a contract, a thing never occurring in any other trade in Edo. It was a rare occurrence which must be attributed, in the first place, to the firm union of the Kishu Orange guild, and, secondly, to the fact that the Kishu oranges were better than any other kind. Moreover, had not they been backed by the prestige of one of the three branches of the Tokugawa family, they could not have attained the position they held in markets of Edo.

THE ORANGE DEALERS AND THE KISHU FLAG.—That the Lord of Kishu exerted himself to protect the interests of the orange cultivators we have already seen, and it cannot be gainsaid that the kind of monopoly they obtained was due to the help of the clan officials. It is regrettable that such facts did not come down to us in written form. However, even if another clan had tried to extend such aid as was given by the Kishu clan to the orange growers, they could not have done very much, for the reason that the Kishu clan, being the strongest of the three branches of the Tokugawa ruling house, was able to obtain various concessions from the high Shogun officials and daimyos. The Kishu clan with its influence unified the orange growers and important merchants into one organization, gave them the privilege of having a surname and wearing swords, and raised them to a semi-official position. The oranges were shipped to Edo on ships flying the clan flag, and all other ships had to make way for them.

THE KISHU ORANGE.—Although the Kishu clan protected the orange-growers, in 1698 they levied a tax of 1 bu per pasket for oranges shipped to Edo and 8 rin for those sent to the surrounding provinces. When, in 1714, a reform was made in the currency, the above tax was reduced to one-half, namely, 5 rin for export to Edo and 4 rin for the surrounding provinces. Again, in the 3rd year of Genbun, when another change of currency was brought about, known as the monji-kin, the rate for Edo became 7 rin 5 mo, and for the other parts 6 rin. That the orange guild was openly and covertly protected by the clan government we have seen, but at the same time it served as a financial resource of the Kishu clan, so that naturally it was both restrained and protected. In other words, it finally became a licensed association. It seems that the orange-growers from this time became a semi-official organ, as in the same year the clan authorities, finding after investigation that there was room for more groups in Arita-gori, ordered the formation of four new kumi-kabu, making the total twenty-three kumis. A little over twenty years from this time, in 1712, some of the towns and villages, not having any licensed organization, petitioned for the same, and the authorities permitted the formation of three more, bringing the total up to twenty-six associations. With these changes the number of baskets shipped to Edo, which was formerly from 250,000 to 330,000, increased to about 350,000 to 500,000.

LIMITATIONS OF THE KUMI-KABU.—In the year 1714 a petition to permit the formation of a new kabu by the village of Kankiji was made to the clan head. As the orange association had come under the supervision of the clan, and the expansion of it had increased exports, thus increasing the revenue of the clan, there was a tendency to encourage the industry, which many took advantage of. However, such a tendency could not but conflict with existing interests, and the orange-growers complained that further increase would greatly hamper the old growers, making it difficult to maintain their existence. The clan government, after investigation, granted the petition of Kankiji, but this was the last increase made by the officials.

The orange-growers of Kishu thus became genuinely licensed associations having the nature of a trust. In order to ship their products, groups of five kumi combined into one organization and formed a shipping body. This organ, combined of five groups, chartered the boats that plied along their shores independent of others.

RELATION BETWEEN THE KUMI-KABU AND THE ORANGE TONYAS.—The orange-growing associations in their relations with the tonyas of Edo had a contract stipulating that each of them was to trade with one of the seven tonyas separately, and that each had a fixed correspondent within the seven, and was bound to co-operate with that one. This was kimetsuke, which resembled somewhat the harbour regulations of Niigata, Shimoda, and other places. On the other hand, if payment to the growers by the tonya was not duly made, his rights were confiscated and a new party installed. In the Kyoho era the import of oranges into Edo dwindled so that two of the tonyas out of the nine gave up business.

THE OLDEST TONYA ASSOCIATION.—To judge from the case of the Kishu orange tonyas, it seems that the tonya was an outgrowth of what were at first commission merchants. They sold what goods were consigned to them to the brokers, and paid what money they received from the brokers, reserving a small commission. Differing from the usual traders their business consisted of credit sales, which were found to have in them much evil, yet the Shogunate, although prohibiting such transactions in general, specially allowed the tonya to practise the method, which was due to the conditions of their sales. The Shogunate prohibited in principle combination of traders as it resulted in bolstering up prices, but, as far as this evil could be restrained, it permitted combinations; and the oldest of such bodies was that of the lumber trade formed in 1664, and sworn before the Shogunate as follows:—

> We beg to extend our extreme gratitude to you for allowing us, the dwellers in the lumber street, to follow the trade in lumber and bamboo, also for the rate of commission granted in the past.
>
> We have decided to limit the number of tonyas to three, and if any be found dealing unfairly, the trade association shall make due investigation and, if found guilty, shall replace the member by another party. In such a case the party in question shall acquiesce in the verdict without any protest.
>
> With regard to the rate of commission, it is fixed at 3 per cent., in accordance with past practice, settlement to be made twice a year. A special discount fixed by arrangement with the Shogunate officials shall be applied to the lumber street tax.
>
> *July 2nd, the 4th year of Kanbun.*

THE TONYA OF THE GENROKU PERIOD.—If we investigate the saké tonya, we find a tentative understanding within the trade already brought about in 1675. Five years later they had a conference to discuss their business, and named their organization the Saké Tonya. In 1683 they elected respective committees for the Setomono, Nakabashi, Gofukubashi, Aomonocho Streets, calling them the Four-Street Committee, which looked after the general affairs and correspondence between the shippers and brokers, negotiating under the name of the committee, thus following a unified movement. From this and other examples of tonyas, along with that of the Kishu orange tonyas, it cannot be doubted that there existed, in fact, a combination of fellow-traders. When compared with the tonyas of the Ashikaga period, the latter are found to have had the licence to form a za, and were thus traders possessing special privileges ; the former, however, were not openly allowed to form a za, and were prohibited from combining, having neither any licence nor any special privileges. A list of the various tonyas that existed in this period gives :—

General wares, Osaka shipping, iron, steel, paper, cotton, tea, Indian ink and writing brushes, carrots, combs, paraffin and wax, herbs and medicine, pipes, fancy-goods, clay dolls, and fish.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TONYA FOLLOWS THAT OF MARINE TRANSPORTATION.—The Genroku period is one in which prosperity reigned in Edo, and the kinds of tonya found in chronicles are as listed in the previous paragraph. Of course, it does not include the whole, but it can be taken without doubt as the majority, and the number, when compared to that of Osaka, was, they say, very small. Edo was only a consuming city, whereas Osaka was not only a productive but a market centre where goods found their way, and when the tonya first originated in that city it was sure to develop further. When we realize that the Edo tonya had little chance of development, the number in the Genroku period is surprising. That they made such progress may have been greatly due to the flourishing commerce, but we cannot overlook the fact that it was largely the result of the development of marine transportation. In the years about 1640 especially, the water communication between Edo and Osaka made vast progress, thanks to the Hishigaki shipping service. And in 1660 a route was opened by a certain Kawamura Zuiken, who connected the eastern with the northern waters, so that the goods of the country were mainly sent by marine transportation ; and the tonyas, which were in close touch with such means, took charge of the landing of shipments, the stocking and distribution of goods, and from thenceforward their existence made itself greatly felt, for they became necessary in the importing and marketing of goods ; and the marine transportation service and the general tonyas of Edo were an indispensable organ in the commerce of the city. Not only did Edo now deal in goods consumed by the city alone, but she burst the city barriers and expanded throughout the Empire connected by water routes. Especially was the relation close with Osaka, whither Edo resorted for most of its supply of commodities. The Hishigaki shipping service, plying regularly between the two large centres, was handled through marine tonya.

The Appearance of the Tokumi Tonya.—The tonya of the time, although forming a kind of association, was only a combination to raise prices to a desired level, and cannot be called an association in the strict sense. Further, they had no definite agreement with the shipping-agent, so that in case of any marine disaster the tonya, who were the consignees, had no way of investigating their loss. The shipping-agent settled the case as he liked, which gave every opening for the seamen and agent to pilfer and what not, causing serious loss to the consignor and consignee every year. In 1694 an Edo merchant, Osakaya Ihei, regretting this state of affairs, started a movement to protect the interests of the consignor and consignee, and broached the matter to the tonyas dealing with Osaka, asking their co-operation, the result of which was the formation of the Tokumi Tonya.[1] This organization was an association of the tonyas of various lines, and the number ten does not necessarily mean that it was limited to ten different trades. It included nearly all the trades that imported goods from Osaka, and in general it was called the Tokumi (ten groups), aiming at the preventing of pilfering and arbitrariness of the seamen and shipping-agents, and protecting each other's respective interests. In the first place, they made the shipping-agents, who ruled marine transportation between Osaka and Edo, come under their regulations, causing a transfer in the management of the transportation between the two cities to the Tokumi, as a consequence of which this body was made responsible for the repairing and the building of the vessels in the service. In the second place, they changed the system of shipping, only saké on one vessel and fancy-goods on another, to taking varied cargoes in order to distribute the loss in case of disaster. About the same time the Kaitsugi Tonya (afterwards known as the Twenty-four Kumi Tonya) was formed in Osaka, which was also a kind of marine transportation alliance. The two bodies in the east and west co-operated, and endeavoured to protect the interests of the consignor and consignee, and the two organs practically ruled the seas between the two cities. They made Imakiri of Totoomi (Saka-Hamana) the dividing point, agreeing that all supervision of vessels and loss incurred west of the line should be borne by Osaka and east by Edo. The goods dealt in in Osaka by the Tokumi Tonya covered the commercial system of Edo, so that if any merchant not connected with the body attempted to import any line of goods, not only was it impossible, but the Shogunate, too, recognizing the regulations of the organization, prohibited and prevented any other party from importing goods to Edo already handled by the Tokumi Tonya. Thus, not only was it an alliance of marine transportation, it went farther and monopolized a certain variety of commercial articles, corresponding exactly to the za of Kyoto during the latter part of the Ashikaga period. Just as then, the different za combined, and, to a certain extent, monopolized traffic on the highways, the Tokumi Tonya monopolized the marine traffic between Osaka and Edo. In spite of the Shogunate issuing countless statutes prohibiting the combination of merchants and tonyas, when we note these underhand methods of the business men, we cannot but realize their ingenuity and the power of wealth. Although nothing is known of the life of the founder, Osakaya Ihei, from his name we can imagine that he had the blood of Osaka merchants in his veins, which shows what bright business men the Western people are.

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[1] For the organization and history of this body, refer to the chapter on "Marine Transportation."

THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TOKUMI TONYA.—The Tokumi Tonya placed in one group tonyas of various lines as seemed convenient, and these made up the ten groups as listed below, showing an association of twenty-two different trades.

NAMES OF THE TOKUMI TONYA.

Nurimono-gumi ..	.. Painting and lacquer materials.
Uchimise-gumi ..	.. Silk piece goods, cotton goods, ginned cotton, fancy-goods, and dolls.
Torimochi-gumi ..	.. Fancy-goods, cotton goods, raw materials for painted and lacquer goods, and forged works.
Yakushuten-gumi ..	.. Drugs and medicine.
Kugimise-gumi ..	.. Nails, iron, copper, and other metals.
Watamise-gumi ..	.. Cotton.
Omotemise-gumi ..	.. Tatami covers and coloured mattings.
Kawagashi-gumi ..	.. Liquid oils.
Kamimise-gumi ..	.. Paper and candles.
Sakemise-gumi ..	.. Saké and other liquors.

The association arrived at was an agreement with Osaka, prohibiting the import of the above-listed goods into Edo, other than through the Tokumi tonyas. Transactions in the above lines with merchants outside Osaka were possible to parties outside of the association in question, that is to say, merchants residing west and east of the city of Osaka, and trading direct with Edo, were not included in the association, and these transactions and the transportations were handled outside the Tokumi tonyas.

THE KUMIAI BECOMES A REGULATED COMPANY.—Previous to the formation of the Tokumi, there existed, in fact, associations of traders, limited to those engaged in the same line, but a combination of tonyas engaged in various lines must be said to be a new departure in the economic annals of the country. In the beginning the Shogunate permitted its formation in order to stop the malpractices of the shipping-agents, but, once allowed to exist, it became a monopolistic combination, and after few years, when the greatness of its influence became felt, it became impossible to do anything against the body. Finally, during the Kyoho era, taking this as a precedent, the combining of traders in general was permitted. As it was easy to supervise these bodies, and it brought in revenue to the Shogunate, the Government encouraged such formations. Finally, not only did the organization of the Tokumi Tonya bring about a change in the attitude of the shippers between Edo and Osaka, but it served as a general warning against violence and cultivated a change which went a good way to protect the interests of the consignor and consignee.

THE TOKUMI TONYAS AND SIMILAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE.—The metamorphosis of the za caused by the combination and association of the tonyas changed to the Tokumi tonyas, a transformation which must be emphasized as it was a process much like the change of the guild into a regulated company in European economic history. Probably the real substance of the za, the guild, or the combination of tonyas lay in its special privileges; and when such bodies by chance combine it does not mean that the combination was to work as a single body for the purpose of obtaining profits as a whole, but it was for self-preservation, and to uphold the welfare and safety of the particular groups composing the combination. However, the European guilds developed and transformed into regulated companies. The regulated company is an organization developed to a stage just between a kumiai of ancient days and a modern company, and although it resembles the latter in the one respect, that it works to obtain profits for the combined particular groups, it cannot shake off the remnants of the guild system in instances where the business is carried on separately by particular groups under separate accountancy. The beginning of this form may be traced far back, having its rise sometime near that of the Hanseatic League. Of regulated companies the most famous are the Turkey Company, the Levant Company, the Russian Company, the East India Company, and others. The feature of such a company was that it monopolized the trading rights with certain countries, and although it is called a company, it differs in its nature from a company of the present day. It was a sort of merchants' association, the members of which carried on trade separately and for their separate accounts, following the articles of the association in their methods of business and paying a certain amount of initiation fee when becoming a member of the combination. The Turkey Company, for instance, required its members to be free citizens residing in London, and at one time charged an exorbitant amount as initiation fee, which in 1752 Parliament limited to £20. The feature of this licensed company was that it monopolized the trade between England and Turkey, prohibiting competition by others. In such a way did the regulated company take its rise from the 13th and 14th centuries, continuing up to the 19th century, the most flourishing period being during the 14th and 15th centuries. Thus, when we find the kumiai and tonya associations of the Genroku era, about 1689–90, transformed into the Tokumi Tonya, we cannot but recall the evolution of the guild into a chartered or regulated company. In studying the nature of the Tokumi Tonya, we find it had developed from the singleness of the za trader and his kabu to a combination of many traders of different lines of commodities, desiring to obtain profits by co-operation; not into one unified and harmonious whole such as we find in the present-day company, but one in which the members engaged in business separately and under their respective accounts, which resembles the regulated company of Europe. The regulated company of Europe rose during the 13th and 14th century, and although it continued through the 19th century, its most flourishing period was during the 13th and 14th centuries; while in our country the rise was about 1689–1690, some time around the Genroku era, and, as will be discussed later, it flourished about 1800, during the Bunka and Bunsei periods. Comparing the two cases we must admit that the economic system of Japan came behind those of Europe by about 200 to 300 years.

Law of the Cancellation of Debt and its Relation to the Tonya.—In any nation and in any age, although the warriors hold sway in time of war, yet when peace reigns for a certain extent of time the soldier's influence wanes, with the expansion of the commoner's powers, for the reason that peace is a time to increase wealth, in which stage civilians excel. However, when a Government is run based on the powers of the soldier, oftentimes, even in time of peace, help comes to the fighter from the streams of wealth by the aid of legislation enacted to maintain his prestige. Such a condition can be seen in many instances. During the Hojo period we find "benevolent administration" cancelling the soldier's debts. We find a similar cancellation during the Ashikaga period, when such legislation was enacted at the petition of the warrior class, and those out of service in Kyoto, as a result of their family circumstances. Following this, in the Tokugawa era, the prolonged peace after the Keicho and Ginwa periods caused the warrior class to be more deeply in debt than other classes. Many fell into embarrassing situations, so that in 1685 and in 1702, during the life-time of Tsunayoshi, a law was passed which savours of the benevolent administration, although such was not clearly mentioned. It only stated that no debt suit would be entertained, which was, in fact, the rebirth of the administration in question. Although the Shogunate did not state that it would aid the warrior class and oppress the commoner, as the latter was the loser and the debtors were chiefly soldiers, it cannot be gainsaid that the purpose of the legislation was protection of the samurai. The law pointed out that although the court would receive suits regarding debts incurred between January and August of the 15th year of Genroku, it would not give judgment for debts incurred before the stipulated time, so that the parties in the case had to come to a decision among themselves. When there is no punishment by the law very few will meet their claims, so that in reality the legislation was one of "benevolence." Four years later, when Yoshimune became the Shogun, he issued a more drastic law making no exceptions. No suit was to be received in the court for any kind of debt of the past and future; debts had all to be settled by the parties concerned.

COMPLAINTS AGAINST BENEVOLENT ADMINISTRATION BY THE TOKUMI TONYA.—The benevolent administration of Genroku had in view the cancellation of debts outstanding within a certain time, and although the measure was rather drastic, it had more or less meaning. The law not only cancelled past debts, but also was intended to make future loans null and void, with the natural result that no one will lend money. No merchant will sell on credit.

Merchants and farmers stood at the gateway of daimyos and warriors dunning for the payment of debts, or formed a procession to stop their debtors in the street, or even followed them asking for the payment of debts; but many daimyos and samurais, taking advantage of the law cancelling the debts, refused to listen. Some, however, were wise enough to see that the law would render it impossible to borrow from the merchants in the future. While, on one hand, the law meant to save the warrior class from the clutches of the merchants, it also stopped loans between commoners, causing great inconvenience in financial circles, by which the tonyas were the most hard hit, owing to the fact that their business was one in which credit was necessary. This may be seen by the fact that in August 1661 the Shogunate, while prohibiting credit sales in general, permitted the tonyas to trade on credit. This unconditional law regarding suits over debt was simply equal to ordering the tonya to close their business, and they tendered the following petition:—

STATEMENT TENDERED BY THE TOKUMI TONYA OF EDO.

Of the many lines of business engaged in by the merchants are those of the various tonyas which import consignments from the provinces and distribute them on credit, collecting the accounts later and paying to the shipper, reserving a small commission. Honesty of method allows the family to continue the trade, and the credit sales of the tonyas are entirely different from the usual form of debt arising among members of the general public, for it does nothing but dispose of the goods as a broker on a commission basis. When arrears due to us are classed as the ordinary debts referred to in the law, and when the public fails to settle the same, we shall be greatly embarrassed in our livelihood. Hitherto, the shipper and the tonyas acted as if they were of one body, although separated by sea and mountain, and everything was done by mere letter advice, but when, through the promulgation of this law, the outstanding debts cannot be collected, and the tonyas are obliged to postpone payment of the invoice amount, the shipper will begin to think that the tonyas too are taking advantage of the measure. Neither shall we be able to offer any satisfactory explanation. Thus a relation existing for generations must be severed, and a business which has been in existence for generations sacrificed. Moreover, among the merchants there are brokers, and when the law suspends all legal action for a settlement of debts, transactions with them, we regret to say, will have to be carried on in cash, so that their plight is just as bad as that of the tonyas. Their condition depends on the size of their business, and, when credit sales are prohibited and they are unable to obtain financial means, many will have to close their shops to seek livelihood elsewhere. It is even known that parents and children have had to part from each other for this reason. The brokers, if they estrange the tonyas, lose their trade, so that even if they have to pawn their clothes, they are wont to pay the tonyas, but when credit sales are forbidden and cash is difficult to recover, they are forced to be in arrears unintentionally, finally causing them to sell their own selves. Although it is difficult to do business when either shipper, middleman, or broker be lacking, when the law passed last winter it slackened the hearts of many, giving rise to the postponement of the settlement of accounts. The shipper began to distrust the tonya, while the latter were sore with the broker, who suffered inconvenience because of his clients failing to settle with him. For this reason each is gradually forced to give up his trade.

December, the 5th year of Kyoho.

In April of the following year the merchants of Kyoto, who suffered from the law cancelling debts, complained of its injustice and inconvenience to the commissioner of Sakai. Studying these petitions, we not only are able to see how much the law hindered the credit system of the time, giving quite a blow to commerce, but also are able to see distinctly the actual methods of business of the tonyas and brokers.

PETITION TENDERED TO THE COMMISSIONER BY THE KYOTO MERCHANTS.

Owing to the unsatisfactory manner of the settlement of outstanding accounts, not only did it cause hardships to the tonyas, but also to the consignors residing in different parts of the country, and to artisans and farmers, who shipped their goods to the city and disposed of them to different classes, thus allowing all to gain their respective livelihood. But when we got the law obliging creditors and debtors to settle their accounts by themselves without being able to have recourse to the court, the volume of trade had to be limited, which caused the decline of goods coming in from the different provinces, and has resulted in much hardship in earning a livelihood. As may be seen in any part of the country, there is not a single trader, big or small, who is in a position to buy and sell by holding funds in cash, not to say anything about an emergency fund, and all transactions are made on credit. Especially is the credit system followed by the tonyas in disposing of consignments from the provinces, so that when payment of accounts cannot be assured under the protection of the law, the annoyance caused is very plain.

April, the 6th year of Kyoho.

THE ABOLITION OF BENEVOLENT ADMINISTRATION.—Again in November, the 6th year of Kyoho, a certain ronin, Konai Yamashita submitted a pamphlet to the Shogunate criticizing the law of debt cancellation. To quote from the pamphlet :—

> Though the authorities may believe it to be benevolent administration to ignore any suits against a debtor, so that the large and small daimiates try to avoid payment of their obligations, such a measure cannot be looked upon as one of benevolence. That there should be unfairness in legislation cannot but make one suspect that the officials lack morality and are a disgrace to the rulers. If no suit can be accepted in the case of loans, then repayment of them will not be made, as a consequence of which no one will hereafter lend, so that the commerce of the nation must come to a standstill, making a root of trouble.

He further remarked that the Shogun, Yoshimune, although he might know how to rule his clan in Kishu, was not fit to govern the nation, and urged that the law be immediately repealed.

Of all the petitions and complaints made to the Shogun during the Tokugawa Shogunate by a subject, none was so decided and dauntless as the essay from the pen of Konai, and it is clear how unjust the law was. But skill in argument and might of the pen were lost on the foolish and obstinate Shogunate officials. However, in 1729 (14th year of Kyoho), as a result of a bountiful harvest of rice throughout the country, the price of rice suffered a decided decline, and the Shogunate, owing to its interests as owner of land producing 4,000,000 koku, and desiring to lessen the hardships incurred by its vassals owing to the fall of price, devised different means of raising the prices, finally commanding the rice-dealers to corner the entire stock. The dealers refused to do anything unless sales on credit were made valid by law, and the Shogunate passed a law to the effect that the court should accept and give verdict in any case concerning debts, thus gradually doing away with the law cancelling debts, and at the death of Yoshimune the law was effective no longer.

CHAPTER LX

APPEARANCE OF THE TONYA ASSOCIATION AND THE FELLOW-TRADERS' GUILD

ASSOCIATION OF TONYAS ENCOURAGED DURING THE PERIOD OF HAKUSEKI. In 1687 there already existed in Edo an association of the orange tonyas. And, as set forth in the previous chapter, in 1694 the association of Tokumi Tonya (tonya consisting of ten kinds of trade), which was a form of marine transportation alliance, was formed. This organization of the tonya association not only curbed the arbitrariness of the shipping agents and shipowners, but was a finger-post to the tonyas of the different trades to form guilds for the protection of their interests, and they sprang up one after another. Up to this time the Shogunate had been most afraid of ronins and Roman Catholics, and although great efforts were exerted to stamp them out, it was feared that they might conceal themselves within the circles of trade and secretly combine. The chief concern of the administration was to prohibit the formation of such factions. However, as far back as the beginning of Edo there can be found combinations and associations among the traders to protect their interests, which were regarded by the commercially ignorant Shogunate officials as seed-beds of factions ; and as they believed that the combinations were means to raise prices and to reap greater profits, they made it their general policy to prohibit them. It was a mere accident that the Shogunate not only recognized such associations, but even encouraged the association of guilds. In 1714, when Hakuseki recoined the debased Genroku currency, the new money did not circulate freely, and especially was this so in the eastern provinces in the Shogun's own territory. For this reason the Shogunate investigated methods to popularize the new coins, and looked for people who might help in circulating them in the provinces. Besides the financial groups, they obtained the services of the different tonyas who engaged in trade within the city. As explained previously, all of the tonyas along different lines of trade received consignments from the provinces, sold to the retailers, and handed over the money to the consignors less their commission. Standing between the retailers and provincial shippers they ruled the market. The amount of money handled by them reached an enormous figure, and, although the financial houses of the city handled vast sums also, yet their clients were merchants in the city, while the payments of the tonyas were wholly to the consignors in the provinces, so that the tonyas were necessary organs in the provincial campaign. The Shogunate saw its chance to introduce its new money into the provinces where the people still demanded settlement in Kenji gold or other old denominations, and ordered the tonyas to settle their accounts in the new coins, which were just as good a buying medium as the old. In order to see that the various tonyas actually followed the instructions, it was necessary for the Shogunate to supervise them and yet to leave them free, as it was difficult to watch each particular case. As a means of supervision the Government made the tonyas form associations according to the kind of trade engaged in by each. In this way, in 1715, the first tonya guild was established by public licence. The Shogunate allowed combinations subject to the following three conditions :—

1. A guild should be formed according to the kind of commodities handled by the respective tonyas.
2. Each of the guilds should elect someone to keep track of the monthly affairs of the body.
3. The elected member shall collect the coins minted since the Genroku era from the guild of which he is the member, and shall daily tender the same to the place of exchange for the new coinage.

In order to keep an eye on delinquent members, the Shogunate ordered the guilds to submit the names of all their members with the places of residence and minutes of the monthly meetings. This information was handed on to the exchange so that the officials might check up properly, and any offender was severely punished as well as the members of his guild.

Money Exchanges, too, were ordered to form a Guild.—Thus did the Shogunate order the different tonyas to form guilds in order to enhance the spread and circulation of the new currency, at the same time bidding the money merchants to combine so that there might not be any hindrances in the circulation. Notwithstanding that the money exchangers carried on their trade through the circulation of money, since the issue of the new currency they had fought shy of the new coins, and, although the Kenji gold coins were the most numerous in circulation, yet they were least dealt in at the exchanges. However, the Shogunate took the same attitude towards the money traders as towards the ordinary tonyas. As it could not supervise the numerous traders separately, it forced them to come together, obliging them to exchange for the new coins. In such a way the exchangers of the exchange street were made to combine, to decide on the persons to take charge of affairs for each month, and to stipulate the minimum of the money exchangers' daily amounts at from 3,000 to 5,000 ryo, one half of which was to be Genroku gold, while the other half was in

Kenji gold. If there was an insufficiency in the exchange of Genroku gold, it was arranged that the gap should be supplemented with Kenji gold. Everyone had to come into the rules under pain of punishment, and all members of the guild and the monthly member in charge, and the whole guild swore to follow the method under their joint signature and seal. A written acknowledgment was filed with the Shogunate.

ENCOURAGEMENT OF GUILDS AS A MEANS TO READJUST PRICES OF COMMODITIES.—After the Kyoho era a new turn was seen in the policy of the Shogunate towards its regulation of trade and industry. Contrary to its previous policy of prohibiting the formation of guilds, fearing that it might raise prices, it now encouraged the guilds in order to abolish the trade competition, or rather to check the evils of production of new and adulterated articles. Probably the officials believed that every article needed by man already existed, and any new production or invention was luxury. When people became luxurious, prices rose, and the people became dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs and wanted a change, which threatened the peace of the state. If each trade was given a free hand, the result, it was feared, would be the cultivation of more luxury, and hence the Shogunate attempted to limit competition through the organization of guilds. Thus, in 1721, after the great conflagration in Edo, the merchants who dealt in bamboo, lumber, reeds, reed matting, ropes, rush matting, and straw mats were divided into three classes, namely, middlemen, broker, and retailer, each of the classes being ordered to form guilds; but in September of the same year a law was passed which provided that merchants in general were expected to form guilds.

GUILDS AND THEIR SPECIAL PRIVILEGES.—As a result of this order, traders of various lines organized guilds, so that over a hundred bodies were formed one after another. Such a course, according to the standpoint of the Shogunate, was a means to keep order, to restrict the production of new articles, which were believed to be useless, and to check the growing influence of the merchant class. As, however, there was a limit put to the membership of the respective guilds, it was in part a check upon the rise of new traders even if the law itself brought about no hindrance. The limitation clause was a security to the traders who had obtained position and interests by years of hard labour. It formed the beginning from which in later years grew special interests or kabushiki. Among the most important guilds were those of the tonya.

DRUG AND MEDICINE TONYA GUILD.—In 1722 the drug tonyas of Ise-cho in Edo not only organized a guild in accordance with the regulations, but also established a hall for themselves on Ise-cho, for the purpose of stabilizing their prices, and for the inspection of medical products to maintain their quality. The name of Ise-cho, of course, comes from the Ise men who migrated to Edo in large numbers in the time of Iyeyasu, most of whom called their places of business Ise-ya. The name was finally transferred to the quarter or street which was the oldest and wealthiest in Tokyo, just outside the castle moat, and other streets were subordinate to it. In 1657, at the time of the construction of the Nakanohashi (middle bridge), twelve streets contributed a sum amounting to 164 ryo 6 momme towards the expense, but the inspection and carrying out of the plans were superintended by Ise-cho. History tells us also that when in the Kyoho era women slaves were on the market, the Shogunate gave the privilege to Ise-cho. Among all the drug and medicine tonyas the most wealthy and influential had their premises in Ise-cho, Previous to the Tokugawa era the drug tonyas of Kyoto and Sakai used to form za to obtain a monopoly of their trade, so that even in Tokugawa days they secretly monopolized the market by a combined understanding. When the Shogunate put a stop to this, many drug tonyas and dealers appeared around Odenma-cho. Then, when the government issued the order for those carrying on the same line of trade to form guilds, the drug tonyas of Ise-cho united and formed a guild by themselves, excluding all outsiders. The Exchange hall, too, was for the exclusive use of the twenty-five members of the Ise-cho guild, and the Shogunate issued an order granting the association certain special privileges. According to the order, all purchases of domestic drugs and medicines were to be made through the Ise-cho drug tonya guild, so that all cultivators of medicinal herbs had to dispose of their goods through the above body; and since the organization was limited to twenty-five members the whole thing was a pure monopoly and nothing but a rebirth of the za of the Ashikaga period, only in a new garb. This guild flourished for over seven years, but the drug tonyas of Odenma-cho, crushed between the upper and the nether mill-stones, started private and public movements with the officials, and finally the Shogunate authorities issued an order dividing the monopolistic interests of the drug trade between Ise-cho and Odenma-cho. In spite of this change made in the trade, it cannot be said to have altered the nature of the guild, except that a slight increase was made in the number of parties sharing in the interests. The order further declared that no further increase should be made in the membership of the guild, which naturally limited competition again.

THE TENDERING OF ACCOUNTS ON FIFTEEN STAPLE GOODS.—In 1726 the Shogunate fixed on fifteen staples as follows :—

> Liquid oil, fish oil, ginned cotton, floss silk, saké, charcoal, fire-wood, cotton goods, soy, salt, rice, miso, wax, candles, and paper.

Tonyas in Edo dealing in any of the above, or anyone who imported direct from the production centres, however small the quantity, were required to submit a detailed account of the transactions. Previous to this measure, during the Hoei era, this submission of accounts was a rule, but the figures were not dependable, and many neglected even to send in their books. Now, all books were abolished, save only those concerned with the fifteen articles necessary to daily life, which needed special and strict surveillance, for, in order to be able to adjust the demand and supply, it seemed necessary to keep track of the transactions between tonyas and producers, or of parties doing business somewhat similar to the tonyas.

Rice Tonyas and Cornering.—On one side, the Shogunate may be viewed a mighty duke and great lord, yet, on the other, it was a great land-owner of estates yielding 4,000,000 koku of rice a year. The Shogunate was from the start a large landed proprietor, and, although a portion of the produce was allotted to the families of the immediate vassals, the greater part was sold for cash, on which it relied to meet its expenses. The same was true of the vassals, who, excepting that part needed for their own use, sold the surplus to purchase other daily necessities, such as salt, firewood, clothing, etc. Hence the rise and fall of the rice quotations deeply affected the Shogunate. If prices went up too high there might be rice riots; and, if too low, the revenue of the Shogunate and its vassals was insufficient. In the autumn of 1728, as a result of favourable weather, a bountiful harvest was reaped to the great delight of the nation, but the price of rice fell almost out of sight. This situation hit the farmer, samurai, vassals, and the largest land-owner, the Shogunate, and the people called the condition " plenteous misfortune," for the reason that owing to too large a rice harvest it turned out to be a bad year. In April 1729, although the Shogunate had always prohibited the cornering of rice, it overruled the law by permitting the stocking of the cereal. As we have seen in the chapter on " Rise of the Tonya," the Shogunate had before this period refused to deal with lawsuits regarding loans in order to relieve the samurai by bringing about the cancellation of debts; but now, in order to encourage stocking of rice, it assured the dealers that they might do so without fear, as the Government would recognize all accounts when brought to court.

Monopoly of Rice imported into Edo.—The Shogunate proclaimed a law that no one need fear to store rice, but in fact rather forced the stocking of the commodity, even going so far as to assist by the loan of capital. The purpose was to raise the price-level higher. Such an attempt to interfere with natural laws of economy was very dangerous and embarrassing to the rice dealers, who, as some compensation for the risks they ran, proposed that all rice imports from Osaka should be made direct through the hands of the Edo rice tonyas, composed of eight individuals. If their demand could not be granted, and free import of the product to Edo allowed, they believed that there was no hope of bolstering up the price. The Shogunate in the same year conceded the demand, and granted the eight tonyas the sole right of handling all rice imports from Osaka, and, as there were many violating the law by making secret importations, in September 1730 it published a further notice strictly prohibiting the importation of rice from Osaka by any outside the eight tonyas. However, even with this measure the price of rice did not rise, and the Edo rice dealers were ordered to keep buying until the price reached 1 ryo per koku.

In June of the same year, another order was issued to the rice tonyas, fixing the price of rice as follows :—

> With respect to the rice shipped to the rice tonyas for commercial purposes from different parts of the country, be it known that no transactions shall be made below the fixed price as previously notified, as such a case has been found through the statements of the shippers. If such a price-cutting be found among the dealers in the local product or among the tonyas of Oshū, it shall be immediately notified.

Again on the 16th of the same month an order was sent to the Sendai clan :—

> If the Sendai rice is to be sold, it shall be at a price equal to that of the eight tonyas, no lower.

Judging from these Government notifications, it appears that the Shogunate believed that the right price of rice was 1 ryo of gold per koku, and to bring it to this level it " bulled " rice and ordered the public to do the same. Thus, on the one hand, while encouraging the buying of rice, on the other hand it fixed the price to that set by the rice tonyas, prohibiting any transactions below this set price. Notwithstanding this, rice from Osaka districts declined, and the local rice and Oshū rice, handled by different tonyas, was sold at lesser prices, although the Shogunate warned the merchants specifically, at the same time commanding the Sendai clan, who had connections with Oshū tonyas, to sell their stock at the same figure as the Osaka rice. These facts make it clear that there were three kinds of rice in the Edo market—Osaka, local, and Oshū products.

Licence granted permitting the Rice Tonyas to sell to Consumers direct.—When in the 18th year of Kyoho, after normal crops for some years, a rather lean harvest was experienced in certain districts, thus bringing about a shortage of rice supply, the Shogunate granted the Edo rice tonyas a licence in January, permitting them to sell rice direct to consumers, which was a departure from the usual routine.

PROHIBITING BUYING AND SELLING OF RICE ON THE WATER.—Although the Tokugawa Shogunate made a distinction between tonya, broker, and retailer, ordering them to form guilds between themselves, and directly controlling their respective organizations, yet the natural course of this policy tended to protect the tonyas. It was natural, because the tonyas had the power of their capital and were in close touch with the authorities, with the opportunity to bring their case before the officials frequently, so in course of time these gentlemen always saw things from the tonyas view-point. Moreover, with their money power, the tonyas were able to employ the services of able negotiators. As the tonyas had to deal with producers and shippers, it was a severe blow to them when deals were made secretly on the water without referring to them. Such cases becoming frequent, the tonyas finally, in the 11th year of Kyoho, complained to the Shogunate. In order to stop the transactions made in Shinagawa Bay by buyers and sellers going out in boats and bickering alongside, a law was issued that no boats, except tea, water, and other supply crafts, were to be allowed to go out to the cargo vessels, and that all deals must be made on land. In spite of the regulation, clandestine methods still prevailed, and a more stringent regulation appeared in the 2nd year of Kwanpo, fixing a heavy penalty on both buyer and seller found resorting to such acts ; confiscating the goods and the money paid, and handing the consignment to the tonyas. Of course, the ban put upon the method was mainly for the purpose of protecting the interests of the tonyas.

TONYA-KABU BECOMES A MONOPOLY.—How, in 1694, there came into existence in Edo an association known as the Tokumi Tonya, which monopolized the business between Osaka and Edo, was described in the previous chapter. However, within the twenty-seven years between 1694 and 1721 it became a custom for merchants of all trades in Edo to organize a guild within the same trade, but somehow, beginning with the Tokumi Tonya, the merchants who organized the associations barred all new competitors from coming into the guild, attempting to keep their trade intact. The trades and the traders' position assumed the nature of kabu, and the Shogunate began to recognize it as such without any due cause. Such methods of putting a value upon business interests had originated in Kyoto, Osaka, and Hyogo, and had already existed in these localities for a long while. The largest transaction in buying out interests is said to have taken place in Hyogo in 1769. When the Shogunate made Hyogo one of its suzerain territories, a Edo merchant, Sawada-ya Yashichi, and an Osaka merchant, Kashiki-ya Genbei, petitioned the Shogunate to grant them the sole rights of the tonya and farm produce interests of Hyogo, and obtained them. It was publicly announced that they paid an enormous royalty for the rights, but in fact it was the result of bribing the Shogunate officials. Since there already existed in Hyogo 131 tonyas, these two men cannot have obtained every right excepting by corrupting the authorities. The tonyas and brokers of Hyogo heard the news with amazement, which increased when, on approaching the two grantees for the apportioning of the interests, they were met with a proposal to allot the interests as kabu in return for a royalty. After long negotiations, 131 persons bought out the two men for 131 kwamme of silver. The Shogunate immediately recognized the deal. In such a way were the stocks or interests of different trades bought and sold publicly, as on the Stock Exchange to-day, the most conspicuous being the case just described. This method, followed by the traders of Osaka districts of considering their trade as an interest, which commanded a price, gradually invaded the trade of Edo.

Tokumi Tonya Stocks.—In August 1792, from the memorandum sent to the Shogunate by the eldermen of Edo, we find that those merchants who had entered into the membership of the Tokumi Tonya gradually came to consider their business interests as a sort of kabushiki, and bought and sold the interests as if they were stocks of different companies of to-day. Moreover, there was formed a subsidiary association to the Tokumi Tonya, which, too, became a kind of kabushiki.

REPORT OF THE ELDERMAN OF EDO MADE IN 1792.

From bygone times it was known as the Tokumi Tonya, and, according to the line of trade, names, or any changes of names, and seal and other alterations in the respective interests were reported to the eldermen's office, which method is still practised, and the membership runs up to a large number. The incentive to the organization of the guild was the nefarious actions of the seamen in taking advantage of any damage incurred and feigning to have met with accidents, so that unexpected losses were met with by the merchants throughout the places served by the ships in question. Finally, during the Genroku era, these ships were chartered or built by the tonyas, and when any consignments were made every means was taken towards safe transit in order to prevent loss. Members of the Tokumi Tonya who engage in commerce on a large scale in the past have been summoned and ordered to tender a full list of names, but owing to the length of time which has elapsed since the last report was made, many changes have not been registered, so that the list will not serve to-day. In order to bring matters up-to-date, I hereby present the latest census of the Tokumi Tonya and its subsidiary associations :—

Torimachi Tonya Guild, 16 members. Silk piece goods, cotton goods, floss silk, ginned cotton, cutlery, lacquered wares, coarse wares, candles, foreign fancy goods.

Torimachi Subsidiary Guild (Shita-gumi).

Maruaikumi, 24 members. Coarse goods, fancy goods, lacquered wares, dye-stuffs, ironmongery, swords.

N.B.—These names have not as yet been reported.

Drug and Chemical Tonyas, 25 members (of which 7 are inactive and 18 now in existence).

Omote-mise Tonya Guild, 12 members (of which 6 are inactive and 6 in existence). Tatami covers, green cloth, and mosquito netting.

Uchi-mise Tonya Guild, 10 members. Silk-piece goods, cotton goods, fancy goods, assorted ginned cotton, cutlery, candles.

Uchi-mise Guild's Subsidiary Association.

Kaya-cho Guild, 4 members. Dolls, toys, decoration swords, painted paper lanterns, bon-festival lanterns.

Lacquer-ware Guild, 12 members. All kinds of lacquered wares.

Saké Guild, 45 members. Imported saké, vinegar, soy.

Nail and Ironmonger Guild, 14 members. Nails, iron, copper articles.

Paper Tonyas, 9 members (of which 2 are inactive and 7 in existence). All kinds of paper, candles, parasols, dried bonito, vermicelli.

Ginned Cotton Tonyas, 4 members.

N.B.—These suspended their trade a few years ago, but if taken up again, it must be so reported.

Kashi Tonya Guild, 22 members. Liquid oils.

Kashi Subsidiary Guild.

Cotton Dealers' Guild, 5 members. Ginned cotton.

Paper Dealers' Guild. Paper and candles.

Horidome Guild, 26 members (of which 15 are inactive and 11 in existence). Tatami-covers, coarse goods.

Drug Stores, 33 members (of which 15 are inactive and 18 in existence). Drugs, chemicals, sugar, paints, incense, dyes.

Shinbori Guild, 12 members. Candles, paper, vermicelli, incense, dried bonito, edible seaweed, parasols, fern-rope, tatami covers, green cloth, hemp, taro, sail cloth, nets, locks.

Sumiyoshi Guild, 14 members (of which 4 are inactive and 10 in existence). Paper, coarse goods, candles.

Oil Dealers, 47 members (of which 3 are inactive and 44 in existence). Liquid oils.

Sanbam Guild, 4 members. Paper.

Rice-Bran Guild, 18 members (of which 4 are inactive and 14 in existence). Imported rice-bran.

Dried Articles Guild, 11 members. Dried articles.

Porcelain and Earthenware Guild, 32 members. Porcelain and earthenwares.

The above tonyas are not new guilds lately organized, but were in existence for quite a length of time, and their names have been registered at my office. As there were increases, decreases, and omissions, no definite report could be framed, but I herewith desire to tender a supplement to my last report. Any further changes in the interests, new members, and such points as addresses, names, seals, etc., must be attended to and reported, which I trust will meet with your approval.

I remain,
Honourable Sirs,
TARU YOZAEMON (Elderman of Edo).

Tonyas the Lords of economic Feudalism.—The members of the Tokumi Tonya monopolized the trade between Edo and Osaka, and no one could deal with the producing districts save through the hands of the guild, and this was recognized by the Shogunate. Furthermore, marine transportation between Edo and Osaka was carried on exclusively by the Hishigaki Tonya, which, in fact, gave the entire trade between Edo and Osaka to the Tokumi Tonya. Moreover, the membership of the Tokumi Tonya was gradually limited, and those who were members considered their membership a form of stock which commanded a market price; in fact, just as in the Shogunate, no one, unless he was a scion of one of the old families, could enjoy a certain rank, and such monopolized the political powers, so the trade rights of Edo and Osaka were also entirely based and established on hereditary principles, the tonyas creating an economic feudalism with themselves as the dukes and lords.

Transactions between Tonyas of Edo and Osaka.—Although Osaka had brisk transactions with all parts of the country, yet its connections with Edo were the most flourishing. The city of Edo resorted for its daily necessities to Osaka, and although at first the general tonyas engaged in the transactions were on equal footing, in 1694 the Tokumi Tonya in Edo, and later the Twenty-four Kumi in Osaka, coming to the front, all transactions with Osaka by Hishigaki vessels fell exclusively into the hands of the two combinations at both ends. Transactions between Edo and Osaka were simply imports of goods into Edo, while exports to Osaka were very nominal, one reason for which was the haste of the Hishigaki vessels to weigh anchor and depart for Osaka, so that it was a custom for them not to accept any cargo on the return voyage. Any shipments to be made had to be put aboard other vessels, which was not so safe, as in them the Tokumi Tonyas were under disadvantages.

Two Forms of Tokumi Tonya Transactions.—During the Kyoho era of the collective shipment of commodities, saké shipments were excluded, and the saké dealers arranged their shipments independently, chartering from the Taru Ship Line, so that there arose a competition between them and the Hishigaki Line, which is fully described in the chapter on "Marine Transportation." Although there was competition between the shipping lines, yet all the business between Edo and Osaka through the two services had to pass through the Tokumi Tonya of Edo and the Twenty-four Kumi of Osaka. Whether the cargo came through one or the other of the lines was a matter of no consideration, for they were controlled by the two guilds at both ends, which shut out all non-members. In short, the Tokumi Tonya had the exclusive rights of all shipments made from Osaka to Edo through the Hishigaki vessels (later including the Taru vessels). If we review the transactions between the Tokumi Tonya and the Twenty-four Kumi we may note two different forms, as follows :—

1. The Osaka tonyas shall accept and fill all orders from the Edo tonyas.

2. The Osaka tonyas shall ship goods according to their discretion, whether they receive orders or not. These shipments were known as consignments.

3. The orders for goods from the Tokumi Tonya usually were accompanied by a certain price, and, although rarely, if no buying offers were made, they were supplied according to the ruling prices in the Osaka market, the rate of commission more or less varying according to the goods shipped. A few lines were handled without any returns.

4. When shipments were made on consignments, no price was invoiced, and payment was made according to the Edo market price. However, as the Osaka tonyas paid for their goods in cash and shipped them on consignment, to be paid for after the commodity reached Edo, when the settlement thereof tended to be prolonged, the Osaka exporters gradually began to feel a tightness in capital. Between parties who had been dealing with one another for a number of years, slight arrears did not affect new shipments, but in later years the tendency grew serious, and as a result of it many discontinued exporting to Edo on account of lack of capital. Even if they had any inclination to continue, the Edo tonyas caused them to hesitate, and did not accept any further orders. Of course, this raised prices in Edo. It is said that in the 13th year of Tempo, according to an investigation made, there was an outstanding account of 164,473 ryo due to the Osaka merchants.

Osaka Tonyas' Capital and the Exchange Trade.—To know the relationship between Osaka and Edo it is necessary to find out the Osaka tonyas' means of obtaining working capital. It was the usual trade custom of the Osaka tonyas to accept shipments of goods arrived in the port from different parts of the country and dispose of them to the brokers, who sold them to the dealers, collected the money, and settled with the tonyas, who then paid the respective shippers. However, often enough, before the brokers were ready to settle with the tonyas, the shippers for some reason or other had to sail home, so that they requested an early payment, or were satisfied with a bill of exchange with a certain time limit attached. The tonyas in such a situation paid the shipper by borrowing from the exchanges (quasi-bankers), with whom they had previously opened an account. These loans were payable within thirty days, the interest being 4 bu of silver on 1 kwamme. As it was the custom to pay the shippers in gold, the tonyas obtained gold from the exchanges, but when receiving payment from the brokers the basis was silver, so that within the time the loan was made and receipt of payment there might be fluctuations in silver and gold quotations, causing a loss or a gain. In delving farther into the study of conditions of the exchanges, we learn that when an exchange broker found himself short of capital he asked for a loan from some fellow-trader to accommodate the tonya. On receiving the payment of the loan from the tonya, after ten days he repaid the borrowed amount in silver on the basis of the price of silver at the time of obtaining the loan ; or he could make a settlement at the quotation of silver on the day of refunding, which was a matter to be decided upon between the negotiating parties, and noted in the books upon the terms of redemption after the lapse of ten days. Such accommodations among the exchange brokers, when short of capital, was known as "sho kin gin sen tsunagi shobai," meaning the accommodation of gold and silver, and was limited to the exchange brokers only, so that even those who were short of capital could carry on business. From what has been described we are made to see in what manner the Osaka tonyas were able to obtain their working capital, at the same time taking note that silver was the basis when payment was made from broker to tonya, while the tonyas paid the shipper in gold and not in silver.

Relaxation of the Tokumi Tonya Agreement.—As has been shown previously, the Tokumi Tonya of Edo entrusted the shipment of their goods bought in and around the city of Osaka to the Hishigaki vessels which they directly managed. With the increase of the demand in Edo for the Kamigata saké, the saké manufacturers of Nada and the vicinity of Osaka grew prosperous, the quantity exported to Edo increasing very rapidly ; but when sea damage took place, the method of averaging the losses among the consignors was a point of dispute between the saké consignors and the consignors of other commodities, causing great expense and trouble. In the 15th year of Kyoho, therefore, the members of the Tokumi Tonya conferred and decided to have the saké consignments shipped on vessels other than the Hishigaki boats, which were restricted to handling goods destined for the other nine tonyas. At the same time they decided to load sugar and oil casks as ballast. The change does not mean that the saké dealers were excluded from the Tokumi Tonya, but inasmuch as the saké merchants were excluded from the advantages of the Hishigaki vessels, there soon arose the rift within the lute, and in many cases the Hishigaki and Taru vessels were in keen competition. As the saké dealers were very progressive and energetic, they vigorously took the upper hand in their services, so that some of the tonyas of the Nine Kumi were enticed into shipping their goods on the Taru vessels owing to the cheap freight rates. Within this society it was known as morashizumi (spilled freight). The business of the Hishigaki vessels gradually declined, and the Hishigaki tonyas proposed a compromise to the Taru vessel tonyas, and both parties agreed to observe the regulations covering their respective spheres. The details are plainly outlined in the chapter on "Marine Transportation." Nevertheless, the agreement arrived at was soon violated, and in the era of Tenmei sugar, which was the main cargo of the Hishigaki vessels, was often shipped on the Taru boats owing to their cheap rates, two or three sugar merchants beginning, and others following when they heard of it. The Taru prestige consequently grew stronger, and many of the merchants of the Nine Kumi Tonyas dealing in miscellaneous commodities followed the same course. Thereafter, the discipline in the Tokumi Tonya gradually relaxed, so that even when the Hishigaki vessels were damaged, they could not be repaired, as was formerly done, at the joint expense of the Tokumi tonyas. For this reason, while in the 8th year of Kyoho they numbered 161 vessels, seventy-five years later, in the 5th year of Bunka, the number had decreased to only thirty-eight, of which every one was in very poor condition. Such accidents had to be shouldered by the Tokumi Tonya, and caused them to fight shy of the marine-transportation trade; and as they found it more profitable to engage in miscellaneous merchant business not directly connected with marine transportation, many turned dealers or gave up their trade for other lines of business. When the organization of the Tokumi Tonya was in such disorder and decadence, many merchants who had no connection with the tonya began to import goods directly from Osaka, thus usurping the commercial rights of the Tokumi tonyas.

The Tokumi Tonya obtains the Help of the Shogunate to restrain Others.—Besides the cause explained in the previous paragraph for the slackening of the system of the Tokumi Tonya, there was another which accentuated the decline, namely, the appearance of progressive merchants in Edo, against whom the Tokumi Tonyas could not hold their own in competition, or maintain the monopolistic position which they had so ingeniously built up. During the Kyowa era, not only did the merchants outside the Tokumi Tonya import directly from Osaka goods which was understood to be an exclusive right of the Tokumi, but they even refused to become members of the Tokumi tonyas. There is nothing surprising in this because, in the first place, the ban put by the Tokumi tonyas on others engaged in the direct importation of certain lines of goods from Osaka was only their private interpretation of the law and did not legally bind others. Therefore, those outside the pale of the union not only were not put under restrictions, but were saved association dues and could act as they liked, to the envy of even the members of the Tokumi tonyas. Due to the increase in the influence and number of non-union tonyas, the members of the Tokumi tonyas, on the 17th of May, 1803, presented themselves in a body at the office of one of the Shogunate's commissioners, Odagiri, lord of Tosa, tendering a petition for a decree obliging the non-union parties to join in the Tokumi tonyas.

We meekly beg to submit our cause in writing. On behalf of the merchants and tonyas of the Tokumi residing in your territory we beg to present our cause. That we have been treated with favour and benevolence since our immigration to these parts, being permitted to carry on our trade to this day, is true; this we respectfully acknowledge as a blessing, and for it we tender our humble gratitude. The aforementioned tonyas, known as the Tokumi, the kinds of commodities handled and the numbers are as certified in the books herewith separately annexed.

The said members of the Tokumi engaged in the export of various commodities from the Kamigata Provinces loaded and discharged the same through the Hishigaki vessels from the beginning in order to insure full supply in your domain. Previously those not members of the Tokumi Guild were unable to import directly from the Kamigata end, but lately parties not members of the Tokumi are able without any restraint to import directly from Kamigata just as well as the Tokumi tonyas, so that many are guilty of such violations of the regulations established by the Tokumi. And although we have deliberated on the matter, nothing could be done owing to the size of the territory, and the situation was left to take its own course to this day. At first, as the non-union members traded in lines not handled by the Tokumi matters ran smoothly, not necessitating any negotiations, but, with the growing influence of these merchants and their large numbers, is a vital question to the Tokumi Tonya, threatening the dissolution of the organization if many of the members of the Tokumi are led to separate from the guild. The commodities handled by the Tokumi Tonya have been classified from the beginning and so followed up without change that when its existence is jeopardized those who have assiduously laboured for its organization from the start cannot remain silent. Although the members of the Tokumi tonyas have frequently discussed the proposition, it is impossible to regulate affairs when many of those engaged in direct import from Osaka do not become members of the guild. Moreover, even if inferior goods are imported there are no means of investigation or prohibiting the practice, to which we humbly call your Honour's attention. If the guild is to be dissolved, all goods imported thereafter will be of different grades, and supervision of importation cannot be made as heretofore; at the same time the random influx of goods will upset the market supply, which naturally will react upon the financial condition of the territory. The number of members of the Tokumi tonyas has in late years decreased, and no one will have any inclination to join if things are left as they are now. Moreover, when an organization in existence for years is allowed to fall, difficulties will naturally arise in case any investigations are necessary, when no committee can be resorted to and no one is in a position to give the desired data. Therefore, since the case stands as explained, it is necessary to force the non-members to join the Tokumi Guild, to form a single organized unit. This would be, to our minds, the most convenient means of control. Further, those engaged in direct import, besides the Tokumi tonyas, should be included in one guild or another according to the line of business, and those in the suburbs engaged in direct import should be turned over to the traders in the city, to effect which we humbly request your Honour to use your influence in order that the Tokumi Tonya may exist continuously. Furthermore, upon entrance of non-members into the Tokumi tonyas they incur no initiation expense. Although the nature of the Tokumi is one body and a unit, its field of activities covers a large variety of goods, and we endeavour to keep the markets of the city fully supplied. Therefore, if such transactions are also freely entered into by parties outside the organization, no order could be maintained, and, although we desire to attract such traders into the Tokumi, yet it is impossible within the limits of our powers. Such a state of affairs if left to its natural course will plainly dissolve the Tokumi Guild, so that there is no way but to appeal for succour. We trust you will heed our plea and lend your authority to restrict the transactions with the Kamigata to the Tokumi, which would be an act of deep benevolence and be greatly appreciated by the members of the Tokumi tonyas.

May 17th, the 3rd year of Kyowa (1803).

To H.E. The Magistrate.

In accordance with the inquiry made by Kichibei Mimura of the executive committee of the twenty-two guilds relative to the kinds of goods exclusively handled by the Tokumi tonyas, and what kinds are not, the reply was to be handed in written form, which was at the time promised for the 24th. The executive committee have pleasure in presenting the following memorandum:—

The committees of the various guilds composing the Tokumi tonyas hereby report that on the 17th inst., after we had tendered our petition, you saw fit to summon us for the 19th, at the same time appreciating our position, for which we extend due gratitude. To complete our case, we beg to reply as below:—

As per your inquiry with reference to the commodities handled by the Tokumi tonyas, as to what kinds have been stipulated as their exclusive lines and what not, and as per your commands to tender a full list with said distinctions, we present the same on separate sheet. The organization of the Tokumi tonyas in the first place has its counterpart in the Twenty-Four Kumi of Osaka, who buy, supply, and ship various commodities of the Kamigata, five Kinai provinces, and the vicinity of Osaka, which are shipped and discharged through the vessels plying regularly. Accordingly, when the said vessels meet with accident and damage on the seas, as agreed upon between the ten guilds of Edo and Osaka, all such occurring west of Imakiri of To-tomi shall be investigated by the Osaka end, supervising the average of the cargoes on board and all other actions and deliberations which may be necessary. As you know from our petition, although the number of traders not members of the Tokumi is numerous, yet they have no regulations or organization such as ours. Moreover, owing to the convenience of importing goods, members renounce their membership, the numbers of the Tokumi are gradually dwindling, and if such a state of affairs is left to take its own course, in time there will be no one to continue the existence of the organization. Hence we had no way but to bring the case before your judgment. The motive for the formation of the Tokumi at the beginning was to limit the handling of each line of goods, and not for the purpose of organizing different groups, but within the kinds of goods handled, as given in the separate list, there are articles which have been allocated to certain groups only by public order. In addition, we beg to propose that hereafter all merchants shipping from Osaka shall do so by entering the respective guilds of the Tokumi or the Twenty-four Kumi, subject to each line of trade. The nature of the Tokumi merchants' method is such that in shipping consignments they are so arranged between Edo and Osaka that due respect is given to the market prices and other points, whereas, among the numerous individual traders no discipline exists and importations are made at random, causing over-supply, and even when their policy is in accordance with the circumstances, they act without due consideration of others and undue hardships are met with in trade circles. Therefore, we again beg you to use your influence to have these individuals become members of our organizations in order that due co-operation may be possible for the benefit of all concerned.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE RESPECTIVE
GUILDS OF THE TOKUMI TONYAS.

May 24th, the 3rd year of Kyowa.

TO H.E. THE MAGISTRATE.

TOKUMI TONYAS RECOGNIZED BY LAW.—It is possible from the foregoing two petitions to obtain an idea of the Tokumi Tonya organization, and we know that averages of cargoes were divided between Edo and Osaka, by setting Imakiri of To-tomi Province as the boundary. Further, in its case to the Shogunate it gave two reasons, namely: (1) should the merchants outside of the Tokumi be allowed to trade freely, no due control could be exercised; and (2) in case of emergency the Shogunate would not be able to rely on the aid of the Tokumi organization. At any rate, the slightly threatening petition had its effect, and the Shogunate summoned the president and manager of the Tokumi tonyas to the elderman's office of Edo, which may be likened to the municipal office of the present day, questioning them whether the tonyas' desire was a licence for tonya-kabu of the entire line of goods handled by themselves and monopoly like rights. To this the committee replied that what they aimed at was not tonya-kabu, but that all merchants handling the same line of goods as the Tokumi traders should be made members of the Tokumi organization, to which the Shogunate acquiesced and ordered the non-members to join the Tokumi Tonya Guild, making them sign the agreement given below. Thereafter, on the 7th of February of the 5th Year of Bunka (1808), the Shogunate granted the Edo Tokumi Tonya Guild the name of Hishigaki Vessel Shippers (Hishigaki Kaisen Tsumi Nakama), which was not only a permission to use a title, but a licence of a legal nature which plainly set forth that all members of the organization should abide by the decisions made by the members of the said organization.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TOKUMI TONYA AND OTHER TONYAS.

We graciously extend our gratitude to you for listening to our recent plea, and beg to say that those members who have lately joined the guild are not as yet fully aware of the organization's by-laws, but will be so informed after carefully reading the constitution, so that they may not act according to their individual viewpoint but in a line with the regulations of the guild made for mutual advantage. Moreover, whether they be the old or new members, any misdemeanour found shall be reported to the two arbiters, and thereafter be discussed by the four elected seal-holders.

That with the formation of the Tokumi Shippers' Guild all members shall register their respective seals at the Taru's office, and swear that they will not adopt an individualistic attitude or commit a breach of the existing regulations of the Tokumi.

That after the registration of the names and seals of the members with the Taru's office, we beg to be granted the licence of forming a Tokumi Shippers' Guild, and in return thereof shall immediately submit to any orders hereafter to be given.

November, 3rd year of Bunka (1805).

We hereby agree to the above clauses by affixing our seals thereto.

The document as given, showing the agreements between the new and old members of the Tokumi tonyas, is sufficient to prove the extent of the merchants' wisdom during the middle part of the Tokugawa period, and is a fine specimen of shopkeeper literature, a record which cannot be passed over with neglect.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TOKUMI TONYAS AND THE SUGAR MERCHANTS.—It was in February 1808 when the Tokumi tonyas received a licence to the title of Hishigaki Vessel Shippers, but in May 1807 there had been an internal dispute within the tonyas. Sugar was not an indigenous product, but introduced through the Dutch and Chinese traders, and in the early stages was handled by the drug drealers merely as one of the imported articles. With the increased demand for sugar, the quantity of imports increased too, and to reduce it brown sugar began to be produced in Satsuma and Ryukyu. After some time the country was able to produce refined sugar such as wasanbon, etc., and, although it became a staple similar to rice and salt, a daily necessity to the life of the nation, yet it was still handled by the drug merchants. Neither does this mean that the fifty-one drug merchants of the Tokumi group all handled this article, for there were only sixteen of the number engaged in the trade, the remaining thirty-five following only the drug lines. Owing to the enormous quantity of sugar shipments handled by these sixteen drug tonyas, in order to reduce the freight rate they attempted to withdraw from the Tokumi tonyas, so that they might be able to do as they pleased. They decided, therefore, not to entrust their consignments to the Hishigaki vessels, which were chartered boats of the Tokumi tonyas, and secretly loaded their shipments on the Taru vessels, which were chartered ships of the saké tonyas, causing a disruption within the Tokumi organization, and bringing up the question of the guild's decadence. When these sixteen sugar men realized their power, they took in another man, bringing the number up to seventeen, formed an association in 1807, and petitioned the Lord Odagiri, the City Magistrate of Edo, to grant them a licence to establish a sugar guild to bring about a new line of trade, offering to pay a royalty of 1,000 ryo per annum to the Shogunate. The remaining thirty-five drug tonyas were greatly dismayed and excited at this movement, and they immediately brought a petition before the Shogunate begging that the same rights should be granted to all the drug tonyas, and not only the refractory sixteen. It had become the custom since the Genroku era to call each licence of trade a kabushiki, which was a monopoly right and fair subject of barter. Not only did the other drug tonyas oppose the movement of the sixteen, but the general members of the Tokumi tonyas also lodged a complaint against these sugar merchants, stating that they had violated the custom of the Tokumi tonyas by consigning their sugar through Taru vessels instead of the Hishigaki, thus causing a disorder in the system of the organization, and requested the authorities to bid these breakers of rules make their sugar shipments ballast cargo of the Hishigaki vessels, as had been the practice. Thus there arose a triple and complicated strife between the sugar tonyas, drug tonyas, and the members of the Tokumi, and the Shogunate was at a loss to know how to make a settlement. In the meanwhile the members of the Tokumi tonyas secretly entrusted the mission of settling the entangled affair to a courier tonya, Mojiro Sugimoto, who visited all parties and heard what they had to say, and finally succeeded in bringing about an adjustment of the case satisfactory to the three groups. With regard to the dispute between the sugar merchants and the drug tonyas, it was proposed to permit the establishment of new sugar merchants' kabushiki to fifty-one houses composed of the Honcho and Denmacho Drug Merchants' Guild, with the addition of one subsidiary dealer of the Honcho Guild, making the total fifty-two parties. Of this number, the sixteen merchants who took the initiative in petitioning, with one other dealer, and eight members of the remaining thirty-five drug merchants, were to be allowed to deal mainly in sugar. The above three groups, numbering twenty-five, were to be given the exclusive handling of the sugar imports from Kamigata ; the remaining twenty-seven reserving their rights in return for a certain rate of royalty per annum from those engaged in the business. This proposal found favour with the officials, sugar and drug tonyas, and the question was satisfactorily settled.

THE TRUST IN THE TOKUGAWA REGIME.—The arrangement arrived at between the triple groups was plainly an early establishment of the trust as we find it in the United States. Not only was the number of the Edo drug merchants limited to twenty-five members, but the remaining twenty-seven houses reserved their rights, taking dividends in return for not engaging in competition, which was simply equivalent to a trust which closes the factories of some of its members in order to curtail production, creating what is known as sleeping-partners. We must admit that to learn of the existence of trust organizations a century ago, and already in practise by the Edo merchants, is almost incredible. Neither was this system first created in 1808. As previously explained, within the petition of the Tokumi tonyas to the Shogunate, in the 4th year of Kwansei, there appears the arrangement proposing that out of the thirty-three members of the drug guild, fifteen were to be in reserve, and out of nine paper tonyas, two were to be in reserve, which shows that in 1789 trusts were already working, and that Mojiro Sugimoto did nothing but adopt the idea to fit into the settlement of the commercial strife. It seems that during the Genroku era, soon after the formation of the Tokumi tonyas, trust organization had been practised, which shows that the merchants of the day were not only diligent and hardworking, but had thorough organization and system. Having settled the dispute, Mojiro further made the Tokumi tonyas give up its rigid principles, recognizing the sugar tonyas shipping their goods hereafter by the Taru vessels, and at the same time proposing that all other shipment of goods handled by the sugar merchants should be entrusted to the Hishigaki vessels. Both parties favoured the proposal, so that the lawsuit was withdrawn and matters settled amicably. This affair may be classed as one of the largest commercial cases during the Tokugawa era and conspicuous for its clever and appropriate solution.

A SKETCH OF THE PERSON OF MOJIRO SUGIMOTO.—Mojiro Sugimoto was the son of a small farmer of the village of Matsume-hara, Yashiro-gori of the province of Kai, but adopted into the family of Mohei Osaka-ya, Yorozu-cho, Edo. Mohei's family occupation was that of an appointed courier tonya, covering such business as the carrying of orders from the Shogunate to its officials in far-off provinces, acting as agents of the stipend office of the large and small daimiates, as correspondents of commercial transactions for the Edo merchants, as consignees of the silver and gold shipments, etc. In other words, his business was that of an all-round broker and trustee, which began sometime in the Kwanei era and was handed down from father to son for two hundred years. Such a business was connected with the different Government offices, knowing all the intricacies and red tape of such places, and had transactions with different merchants, obtaining first-hand knowledge of their idiosyncrasies, so that Sugimoto was the most competent man to steer a way through the convolutions of Government red tape and the intricate conventions of the commercial classes. At the time there were six houses in Edo engaged in the business of the appointed courier tonyas, who jointly paid a royalty to the Kwanto-gun Dai (County Commissioner) of the Shogunate amounting to 50 ryo every year on the 15th day of November, in consideration of which their business was made kabu. The above 50 ryo were apportioned according to the amount of capital of the member, and as we find Mojiro Sugimoto paying 16 ryo of the sum, it must be that not only was he superior in talent and energy, but the richest of the number. In 1806, when the Shogunate was hard up, they compounded the royalty for a lump sum of 300 ryo to meet the immediate requirements of the Government and to get rid of a permanent burden, which shows how clever they were in negotiating with the authorities. At the time the Kishu clan owed the Shogunate 8,000 ryo, and in discussing the matter with the clan authorities, Sugimoto hinted that if the Kishu clan lord could persuade the Shogunate to grant special privileges to the Tokumi tonyas, they would be sure to remunerate their benefactor. Although we cannot ascertain what the remuneration was, it is certain that the hint had effect, as we note that thereafter the Hishigaki vessels began to fly the Kishu clan flag.

MITSUI FAMILY AIDS TOKUMI TONYAS.—It is said that Mojiro was able to build a number of new vessels and to manage the new enterprise largely with the help of the Mitsui family. Although Mitsui made it a family regulation to avoid loans to the daimyos, yet, as special cases, accounts were opened with the Uyesugi family of Yonezawa and the Tokugawa family of Kishu, and it seems probable that the Mitsui broached Mojiro's proposal to the Count of Kishu, that the daimyo should bring pressure on the Shogunate to favour the Tokumi tonyas. Mojiro's business was not one in which he could fully display his talent and energy, and the Tokumi tonyas appointed him Torishimari-sewa, (Comptroller), and he proved such a clever manager that he was recommended to the presidency of the oldest and most influential trade union, bringing the organization under his influence. He did not, however, receive any remuneration whatever from the tonyas and lived on the proceeds of his business, which was managed by his son. The Shogunate, therefore, recognizing his public services, gave him a stipend amounting to the sustenance of three persons, the privilege of a surname, the right to carry a sword, and an official capacity with the title of agent of the Commissioner and president of the Tokumi tonyas. His position among the citizens was similar to that of the office of land allotter, who, during the pioneer days of Edo, was an elder and had the powers of allotting lands, ranking second to the city elder, Taruya Yozaemon, who may be likened to the mayor of the present day. Thus Mojiro became one of the most honoured citizens of Edo.

The Construction of a Hundred Hishigaki Vessels.—History records the names of many men who have perpetrated themselves by heroically risking their lives for the sake of the state, dying on battlefields, buried among horses and shivered arms, or, as statesmen, distinguishing themselves in times of sedition and what not; but men who work simply out of a desire to help their fellow-creatures, and whose only reward is the respect of their contemporaries, must not, at any rate in Japan, look for further fame, though in the West there are not a few who have won immortality in this manner. Of course, even in this country there are to be found men in different provinces and prefectures who made waterways for their town or locality, or cultivated forests, or built bridges, and performed other public-spirited actions, but there rarely can be found in the metropolis men who have been canonized as heroes. Mojiro Sugimoto must be counted as one of the very few. He led the disagreement between the Tokumi sugar and drug tonyas to settlement, and revived the Tokumi tonyas, which was on the verge of dissolution. He not only saved the organization from collapse, but framed a new programme for its restoration and expansion. Before his time the price of commodities advanced in Edo for various causes. We can number among them the increased output of debased coins in the Genroku era with the frequent re-minting of currencies causing an increase of the amount in circulation, and the rise in the standard of living, with its growing demand for daily necessities affecting the equilibrium of supply and demand. But the most important cause was the decrease in the number of Hishigaki vessels, which was the only means of importing Kamigata commodities into Edo on account of the loss of prestige and derangement of the organization of the Tokumi tonyas. The fact that 161 Hishigaki vessels in the Kyoho era were reduced to only 35 in the Bunkwa era is sufficient to make clear the seriousness of the position. It is true that the Taru vessels came on the scene competing against the Hishigaki, but their number was in no way comparable to that of the flourishing period of the latter line. For this reason Edo was often short of commodities while there was a surplus in the provinces. Moreover, owing to the slackness of the Tokumi business, the members were hard hit financially, and they lacked business capital, so that not a few borrowed money from several tonyas of Osaka. Thus handicapped, although receiving shipments from Osaka, they often did not meet the bills, or postponed payment thereof, or further increased their debts. Finally, the Osaka tonyas, anticipating a postponement or non-payment of accounts, increased the price of their goods so that naturally the prices in Edo ascended. Neither should we overlook the fact that the Hishigaki vessels were in bad shape, and there were frequent marine mishaps, causing enormous losses, which were averaged out and made everything imported by ship high. This was the situation when Mojiro Sugimoto became the president of the Tokumi, and he tackled the ship question first, urging on all the members the necessity of a joint subscription to overhaul the old ships and build new ones, sufficient to bring their fleet up to 100. Regarding the necessary expense, he made preliminary arrangements with the Konoike family of Osaka, and with their support he proposed the plan. The tonyas' members were content to leave matters in his hands, and he immediately took steps to realize his plan of a fleet of 100 new and old vessels. He fixed the number at 100 because he thought it enough to keep Edo supplied, and was not merely considering profits as the head of the Tokumi tonyas. His motive was a noble one, as he desired to give Edo abundant supplies to stabilize the life of the capital.

MONETARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE TOKUMI FROM SHIP-OWNERS.—The Tokumi Tonya then decided to repair and build the Hishigaki vessels, and this vigorous step gave no little inspiration to the officers and sailors. These men knew that with the launching of the new programme the livelihood of the seamen would become secure, and in order to show their gratitude they wanted to contribute towards the enterprise, proposing to return to the management of the Tokumi tonyas 200 momme of silver from the freight for each ship on every round trip. As the freight between Edo and Osaka, return trip included, ranged between 13 and 20 kwamme of silver, the seamen figured their gift as 1 per cent., which was to be accumulated and to be utilized either to supplement the expenses of constructing new vessels or in any way thought fit by the management. This proposal came as a great surprise, for the tonyas had not reckoned upon it, and they decided to give it as an allowance to Mojiro Sugimoto for his efforts on their behalf. At the same time they made him a life-director of the Hishigaki Vessel Guild. The decision was reported to Mojiro, who declined with thanks, stating that he did not deserve such generosity, and told them to spend the sum for something more important, for which he had a plan. He then proposed a scheme by which to expand further the undertaking and influence of the Tokumi tonyas.

THE TOKUMI TONYAS' PLAN TO REBUILD THREE LARGE BRIDGES.—According to Mojiro's project every Hishigaki vessel was to make about four round trips between Edo and Osaka during a year, and 100 vessels would make four hundred voyages. This would bring the ship contribution up to 80 kwamme of silver per annum, or in gold, at 60 momme to 1 ryo, 1,330 ryo making in ten years 13,300 ryo. Now in Edo there were many bridges in a very serious state, much to the inconvenience of the citizens and loss of money to the Shogunate. In the case of the three bridges spanning the Okawa, namely Eitai-bashi, Shin-ohashi, and Okawa-bashi, the Shogunate to save expenses had let the rights to a private party, who collected a toll of 2 mon per head from the citizens. Of course, it was stipulated that the contractor should build up a reserve to cover the expenses of repair and rebuilding, yet as the original purpose was a money-making proposition, such terms as repairing and rebuilding were only nominal. The Shin-ohashi was in a positively dangerous state, and finally the Shogunate, unable to allow the situation to drift, advanced money and rebuilt the three bridges. "However," said Mojiro, "there will come a time again when the three bridges will have to be rebuilt at great expense to the state. With this unexpected windfall from the seamen, the Tokumi tonyas should propose the building and repair of the said bridges, at the same time abolishing the levying of tolls, which will have the double advantage of saving the Shogunate a lot of expense and conveniencing the public. It is true that in their present condition the three bridges do not need any repair, but due preparations must be made for the future. Calculating that the three bridges will be serviceable for the next ten years, we shall have 13,300 ryo to spend, and, doubling the period, 26,000 ryo. The interest on this sum will easily cover the necessary expenses of the three bridges." This plan was unanimously favoured, and in November of the 5th year of Bunkwa a petition was tendered to the authority setting forth how the funds were to be raised, and that in place of the Government the Tokumi tonyas volunteered to shoulder the upkeep of the three bridges, at the same time abolishing the tolls heretofore levied.

A Banking Organization called the Three-Bridge Company.—Glancing through Mojiro's petition we come across such phrases as "grace of the state," "in gratitude for," and "special benevolence," all expressive of deep gratitude; but Mojiro Sugimoto, who thought out the plan, was not blindly thanking a parcel of insignificant officials. Under the guise of serving the state by undertaking all expenses of the upkeep of the bridges and supervising the same, he had in mind the establishment of a banking system for the benefit of the Tokumi tonyas by accumulating and using the funds. To form a company and accumulate company required the permission of the

Shogunate, and, as it was extremely difficult to obtain this permit, he proposed to undertake the great task for the upkeep of the public utility referred to, tickling the Shogunate officials with what he called serving the state. He knew that when he tendered the petition the Shogunate would summon the signatories and consent. With this accomplished, a second petition was tendered in which is given the true purpose, namely, the request to allow the establishment of an organ known as the "Three-Bridge Company" for the supervising of the upkeep of the three bridges.

Conditions under which the Licence was granted to the Three-Bridge Company.—As Mojiro expected, the authorities, at their wits' end for money, were greatly moved by the offer, and summoned the officers of the Tokumi tonyas and Mojiro Sugimoto several times to question them, but finally consented to entrust to them the upkeep of the three bridges, stipulating a few conditions. In order to amass a fund the Sankyo Kaisho, that is to say, Three-Bridge Company, was created, which was permitted ordinarily to be the financial organ of the Tokumi tonyas.

The conditions were :—

1. No tolls should be collected from the crossers.
2. Watchers shall be placed at both ends of the bridges, in order to keep clear the bridgeways and the open ground in the neighbourhood.
3. When the Shogun is to cross the bridges, the tea-house-boats around the bridges shall be removed, and all filth and rubbish on and under the bridges shall be swept away.
4. Due precautions shall be taken against fire and flood.
5. The annual expenses required for the repair of the bridges, amounting roughly to 175 ryo for Eitai-bashi, 52 ryo for Shin ohashi, and 100 ryo for the Okawa-bashi, shall be shouldered by the Tokumi tonyas.
6. Since 2,963 ryo were advanced by the Shogunate for the construction of the Eitai-bashi, redemption to be made within twenty years at 148 ryo 9 momme per annum, and 250 ryo were advanced for the repair of the Okawa-bashi, at 8 per cent., of which 100 ryo has already been redeemed, the Tokumi tonyas shall pay the sum of 250 ryo at the end of the year. Eitai-bashi has a debt of 742 ryo, and redemption shall be at the rate of 90 ryo per year for nine years, covering principal and interest. Shin-ohashi has an advance of 400 ryo from the city office, the present balance being 320 ryo, which shall be redeemed in annual payments of 80 ryo with interest.
7. The contractors of the Shin-ohashi and Okawa-bashi shall be entitled to the rents paid by the tea-stands, and so on, for the open ground around the said bridges, and shall employ two men as watchers of the bridge at a fixed wage.
8. The Shogunate will have no objection if Mojiro Sugimoto be elected president and administrator of the Three-Bridge Company (Sankyo Kaisho).
9. The funds of the company shall be loaned only to the members, and to no others.

With this licence the office of the company was opened at Nishikashi, and became a very busy financial organ. Previous to the formation of this organ, during the Kyoho era, the Osaka branch office of the Nagasaki copper exchange formed itself into a copper-za, which accumulated capital and established an affiliated financial medium for the purpose of helping their fellow-traders. However, it began to do business by making ordinary advances, so that what Sugimoto and his colleagues desired was to establish a like medium of the Tokumi tonyas by imitating that founded in Osaka. Here is another evidence showing the genius of the Kamigata race in trade activities.

SYSTEMS OF LOANS DURING THE MIDDLE OF THE TOGUGAWA ERA.—The capital of this financial organ was for the most part composed of the money contributed by the seamen as described in the foregoing pages. The Three-Bridge Company loaned this fund to members of the Tokumi tonyas, who lacked commercial capital, and the amount was left to the discretion of the executives, who decided according to the standards of the borrower, who offered no security but paid an interest of 8 per cent. Further, according to the plan of Mojiro Sugimoto, there was a system called " harmony between the poor and rich," under which the rich members loaned their surplus capital to the Sankyo Kaisho at 7 per cent., who then accommodated the needed members at 8 per cent., profiting by 1 per cent., so that the comparatively poor members of the guild had access to capital at low interest, thanks to the good will of the rich members. If we study the system of the middle part of the Tokugawa Shogunate, we find there were three kinds of loans made by the professional money-lenders to the citizens of Yedo. The first was the so-called house mortgage, by which money could be borrowed by those who owned land, who openly mortgaged the property, though actually it was a contract similar to a deed of sale. The interest on such loans was 2 or 2½ per cent. The second was called loan against deeds (koken kari) which was an advance against security of the deed of ownership, and interest of 7 to 8 per cent. was charged. The third was called te-jomai, or " hand-lock," which was a loan made against the amount appraised on the stocks of merchants in their warehouses, which were locked and sealed. The interest charged was from 7 to 8 per cent. About the time of the Bunkwa era the interest rates advanced. That for iye jichi (mortgage) loans became 7 to 8 per cent.; koken kari became 10 to 15 per cent.; te-jomai interest was the ordinary rate plus what was called gratitude fee, which was nothing but an additional interest and practically similar to usury. Merchants grew more and more distressed, and consequently prices increased. Many of the members of the Tokumi tonyas had resorted to capital bearing exorbitant rates, but by the foundation of the Sankyo Kaisho, which accommodated them with capital at low interest, an easy access to money was opened. Moreover, all meetings of members were held in the Sankyo Kaisho office instead of in restaurants, at a great saving of time and money, not to mention the elimination of other evils. Thus the Tokumi Tonya, with the establishment of a financial organ, at once became of the nature of a credit association, and when we find that the gross trade returns of the guild per year at the time aggregated 5,000,000 ryo, we can easily imagine what the magnitude of the Sankyo Kaisho as a credit organ must have been to be able to finance such an amount of business.

Tokumi Tonyas' Kabu.—Although Mojiro Sugimoto had thus hoodwinked the authorities and established a credit organ, after obtaining the licence in April 1809, with some difficulty he got the consent of the members of the Tokumi to offer to pay the Shogunate a royalty every year. In spite of their confidence in Mojiro, the largeness of the sum to be paid caused many to hesitate. Those who agreed to pay without any hesitation numbered thirty-eight lines of trade, whose total royalty came up to 8,150 ryo. When the executive committee petitioned the Shogunate to accept the gift in return for all the protection extended by it, handing in a list of the members who made the gift, the authorities were highly pleased, calling the step a unique one, and accepting the contribution with commendation, at the same time permitting the royalty to be paid in old or defaced coins. It also prohibited any further pressing of those members who did not see their way clear to join the givers.

FIXED AMOUNT TO BE PRESENTED PERPETUALLY IN RETURN FOR THE BENEVOLENCE OF THE AUTHORITIES BY THE MERCHANTS TRADING WITH OSAKA THROUGH THE HISHIGAKI VESSELS.

Ryo.	Tonyas Line of Trade.	Members.
1,000	Ginned cotton	68
1,000	Cotton goods	44
500	Liquid oil	18
30	Coloured oil	3
300	Tatami covers	32
400	Drugs and chemicals	52
200	Sugar	10
400	Nails and iron goods	65
200	Seto porcelain	35
100	Incense	59
100	Imported swords and cutlery	36
100	Imported paraffin	—
300	Paper	47
100	Floss silk	33

Ryo.	Tonyas Line of Trade.	Members.
200	Dyes and colours	—
25	Bamboo sheaths	—
50	Secondhand cloth	12
15	Osaka tabi	32
100	Leather-soled sandals	37
30	Hemp slippers	10
100	Cured bonito and dried fish	8
200	Dried sardines	15
100	Paint	73
50	Yarns	21
10	Sedge hats	9
35	Tin and lead (two guilds)	8
35	Candles	25
1,500	Shinkawa saké	—
60	Soy	38
20	Vinegar guild	—
50	Uji tea	30
100	Shipping-agent of Nihombashi	—
200	Ocean-going ship-owners	30
20	Coasting ships	35
30	Ship-chandlers	8
350	Fancy goods, fans, smoking pipes, toilet articles	8 —
50	Kaya-machi and Tori-machi ink and brushes guild, Nihombashi, Yorodzu-cho Osakaya Mohei's family	— —
8,150	Total.	

June, 6th year of Bunkwa.

In the following year the names and amounts increased as follows:

Tonya Trades.	*Royalties in Ryo*
Drugs and chemicals	200
Odemachi drugs and chemical guild	200
Tatami covers	300
Imported bran	200
Liquid oils	500
Ginned cotton	1,000
Seto porcelain wares	200
Cotton goods	1,000
Nails, iron, and copper goods	400
Swords and cutlery	100
Dyes and colours	200
Paraffin	100
Tin and lead	50
Ship-chandlers	30
Paints and dyeing herbs	100

Tonya Trades.	*Royalties in Ryo.*
Paper	300
Incense	100
Cured bonito, salted and dried fish	100
Leather-soled sandals	100
Bamboo sheaths	25
Koshu and Joshu teas	50
Floss silk	100
Torimachi and Uchimi fancy goods guild	115
Thirty-six houses guild, imported candles	10
Imported candles	35
Marmai guild : Fancy goods	40
Needles	10
Ink and brushes (old)	30
Smoking pipes	20
Face powder	20
Fans	10
Ink and brushes (new)	30
Kaya-machi guild, dolls and tonya	20
Fans	25
Hemp slippers	20
Dried sardines, oil cake, and fish oils	200
Secondhand cloth	50
Inland river shippers	20
Coloured oils	35
Ichi-ban and Ni-ban guild, lacquered wares	60
Imported salt	40
Imported salt, breakers	60
Yarns	50
Sedge hats	10
Imported saké	1,500
Osaka tabi dealers	15
Rice and potato starch	50
Seaweed and jute waste	70
Tobacco	300
Pans and pots	150
Imported parasols	150
Liquid oil brokers	150
Hemp card	150
Dry goods	500
Soy	300
Empty casks	70
Round rattan	10
Imported vermicelli	30
Cotton spindles	20
Tea	100
Ginseng	20
Courier	50
Hishigaki ship-agents	100
Hishigaki vessel longshoremen	200
Total	10,200

Licence granted to the Tokumi Tonyas, making them Hereditary Occupations.—Mojiro did not pay such a handsome sum to the Shogunate just to receive praise from the officials for the mere sake of pride or vanity. He was by no means such a simple person. His object was to obtain for the Tokumi tonyas a legal sanction to make their trade a kabu, to give to each a hereditary nature. It is true that in practice each trade name commanded a premium on the market, and was subject to be bought and sold as a kabu, prices ranging from 50 to 4,000 ryo. Such trades as imported salt tonyas, paraffin tonyas, cotton goods tonyas, and what was outside the Tokumi Guild, and the purveyors of rice to the Shogunate's warehouses, were known as "thousand-ryo kabu," which were bought and sold or used as bonds and security. In such a way, although each line of trade was recognized as kabu within trade customs, there was no legal recognition, so that if a third party began to infringe upon the rights, there was no statute to resort to to stop it. Mojiro, therefore, in return for the royalty paid, desired to obtain legal protection, and he requested the authorities to grant a certificate to each giver specifying the name, his affiliations with the guild, and the amount. When asked what was the purpose of such a certificate, he replied that it was in order to make it a record and preserve it so that in case a tonya failed and was unable to carry on his trade he might sell his interest accompanied by the said certificate. If the owner held the certificate after transferring his interests to another, there was a possibility of a decrease in the amount of royalties. Another point was that if there was a decrease in the tonyas engaged in importation of goods by sea, it would cause a scarcity of commodities in the metropolis, even while abundant supplies were to be found in the provinces, finally enhancing prices. The Shogunate finally acquiesced to Mojiro's plan and granted certificates to the payers of the royalties legally recognizing the tonyas trade as kabu, and hence, hereditary occupations. To keep these royalty papers, the Shogunate granted a piece of land 110 tsubo at Sanchome, Muromachi, on which a building was built.

The Shogunate and the Sankyo Kaisho.—Still Mojiro's programme did not stop with what he had already accomplished. He always impressed on the Shogunate the need of the Tokumi organization and ample funds for the Sankyo Kaisho, in order to maintain the position of the tonyas; and when he requested the Government to loan one-half of the amount of the royalty for three years without interest, it consented to lend 4,075 ryo to the Sankyo Kaisho on his terms, so that the organ was able to utilize free capital. Thus the Tokumi Tonya not only revived through the management of Mojiro Sugimoto but, moreover, expanded their undertakings and influence, so that many merchants outside the organization cherished a grudge against it, and many spoke of the evils of monopolizing the profits of the trade between Edo and Osaka. For this reason the executives of the tonyas reported to the City Magistrate, Odagiri, lord of Tosa, that of the vessels owned by the Hishigaki Ship Line seven were wrecked and one was missing, and three had jettisoned their cargoes or had them washed away, making a total loss of eleven vessels. The financial loss on the cargoes and cost of vessels from these disasters was estimated at over 45,000 ryo. Further, the saké importers had lost twelve vessels and ten had damaged cargoes, the total amount of loss being figured at over 42,000 ryo. The cotton guild vessels, numbering five lost and three with damaged cargoes, the liabilities of which ran up to 33,000 ryo. As a result, it was natural that the prices in Edo should take an upward trend. However, the Tokumi tonyas, reflecting on the public criticisms that would be made against their organization if there really took place an increase of prices at the time when the Sankyo Kaisho was just brought into existence, chartered vessels from all around, paying a rate higher than what was fixed on the Hishigaki ships, in order to maintain a full supply of tonnage, and endeavoured to keep the markets of Edo supplied, so that prices did not rise after all. Unhappily, the tonyas met various criticisms, as very few knew how sincere and devoted they were, but the Shogunate recognized the efforts to make up for the marine losses, and decided to lend the remaining half of the royalties to the Sankyo Kaisho as a contribution to the cost of building new vessels.

TOKUMI TONYAS GUILD KABU BECOMES LEGALLY RECOGNIZED.—With the growth of the undertakings of the Tokumi tonyas, the members who had at first hesitated to pay the royalty saw that it was a good move and requested in December 1810 that they, too, be allowed to pay a total of 2,050 ryo. The Shogunate acceded to their wish, and they received certificates similar to those of the first group. The sum total of the royalties of the Tokumi tonyas, now composed of 65 guilds numbering 1,995 persons, reached 10,200 ryo, and in March 1816 the Shogunate finally authorized them by issuing the following instructions to the 119 executives of Hishigaki shippers :—

> It is learned with pleasure that you have been of great service to the Government, especially in the case of the adjustment of rice supply, having made great efforts in collaborating with your Osaka colleagues. In order to be able to administer due supervision it has been decided to limit the number of guild members to 1,995, authorizing them as kabushiki, and granting to each their respective licence in order to prohibit the forming of any new groups. In case anyone owing to personal circumstances cannot continue his trade, the licence shall be entrusted to the guild, in the meantime the

members to select any new party who may be deemed as worthy of the position and recommend the said party to the authorities.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE TONYAS IN EDO.—This memorandum perfected the Tokumi tonyas association as a *bona-fide* za, making it a monopolizing enterprise. During the Bunsei era the tonyas of each line of the various trades of Edo assembled within certain limits somewhat in the following manner :—

Tonyas.	*Streets.*
Fresh fish	Around Nihombashi.
Salted fish	Around Yokkaichi.
Cured bonito	Around Kobuna-cho.
Rice	Around Ise-cho.
Drugs and chemicals	Honcho Sanchome.
Cotton goods	Denmacho Itchome.
Smoking pipes, paper tobacco-pouch	Around Abura-cho.
Sinks and chopping boards	Around Koyanagi-cho.
Inks and brushes	Around Abura-cho.
Needles	Around Kyobashi.
Bamboo	Both sides of Kyobashi.
Furniture	Teppo-cho.
Sign-board	Edo-bashi.
Colour print	Yoshi-cho.
Sugar	Honcho.
Water-jar	Reiganjima
Buddha images	Teppo-cho
Copper-ware	Daimon-dori.
Fried articles	Koami-cho.
Basket	Kanei-cho.
Slipper	Shirokane-cho
Poultry	Yasuhari-cho.
Steaming basket	Muro-machi. Odenma-cho.
Abacus	Muro-machi.
Tatami (mats)	Odenma-cho.
Lumber	Honzaimoku-cho. Shinzaimoku-cho. Konya-cho.
Rock and stone	Kamejimacho.
Cereal	Ise-cho.
Lock	Reiganjima.
Earthenware	Imagawa-bashi.
Second-hand clothing	Tomizawa-cho.
Parasol	Kayaba-cho.
Traveller (hotels)	Bakuro-cho.
Dyer	Konya-cho.
Saké	Shinkawa.
Charcoal and firewood	Teppo-zu.
Doll	Ningyo-cho.
Match	Bakuro-cho.

Tonyas.	*Streets.*
Cabinet-maker	Kodemma-cho.
Physicians	Otamagaike.
Short sword	Muramatsu-cho.
Hairdresser	Around Ryogoku.
Leather-soled sandal	Hikage-cho.
Geisha girls	Yanagi-bashi.

Although the list specifies such professions as doctors, hairdressers, and geisha as tonyas. this does not mean tonyas in the strict sense of the word, but implies they were members of the guild. According to the enumerated facts, we get a general idea of the distribution of tonya districts during this period.

THE MEANING OF EDO UCHIKOSHI SHIPMENTS.—The gradual growth of the Tokumi Tonya Guild into a monopoly of the trade between Osaka and Edo is now clear, but this monopoly was widened still further, until it covered transit taxes for goods passing from O-u to Osaka, or goods shipped from Osaka through Edo to Eastern Japan. The Tokumi tonyas were clearly more than the desultory organization carelessly recorded by many historians, but was a great system which spread its meshes widely, establishing barriers in all directions on land and on water, east and west. We read in Tokugawa days of uchikoshi shipments, which were goods to be transhipped from O-u to Osaka, or from Osaka or Tokkaido to the provinces near Edo, or to be shipped to O-u without passing through the hands of the tonyas. However, after the Tokumi tonyas became so powerful, these uchikoshi shipments could not be freely handled except through the hands of the Edo tonyas, even if the goods did not in any way actually pass through their hands, and nothing could be done without reference to them. Nevertheless, there were exceptions. The trade of various districts had been active before the formation of the Tokumi tonyas, and goods were sent to O-u from Kamigata, or rice-producing areas by ship, or on horseback, without passing through the hands of the tonyas. Before the autumn equinox, goods exported from O-u had up to that time passed down the Mogami River, went northward through O-ishida, via the Straits of Tsugaru to the port of Tsuruga, from thence they were shipped to Kamigata via Shimonoseki, the route being known as the Northern Route. When the autumn equinox was passed the shipments from O-u were sent to Edo, but after the Bunka era, as a consequence of the development of marine transportation, all goods were shipped to Edo regardless of the season. Still, when the shipments took the Northern Route the past usage was followed, and this was recognized as outside the pale of the Edo tonyas' sphere of influence.

THE BEGINNING OF THE RESTRICTION OF THE EDO UCHIKOSHI SHIPMENTS.—It is not exactly known when the Edo uchikoshi shipments were prohibited, for we cannot find the records, but at least the restriction was already made in the Kyoho era, as may be seen from excerpts from documents. In one it is stated that Yoshiyemon Isumiya of Hirano-machi, Osaka, in the 11th year of Kyoho, consigned goods to Edo to be transhipped to Jiroyeman Surugawa of Mito, which was protested against by the drug tonyas before O-oka, lord of Echizen, who, after due investigation, decided that the goods must be returned to the consignor in Osaka. After that time such consignments were not allowed. Another record is slightly different, but shows that the restriction of the kind of shipment in question was brought about by similar incidents. There was no law either before or after that case, but the decision arrived at by the incident formed a precedent from which a very important commercial usage came into existence and gradually developed. The various tonyas of Edo were able to protect their respective commercial interests and expanded largely, but the basis on which the newly created trade custom rested was the existence of the tonya union at that time.

THE RESTRICTION OF SHIPMENTS WHICH DID NOT PASS THROUGH THE HANDS OF THE EDO TONYAS.—The following résumé shows the connection of the Edo tonyas with the flow of commodities into and out of Edo :—

1. Goods entering the port of Edo had to be first handled by the respective tonyas who arranged for their disposal among the various provincial localities. It was not allowed to ship directly without passing through the medium of the Edo tonyas.

2. Tonyas often had more stocks than they really could dispose of, and as the market price in Edo had declined they could not be sold at the cost prices. Moreover, it was not possible to return the goods to the shippers invoicing them at an increased price, as it would naturally react upon their own market. In such circumstances one of the following methods was resorted to :—

(*a*) It may be shipped to some other province at a suitable price.
(*b*) It may be sold through one of the Edo tonyas at a certain rate of brokerage.
(*c*) After fixing the amount to be accepted per year the surplus may be shipped to other provinces.

One or other of the above alternatives was usually decided upon privately between consignors and tonyas.

REASONS FOR THE RESTRICTION OF UCHIKOSHI SHIPMENTS.—The pretexts and reasons for the restriction of the uchikoshi shipments, on which the tonya insisted so strongly, were something as follows :—

> 1. If transhipment of commodities through Edo were permitted it would be difficult to ascertain which are such and which are not, as may be seen from the claims made by the drug tonyas.
> 2. If goods were sent to Edo for transhipment the exact quantity of commodities supplied to Edo could not be ascertained, consequently there naturally would arise obstacles in fixing prices.
> 3. If goods were allowed to pass through at will to any port of the country for distribution there would be no way to extend due supervision to those shipments made directly by non-members.
> 4. It would hinder the maintenance of a full supply of staples in the city.

These reasons were, of course, pretexts to deceive the Shogunate in order to obtain its support in stopping the practice of transhipments through Edo. The truth was that the Edo tonyas desired to become the medium of consignor and consignee between the markets of east and west, and to get a commission on the transactions.

AN INSTANCE OF THE RESTRICTION OF UCHIKOSHI SHIPMENTS.—As previously mentioned, the restriction of uchikoshi shipments was a commercial custom from the 11th year of Kyoho to the 12th year of Tempo, continuing consecutively for 125 years, but during the year of the suspension of the tonyas, guilds, and kabushiki, this custom, too, came to an end. With the revival of the tonyas in the 4th year of Kayei the practice was restored. One of the most conspicuous cases of the restriction of uchikoshi cargoes was that of the attachment made on the uchikoshi shipment of mosquito netting, made by mosquito-net dealers of Kinugawa-mura, Aichi-gori, Koshu, and eight other towns, in the 6th year of Kayei. The account of the incident is as follows:—

> The revival of the tonyas in the 4th year of Kayei also revived the restriction of uchikoshi shipments, of which ban the traders of the different provinces are fully aware, so that such shipments are not commonly made. But in the 6th year of Kayei a certain Yabei, acting with another, as representatives of the mosquito-net merchants of Kinugawa-mura, Aichi-gori, O-mi, and eight other towns within the territory of Ii Kamonokami, consigned shipments to Edo destined for the surrounding provinces, and seized the retainers when summoned for investigation. A witness asserted that these nine towns have been making shipments continuously through Edo, but inasmuch as the practice had been restricted by order, the case was brought to a close in July of the same year as verbally testified. Besides, there were other cases which have been brought up and settled by apologies made by the shippers, since which time due control is established.

Further, in another excerpt from *Commentaries of Uchikoshi Shipments of Edo*, by Hachitaro Tojo, we read:—

> Whether tonyas or not, there is no precedent by which direct shipments could be made and since the resuscitation of the tonya system, although

the dry-goods tonyas, shikon (vegetable root for extracting purple dye) tonyas, salt tonyas, and mosquito-net tonyas all have a volume of transactions, following the policy decided upon previously, it was settled that they shall not make uchikoshi shipments.

From this it may be seen that the restriction of uchikoshi shipments again came into force, and if anyone was found infringing on the regulation, his goods were seized and he was brought for trial before the city magistrate, who gave the verdict and ordered the goods to be returned to the shippers.

Trade Customs of Saffron Transactions.—The uchikoshi shipments of drugs and mosquito nettings all came from the Tokkaido to the markets around Edo and O-u, but there were numerous lawsuits relative to shipments made from O-u and Kwanto districts to Kwansai, of which the most important was the movements of saffron. Up to the close of the Shogunate's regime, the commodities imported from Kwansai to Kwanto were, besides rice, various refined articles, while exports from Kwanto to Kwansai were saffron, shikon, and other raw materials. In manufacturing Kwanto was always behind Kwansai, and saffron was sent from O-u and Kwanto to Kamigata for the manufacture of dye stuff in Kyoto, and the silks dyed in it were again exported to Kwanto and O-u, where the demand was very large. At first saffron was chiefly produced in Mutsu and Dewa Provinces, but during the Tenmei era the cultivation of the herb began in Okegawa of Musashi, and quickly became one of the products of the region. It further spread through the whole Musashi Province, through Shimotsuke, Hitachi, Simosa, becoming a product of all the Kwanto Provinces. The saffron shipments to Kyoto from O-u were transported to Edo in care of the courier tonyas, who then forwarded them by horse. In Edo the business concerned the fancy-goods trade, and a fancy-goods dealer (Maruai-gumi) supervised the transactions and kept track of the quantity sent to Kyoto by inspecting the shipments, negotiating with the courier tonyas, and receiving a certain rate of return commission. But, as related, after the propagation of the plant during the Tenmei era, when it became a product of the entire region of Kwanto, it was shipped to Edo by land in the same way as consignments from O-u and similarly handled by courier tonyas, who forwarded the consignments to Kyoto.

Shimaya Insurance of Marine Shipments.—Near the close of the Bunka era the means of marine transportation of both O-u and Kwanto were greatly improved, and it was found that not only were the freight rates cheaper than by land, but the possibility of goods being damaged when transferred at the posting station could be eliminated, which was the reason why saffron shipments began to be made by ship.

A certain Sanyemon Shimaya, one of the courier tonyas, took the initiative in utilizing the marine transportation facilities, inventing a new form of business. He accepted shipments from the shippers paying a suitable sum in advance and entrusting the shipments to a shipping-agent, Jujiro Inouye, who received every right, accepted responsibility, and shipped the consignment to Kamigata. This form of transaction was known as kaijo ukeai nimotsu (marine assured shipments). Hitherto, in case of marine accident to cargoes in transit between Edo and Osaka, the consignor could not claim a sen for the losses incurred; according to the new form, as a fixed sum was advanced in case of damage the consignors were saved from incurring a total loss at any rate. Moreover, as they were assured that if the shipment arrived at their destinations without mishap the balance would be paid, every one began to ship his goods by the kaijo ukeai system. This new method may be likened to one of the forms of modern marine insurance, which, if studied and compared with the insurance method of Okudsumi tonyas and Sumiyoshi-gumi, as described in a separate section, makes one realize that we have finally entered the most important period of Japan's economic history.

O-u Shipments are forwarded direct to Kamigata.—Although, as explained, O-u shipments were forwarded directly to Kamigata without passing through the hands of the Edo tonyas, yet the courier tonyas collaborated with the fancy-goods tonya (Maruai-gumi) by reporting the quantity shipped, the latter receiving a fixed rate as toll, so that there was no question of smuggling or evasion. However, during the 7th year of Bunsei several vessels loaded with saffron foundered. Sanyemon was responsible for the loss incurred to the shippers, so that he was very hard hit and obliged to refuse all future shipments, which caused the interruption of the method. Taking due note that the total loss had to be met by Sanyemon alone, it is clear that the shipments were on his own account, and he got direct consignments from the shippers. In such a manner did the kaijo ukeai nimotsu of the courier tonya (Sanyemon Shimaya) come to an end, and the surrounding and O-u shippers were obliged to ship directly through the shipping-agent, Jujiro Inouye. With the muddled state of affairs in the trade customs, linking O-u, Edo, and Kamigata, coupled with the order in the Tempo era suspending the tonyas and guilds, added to the general chaos, and the ignorance of the merchants of O-u of the old commercial organization and its history, the old usage died out. True, previous to this situation there were a few parties of the Kwanto and its near provinces who also operated directly with Kyoto, but they were able to do so only after obtaining the sanction of the Maruai-gumi, and this was in its way a simple direct transaction.

DEMAND TO REVIVE THE RIGHTS OF RESTRICTING UCHIKOSHI SHIPMENTS.—After the Tempo order suspending tonyas and guilds, the merchants of Kyoto and Fushimi dispatched their representatives to Edo and its surrounding markets to purchase saffron from the selling-agents, and shipped it to Kyoto, practising uchikoshi in its proper form. As the Shogunate had abolished tonyas and guilds, confiscating their special rights, the Edo traders could do nothing against such actions, which gradually became the general custom. With the power of the Shogunate passing into the hands of Masahiro Abe, between the Koka and Kayei eras, the revival of tonyas and guilds was permitted, and in the 1st year of Ansei, Maruai-gumi, taking it for granted the right of restricting uchikoshi shipments was also revived, attempted to restrain them or to get tolls by opening negotiations with the saffron traders. This attempt by the Edo tonyas to regain their ancient privileges according to the old system of commercial transactions was made because most of the shipments from O-u to Kamigata did not take the Northern Route, but were transported to Edo, as a result of the vast development of marine transportation facilities. If the Northern Route was taken, no tolls could be levied, and as the shipments passed through Edo the demand had some justification. Owing to the great increase of the quantity of shipments via Edo and in the name of reviving old rights, the rice executives of the Maruai Guild opened the campaign against the saffron traders of Okegawa in May of the 1st year of Ansei, dispatching to them a letter of warning as follows :—

> By the recent order resuscitating the tonyas and kabushiki, it is prohibited that any line of products from the various provinces shall pass through Edo for outward shipment without an order sent to the tonyas. The saffron consignments form no exception to this rule, and even if direct requisitions have been received from other parts, they shall be filled only after due negotiations have been made. To other dealers of saffron we will give due notice ; and should there be any party engaging in direct transactions, the said party shall be dealt with in the proper manner.

It adds that as the saffron tonyas association had its new office at the home of Kichibei Osakaya of Zaimokucho, Edo, they should appear there. Among the saffron traders a certain Genyemon and twenty-two others gave in to the demand, and, following the old usage, began negotiations to decide on the rate to be levied, but Asagoro and seven others refused to submit to the demand and sent a representative from its group, one Kijiro, to obtain full details of the demand ; and he was handed a draft agreement regarding the restriction of uchikoshi, and requested to sign it. He refused, saying : " We do not know about other lines of products, but saffron has always been transacted direct with Kyoto. We do not see our way clear to sign an agreement binding ourselves to such inconvenience, whatever order may have been issued." The Maruai Guild threatened to seize any goods sold to parties outside, and passing through Edo. At the same time they declared that all uchikoshi shipments through Edo would be suspended. The negotiations finally ended in a split, but no notice was sent to Okegawa relative to the detainment of shipments if sold direct to outside markets; and in July, 1st year of Ansei, a certain Daihachiro, of Kubomura, shipped to Sanyemon daimonji four bales of saffron accompanied by invoice through the shipping-agent, Jujiro, Nichome, Shimbori. An official of the Maruai Guild confiscated the papers and arbitrarily changed the consignee's name, sending the consignment in care of Kohachi Matsuzakaya, Nishizume, Horaibashi, Osaka, a shipping agent. Again, during the same month a shipment made by a certain Jizaemon, of Kimio, to Rizaemon Iseya, of Karasumoridori, Kyoto, met the same fate of being intercepted by Kohachi Matsuzakaya. The consignors, therefore, dispatched a representative to Osaka to negotiate with Kohachi, who replied that he was instructed by the Edo tonyas by letter to detain the shipments, which explained his interposition. As saffron loses weight if kept, the consignors were compelled to give way to Kohachi, and transhipped the goods to Kyoto as his shipment, and he disposed of it. The saffron dealers of Okegawa were most indignant against the violence of the Edo tonyas, and in January of the 2nd year of Ansei they selected a certain Sogohei of Okegawa as their representative and laid a complaint before the Shogunate's Public Accountant, Tamura, lord of Iyo, requesting that permission be granted to make direct shipments to Kamigata. The complaint read as follows:—

> With the revival of the kabushiki much hindrance has been caused by ignoring custom and attempting to squeeze out commissions, and if this was not paid the result was the intercepting of the goods, which will mean great loss to shipper and brokers if not put a stop to. We have taken up the matter time and again but in vain, and had no recourse but to bring the suit to your Honour's judgment.

Similar suits were made by the representatives of Kashio-mura and forty-two other towns. To the above the Maruai-gumi made a counter appeal:—

> With respect to the uchikoshi cargoes, we acted as was decided by the Edo tonyas, and it was no question of infringement on trade spheres but concerned the extension of due control over the import and export shipments, the practice of which was made a regulation during the Kyoho era. Therefore, we beg to request your indulgence to see that our petition be recognized, at the same time repudiating all direct transactions which are not handled through the Edo tonyas.

Tamura rejected the petition on the grounds that cases concerning commercial statutes were not within his jurisdiction, turning the case over to the magistrate, who attempted to solve it by investigating the saffron petition and the Maruai-gumi's appeal simultaneously.

THE PROVINCIAL SAFFRON SHIPPERS LOSE THE SUIT.—About this time there again rose unexpectedly a similar case, owing to the direct shipment of ninety-three bales by a saffron dealer of O-u to two merchants, one in Kyoto and the other in Fushimi, through Jujiro, shipping-agent of Taru vessels, against which the Maruai-gumi immediately lodged a protest, at the same time instructing Jujiro to hold the shipments in bond. It was decided to hear both cases simultaneously, so the Shogunate summoned the parties concerned in the two shipments, besides representatives of the producing centres and the shipping-agents who handled the shipments. The O-u saffron men had behind them the support of the lord of Mutsu, for they had impressed on his retainers that their livelihood was in danger. In their argument, the O-u Kwanto dealers and shippers asserted, " If while engaging in direct trade with Kamigata in accordance with the old usage, the shipments are now restricted on the grounds that the goods had to be forwarded through Edo, it would be sounding the death-knell of our trade.' Against this the Maruai-gumi tonyas answered : " If any shipments may come and go through Edo, it would be difficult to ascertain exact statistics to decide on the market prices of Edo, and the more so when the Shogunate has seen fit to revive the tonyas, which would hinder the decrease of prices." Upon which the magistrate started an investigation into past usages of shipments, and found out the origin of what the saffron men called " old usages." When, in the 7th year of Bunsei, the system of kaijo ukeai consignments was abolished, the consignors began to ship their goods at will through Jujiro, shipping-agent of the Taru vessels, on the top of which came the disorderliness in commercial affairs caused by the appearance of an order suspending all tonyas and guilds in the 12th year of Tempo. However, the shippers knew nothing of history and believed that the go-as-you-please transactions were a return to the old method, while the Maruai guilds of Edo did not take any definite step and left matters to take their own course, hence the situation. Especially was the strife severe relative to the handling of saffron shipments after the Bunka and Bunsei eras, when the production around Edo greatly increased, and, owing to the order abolishing tonyas in the Tempo era, the Kamigata merchants dispatched representatives to Edo to corner saffron stocks by paying large advances to the brokers. No restraint was placed on the shipppers of O-u and other provinces, so that there were numerous illegal transactions, the result of which had quite an effect on the shipments entering Edo.

This case cleared up the stages by which uchikoshi shipments originated. The saffron dealers gave in ; a settlement was made, and the Maruai-gumi tonyas of Edo received a decided recognition of their rights. Probably due to the Tokugawa Shogunate's commercial policy it laid great stress on past history and custom, so that it seems natural that the provincial shippers should lose when they desired to put a new form of transaction in practice.

REFORMS SAFFRON TRADE METHODS.—Although the dispute was thus settled, every one realized that there were numerous drawbacks in the methods and that reform was needed. At first the saffron shipments forwarded from the surrounding localities of Edo were insignificant, but from the Bunka era on the output increased, while at the same time the shipments from the O-u provinces increased also, due to the change in transportation route. According to Hachitaro Tojo's *Commentaries of Uchikoshi Shipments of Edo* :—

> During the era of Kwansei the annual export to Kamigata per annum was estimated at about 60–70, which in the Bunka era was recorded at approximately 1,000 loads through the combined report of the courier and shipping tonyas. Within seventy or eighty years, therefore, the production of saffron increased fifteen-fold. The customary method of transaction heretofore was, as soon as the consignments reached Edo the members of the Maruai Guild examined the bills of lading, making the necessary changes in order to forward the shipment on to Kamigata. All the consignments were covered by Edo, the merchants subtracting the quantity demanded in Edo, while the remainder only was formally assigned to the Maruai Guild as their shipments. Further, the prices paid by the Edo tonyas, although varying according to the fluctuations of the markets, generally did not fail to be quite low, which was one of the chief points with which the shippers naturally felt dissatisfaction, and one of the reasons why they insisted on direct transportations. For this reason it was necessary to establish a new system which would not injure the interests of the shippers, while at the same time not hindering the Edo supply of saffron, and which would not bring back uchikoshi. The authorities, Edo tonyas, and shippers all studied the question and found that they had a means of reference in the methods practised by the rice importers.

THE NECESSARY REMEDY.—By imported rice was meant the rice imported to Edo from Kamigata, which, by a Shogunate order of the Kyoho era, could be handled only by the imported rice tonyas. If, therefore, any merchants of the city, by the terms of transaction with the merchants of Kyoto and Osaka, had to receive payment in rice, they had to refer the same to the imported rice tonya for inspection, requesting the latter's endorsement and paying a commission of 1 sho per bale of rice in order to enable them to dispose of the rice as they liked. This method was very satisfactory to the parties concerned. It was decided to settle the saffron question thus, and the shipments from all production centres to Kamigata were required to be entrusted to the Hishigaki and Taru vessels, issuing bills of lading for Kamigata shipments, which the two ship organizations tendered to the executive of the Maruai Guild, who inspected the quantity arrived and endorsed the bills, levying a commission of 1 momme 6 bu of silver on shipments from the Kwanto districts, while those from O-u were charged 1 momme 2 bu before allowing the shipments to proceed to their destination. This process does not mean that the Maruai Guild had to actually accept all saffron shipments. The shipper had to issue bills of lading in the names of the consignee, to which the Maruai Guild only put their endorsement, so that there was no question of deciding on the price. As an exception it was decided : " In the years when saffron stocks are short, and when the exports to Kamigata are large, so that there is a shortage in dye-stuff materials, necessities for the manufacture of cakes, etc., affecting the market prices in Edo, it is understood that orders shall be sent to the producers immediately, and shall be given due attention. If in such a case the producers happen to be out of stock, the Maruai Guild may, after first referring the matter to the shippers, utilize such quantity as may be necessary from the consignments destined to Kamigata, taking care, however, not to decide quotations absolutely, but after due comparison with those of Kamigata, and the shippers shall also see to it that such conveniences be extended without suspicion. Further, the Hishigaki and Taru shipping-agent, when saffron for Kamigata arrives for transhipment, shall report to the Maruai Guild along with the shipping documents for endorsement. Returns shall be figured after completion of the checking of the quantities." At the same time, the method of land transportation of saffron was also regulated : " When saffron shipments made by land arrive in Edo, the courier tonyas shall immediately inform the Maruai Guild of the quantity of the goods and obtain endorsement of the papers, taking care that no amount be overlooked." However, transportation by pack-horse was so dear that in such cases no fees were paid to the Maruai Guild.

THE RIGHTS OF EDO TONYAS AS SHOWN BY THE SAFFRON AFFAIR.—In June of the same year one of the traders of Edo purchased saffron from a nearby producer, forwarding it to a Kyoto dealer, and giving rise to a new incident. A certain Uhei of Ise-cho, whose home was in the province of O-mi, left his Edo office in charge of one Masabei, who purchased twenty-four bales of saffron from Tensuke of Urawa and eleven from Isaemon of Okegawa, making a total of thirty-five bales, intending to forward them to Okaniya Kichibei of Yanagino-ba, Sanjo, Kyoto, and chartering space from the shipping-agent, who presented the papers to the Maruai Guild, taking them by surprise. They immediately investigated the affair and found that Masabei was engaged in two lines of trade, that of dry-goods tonyas and cotton goods tonyas, but had no right to deal in saffron. The Maruai Guild complained to the magistrate, who, after questioning Masabei, found out that he acted in ignorance of the existing regulations, and his saffron shipments were confiscated by the Maruai Guild, who disposed of them by auction. Masabei was obliged to swear that he would not concern himself hereafter with any saffron transactions, at the time issuing a written certificate to that effect, which settled the suit. What has been said of saffron applies to all other lines. Any commodity once entering Edo had to pass through the medium of Edo tonyas, but this special right was extended so that any commodity which had a history of having been shipped via Edo and was now being shipped directly to Kamigata without passing through Edo in actuality, yet had to pass Edo formally and give the Edo tonyas a share of the profits. In the case of the Maruai Guild and saffron shipments, although it was a member of the Tokumi tonyas, its claim concerning uchikoshi shipments was a right which had been established for hundreds of years and was not specially enjoyed by it as a member of the Tokumi tonyas.

Restrictions of Direct Transaction and of Passing Consignments.—As mentioned before, although there existed a law and custom restricting uchikoshi shipments, yet if there was no order prohibiting direct trade with producer and consumer, at the same time making a distinction between tonya, broker, and consignee, the Edo tonyas' interests could not be considered as fully protected. The reason why they were able fully to utilize their rights was the existence of the laws restricting direct transactions and the uchikoshi consignments, which worked as a complementary to one another. These two statutes not only protected the Edo tonyas, but as the consignors of the producing localities had always to defer to the views of the Edo tonyas in buying, the result was that there was a sort of limitation in the production, which had the advantage of eliminating a great deal of speculation, conferring on the consignors also no small benefit. The consignors trading under such a system did not necessarily favour large production, but desired to maintain a position of equilibrium. Consequently, as there was no stimulus to productivity as under a free-trade system, the art of production became conservative. When, in the era of Tempo, Tadakuni Mizuno prohibited all tonyas, guilds, commercial interests, and brokers, regulating that transactions should be made direct between producers and small dealers in the urban districts, it caused disorder and strife within the commercial system, ending in utter failure; but that it gave an immense incentive to production is an undoubted fact. Probably with the permission of direct transactions the consignor had the advantage of immediate business with buyers, doing away with profits which heretofore went to the brokers, in addition to the accommodation of advance capital and suchlike; the provincial agricultural industries received tremendous impulse and this, coupled with the encouragement by the numerous clans gave rise to the industries of the period.

CHAPTER LXI

DECADENCE AND FALL OF THE TOKUMI TONYAS.

A Change in the Nature of the Tokumi Tonyas.—As previously shown, when the Tokumi tonyas was first formed, similar trades combined with the purpose of protecting one another's interests, but, later, efforts were made to find other ways to increase their gains, and finally, taking a new turn, the tonya partook of the nature of a mercantile system, monopolizing goods from O-u passing through Edo destined for Osaka, so that all Edo merchants who formed guilds joined the organization, and all who joined made their trade hereditary, maintaining the rights of kabu. In such a situation the executives of the Tokumi tonyas were like lords of provinces. This guild may be likened to the East India Company, the only difference being that where one had its rights overseas, the other had them at home. Of course, the Tokumi tonyas became the envy of the Edo and Osaka merchants outside their circle, and the moving spirit of the organization, Mojiro Sugimoto, was overwhelmed by all sorts of slander and attack, and became the object of caricature and satire.

The Fall of Mojiro Sugimoto.—After successfully rehabilitating the Tokumi tonyas, and establishing the Sankyo Association, Mojiro Sugimoto undertook to gain further laurels by establishing a rice exchange. Owing to the sharp break in the price of rice, the Shogunate was in hard straits financially, and taking advantage of the situation Mojiro asked permission to readjust prices to a level neither so high nor so low. The authorities, who respected his talents, granted the request without any suspicion. In 1813 he was allowed special rights, which equalled those of the Tokumi tonyas, and the number of the members was specifically given in the licence, which was a safer organization than the said tonyas. The rice tonyas were notified that, after due deliberation, the Shogunate had decided to permit the establishment of a rice exchange and, reflecting on the hardships endured owing to the fall in the price of rice, fixing the number of members at 120. The royalty was to be 1,200 ryo, besides 5,000 ryo from commissions, and the licence was given for a term of five years, providing that no underhand methods should be practised. The rice tonyas agreed by contract to keep the regulations. Thus Mojiro, who was already president of the Tokumi tonyas and the Sankyo Kaisho, now became the head of the Rice Exchange. These positions carried with them the entire command of the Edo financial world, and chronicles do not show any merchant of the past who had ever risen to such influence. However, this success was the beginning of his downfall, and although his motive in establishing the Rice Exchange to readjust prices was for the good of the country, yet, when it was a question of making or losing money, he thought of profits alone, and not of the nation's welfare. For large gains, a large capital was needed, and, therefore, in December of 1818, in order to utilize the royalty due to the Shogunate in the gamble, he persuaded the authorities to postpone payment, on the pretext that the sum was needed to relieve the finances of the Tokumi tonyas. The sum was immediately loaned to the Sankyo Kaisho, but as there were some Shogunate officials who envied Mojiro's influence, they finally caught on to his game, and demanded that the royalty should be returned to the Tokumi tonyas, and that Sankyo Kaisho had no right to be accommodated with such a sum. True, to have utilized the royalty without the consent of the Shogunate was *ultra vires*, and, moreover, there were many who disfavoured the idea of a rice exchange. Although this did not impress the Shogunate officials stationed in Osaka, who were used to the manipulations of the Dojima Rice Exchange, as anything out of the ordinary, to the eyes of those of Edo each new method of the Exchange looked queer, and in the 2nd year of Bunsei they abruptly abolished the Rice Exchange. Mojiro was ousted from the presidency of the Tokumi tonyas, the Sankyo Kaisho was shut up, the officers of the Tokumi tonyas were fined, and dealing in future in liquid oils was prohibited.

THE ABOLITION OF THE TOKUMI TONYAS.—Although Mojiro Sugimoto was forced out of office and the Sankyo Kaisho abolished, yet the influence of the Tokumi tonyas, which had been built on well-planned methods and perfect rights stood firm, and impenetrable, and the two million people of Edo were still more or less under their thumb. However, at the close of the Tempo era, when Tadakuni Mizuno became Premier, one of his drastic reforms in the political and social field was to abolish the Tokumi tonyas on the ground that it was an organization for selfish ends. This put a stop to the rigging of market prices. The trade between Edo and Osaka was freed from all its shackles and thrown open to all comers. The payment of royalties was restricted, and it was left to the consignor's and consignees' discretion to loan on whatever vessels they desired by issuing the following orders :—

MUNICIPAL NOTICE.

It has been the custom for the Hishigaki shipping-agents to pay an annual royalty of 30,200 ryo, but as nefarious practices on the part of the tonyas have been found, henceforward such payment shall be suspended. Furthermore, henceforth not only is it forbidden to maintain a kabu licence, but no one shall be permitted to call themselves tonyas or guilds.

Not only shall all be free to make direct transactions on goods heretofore monopolized by the Tokumi tonyas on Hishigaki vessels, but all goods where-ever they may come from, and all commodities shipped to Edo, shall not be confined to tonyas, but may be bought and sold by any party.

The above notification shall be sent as soon as possible not only to tonyas and merchants, but to householders, tenants, and to every one without omission.

13th day of the twelfth moon, 12th year of Tempo.

ALDERMANIC NOTIFICATION TO CITY HEAD-MEN.

Although there were regulations to date, relative to shipments on Hishigaki vessels, with the recent order suspending the tonya guilds and permitting free transaction of all goods by anybody, it has been decided hereafter that shipment of cargoes may be made, according to the convenience of the parties concerned, by any vessel, regardless of regulations pertaining to Hishigaki or Taru vessel shipments. In the meanwhile the Hishigaki have been using the flag of the Lord of Ki-i, since the Bunsei era, which shall not be permitted hereafter, and the flag shall be returned to the Ki-i lord as soon as possible.

The above notification shall be sent to the Tokumi tonyas, the Hishigaki and Taru vessels' shipping-agent, also, without omission to the respective groups of each head-man's jurisdiction, as early as possible.

December 23rd.
22nd day of December, 12th moon of the 12th year of Tempo.

Although it has been prohibited to maintain organization such as tonya guilds, tonyas were left free to engage in business, but as the use of the term "tonya" was not prohibited, people have supposed that combinations were also free, and parties have arranged business between themselves at less than the price market, causing hindrances to the transactions of small dealers. To prevent this, hereafter, not only shall it be prohibited to form tonya guilds, but to declare oneself "tonya" shall be prohibited. Rice traders shall be known simply as rice dealers, and charcoal and oil traders shall be known as charcoal and oil dealers respectively.

March, 13th year of Tempo.

THE ABOLITION OF THE TONYAS.—The Shogunate not only dissolved the Tokumi Tonya Guild, but prohibited any form of combination, and, attributing the rise of prices to the tonyas, restricted them from engaging in nothing but wholesale transactions. They were also to handle retail business and, in case of a shortage of supply, the wholesale line might be suspended while the retail business was carried on, the tonyas to see that prices should not be higher than the proper retail level. The merchants of the Metropolis used to advance capital to the producing centres and store stocks in warehouses. This was a cornering transaction in the opinion of the Shogunate and was not considered commercially fair, and was restricted. Even hairdressers, housekeepers, and rice examiners were prohibited from forming combinations. Not only did the Shogunate restrict combinations, attributing to them the increase of prices, but it further ordered, according to the notice given below, that merchants should notify the authorities of the buying and selling prices in order to adjust them, and it insisted upon being consulted about proposed prices.

The prices of various commodities have gradually risen, especially so after the last poor harvest of rice, and owing to the two conflagrations which took place recently, but steps to the lowering of prices seems to be neglected. The tonyas, from past times, besides charging a fixed rate of commission, obtained further returns, according as the goods were destined to specified territories. The brokers also enjoyed the same selling profits, as a result of which prices went up. During the existence of the Tokumi Tonya, when Sankyo Kaisho made loans freely, a tonya assembly hall was constructed, and many of the members of the guild requisitioning and disposing of stocks knew from past experiences where scarcity prevailed, and although openly they proclaimed that they exercised due supervision, yet they charged extra profits, besides the usual fee. Freight rates of the subsidized lines were known as modoshi (returns), and, secretly, further fees were charged by the different tonyas, who framed their own regulations. Certain parties who dealt in goods of known trade-marks were quite honest, but as the prices charged were high, their profits came up just as if they had charged commissions. The brokers, according to the kinds of goods, added 10, 5, and 3 per cent. profit. However (in these days), there are merchants who from mistaken ideas reckon 8 per cent. interest on their invested capital, thus increasing the cost. Fortunately tonyas brokers, kabushiki, and all forms of guilds and combinations have been abolished so that it is possible to do away with the various profits of the middlemen, enabling direct sales to be made from producer to consumer, which should lower prices 2 or 3 per cent., but it cannot in any way be said to apply all round, for a uniform rate can never be practicable, as conditions differ according to the kind of goods. Comparing the situation in the Kwansei with the Kyoho and Bunkwa eras, there ought to have been better prices, and, in return for the help extended, the merchants should have seen that something was done to lower costs. It was expected that the conference of the different dealers would be over by the 13th, so that a report might be tendered by the 15th. If any goods had fallen below cost, report was to be made and due investigation to follow, to see if the costs were actually so high and did not include secret commissions. At any rate, the matter was not to be left untouched.

A decrease in prices should have been notified the year before, but the quality and quantity seem to have been quite inferior. Thereafter, such articles as food-stuffs and other staple products are to be sold by quantity or weight, and care should be taken to report what rate of discount is to be made on cotton goods, dry goods, drugs, foreign fancy goods, clogs, yarns, copper, tin, leather, soy, miso, taki, vermicelli, saké, sugar, oil paper, dried articles, cut tobacco, salt, vinegar, coarse goods, flour, hemp, bracken, tubs, charcoal, earthenware, horse-shoes, macaroni, tin pots, lumber, paper tofu, boards, pickled articles, towels, bean curd, wheat gluten, fancy goods, dried bonito, incense burning outfit, cakes, smoking pipes, matches, cabinet-maker's wood, clog thongs, mochi, paulonia timber, rush matting, straw, mats, sandals, parasols, straw raincoats, sedge hats, bags, and satchels.

The above goods shall be so listed, according to the accompanying form, showing what the goods are and to what extent prices are to be decreased.

Reason for the Failure of the Tempo Reforms.—It is true that the purpose of the Tempo reforms was quite rational, but the methods were more a penalty than an economic remedy. Tadakuni was strict and narrow in judgment and guided by sentiment. When he saw the enormous profits of the Tokumi tonyas and their luxurious life, he at once branded them as dishonest merchants, attributing the increase of prices to their manipulations, and inferring that all such organizations were injurious. But this did not touch the heart of the question. It may be granted that the monopoly of the marine transportation interests between Edo and Osaka by the Tokumi tonyas' profits was one of the causes of the high prices, but it was only one. The predominant cause was the industrial policies of the different daimyos in their respective territories. Although they were military vassals to the Tokugawa Shogunate, as far as industry was concerned and trade policy, they were entirely independent states, and their position against Edo or Osaka was as that of Germany to England or Paris to New York. Their purpose was to make profits, and they reckoned how and when they might best dispose of their products for the development of their industries. Moreover, the financial conditions of the daimyos were no better than those of the Shogunate. Applying the most extreme principles of state ownership and commerce within their boundaries, they either limited the production or extended protection of a monopolistic nature over rice, lumber, stones, paper, lacquered ware, marine products, and such staples as might be within their reach. Obtaining one of these rights of trade from the lord of the domain, the goods were shipped and stored in either Edo or Osaka, and the owners disposed of them at the highest price, whenever opportunity presented itself. Owing to such methods, the market was always deranged and the prices of commodities were always high. With the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate, peace was, for the first time for many years, enjoyed throughout the land, and the lords and their warriors turned their eyes to commerce, in which they were quite ignorant and fell into the hands of Osaka merchants, who made huge profits out of them. But in time many of these ex-warriors became sharp enough, and were able to hold their own against the merchants. Finally, the clans of different parts were able to ship their products direct to Edo without troubling Osaka, and the Osaka merchants were made to realize that they could no longer fool the clan officials, and had to be content with the profits obtainable from interest on money loaned. All this was not unknown to Tadakuni Mizuno, and in order to break the states' direct handling of trade, an ordinance was passed in the 13th year of Tempo reading :—

> Of late, lords and heads of different territories have got into the habit of cornering and hoarding, through various mediums and by various methods, not only the produce of their own domain, but also those from elsewhere, disposing of them at a profit, when the market prices increase, or to the merchants who are in league with them. Such actions, backed by the influence they are able to wield, cause much hindrance to the ordinary traders, and, further, it is said that aforesaid lords have received royalties from outsiders for certain privileges, which must be called an evil ripe for reform.
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> *October, 13th year of Tempo.*

TADAKUNI MIZUNO EXPELS YABE.—When Tadakuni Mizuno criticized the direct handling of commerce by clan heads, it was not because it was the root of the rising prices of Edo. He thought that it was not becoming for heads of clans to make money by traders' methods, and his order was only a punitive measure. Still less did he realize that an important cause of the rise in prices was the debased currency of the time which diminished the buying power of gold and silver coins. Teiken Yabe, lord of Suruga, who was well versed in commercial affairs, branded Tadakuni's policy as one of ignorance of the actual state of things, and unlikely to have any constructive result, asserting that the cause of the high prices was luxury and the debasement of currency. To decrease prices, he continued, the market customs of Osaka must be reformed. The Tadakuni group, who viewed all matters with suspicion, presumed that Yabe had illicit connections with the Tokumi tonyas, and was trying to mislead them, and they expelled him from his official position. In this, Tadakuni acted with the officials of the Shogunate Government whose ideas and sentiments were the same as his.

THE ABOLITION OF TONYAS CAUSES DISORDER IN THE MARKET.—The Tempo reforms could hardly then be called reforms of an economic nature, but only punitive measures. Hence, in spite of the cancellation of the Tokumi Tonya rights enabling any one to enter into commercial transactions between Edo and Osaka, such a drastic measure brought about various evils and caused a disorderly situation to exist in Edo; and although prices were lowered temporarily, for fear of offending the authorities, yet, after a short while, they again began to climb upwards. Such a situation was due to the fact that the reform was punitive instead of economic from the beginning. It worked for destruction instead of construction, and at a stroke razed to the ground the pillars of the commercial organization of Edo which had taken two hundred years to build. It cut off all connections of trade and obstructed all the channels of finance. There was no control over transactions, and primitive conditions of economy returned, reminding the thoughtful of the old adage that evils originate from beautiful things.

THE PROPOSITION TO REVIVE TONYAS.—In 1843, when Tadakuni Mizuno resigned from the premiership, a mob, made up of thousands of citizens, took advantage of a dark night to throw stones at his residence, thus showing their anger. In the days of feudalism, as a rule, the populace were meek as sheep, and when we find them assailing a person who up to the previous month had been their dictator, it is sufficient measure of the sentiments of the citizens. The successor to Tadakuni Mizuno was Masahiro Abe, who followed a policy of magnanimity with regard to politics and diplomacy, and would have liked to have adopted the same attitude towards the commercial administration. But on account of the destruction of the entire commercial organization, he was at a loss to know how to start and where to begin. Although in the upper circles of the Shogunate there were no supporters of Mizuno, in the lower circles, within the group of inferior officials, there were many who still shared the sentiments and opinions of the Mizuno party. His reform had its supporters who thought the severe measure quite right ; moreover, there was a foolish belief then prevalent, that when once an order had been issued, it would detract from the dignity of the Shogunate to withdraw or ignore it. Thus things went from bad to worse, and it was difficult to come to a decision. What with sufferings from flood and fire, the plight of the Edo citizens grew more and more serious, and in 1846 Lord Masanori Tsutsui, ex-City Magistrate, argued that the immediate remedy to save the situation and to lessen the suffering of the times was the revival of the tonyas in order to facilitate commerce, tendering a memranndum to that effect to Masahiro Abe.

> The present year has been looked upon as an unlucky one and much anxiety has been felt when we experienced such calamities. Especially have the conflagration of last spring and the recent floods brought serious hardships to the population of the city and suburbs. The public utilities have also met with much damage, and we realize that a large outlay will be required to rebuild the collapsed embankments, bridges, roads, etc. With the subsiding of the inundations, the inhabitants will gradually return to their homes, but they will not be able to take possession of their old homes immediately, and with the inevitable rise in the price of rice and other staples they cannot but meet difficulties. Undoubtedly, the officials concerned are planning some relief. Nevertheless, the distribution of rice and money to individuals and families is a form of help which, though for the time being it will satisfy their hunger,

will not enable them to settle down again to their occupations. We believe that some other constructive means are also being planned by the authorities, and taking into consideration the present situation regarding rice, we pray that the tonyas and brokers, who have been recently abolished, be revived as heretofore, so that transactions in rice imported from Osaka and from other localities may be facilitated. This would also help to reduce the rising tendency of the market prices of commodities. In case of need it is easier to deal with the tonyas and brokers who can all be notified promptly. And would it not be the proper way to watch and eradicate fraudulent sales and practices ? Further, if we could in the same way revive the former kabushiki and tonyas, it would be easy to make investigation and take proper control of sales at high prices. It is suggested that arrangements be made so that the dealers with a meagre capital could purchase goods from the tonyas on account, and settlement be made when sales have been realized, in order that the dealers may utilize the margin therefrom to cover their daily necessities. The capital loaned shall be repaid to the tonyas daily, after sales are made, or at the end of the month, or at the time of the five festivals, or at bon, or the year's end. In the latter case it would be possible for those without capital to engage in trade. This system, unlike the rationing by the donation of rice money, which is just for the time being, if carried out, would be duly appreciated. Hitherto, it was possible for parties of limited means to obtain loans, but since the abolition of the kabushiki, those who do not possess anything cannot be accommodated with loans, as they have no security to offer. Therefore money-lenders are afraid to make any loans, fearing that they may incur losses if the redemption be postponed. Those with a certain amount of means have been accommodated, but lately even this is a difficult matter, and, unable to make proper adjustments, such people are gradually declining. With the reinstatement of the kabushiki they would all be easily accommodated. The citizens would, we think, greatly appreciate the change. The proposal was made just after the conflagration last spring, when it was unheeded, and although it is rather embarrassing to make it again, we believe it will save the Government coffers much expense, and at the same time will be an important cause of public relief.

THE PROS AND CONS OF THE TONYA REVIVAL.—The harvest of the 1st year of Kayei was a bumper one, and symptoms of a fall in prices were already evident in the early summer. But a decline in the price of rice was most feared by the great land-owners, the Shogunate, and those of the samurai class who disposed of their rice salary to obtain funds to buy food and clothing. They had to find some means by which to maintain a uniform price to a certain degree. Furthermore, in order to adjust the price of rice it was no use to rely on the insignificant retail dealers, so the City Magistrate, Kagemoto Toyama, tendered a new note, stating that although he had first proposed a universal revival of the tonyas, in the face of the declining price of rice it was impossible to wait for the revival of all of them. The revival of the rice tonyas and the rice inspectors should be immediately permitted. As the employment offices were necessary for the movements of labour within the city, and as exchangers were important in the circulation of money, these two should be forthwith revived, and he explained how urgent it was for a few others also to be re-established. In spite of the suggestion, the Shogunate Council could not come to a decision, although the point hesitated upon was not the advisability of the revival of the tonyas. This had been decided in principle, and the question was as to what kind of tonyas they should be and in what way they should be recognized. They were afraid they might make the same mistakes as during the Bunkwa era, when the Shogunate was hoodwinked by the crafty tongue of Sugimoto, who whiled them out of a trade monopoly between Edo and Osaka.

TONYA KABUS AGAIN PERMITTED.—This conference did not easily come to a decision, but finally, in 1851, it was permitted to revive tonya guilds, similar to those of the time previous to the Bunkwa era. The number of tonyas and individuals was not to follow the old example, but was to be licensed after due investigations into present conditions. This was not to be known as the revival of various kabus, for it was feared that if kabus were legally recognized, it might be that the people would misunderstand and think that everything should conform to the time of the Bunkwa era if the word "revival" was used. On March 9th the City Magistrate, Toyama, summoned the head-men of various streets, and with Ido, lord of Tsushima, licensed the revival of the tonyas by issuing the following order: —

> Although tonya combinations have been prohibited since last year, there has been disorderliness in the commercial transactions, without bringing about any decrease in the market prices, thus causing much financial distress to many. For this reason it has been decided to revive the tonyas, according to the methods existing previous to the Bunkwa era. Moreover, the royalty paid by the Tokumi tonyas shall no more be necessary. It is hereby decreed that every trader shall endeavour not to create conditions such as existed after the Bunkwa era. Each trader shall take pains to keep the prices of commodities as low as possible, and to deal squarely, as strict surveillance will be maintained.
>
> *March 8th.*

LIMITATIONS OF THE TONYA RIGHTS.—The revival of the various tonyas does not necessarily mean the restoration of all rights enjoyed previously, and to make it clear that exclusiveness should not be practised in the commercial organization, an order was issued to the head-men of the various streets. Thus, eight years after the prohibition of tonyas in the Tempo reforms, and six years after the question of the revival was first mooted, the actual order of the revival was made, but the tonyas differed entirely from those existing at the time of the reforms. In the first place, the tonyas were then known as the Tokumi tonyas, who paid a royalty to the Shogunate, which was nothing but a licence fee in return for their legal recognition, and did not permit the opening of new business, other than those that had come into existence during the Bunkwa era. Secondly, the Tokumi tonyas' financial organ was the Sankyo Kaisho, whose main capital was the reserve funds of the owners of the Hishigaki vessels, aided by the investment of the guild members and loans from the Shogunate. Those connected with the kumiai, except the saké tonya, had to ship their goods on the Hishigaki vessels by law. Thirdly, there was an understanding with the Tokumi tonyas of Osaka that all goods handled by these two guilds must pass through this medium, otherwise no one was permitted to deal with Osaka. Fourthly, the Shogunate granted a licence, publicly recognizing the rights of the Tokumi Tonya guilds. We find the following differences in the case of the tonyas revived by the Kayei order :—

1. The annual payment of royalty was cancelled.
2. The regulation obliging all shipments to be carried by the Hishigaki vessels was not revived.
3. There was no limitation on the number of guilds, except those lines of trade which needed such limitations, such as the drug tonyas and the exchange business.
4. Transactions were to be free and without restriction and need not pass the medium of the tonyas.
5. It was prohibited to collect money from some new business, calling it reikin (gratuity money).
6. No licence was to be granted, but, in fact, the occupation might be made a kabu, and could be bought and sold without any restriction.

With such amendments the Tempo reforms for the first time deprived the Tokumi tonyas of their privileges, recognizing free trade, which was quite a master stroke.

THE CITY ELDERS ENTRUSTED WITH THE METHODS OF THE TONYA REVIVAL.—In such a way were the tonyas revived, and in the methods adopted towards the revival there was one point which stood out predominantly, i.e. stress was laid on commercial usage. The Shogunate only decided on the general policy, and the details regarding the kind of tonyas were left to the city elders.

KINDS OF TONYAS REVIVED.—The tonyas which were revived after strict inquiry, naturally, combined into kumiais. The brokers and retailers, too, formed an organization under which the commercial system again recuperated and continued up to the time of the Meiji Restoration. The revived tonyas were :—

Dry goods tonyas ; cotton goods tonyas. These differed from the Odenma-cho and Shirako guilds.

Ginned cotton tonyas ; floss silk tonyas (Torimachi and Uchimise guilds).

Fancy-goods tonyas; yarn tonyas; fancy-goods tonya of the Torimachi Guild, Maruai-gumi, Hinaya.

These were separated into Ichiban-gumi, Niban-gumi, and Kaya-machi-gumi.

Drug tonyas (Odenma-cho-gumi); drug tonyas (Honcho-gumi); paper tonyas; paraffin tonyas; imported candle tonyas; earthenware tonyas; candle dealers; lacquered ware tonyas; candle-wick tonyas (Omotemisegumi), tatami covers and green matress tonyas (Horidome-gumi), tatami covers and coarse goods tonyas (Shimrori-gumi); coarse goods tonyas; tea tonyas.

Divided Dealers.—Indigo-ball tonyas; carpenters' tools tonyas; toilet paper brokers; dried sardine tonyas; stone tonyas; nails, iron, and copper goods tonyas; stone cutters, with offices of their own; imported saly tonyas; imported salt brokers; local salt tonyas; water-fowl tonyas; land-fowl tonyas; bran tonyas; imported sandal tonyas; imported liquid oil tonyas.

Imported liquid oil tonyas and sole importers; local liquid oil tonyas; liquid oil brokers; fish oil tonyas; hair oil tonyas.

Dealers of imported and old golds; the seven kumi fish tonyas (Yokkaichi-kumi and Kobuna-cho-gumi); salted dried fish tonyas; imported cured bonito tonyas.

Dried Article Tonyas—Exchangers.—The number of members was according to the old regulation. There was a regulation regarding the scales used by the exchangers. Those who closed their doors had to give up the scales to such parties as were satisfactory to the city elders, and when they opened business a tax of 3 bu was levied on each scales.

Moat cutting contractors; owners of house-boats. Licence was granted to the owners according to the number of boats.

Rush reed tonyas; coopers, tun and barrel makers.

As there were changes in the number of employees, tub and barrel taxes were levied according to the number of coopers. After the Restoration this was abolished.

Dyers.—Taxes were levied on each jar of indigo, which were granted to the purveyor of the Shogunate, Gorozaemon Tsuchiya, but abolished after the Restoration.

Hairdressers.—The hairdressers of the entire city of Edo were divided into forty-eight kumi and a licence was granted to each kabu, which in time of fire was to aid the commissioners and city elders' offices. However, this system was gradually done away with after the Meiji Restoration. Eight commodity dealers, which were: pawnbrokers, secondhand clothes dealers, secondhand clothes buyers, dealers in small furniture, secondhand article dealers, fancy-goods dealers, dealers in old coins, and old coin buyers.

Almanac Tonyas.—The number was limited to eleven members, prohibiting any increase, and in return they had to file the papers and books of the two commissioners' office.

Book stores; fan tonya; match tonyas; Shikon tonyas and dyers; lacquer tonyas; cinnabar tonyas; imported rice tonyas; Kwanto rice three kumi tonyas; local rice tonyas; Wakimise eight place rice tonyas; Kashi eight street rice brokers; cereal from the west; cereal broker; rice polisher.

Above divided into eighteen kumi. Fukawaga lumber dealers, lumber tonyas; lumber Kumano tonyas; bamboo, charcoal, and firewood tonyas; Ichiban-gumi charcoal and firewood tonyas; charcoal and firewood tonyas; Kumano charcoal large tonyas; other charcoal tonyas; miso tonyas; six-kumi courier tonyas ; paper tobacco pouch tonyas ; imported saké tonyas ; local saké tonyas. Ten years after the revival in Kayei, in the 1st year of Ganji, the imported and local saké tonyas had to pay a tax of 6 momme to the Shogunate for each barrel, in return for which a kabu licence was granted.

Bean curd dealers, messengers ; casters, cage bird dealers, shipping tonyas ; Ichiban-gumi hotel keepers ; contractors of cross-road watchers, Osaka tabiya ; booking office Government rice bids. The exchange of the Fudasashi was in Saruya-machi, Asakusa, which was the financial organ of the trade, just as the Sankyo Kaisho was to the Tokumi tonyas. Local soy tonyas ; vermicelli.

THE ORDER FOR TONYA REVIVAL AND THE TONYAS OF OSAKA AND SAKAI.—The Tempo reforms did not take effect in Edo alone, but were enforced throughout the country within the scope of the Shogunate's direct jurisdiction, so and in like manner the Kayei revival order covered, besides Edo, such districts as Shizuoka, Kofu, Yamada of Ise, Niigata, Kyoto, Osaka, Sakai, and others. And just as the Tempo reforms had a different effect on Osaka and Sakai to what they had in Edo, the same holds good of the revival order. Probably the difference may be attributed to the fact that, although there existed independent tonyas in Edo, yet a large majority were included in the Tokumi tonyas, and as the power of this organization reached its zenith in the Bunkwa era, its evils also were most conspicuous during this period. If the Kayei revival simply meant a revival of the old order of things, it would include all the evils of the Bunkwa era, therefore it was specified that the revival was to be made according to the status of the tonyas before the Bunkwa era, great pains being taken to distinguish between the old and the new. On the contrary, in Osaka and Sakai the custom of recognizing the kabushiki was very old and did not spring up during the Bunkwa era. Further, unlike Edo, the retailers did not form guilds and organizations so that the revival law covering the two named cities was simply this. It is hereby permitted to revive the tonya guilds as of old, but, hereafter, it will be unnecessary to pay royalties, in return for which it is expected that prices shall be lowered. Due inspection and control shall be extended to buying and selling, not to speak of the attention to be paid to the quality and weight of the commodities, in order to thwart any misdemeanours. This was only a declaration to revive the old state of affairs. Although the commissioners of Osaka and Sakai favoured the charging of royalties, the Shogunate disagreed. Moreover, as the hairdressers in Osaka acted as prison warders without remuneration, they were licensed to organize guilds. A certain Jusaburo, bridge contractor, residing in Sanchome, Tokiwamachi, who petitioned for permission to form a guild of the hotel keepers of Sanyo-dori, West Osaka, was allowed to do so, on condition that he, with the aid of the said guild, should rebuild and repair the bridges. Those lines of trade having a special history, which by the reforms of Tempo were freed from their duties, were to be still exempt from duties in the present revival. Finally, tea-houses and bath-houses, although previously maintained by a guild, owing to their being classified with brothels, were not included in the revival.

THE REVIVAL OF TONYA KABU AT THE CLOSE OF THE SHOGUNATE'S RULE.—What the ingenuity of the traders in the Bunkwa era had built up was destroyed by the Tempo reforms, only to be again revived, in the Kokwa era, as ordinary tonyas, without any special interests and without payment of royalties. But in 1864 the financial condition of the Shogunate was serious, for while having to suppress the Court nobles and unemployed samurai within the country, it also had to build warships and manufacture arms for the national defences against foreign invasion. As the Shogunate was unable to tax the daimyo, it had no means of doing what was necessary, and resorted to raising funds by loans, royalties, and other means, in order to meet the immediate needs, collecting royalties from the tonya of Edo, as in the Bunkwa era, and granting them kabu licences. The total came to 200,000 ryo. It was, of course, money the Shogunate thought of, and not the merits of the system. At the time, it was said that the sum ordered to be paid by the saké tonyas of Edo was one-tenth of the total amount collected throughout the country, and amounted to 20,000 ryo. With the advent of the Meiji era, a saké manufacture tax was established, which entirely abolished the system mentioned above.

SANKYO KAISHO AND MODERN COMPANIES.—It has been previously noted that when the Tokumi tonyas were organized, in the Genroku era, they gradually developed, finally obtaining supervisory powers. They even were the Hishigaki vessels, and became like the regulated companies appearing at the end of the Mediæval period and at the beginning of the modern period in European history. The chief feature of the regulated company was the monopoly of the territories within the scope of its commerce. In order to bind the traders within its territory and the members engaged in the trade, there were certain regulations to be observed. Members when enlisting in the organization had to swear to respect the regulations and to pay an initiation fee, but commerce was carried on with their own capital for the profit of the respective parties, and unlike the joint stock company of a later period, there was no union of capital, equality of profits, and suchlike. It is here that the Tokumi Tonya of the Genroku and Kyoho period were the same as the regulated companies. However, the system of the company could not meet the demands of the times and the growing needs, and to cope with the new turn of affairs it had to undergo change. The regulated company in the west was transformed into the joint stock company, while with us it became a trade guild, for although the Sankyo Kaisho, a collateral product of the Tokumi tonyas, resembled a joint stock company, it ended without making any significant development.

TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN EDO, OSHU, AND THE PROVINCES.—The transportation and trade facilities between the two large cities of Edo and Osaka have been already described, but it must be known that the Edo trade was not limited to Osaka alone, for it had transactions with the markets of Oshu and neighbouring provinces. Although the transactions between Edo and Osaka were only handled by the Hishigaki vessels, this line simply plied between the two cities. Therefore, to conclude that the volume of trade of the Hishigaki vessels was the total done by the Tokumi and the Twenty-four Kumi Tonyas, which included trade with the entire country, is a fallacy. After all, the Hishigaki and Taru vessels only transported goods loaded in Osaka for Edo, and those from Edo to Osaka, and did not even unload or take on any goods from the ports between the two destinations, or undertake any other transactions. This was due to the nature of both these lines under which the consignor and consignee only attended to shipping affairs, and did not have anything to do with the policy of the lines. Consequently, the business was limited to transportation of goods between the two cities, and all the relations these vessels had with the ports on the way were the buying of provisions and the private transactions of the seamen. Furthermore, it is true that direct business relations of Edo merchants were maintained with the territories lying west and east of Osaka without the medium of the Osaka tonyas and the Hishigaki vessels.

THE ORIGIN OF THE SUMIYOSHI FRATERNITY OF THE OSHU GUILD.—With respect to the marine transportation between Oshu and Edo, there were connections through the importation of Oshu rice to Edo during the early party of the 17th century. A further development was made in 1660, thanks to the efforts of Zuiken Kawamura, but the most flourishing period in the transactions between the two places was during the 18th century, in the Genroku era, and the trade was only second to that between Osaka and Edo. It is natural, therefore, to find an organization of tonya associations and shipping-agents who attended to the transactions between Oshu and Edo just as the Hishigaki vessels and Tokumi Tonya acted for the trade between Osaka and Edo. The Sumiyoshi Fraternity, which was one of these, lasted for six years from 1751, and was promoted by Chozayemon Konishi, Juyemon Hinoya, and others, drug tonyas at Edo. The number of the members was limited, which shows that it was an organization of Edo merchants who monopolized the transactions between Edo and Oshu and supervised the vessels carrying commodities between the two markets, initiating the relationship between the Tokumi Tonya and the Hishigaki vessels. In 1824 the membership was limited to thirty, and regulations were framed. April 10th of every year was fixed as the date of the general meeting, and an assemblage fee of 100 hiki collected, and it was made a custom to pay homage to the Sumiyoshi shrine at Tsukudajima Edo. Since the formation of this union took place, almost sixty years after the founding of the Tokumi Tonya, there is no doubt that it was modelled after it, and sought for a sphere outside that of the Tokumi Tonya.

The Organization of the Sumiyoshi Fraternity was a Form of Self-Insurance.—In studying the contents of the regulations drawn up in the 7th year of Bunsei we find the number of members of the guild limited to thirty, and should there be a vacant kabu and an applicant, the presiding officer of the month notified the members to that effect, who, after due investigations as to the candidate's qualifications, reported to the Kashima Fraternity. If nothing was brought against the candidate by either side, the new party might join, providing he paid an initiation fee of 500 hiki and an equal sum for tarudai, and also after he had sworn strictly to observe the by-laws of the fraternity. Further, should any member desire to suspend his trade for a time and be free from joint responsibility, and still want to leave his name in the guild, the members made investigation at the time of the inspection of his goods, and after due deliberation, his name was cancelled from the list. If after a while he desired to re-open his business and join the guild, again the members conferred together, and if there were no objections, he might do so by paying one-half the sum paid by a new-comer. All this is proof of how intent the members were on keeping their number limited. This limiting of the number of members in the trade with Oshu gave the guild traders much influence and predominance, and, as was the case with the Tokumi Tonya in their trade with Osaka, it practically gave them the monopoly of the trade between Edo and Oshu. Should any of the members be requested to ship goods to Oshu under what was known as "name borrowing" or "entrusted shipments," he was on no account allowed to do so, even if the request came from relatives, members of the family, or branch offices, and the penalty was expulsion from the guild. In cases when it was impossible to refuse, after due deliberation by the member, the consignment was attended to as "picked-up goods" by Sakubei Kawachiya, a member of the guild. In case of marine disaster, as the shipment did not belong to Sakubei himself, the loss was averaged among the remaining twenty-nine members, and as a reserve for such emergencies a sum of 2 momme 5 bu of silver was charged for each package. This shows us that the shipments to Oshu were limited to those of the members, and shut out all others. Also the vessels loading such commodities were under the management of the guild, consequently the shipping-agents were subordinates of the tonyas, restricting others from taking advantage of the facilities. In the reserve set aside for marine losses, we see the germ of self-insurance.

Responsibility for Marine Disasters.—According to the understanding among the members of the guild regarding marine disasters, in case news was received of any disaster, the members were immediately notified. The shipping-agents were ordered to assemble the invoice prices, and a conference of consignees was called, while, in the meantime, one of the presiding officers, as surveyor, one of the consignees, and a shipping-agent proceeded to the scene of disaster, and inspected the damaged vessel and the consignments. The presiding officer, who remained on the scene, reported the result of the inspection to the Sendai correspondents in writing. After his return to Edo, the consignees were summoned to decide on the average, which was reported to the Sendai correspondents. The expenses and losses were met by the consignees. The expenses of the seamen and the vessels were the same as in the Hishigaki Line vessels. The repairing and building of the vessels were at the cost of the consignees.

Reserve Fund for Marine Disasters.—In order to be prepared to meet marine damages, the Sumiyoshi Fraternity always held a reserve fund of 20 ryo, and an extraordinary allowance of 10 ryo.[1] Whenever there were marine losses, the shippers had to bear the loss of the shipment, so that it was hard for them to have to pay for further damages, and the amount was averaged between the members. If the marine disaster took place within the Edo boundary-line, an amount of 5 ryo of gold was expended from the above reserve fund, without reference to the total amount, and if found insufficient, the balance had to be met by the shippers. With respect to the marine transportation between Osaka and Edo, all damages incurred were carried either by Osaka or Edo, according to the point of accident, the dividing line being the port of Imakiri. The same understanding seems to have been in practice in the relations with Oshu. By combining the two above sums, 30 ryo were put to reserve, and if there was any surplus, after knowing the quantity of each member's shipments, a report was made by the presiding officer, at the annual meeting on April 10th, and a bonus made *pro rata*.

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[1] The amount of 30 ryo being so insignificant, it is most likely that it was the reserve made against each vessel. Sakubei Kawachiya, not having any connection with marine shipments, was not expected to pay or receive any of the allowance. What this bonus means is not evident, but in all probability it must have been a sum shared by the members, proportionately.

REGULATIONS OF THE SUMIYOSHI FRATERNITY.—There existed then an Oshu shippers' guild for Edo-Oshu business, similar to the Tokumi and the Twenty-four Kumi in the Edo-Osaka trade, which if it did not monopolize the trade yet came near to doing so. Subordinate to the guild was the shipping, which the former controlled, and there is no doubt that by checking the shipping-agents good profits were reaped. True, there were other guilds engaged in the Oshu trade, but this Sumiyoshi Fraternity was the largest and most important. Furthermore, it is plain that the members of the combination were merchants engaged in different lines of trade. The number of members seem to have been different at different times, but we can't say for certain. The following are the Regulations governing the Sumiyoshi Fraternity, framed in the year 1830 (13th year of Bunsei), revealing what were the conditions of the Oshu shipments during that period :—

> The number of members of the fraternity shall be limited to thirty, and no increase shall be made, as otherwise difficulties of control would arise. The above stipulation shall be observed as in the past.
>
> If there happens to be a vacancy in the guild, and if there should be any party desirous of joining, the members must be immediately notified by the presiding officer, upon which due inquiry shall be made into the candidate's qualifications. And after the Kashima Fraternity is notified of the result, and if the man is found satisfactory to both parties, the candidate shall be eligible, providing he pay 500 hiki (initiation fee) and 500 hiki taru, at the same time promising to observe the by-laws of the organization.
>
> If, through personal circumstances, any member of the guild desires to suspend exporting to Oshu, but desires to reserve his name until such time as he deems fit to resume trade, such a party shall be taken off from the members' list after due deliberation, as his presence on it would cause inconvenience. Should he, later, desire to re-enter the trade, he may do so after due consideration by the members, and providing he pay one-half the entrance fee paid by new members.
>
> The report on the shipment returns has been entrusted to the agent of Sentaro Nagashima, and he should make a complete report every month upon freight returns, quantity of the shipments, etc., to the presiding officer for the month, who shall record the same in the books reserved for that purpose, and they shall be turned over to the party succeeding him. In case of unpaid fees, the presiding officers shall give due notice and collect the amount every month.
>
> No one, whether relatives or affiliated firms, etc., shall be allowed to ship goods to Oshu by making request or using a member's name, and the penalty for infraction is expulsion from the guild.
>
> Requested shipments (tanomare zumi) are an item of paramount importance to the discipline of the guild, and undoubtedly due consideration will be given to this point by every member, but there may arise occasions when refusal cannot be made. In such a case, after due consideration, the ship-

ment shall be classed as "picked-up shipments," and entrusted to Sakubei Kawachiya of the guild, as if it were his own consignment, in order better to keep track of such shipments. As the shipments are not his own, should any mishap occur, the responsibility shall be borne by the twenty-nine members, and to be able to meet such accidents a reserve fund shall be accumulated by collecting 2 momme 5 bu of silver for every bale of such shipments. The above sum shall be paid to the presiding officer of the month, with other fees, after a report of the returns shall have been completed and entered in the shipment return-book. If such payments are in arrears, they should be strictly called for. However, if this item of reserve reaches a substantial figure, it shall be refunded proportionately.

In case news of any marine disaster be received from the coast, members shall immediately be notified of the same by circulars. At the same time the shipping-agent should be instructed to make a report of the damage, after which a meeting of the consignees shall be called. The surveyor shall be the presiding officer of the month, together with a member representing the consignees and one of the shipping-agents, who shall immediately proceed to the scene of disaster and make due and minute investigations. The presiding officer shall remain and report the matter to the Sendai correspondents in writing, and after his return to Edo, a meeting of the consignees shall again be called in order to decide the settlement, the result of which shall be sent to Sendai. The expense and average shall be borne by the consignees.

The expenses of the seamen and the vessels shall be assessed as under the regulations of the Hishigaki vessels.

Upon receipt of a circular telling of the departure of vessels, the name of the vessels and the date of departure shall be recorded in the circular-book and distributed, and each member shall affix his seal thereto.

All negotiations made by letter with the Sendai correspondents shall be carried on by the yearly officer, who should also arbitrate in any of the questions with respect to marine disasters, doing all in his power to facilitate matters. All negotiations lasting over a month shall also be carried on by the same medium. If the officer for the month serves *ad interim*, he shall be notified of the results.

An amount of 20 ryo shall be continuously held in reserve.

A sum of 10 ryo shall be reserved as an extraordinary allowance, as in cases of total loss by marine disaster it is hard for the consignees to meet the whole damage. Taking the average of the shipments, an estimate shall be made of the amount, to be borne by the Edo side, and of the total amount of this figure, a sum of 5 momme of gold (about 5 ryo) shall be given to each vessel from the said extraordinary allowance. Any shortage in the allowance shall be collected in the manner practised hitherto, and if the amount of 10 ryo prove insufficient, the shortage shall be collected in bu silver.

However, should there accrue any surplus from the two reserves of 30 ryo, a report of the trade returns of each member shall be made and read at the annual meeting on April 10th, on which occasion the presiding officer of the month shall make a refund, according to the quantity of returns of each, with the exception of Sakubei Kawachiya, who shall neither pay nor receive any of the said reserve, as he is not engaged in the regular shipping line. The above clauses are different from those of the past and shall be strictly observed. The points should be well considered at all times, and so arranged between each party that none may be guilty of error. For this reason, at each of the annual general meetings the yearly presiding officer reads the by-laws, and members promise not to leave the meeting before the whole has been read. In order that the Regulations shall not be neglected at any time, the members shall herewith annex their name and seal.

MEMBERS' NAMES AND SEALS.

May, 13th year of Bunsei.